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JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
FALL 1988
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IN SEARCH OF CANADA



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In Search of Canada

Fall 1988

Issued as Volume 117, Number 4, of the
Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Fall 1988, "In Search of Canada." Issued as Volume 117, Number 4, of the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

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Library of Congress Catalog Number 12-30299.

Editorial Offices: Dædalus, *Norton's Woods,*
136 Irving Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.

Dædalus (ISSN 0011-5266) *is published quarterly by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Subscription rate: $16, one year; $24, two years; $32, three years. As of January 1, 1989: $20, one year; $35, two years; $48, three years.*

All subscription orders, single-copy orders, and change-of-address information must be sent in writing *to the* Dædalus *Business Office, P.O. Box 515, Canton, MA 02021, U.S.A. (Telephone: 617-828-8450). Orders for single copies must be accompanied with prepayment of $5.00 ($6.00 as of January 1, 1989).*

Printed in the United States of America.
Printing Office: 2901 Byrdhill Road, Richmond, VA 23228.

U.S.A. newsstand distribution by Eastern News Distributors, Inc., 1130 Cleveland Road, Sandusky, OH 44870.

Second-class postage paid at Canton, Massachusetts, and at additional mailing offices.

Postmaster: send address changes to DÆDALUS,
P.O. Box 515, Canton, MA 02021, U.S.A.

Contents

ix Preface

William Kilbourn
1 The Peaceable Kingdom Still

F. Kenneth Hare
31 Canada: The Land

Robert F. Harney
51 "So Great a Heritage as Ours"
Immigration and the Survival of the Canadian Polity

David H. Flaherty
99 Who Rules Canada?

Lloyd Axworthy
129 The Federal System—An Uncertain Path

Robert G. Evans
155 "We'll Take Care of It for You"
Health Care in the Canadian Community

Geraldine A. Kenney-Wallace and J. Fraser Mustard
191 From Paradox to Paradigm:
The Evolution of Science and Technology in Canada

Eleanor Cook
215 "A Seeing and Unseeing in the Eye"
Canadian Literature and the Sense of Place

Alan F. J. Artibise
237 Canada as an Urban Nation

Gérard Pelletier
265 Quebec: Different but in Step with North America

Léon Dion
283 The Mystery of Quebec

Margaret Catley-Carlson
319 Aid: A Canadian Vocation

Monique Bégin
335 Debates and Silences—Reflections of a Politician

Donald S. Macdonald
363 Three Perspectives on Canada's Future

John Conway
381 An "Adapted Organic Tradition"

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
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NORTHWEST TERRITORIES
SOUTHAMPTON I.
Hudson Strait
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Yellowknife
Great Slave Lake
UNGAVA PEN.
HUDSON BAY
CANADA
NEWFOUNDLAND
LABRADOR
BRITISH COLUMBIA
Lake Athabasca
Reindeer Lake
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Churchill R.
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QUEBEC
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MANITOBA
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CANADIAN SHIELD
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Lake Winnipeg
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Preface to the Issue
"In Search of Canada"

CANADA IS A VAST, sparsely populated continental society of 26 million. Today it is predominantly a modern urban industrial nation, technologically advanced and highly developed in its social policies. One in five Canadians is an immigrant or the child of immigrants who arrived in the country after World War II, to join a population that was then overwhelmingly Scots, English, Irish, and French. The last, by their number and concentration in a single province, Quebec, are a constant reminder of a past that has not been abandoned, that remains vital and contemporary. In the intervening years, as the country has become increasingly multiethnic and multiracial, there has been little propensity to shed certain of these identities, to value them less. The melting pot process, if it remains salient for the United States—a disputable proposition to some—has little relevance to Canada, where ethnicity remains a formidable social force. There is no great obliterating of historical memory either for those who came to Canada before 1756 or for those who have come since; 1956, the year of the Hungarian Revolution, and 1776, year of the American Revolution, are dates of considerable significance for Canada: each brought the country a flood of new immigrants.

Canada, compelled to live cheek by jowl with a more populous society, itself supremely self-confident and more than occasionally aggressive, particularly in respect to its economic and cultural power, has never found the experience easy. No Canadian is ever able to ignore or forget the United States, though the reciprocal sentiment is decidedly uncommon. However galling this asymmetry has been, however threatening to a certain national self-esteem, it has had positive consequences as well—it has instructed Canadians in the need to avoid becoming either patently submissive or unnecessarily defensive and belligerent. If the world outside, not least in the United States, has remained blissfully ignorant of the nature of Canadian society and politics, uninformed about the most elementary facts concerning Canadian life, the Empire and the Commonwealth, even more than trade and immigration, have protected Canada against the hazards of similar isolation, the dangers of excessive self-absorption.

Canada's democratic traditions and practices, so different from those of Europe, where many of its intellectual and institutional foundations are to be found, and from those of the United States, established through revolution of a kind that Canada has been spared, rely on forms of negotiation and compromise that constantly test the nation's claim to be pacific, pragmatic, and rational. Proud of their democracy and pleased with their current prosperity, aware of all that has happened since 1945 to make them a major economic force in the world, Canadians are reluctant to vaunt their power or to insist on their moral superiority. Committed to their parliamentary institutions but also to their unique form of federalism, concerned with government efficiency but also with justice and human rights, seeking to work out compromises that will keep their union intact, knowing the importance of tolerance, and indeed relying on its beneficent influences, they accept also that Canada is little known in the world, that it remains substantially hidden. It is not so much the forces created by the tyranny of distance and geography that explain this phenomenon in the late twentieth century as it is the influence of the media, unable to render accurately or record imaginatively the attributes of this complex society. Canada is not simply a version of other modern industrial societies. While it owes much to Great Britain, France, and the United States, it is not like any of them; this is a fact too rarely acknowledged.

This issue of *Dædalus* has as its first objective, then, the dissemination of information—observations and reflections—calculated to reduce, if not wholly eliminate, an ignorance that is widespread. In no sense, however, is the volume meant to be read as a manual on contemporary Canada that treats every aspect of its national life. Selection has been mandatory. As a consequence, less has been done with foreign policy issues, for example, than the subject merits. Also, some may regret that the Canada of the West, facing the new and increasingly prosperous Pacific world, is not more abundantly treated. Native Canadians, peoples of very great significance, for whom there is increased national concern, do not figure sufficiently.

The issue has a second objective, which ought also to be stated. Many who use the term *American,* imagining that it refers only to the United States, ignore the other two Americas and forget that even North America has two democratic societies sharing certain values and aspirations, linked economically, militarily, and culturally but essentially different. The most signal contribution that this issue of *Dædalus* can make, written as it is by Canadians for an international audience, is to explore Canada's distinctiveness, explaining why and how even it is changing, challenging a good number of the common stereotypes. Canada deserves to be known for itself; a perpetual comparison with its powerful (and sometimes difficult) neighbor to the south is not always productive. France and the United Kingdom, both members of the European Economic Community, do not realize themselves simply by demonstrating or insisting that they are not like Germany, Italy, or Spain. Why, then, should Canada be denied a comparable identity? In the world today, where interdependence is a phenomenon too obvious to ignore and where continuity and change are too important to neglect, Canada provides an incomparable opportunity for the study of the limits of independence and of the possibilities of diversity. At a time when "the global village"—a Canadian concept—threatens to obscure the reality of difference, there may be some utility in promoting an inquiry that dwells on the continuing importance of history, geography, religion, and culture.

The title of this *Dædalus* issue, "In Search of Canada," ought to be explained. It must not be read as an assertion of the ambiguity sometimes expressed about the nature of the Canadian nation today or about the long-term viability of the Canadian union. Its meaning is a much more positive one. Seeking to draw attention to certain of the more dramatic changes that have occurred in Canada in recent times, it uses the themes of exploration and discovery—so central to a study of Canadian history in earlier periods—as a way of approaching certain contemporary problems of social, cultural, and political transformation. Where the society's options remain obscure and the possibilities seem immense in so many areas, the concept of "search" is a particularly appropriate one. It suggests ambition but with just that degree of tentativeness and modesty that is called for.

We are deeply indebted to the William H. Donner Foundation, Inc. of New York for a generous grant that made this issue of *Dædalus* possible. We also appreciate the additional assistance provided by the Canadian Studies Program of the Canadian Embassy. McGill University and its principal and vice chancellor, David L. Johnston, deserve a special note of thanks; they provided the welcome and the facilities that made it possible for a *Dædalus* planning committee to meet, deliberate, and fashion the outline for this issue.

S.R.G.

William Kilbourn

The Peaceable Kingdom Still

CANADIANS HAVE LONG LOOKED AT themselves and their country with an ambivalence verging on the schizophrenic. The Canadian identity—the phrase is both a chimera and an oxymoron—is full of odd conjunctions, split visions, and unresolved tensions. But the beast can be described readily enough. Consider a few samples of the species:

- Louis Riel, provisional government leader in Fort Garry during the interregnum between the Hudson's Bay Company's abdication and the Dominion of Canada's accession, solemnly received visitors while wearing both his formal Victorian frock coat and his rough leather moccasins. He was at once both Métis son of the buffalo hunt and a model young Montreal seminarian. Even his story splits into two rebellions. Shrewd political guidance of the first, in 1869–1870, made him father of Manitoba; for the second, in 1885, he assumed the name *David* and became the half-mad prophetic leader of the doomed native state of the Northwest. Long after his death, he was still for English Canadians a justly hanged traitor, and for French Canadians a martyr to Anglo-Protestant hatred of their religion and their race.
- Roughing it in the Canadian bush, the genteel English author and pioneer Susanna Moodie wrote rapturously of her faith in Nature, the Divine Mother, and then in the same breath and very next

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William Kilbourn is Professor of History and Humanities at York University in Toronto and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.

sentence complained of Canada being a prison, herself and her children its unhappy prisoners.

- New France was meant to be the model colony of Louis XIV's minister Colbert on the banks of the St. Lawrence, but it became much more a base for exploring and claiming the vast interior of the continent, from the Laurentian Shield to the Shining Mountains, from the Ohio and the Mississippi to New Orleans. The solid habitant, mainstay of parish and seigneury, would like as not give up a son or two to the fur-trading empire for its voyageurs as to the Church for her priests. Or he might become a wild man of the forest himself, against all attempts to prevent him, yet slip back in to be a habitant again when he pleased. Even in the fortress of Quebec, the most pervasive and subtly powerful authority was not that of the male trinity of governor, intendant, and bishop but of Mère Marie de l'Incarnation, first and greatest of that long line of strong French-Canadian women.

- John Strachan, founding father of Upper Canada, incumbent of many of its chief offices, and dominie to its governing clique, the Family Compact, was the son of a Scottish Presbyterian stonemason who became the first member of the working class to receive an Anglican miter since the Middle Ages ("one insolent bishop of Toronto, triumphant Canadian," Carlyle called him). The original anti-American, defier of Yankee occupying forces, lover of England (though he never set foot there until his late forties), Strachan wrote a book in 1811 whose hero was George III, "paragon of men" (never mind that His Majesty had addressed an oak tree as the king of France and had long since became dysfunctional); the book's villain was the "mischievous" democrat Thomas Jefferson. Strachan's lifelong goal was to reconstruct the best of eighteenth-century British civilization's ancien régime in the backwoods of America.

- Our two longest-serving prime ministers between them held office for forty-two of the Dominion's first eighty years. One, Sir John A. Macdonald, father of our country, was a manic-depressive alcoholic who held things together by cajolery, bribery, humor, and cunning. The other, grandson and namesake of our only important English-speaking rebel, William Lyon Mackenzie, regularly used mediums to commune with his mother and grandfather, with Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who was his predecessor as party leader for thirty-two years, and with other assorted deceased, including members of the canine kingdom, in order to receive the strength and comfort he needed to carry out the contradictory things he knew the Canadian people wanted of him. He never, as the great jurist and poet Frank Scott wrote, "did things by halves that he could do by quarters," nor "let his on the one hand know what his on the other hand was doing." Before becoming a politician, William Lyon Mackenzie King was an Ottawa mandarin, one of the first in an eminent tradition of deputy ministers who have governed us effectively no matter which party was in power. But the mandarins do remind one at times of that particularly Canadian catatonic state of being caught between two or more higher authorities and on both sides of every debate.*

• As we drove down the lovely Saint John valley, Beaverbrook scowled at the gentle autumn hills. "The Lord has not blessed New Brunswick with mountains," he complained. Entering Saint John, he instructed me to look away from the grand spectacle of Reversing Falls on our left and cast my eyes upon an evil prisonlike structure atop the bald promontory to our right. "County lunatic asylum!" he growled. "Very many idiots in New Brunswick!" This from the province's chief lover and benefactor, the man who managed to make a fellow New Brunswicker, Bonar Law, prime minister of Great Britain, and who had the legislature declare him a native of the province in spite of the fact that he was born in Ontario. Beaverbrook could not stand living in New Brunswick more than a few days a year, and in the last half century of his life he focused mainly on the affairs of Britain, the Empire, and the United States. But on the highest questions of faith and morals he always pronounced—more than half seriously—the final arbiter to be the moderator of the Presbyterian church in Canada (a position his father might have attained but did not).

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*Question: Why does a Canadian cross the road?
Answer: To get to the middle.

(One of several Canadian jokes circulating in New York City in the winter of 1988.)

- Emily Carr was told the Pacific rain forest was no fit subject for art, nor was she qualified to be an artist. To survive, she had to run a boardinghouse and a dog kennel and to play the role of Victoria's village eccentric. But the Indians allowed her among them to record their totems, and they called her Klee Wyck, the Laughing One. Her canvases proved the green jungle she loved was wonderfully paintable after all and that the human spirit could survive a life of appalling loneliness and abuse.

- What strange masks we choose to wear! Plain Bill Smith wasn't good enough, so he called himself Amor de Cosmos (Lover of the Universe) and became premier of British Columbia. Archie Belaney from Hastings, England, wouldn't do either, so *he* became Grey Owl, the most celebrated Indian, conservationist, and Canadian author of his day. But for the ultimate alter ego and disguise, try Clark Kent, aka Superman, drawn by Canadian cartoonist Joe Shuster. As the writer Mordecai Richler put it, Kent is the archetypal middle-class WASP—nice, kind, modest, square, but "within whom burns a hate ball, a would-be avenger, possessed of super human powers, a smasher of bridges, a breaker of skyscrapers, a potential ravager of wonder women. And (may those who scoff at Canadian culture, please take note) a universal hero."[1] The best and most succinct description of the Canadian and his mask is Douglas LePan's, in his celebration of the *coureur de bois* as "Wild Hamlet with the features of Horatio."[2]

- Hundreds of our men and women have been world champions in their team or individual sport, and we produced the world's first athletic superstar, the oarsman Ned Hanlan; the most famous Canadian hero in Europe today is the daredevil racing driver, the late Gilles Villeneuve; and *Sporting News* claims that the person who has dominated a team sport more decisively than anyone else in history—Babe Ruth, Pele, anyone—is Wayne Gretzky in hockey. But I sometimes think Canadians' favorite games are the Special Olympics for the handicapped. The closest thing to a national hero we have had in the 1980s is a cancer-ridden young man who tried to run across the country from ocean to ocean on one leg. Perhaps Terry Fox reminded us of all those wounded princes, heroines, animals, and anonymous ordinary folk in our literature who battled on defiantly though hurt beyond repair in body or mind, tenaciously refusing to submit to the exigencies of an apparently cruel universe and an inexorably hostile environment. These have run a streak of stoic iron through our soul and helped make us puritans, though it is a puritanism tempered by orgy.

Canada's physical geography is one of extremes. Its dominant feature is the world's largest and oldest rock formation, the Precambrian Laurentian Shield, which crosses the continent from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the western Arctic. From east to west the land stretches 4,000 miles—farther than the distance from New York to the edge of Africa or Russia; and its latitudes range from points as southerly as California and the central Mediterranean up to the polar ice pack at the top of the world. The patches of arable soil in all this vastness are relatively small and mostly crammed against the Great Lakes and the shield or tucked between western mountain ranges or onto sea coasts or valleys in that long northeastern arm of Appalachia that reaches far out into the Atlantic. Canada contains one-fifth of all the world's fresh water, and the thousands of rivers, some three dozen of them larger than the Thames and the Hudson, drain a million square miles of lakes and swamps and glaciers. They flow in five directions—to the three bordering oceans, to the Gulf of Mexico, and to the inland sea, Hudson's Bay, which in itself is over five times the size of the United Kingdom.

Climates range from those of the warm lush Pacific rain forests and the bleak Labrador coast with its 200-inch annual snowfall to that of the far northern deserts, which record as little as 4 inches' precipitation a year. There are areas that regularly see temperatures of ninety-five to one hundred degrees Fahrenheit and others that run to sixty or seventy degrees below zero. And one area, southwestern Alberta, when the Chinook blows, can register as much as ninety degrees' rise in a couple of days, from minus twenty degrees Fahrenheit to plus seventy. Some Canadian islands are frost free for over two-thirds of the year, others only in the twenty-four-hour light of the brief arctic summer. In standard time, a concept invented by the Canadian scientist and railway engineer Sir Sandford Fleming, the country has been divided into six different time zones, spanning one-quarter of the earth's day.

But physical, like demographic and political, maps of Canada do not reveal much about the country.* It is best imagined, the geographer Cole Harris has suggested, as an immensely long, thin archipelago. On a clear transcontinental night flight, "Canada dissolves into an ocean of darkness spotted by occasional islands of light," he writes. "These lights mark the lived-in Canada. . . . Between the islands in winter are snow and ice, and in summer rock, muskeg, endless tangles of spruce and black flies."[3] Almost all the islands appear in widely separated clusters close to the southern border. Not far from their northern urban limits, where now the climate for most people is indoors and seventy degrees year round, there begins the solemn land of forest and tundra and permafrost that curves up and away to the other side of the earth.†

Or conjure the contrast between the first sight of Canada and the United States as generations of our early immigrant ancestors experienced them. America presented a clear coastline marking the definitive limit of the ocean voyage; suddenly, there was the lush garden of the New World—or the skyline of New York City and its colossal liberty goddess bespeaking the age of reason in which the republic was conceived. But for ships' passengers entering Canada through the Strait of Belle Isle, there was still many days' journey, past the great gulf and up the river, through the savage wilderness to Quebec or Montreal. Even then, some passengers were closer to the coast of Ireland than to a final destination that lay beyond northern Ontario's 1,200 miles of muskeg and rock and across the western prairie. Others had to move on southwesterly for many days, up river and lake to the Upper Canadian heartland. The literary critic Northrop Frye has compared this experience of entering Canada to that of Jonah being swallowed by the whale. To early Canadians, it was not so much a question of "Who am I?" but of "Where is here?"[4] The center, the metropolis, the head office lay somewhere else, back in Rome or Paris or London, the imperial capitals for which Canada was but a distant collection of provinces on the barbarian borders.

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*Geographically speaking, the average Canadian, according to a weighted center of gravity for the population, lives in Alpena, Michigan, 200 miles north of Detroit.

†In photographs taken by satellite from outerspace, the Canadian-American border on the prairies, the forty-ninth parallel, shows up with startling clarity. In southern Saskatchewan and Alberta there is grassland for cattle grazing, much of it on Indian reservations; in northern Montana, vast investment in irrigation projects has kept the land in wheat. (Paraphrase of a conversation with Kenneth Hare, April 8, 1988.)

Canadians have not had the experience of the American frontier population, the steady progress westward. The archipelago's habitable islands of land were occupied tentatively, discretely, in bits and patches, at discontinuous times. They function with a variety of economies and technologies and with far fewer people. Sea probes from the Atlantic to these forbidding coasts left colonies that were not so much part of the New World as extensions of the old northern and maritime boundaries of Europe. As isolated as moon landings or space stations, their tenuous connection with each other was maintained chiefly through the European ports on which their life depended.

The country's first European residents were Norsemen from the more established Viking colonies of Iceland and Greenland who settled for a time in Newfoundland around the year 1000. The next pre-Colombian residents seem to have been renegade Basque and Portuguese fishermen who stayed ashore and did not return with the fleets that fished the Grand Banks during fifteenth-century summers. The expeditions of Giovanni Caboto from Bristol to Newfoundland in 1498 and of Jacques Cartier from St. Malo to the St. Lawrence (1534–1541) left little more permanent trace than the territorial claims made for their royal sponsors, and chilling accounts of the land God gave to Cain, as Cartier put it. For explorers such as Martin Frobisher and Henry Hudson, the land was simply a vast nuisance, the barrier maze to be solved in the search for a northwest passage to the riches of the Orient. Only from the seventeenth century did European habitations in Canada have a continuous history, notably those established by Samuel de Champlain at Port Royale on the Bay of Fundy in 1605 and at Quebec in 1608, and by the Hudson's Bay Company after its founding in 1670.

The most substantial eighteenth-century settlements, until the Loyalists came north after the American Revolution, were those of the St. Lawrence River towns of Quebec, Three Rivers, and Montreal and of the habitants on their long narrow river lots close by. Even so, the population of New France had only reached 60,000 by the year of the British Conquest, 1759. On the Atlantic Coast permanent residents either functioned as laborers and suppliers to the two great imperial fortresses of Halifax and Louisbourg or lived in small isolated ethnic communities, such as those of the Acadians of Isle St. Jean (Prince Edward Island), the Germans of Lunenberg, or the Gaelic-speaking Highlanders of Cape Breton.

The great arc of the continental interior from Quebec to New Orleans formed by the St. Lawrence—Great Lakes and the Ohio-Mississippi river systems—was dotted with small military posts, the links in the grand design of French imperial strategy. These forts and the workers associated with them also formed a support system for the fur trade with the Indians and for the shifting military alliances with the tribes against the populous seaboard colonies, whose very existence represented a threat to the Indians, the fur trade, and the imperial design. It was little different when Britain replaced France in the imperial role after 1763, except that by 1800 the far Northwest was opened up as well. Hudson's Bay posts by mid–nineteenth century were scattered across the continent to the Pacific, and the first British colonists reached the southern tip of Vancouver Island by sea round Cape Horn.

To a seventeenth- or even an early nineteenth-century observer, it would have seemed preposterous that someday Canada's separated and largely uninhabited sea coasts, river valleys, lake shores, forests, and plains would become a single geographical expression, let alone one political entity. Even after it was all nominally organized under one government between 1867 and 1873, with the high arctic islands and Newfoundland added later, this second largest country on earth was still not a nation in either the European or the American sense of the word.

Its peoples are not of one predominant race or culture, or identifiable by a common history, language or ideology. One may speak almost any tongue with any accent and belong to any race, and still plausibly be Canadian. The Canadian passport was for many years the one international racketeers and spies favored most for forgery.[5] There could be no such thing as an Un-Canadian Activities Committee.

Indeed, Canada's very attraction to many prospective immigrants has been its lack of obvious positive attributes. It seems you could say little more of it than what it is not—it is not British, not French, not American. Even its name is a negative pun. In south German dialect, *Keine dah* ("nothing there") is pronounced "Kana dah." Portuguese explorers are supposed to have invented the name by saying *aca nada* ("nothing here"). In fact, *Kanata! Kanata!* (meaning something like "Yonder are our wigwams!") seem to have been the words spoken by Indians as they greeted Jacques Cartier at Stadacona in 1534. The English poet Patrick Anderson was moved to write his most memorable lines when in the 1940s he noted the negative quality of Canada and its peoples in "the wind that wants a flag . . . . a something possible, a chance, a dance that is not danced."[6] It was a society mostly still in the making, still nearly pure potential. On being asked by an angry Canadian patriot in the 1960s what he thought of a country that didn't even have a national flag, the comedian Mort Sahl replied, "Well . . . it's a start."

Canada finally did acquire a national flag in 1965, and Parliament authorized the tune for a national anthem in the 1970s. The status of "Canadian citizen" as opposed to "British subject" was created in 1947. Only in 1949 did Canada's final court of appeal become its own Supreme Court instead of the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council. And the main written part of our constitution, with an amending formula, was brought to Canada from the Parliament at Westminster in 1982. Although like several other Commonwealth countries, Canada does not have a resident head of state, the representative of the queen in Canada, the governor-general, has since 1951 been not a member of the British peerage but a Canadian citizen.

But if Canada has only recently acquired several of the attributes of a sovereign nation state, it has evolved, at first mostly by historical accident and later by design, further than other countries in the direction of multinational liberal democracy—"seventy-five years ahead of the rest of the world," Pierre Elliott Trudeau said, "and I happen to believe that the hope of mankind lies in multinationalism."[7] Later, as prime minister for fifteen years, he fought traditional nationalism, particularly in his native Quebec, and worked toward establishing a state of many nations and cultures in which members could count on being treated equally before the law. The jurist Thomas Berger has pointed out that in its constitution Canada has not only established individual rights but also (something which distinguishes our Charter from others) collective rights—those of its two founding peoples to special linguistic and cultural status and those of its provinces to equalization payments. According to Section 36 of the Constitution Act of 1982, all groups and regions, rich and poor, may receive "reasonably compatible levels of public service." The special place of the native peoples—Inuit, Indian, and Métis—has been acknowledged as well as the rights of women, the needs of the disabled, and the multicultural dimensions of Canadian society.[8]

In spite of such grand new ideals, however, Canada's beginnings were hardly promising. The aboriginal peoples were reduced, by an admixture of conquest, disease, unfair treaties, broken promises, official blindness, and the enforced application of alien laws and customs, to a disheartened specter of their former selves and their once proud tribal societies. Only in recent times have they insisted on and begun to receive justice. The French Canadians of Quebec were colonials, first of France and then, when conquered, of Britain. They were designated for assimilation as "a people with no history and no literature" by the imperial reformer Lord Durham. Over the next century, though they did win self-government through an alliance with English-Canadian reformers and though they effectively protected their language and religion and increased greatly in numbers by means of one of the world's highest birthrates, they remained second-class citizens in their own country until the 1970s. The Acadians of the Maritime Provinces were subjected to wholesale deportation in 1755, and the remnant that straggled back to the land of Evangeline some years after have only lately begun to reclaim and revive a heritage as old and as tenacious as Quebec's. The descendants of the original French-speaking settlers of the Laurentian Shield and the western prairies are still struggling to maintain their identity against the latent hostility or indifference of the non-French majorities. The Francophones of Quebec have in turn unfavorably treated the non-Francophones of the province—Jews, Greeks, Italians, Scots, Irish, Chinese—many dismissing them indiscriminately as *maudits anglais* ("goddam English").

The earliest English settlers in Canada were also, most of them, defeated peoples. The so-called United Empire Loyalists were, with a few upper-class Tory exceptions, from underprivileged minorities and outcast groups in the thirteen colonies—Pennsylvania Dutch, poor farmers from western Virginia, citizen soldiers on the wrong side of what was a New York civil war, other isolated social and ethnic groups that had not fitted in easily, and of course many blacks and Indians. Canada's early emigrants from the British Isles also tended to be exiles, driven out by penury, starvation, and greedy landlords. The French, except for some Huguenots after the British Conquest and a few royalist refugees during the French Revolution, did not leave their homeland for Canada in significant numbers again. But there were the American slaves who escaped here via the Underground Railroad to settle in Canada, and in the twentieth century a steady succession of the persecuted and the homeless: eastern European Jews, Ukrainians, Armenians, Hungarians, Czechs, Ugandans fleeing Amin, American draft dodgers, Vietnamese boat people, Sikhs, Tamils, refugees from Latin American dictatorships. One in 324 Canadian citizens and landed immigrants today came here as a refugee, the highest proportion of any nation in the world. The largest numbers of immigrants since midcentury, however, have been from the poorer regions of Italy, Greece, Portugal, and the West Indies. The immigrants who arrived fairly wealthy and well educated have been British, Americans, northern Europeans, and more recently, people from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Indian subcontinent.

For the past seventy-five years it has been easier to gain entry into Canada than into the United States. As American immigration laws tightened in the 1920s, prospective immigrants to the continent chose Canada as second best. This was the other, less desirable America but perhaps a way station on the path to the true promised land. Most of the first-generation arrivals had perforce to stay in Canada. It was the native Canadians who during the depressions of the past century or more moved south in large numbers.

The newcomers to Canada found themselves in a more stratified society than they would have in the United States, a society which in theory at least had no second-class citizens and where everyone had a political ideology in common as well as economic opportunity. In contrast to the American melting pot, Canada has been described as a vertical mosaic: a minuscule Anglo-Celtic elite at the top, supplemented in recent times by even smaller French-Canadian and Jewish elites, with, in descending order on the social totem pole, other English and French Canadians, Northern Europeans who assimilated quickly, Eastern and Southern Europeans, Asians, Latin Americans, blacks, and at the bottom, the aboriginals.

Contemporary Canada's aspiration to social and political equality in a multinational state is obviously far from being realized. But the idea at least was around at the country's beginnings. In 1783 the regiments that retired to British Quebec were settled by their commander, Governor Haldimand, a Swiss by birth and training, along the shores of the St. Lawrence and eastern Lake Ontario according to their cultural groups—Gaelic-speaking Catholic Highlanders, Presbyterian Scots, Lowlanders, German Lutherans, German Catholics. In the Confederation debates of 1865, the two most powerful leaders of English and French Canada each spoke of the English, Irish, Scots, and French living beside each other in harmony. The Francophone Catholic Conservative George-Etienne Cartier vowed that:

> We will form a new nationality, a political nation, with which neither the national origin nor the religion of any individual can interfere. We are placed beside each other like great families. We are of different races not for the purpose of frustrating or warring against each other, but so that each by his efforts may increase the prosperity and glory of all.[9]

And French Canada's former nemesis, the Scottish Presbyterian from Toronto, George Brown, celebrated the fact that a century after the Conquest:

> Here we sit, the children of victor and vanquished . . . representatives of a British population seeking justice and . . . representatives of a French population discoursing in the French tongue whether and how we shall have it. We are endeavouring to adjust amicably greater difficulties than have plunged other countries into all the horrors of civil war. We are striving to do peacefully what . . . Austria and Hungary, Denmark and Germany, Russia and Poland, could only accomplish by armed force. Have we not great cause for thankfulness that we have found a better way? Can the pages of history find a parallel?[10]

In spite of their rhetoric, the odds against the founding fathers pulling it off were high. The British North American colonies were isolated from each other and had differing histories and cultures. What little they knew of each other tended to be unfavorable.

The differences between the two oldest colonies of Britain, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, began with the Indians. In the latter, the Micmacs more or less adapted what was left of their economy and culture to European mercantile patterns and were largely assimilated into white society; in the former, the Beothuks shunned contact, preserving their way of life, and were casually gunned down and eventually exterminated by white settlers. Newfoundland's colorful and peculiar culture emerged from Irish and English west country origins; Nova Scotia's people came mostly from Scotland and New England. Newfoundland, except for a few wealthy wholesalers in St. John's, was extremely poor; Nova Scotia in the heyday of the wooden sailing ship had the world's fourth largest merchant marine and in the 1860s was still experiencing the afterglow of great prosperity. It also had some fertile farmland and enough coal and ore to establish briefly an important iron and steel industry; Newfoundland had neither. Besides their British colonial status, their fisheries, and a location far out into the Atlantic, the main thing they both had in common was a disinclination to join Canada.

The Newfoundlanders actually held out until 1949. But the Nova Scotians, who looked to London and to "the Boston states" as their metropolitan centers, were manipulated into federation with Canada by a forceful premier and his friends, a few powerful church leaders, and a determined colonial office.

If the Nova Scotians had been consulted, they would have voted overwhelmingly against it. In fact, they did just that in both of the first federal and provincial elections held after July 1, 1867. But by then it was too late. The other two Atlantic Provinces also had their distinct cultural traditions, and all four were radically different from the giant interior provinces of Quebec and Ontario.

The strongest single force working toward Confederation was the political and business leadership of Toronto and Montreal. This group needed the power of a central government to take over the Canadian West from the Hudson's Bay Company before the United States could claim it as well as an instrument to build railways west from central Canada to the Pacific and east to the Atlantic.

What tipped the balance in their favor was a British government determined to shrug off the burden of colonial administration and defense while creating a buttress against the United States. It helped too that the British public was thoroughly bored with the idea of Canada, as it has been ever since; the Commons was three-quarters empty when it passed the British North America Act, though it filled up immediately after for debate on a dog-tax bill.

The final impetus toward rousing colonial opinion to accept the British North America Act came from an invasion of Canada in 1866 by Fenian-American Civil War veterans. The militia turned out to fend them off at several border points, amid public demonstrations of anti-American and pro-British feeling.

The original federal union of 1867 formally took over the vast territories of the Northwest in 1869. It settled a rebellion of Métis inhabitants there in 1870, out of which was born the then minuscule province of Manitoba, and in 1871, with the promise of a transcontinental railway and hard cash, Canada lured in the colonists of British Columbia, hitherto connected to the empire via the long, perilous route around Cape Horn.

During its first two decades the infant Dominion depended heavily on American commerce and transportation for its survival. The winter seaport for Montreal, icebound in the St. Lawrence, was Portland, Maine. Toronto's chief maritime outlet was New York City. Winnipeg's main connection to the outside world was the railhead north of St. Paul, and Victoria's was the sea route to San Francisco. Like most Canadians, members of Parliament from the West and the Maritimes used American rail routes to reach central Canada and their new capital city of Ottawa. (Three of Canada's largest cities today, Vancouver, Calgary and Edmonton, were not yet in existence.)

The Pacific railway scheme, ridiculed by opponents who claimed it was folly to try building a line through that "sea of mountains," collapsed in financial scandal. The premier of British Columbia was soon threatening to secede. World depression meant that there was little demand to settle and farm the Canadian prairies. And the premier of Nova Scotia actually won a provincial election on the platform of separation from Canada. The Dominion's worst crisis came in 1885, when—under the direction of Riel—the Métis and the Indians of the Northwest Territories mounted another rebellion. Troops rushed west over the barely completed section of the railway through the rock and muskeg of northern Ontario in time to put the rebellion down. On the strength of this success, Parliament voted enough funds to finish the track through the western mountains. But the hanging of Riel left a legacy of racial bitterness for the next sixty years. It also meant that the little French-speaking communities of the West would receive no further settlers from Quebec; they soon lost government support for their language and education rights in an increasingly English-speaking society.

At the height of Canada's time of troubles, the master political architect of Confederation and prime minister for all but one-fifth of the country's first quarter century, Sir John A. Macdonald, at 76 faced one last election. His Liberal opponents advocated commercial union with the United States. Many saw that as a step toward political union. Toronto's leading journalist and intellectual, Goldwin Smith, formerly Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, openly advocated such a course. The New York *World* opined that $6 million judiciously spent in that election would secure a Parliament favorable to annexation.

But Macdonald triumphed by means of a passionate appeal to British-Canadian patriotism. Several weeks later he took ill and died. "When this man is gone, who will take his place?" Goldwin Smith had asked. "Who else could make Orangemen vote for Papists or induce half the members for Ontario to help in levying on their own province the necessary blackmail for Quebec? Yet this is the work which will have to be done if a general breakup is to be averted. Things will not hold together of themselves."[11]

Just when Canada's fortunes seemed at their nadir, a miracle happened. In 1896 a new Macdonald assumed the prime ministership in the person of Wilfrid Laurier, a member of the Opposition's Liberal party (now sloughing off its U.S. free-trade position), and, of immense importance for the future of the country, a member of the other founding ethnic group. In his own way, he proved as capable as Macdonald at making the political compromises among regions and cultures necessary to hold Canada together. As an orator, he dominated the political scene for the next generation. It was he who proclaimed that the twentieth century would belong to Canada.

And for a time it seemed that it might, for the greater part of the miracle was a major change in world conditions that led to the rapid development of the Canadian West. The long fall in world food prices dramatically reversed itself after 1896. Europe could no longer feed its growing industrial masses. As the settlement of the American frontier came to an end, people began moving northwest. In the decade before 1914, over 1 million immigrants came to Canada, a nation numbering only 5 million at the turn of the century. The manufacturing towns of central Canada prospered in the western wheat boom, and two more transcontinental railways were built to handle the flow of goods and people. The old east-west pattern of the fur trade, based on river and lake systems from Montreal to the Rockies, was repeated a thousandfold in the traffic of the prosperous and fast-growing Dominion.

Throughout the next half century, the feeling of nationalism grew too, albeit spasmodically, along with the beginnings of a national culture. Canada-wide professional associations and academies took root. Giant business corporations in commerce, finance, transport, and communications—monopolies with government favor and support—spanned the country. Eaton's department store catalogue, Canadian magazines, a public broadcasting corporation, and a national airline all contributed to Canada's self-awareness. The heavy commitment of soldiers and supplies over the ten long years of two world wars reinforced English Canadians' self-confidence.* The last vestiges of real British control were shed.

By the 1940s, the United States had completely replaced Britain as Canada's chief foreign investor and senior partner in trade and defense. Canada moved from being a self-governing colony of one imperial power to being something of an economic and cultural province of the other. The old north-south ties between adjacent and geographically connected parts of Canada and the United States were also reasserted in many ways, particularly by paved roads and mass automobile ownership. There was no Trans-Canada Highway until 1970, and even then its traffic was minuscule compared with the flow of trucks and cars in the north-south direction.

The twentieth century saw a steady increase in provincial power and in the grievances of regions whose people felt they had shared but meagerly with the wealthy business classes of central Canada in the benefits of economic expansion. Among the French Canadians of Quebec this feeling was reinforced by the assertion of a cultural nationalism that eventually (from 1976 to 1985) produced a provincial government committed to independence from Canada. But Quebec's increasing prosperity, rapid social change, and strong measures to protect the French language have postponed for the present another major crisis of Quebec separatism. Over the past twenty years Prime Ministers Trudeau and Mulroney, each from

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*There was of course a strong tradition of French-Candian volunteers for such regiments as the Royal Twenty-second, but French Canada as a whole became increasingly antiwar and anticonscription.

Quebec and from opposite major parties, have advocated fair treatment and enhanced power for French Canadians everywhere in Canada. While regarded with indifference or hostility by Quebec separatists, their commitment has undoubtedly diffused the thrust of this movement. More important, the province of Quebec has acquired all the attributes of a complete society, so that it is something like a state within a state.

The other provinces, though radically different from each other in size, wealth, ethnic mix, history, and culture, are all, unlike Quebec, clearly part of Canada's dominant English-speaking society. Like Quebec, however, the other provinces have seen their powers and their spending rise dramatically. A new embryo arm of government is emerging as a result of the annual meetings of ministers in fields of provincial jurisdiction (backed by permanent secretariats) and the regular dominion-provincial conferences of first ministers. The federal government's recent practice of informally consulting the relevant provincial premier on such senior appointments as those for the offices of judge and senator seems likely to become a constitutional requirement.

At the same time each generation of Canadians has seen growth in the myriad personal and family connections, the intricate network of associations and societies, that have created a powerful, if sometimes unconscious, common heritage, a language and style among English-speaking Canadians and between them and many Francophones. There is little indifference any longer, let alone favor, toward the idea of union with the United States. In the major public debate of the 1980s over freer Canadian-American trade, those both for and against lowering the barriers have made their case in terms of enhancing Canadian strength and independence.

The relationship with the United States has in several ways been the most important fact of Canadian history. It is not just that Britain's Quebec Act of 1774 helped trigger the American Revolution, or that American attempts to conquer Canada in 1775 and 1776 were repulsed, or that some of that war's losers deliberately chose to build a different kind of North American society in the remaining British colonies. By the time the United States attempted to annex Upper Canada in the War of 1812, four-fifths of its population, thanks to post-Loyalist immigration across the St. Lawrence and Niagara Rivers, consisted of recently arrived American settlers.

They tended to remain neutral while a small number of British troops, Indian warriors, and Canadian militiamen staved off the invaders and saved Canada from republican democracy. From then on, to the myth of the Loyalists of 1784, heroically trekking north into the wilderness, was added the even more powerful myth of Canadian heroes standing up to Yankee bullies. It was reinforced by various attempts to cross the border and "liberate" Canada in the aftermath of the 1837 rebellions, which nearly led to another war between Britain and the United States, and by the Fenian raids of 1866, which provided such timely assistance for the advocates of Confederation. Important but lesser conflicts have nurtured anti-American feeling in Canada ever since. However quaint it appears from today's vantage point of our strong post-1941 alliance in defense of North America, Canada's secret Defence Plan Number One, in force until 1931, called for a series of lightning strikes by Canadian forces into the northern states.

One constant in Canadian-American relations for over two centuries—right through eras of friendship or hostility, free trade or high tariffs—has been the heavy volume of trade between the two countries. Little armies went back and forth across the border throughout the War of 1812, but they never seriously interrupted the trade that has always been of such economic importance to both countries. The monetary value of that trade at present far exeeds the total of U.S. trade with both Japan and the European community. The province of Ontario alone is a larger American trading partner than Japan. And most goods and services cross the border free of any duty or restriction whatsoever. The automobile pact of the 1960s has allowed carmakers on each side to profit greatly from the economies of scale possible in a continental market. Trade in this market has been particularly lucrative for hundreds of Canadian manufacturers of auto parts.

A number of giant Canadian firms such as Moore Corporation (a producer of business forms), Olympia and York (in urban development), and Campeau (in retailing) have investments in the United States that exceed those of any American company in their fields. On the other side of the balance, American ownership of Canadian manufacturing and resource industries, such as automobiles and petroleum, has been so overwhelming that Canadians have often seen it as a threat to their independence, and in recent times they have placed it under some minimal forms of restriction and disincentive. Possibly the most damaging aspect of the Canadian-American relationship has been the effects of the branch-plant economy on Canada. Industrial research and development is by and large conducted at head offices in the United States and not at their Canadian subsidiaries.

As for organized labor, the Canadian movement owes its rapid growth and present sophistication to the initiative of international unions in the 1930s and 1940s. It is entirely characteristic that the United Steelworkers of America should now have a Canadian president. But so too is the fact that the Canadian autoworkers recently broke away from their American parent and are presently in the vanguard of nationalist opposition to the 1988 trade pact. Canada's labor movement, particularly in the public sector, has grown to the point that its role is more like that of its Australian than its American counterpart. Labor's support for Canada's social democratic party has bolstered its electoral clout and enabled it to form the government in three provinces and the official opposition in the two others. Nationally, in the 1940s and again in the 1980s, the party briefly surpassed both the Liberals and the Conservatives in the opinion polls.

The common elements of Canadian and American popular culture—in entertainment, advertising, and consumer goods, in street furniture and cityscapes—can easily obscure the profound differences between the two societies. These are far more extensive than such obvious and significant contrasts as the presence of more blacks and Hispanics in the United States and the bilingual nature of Canada.

Canadians live mainly in large cities, for example, and Americans do not. Over 60 percent of Canada's 26 million people live in urban areas with populations of more than 100,000, and half of these are in the three metropolitan districts of Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver. Less than 30 percent of the nearly quarter billion Americans live in cities of 100,000 or more, and less than 10 percent in cities of more than a million.

The thrust of Canadian history comes more from the metropolis and its garrisons and outposts than from the grass roots and centers of local power. The institutions of law, religion, and commerce were planted before most settlers arrived. Toronto was begun, for example, not by a group of self-reliant individuals cutting themselves off from Europe in order to create a better society, but by a military governor and his clients and civil servants attempting to follow patterns of behavior established in Europe. Their authority was later tempered and shared both by their recruits and by rebels within the structures they set up. Over the years, Toronto annexed its inner suburbs and, by a stroke of the pen of the sovereign's provincial governor on the advice of her premier, amalgamated with twelve outer areas. Unlike the land around American cities, early Toronto's immediate surroundings were not cleared for farming. The leading families kept their estates and trees in Rosedale and Spadina, and maintained a tradition of residence in what eventually became the center of town. Toronto's recent history has reinforced this tradition, and city policy is deliberately aimed at building new housing in the urban core. The residential density of the city, excluding the rest of the metropolitan area, is nearly 20,000 persons per square mile—nearly double that of comparable American cities like Cleveland and Detroit. All of Toronto's major new cultural and entertainment centers—its theatres, domed stadium, symphony hall, and metropolitan library—are still being located in the core rather than beyond it. A corollary of this tradition is that the city's functioning depends as much on an efficient public transit system as on the private car.

Canadian cities are not only more lived in twenty-four hours a day but are generally cleaner, safer, and more orderly than those in the United States. Peter Ustinov recently described Toronto as a sort of New York City run by the Swiss. That the violent crime rate of the Canadian metropolis is only 10 to 20 percent of that of the American (murders average 70 a year in Toronto but 700 in Detroit) is more than a matter of strict gun control in Canada and the lack of it in the United States. It is a matter of the two societies differing in their attitudes toward authority.

As the historian William Morton has pointed out, Canada was founded on the principle of allegiance rather than social contract, on the organic growth of tradition rather than an explicit act of reason or assertion of revolutionary will. The Declaration of Independence proclaims "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" as fundamental rights. By contrast, the British North America Act speaks of "peace, order, and good government." Thomas Jefferson drew on Locke and the premise of a group of sovereign individuals, naturally rational and good, setting up a government by contract among themselves.

And government was given as few powers as possible: "that government is best which governs least."

Canadians never broke with their European past and their British monarch. The queen of Canada, who is also the queen of Britain and many other Commonwealth countries, is still head of state; she stands for more than the preservation of an ornamental relic. Her office is the contemporary expression of the medieval political tradition that authority comes first and that the citizen's liberties are protected within the overall framework of that authority. From it derives the sovereignty of Parliament and the union of executive and legislative powers in the parliamentary system. Unfortunately, the ceremonial and personal side of monarchy, so dear to many Canadians, for many others obscures the fundamental tradition it is meant to express. Most Canadians of non-British culture (in a total population that is little more than one-third ethnically British) do not find any serious point to the monarchy; they are either indifferent or hostile to the idea of having a head of state who lives in a foreign country and reigns there as well. At some point in the next century or so, Canadians may well decide to weight the office of governor general with as much of the monarchical tradition as it can absorb and make its incumbent the real rather than the stand-in final authority for Canada.

Hand in hand with its monarchical and parliamentary form of government, Canada has retained a measure of the European tradition of the established church. In its purest and most complete form, the Roman Catholic church in New France, it was modified by the British Conquest. But the Church's position of privilege and authority among French Canadians was supported by the British conquerors, just as they did what they could to sustain the established Church of England throughout the remnants of their American Empire. In the nineteenth century the large influx of Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, Lutherans, and other Protestants made state churches unsustainable once the colonies achieved self-government. But a role for churches in tax-supported public education has remained in both Ontario and Quebec. And in Newfoundland there have been not only Catholic and Anglican public school systems but also United Church, Pentecostal, and Salvation Army public schools. Another remnant of European state church Christianity lies in the keeping of such days as Good Friday and Ascension as public holidays. The population of

Canada is now over 50 percent Roman Catholic. Anglicanism too still has the aura, even the role, of an established church. And Protestantism usually takes a church rather than a sect form. The influence of fundamentalists, lacking a Billy Graham, a Pat Robertson, a Jerry Falwell, and the organized constituency of a Moral Majority, is not especially strong. Canadian Baptists are predominantly of the liberal variety; there is no equivalent of the Southern Baptists, the largest Protestant group in the United States.

The exclusion of the churches from any formal role in American public life has freed individuals to turn their religious fervor into commitment to America itself, so that patriotism becomes a sort of religion. In Canada the churches continue to play an almost institutionalized prophetic role in their criticism of particular economic, social, and foreign policies of the state. Their inspiration in this respect may appear liberal and left wing, but it is better described as simply radical since it stems from a view of community and humanity that predates liberalism. On the other hand, the churches in Canada do play a conservative role in their legitimization of public authority. Sectarian Christianity in America has, by contrast, reinforced the sovereign individual's personal pursuit of the will of God without the mediation of any human institution.

The Canadian pioneer usually arrived and functioned as part of a community, whether that of the Métis buffalo hunt, the retired British regiment, the Roman Catholic parish, or such religious groups as the Mennonites and the Doukhobors. Even the most self-reliant Protestant in Upper Canada or Alberta was never a lonely pioneer moving on west at first sight of a new neighbor's smoke. There are no Canadian Daniel Boones or Davy Crocketts.

If competitive individualism is the mark of America, then the cooperation of groups within large institutional structures expresses an essential Canadian value. It is not surprising that so many Canadian business enterprises have been either owned by the state or heavily supported by public subsidies, loans, monopoly clauses, and toothless antitrust legislation. Or that they have been giants in their fields. Most of Canada's banking, for example, has been done by six chartered banks, each of them larger than almost all of their hundreds of American counterparts. Canadian Crown corporations function in many areas, from steel and petroleum and electric utilities to transportation and communication. And cooperatives and credit unions have traditionally played an important role in Canadian life. No wonder the typical Canadian has been portrayed as someone who would rather save capital than invest it, or count money than make it. He will gladly loan you a few dollars if you can prove you don't need it but would prefer you get it from "the government," that great Canadian milch cow, in the form of a grant or a subsidy. It is no wonder that American business is apt to be more aggressive, efficient, and willing to take risks.

The factors of geography and history that created Canada's pattern of authority have continued to reinforce it. Precisely because life in Canada was so bleak and difficult for such a long time, its communities have been very dependent on the support of metropolitan centers, whether in Europe or the country itself. The instruments of authority—the military governor, the missionary priest, the Hudson's Bay Company, the railway agent, even the branch bank manager—arrived ahead of most of the settlers. The strange sight of a sod hut in the middle of the prairie open for business under a large Canadian Bank of Commerce sign astonished one visitor to pioneer Saskatchewan. As for the Mounted Police, a few dozen of them managed to maintain law and order over half a continent. Where else in the world is the policeman something of a national symbol and a hero? Canada has had little in the way of either the wild West frontier or the anarchic urban center. Most rebellions and riots have been ineffectual and have been put down quickly. Lynchings and political assassinations have been rare. We did not have a revolution, and 200 years of English-French differences and misunderstanding did not lead to a civil war. Now, if one region of the country were to demand its independence in a sustained and serious fashion, there would be no military action to stop its secession.

There has been a price to pay for this streak of repressed violence in the Canadian character. We have often dealt with the symptoms of trouble rather than its root causes. Much of our creativity has simply been cut down or stifled. Even sheer liveliness, openness, and high spirits can be cause for alarm or suspicion. And Canadians have felt free to disapprove of such imperial adventures as the American intervention in Vietnam or the insanity of Star Wars and yet to profit from the lucrative contracts they have brought in. Our jobs, our wealth, our welfare state are intimately tied in with the American military-industrial complex.

English Canadians have not been isolationist and inward-looking in foreign affairs. Pride in being part of the British Empire was an early form of Canadian internationalism. But Canada has never conducted external wars of aggression or held colonies abroad. When she did go to war—in 1914 and in 1939—it was to defend international order against aggression.

Her sacrifices were heavy—she had more casualties in the First World War, for example, than the United States suffered. Canada's navy ended up doing over 80 percent of all Allied North Atlantic convoy duties in 1944 and 1945. Canadian soldiers were often given the toughest assignments, as at Vimy in 1917 and in Normandy in 1944, and they ended up achieving objectives that others could not.

Nevertheless, these two wars greatly enhanced Canada's industrial and research capacity, and she has enjoyed enormous prosperity, particularly since 1945. For the past 175 years, unlike almost every country on earth save Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand, Canada has not experienced revolution or colonial repression or foreign invasion and occupation or sea blockade or aerial bombardment. She has had no significant conscription for overseas military service since 1918 and no involvement in any serious international conflict since Korea in 1952. She has, however, played an important role in United Nations peacekeeping forces and provided funds and leadership for many international bodies, particularly for UNESCO now that both the United States and Britain have abandoned it. The refugees from war and oppression who have arrived since the 1940s have tended to be at least as well educated as native-born Canadians and more highly motivated to work hard at whatever jobs have been available. Like other postwar immigrants, they have contributed much to the social fabric and culture of their adopted country as well as to the size of its population, which has risen since the Second World War from 12 million to 26 million.

People have often remarked on the Canadian talent for compromise and detached objectivity. More than the French, the British, or the Americans, for whom the single brilliant metropolis of Paris, London, or New York has been dominant, Canadian opinion leaders, intellectuals, and artists have had the advantage of having a multiple vision derived from experiencing a metropolitan center at home as well as one or more abroad. They also have the potential to become split to the point of paralysis by this multiplicity of loyalties and viewpoints.

The Canadian situation tends to produce acute critics such as Northrop Frye and Marshall McLuhan and superb interpreters (a host of major actors and such performing artists as Jon Vickers and Teresa Stratas, for example) more readily than innovative creators. With the exception of Paul-Emile Borduas, one of the twentieth century's greatest painters, the filmmaker Norman McLaren, and the inventive musical genius Glenn Gould, we have as yet had few great composers, painters, film directors, poets, and novelists. And none—no Balzac or Dostoyevsky, no Fellini or Bergman—who have irrevocably changed humanity's understanding of itself.

Canada's creative artists have, however, been consistently good at two things. First, they have depicted life's shadow side. Our literature in both English and French is full of Gothic horror tales. It contains long celebrations of the beleaguered community, the collective and often anonymous hero struggling in the face of disaster, doggedly facing the terrors of a bleak natural world or the fearful shadows of the mind. Canadians have been good at comedy too—from Stephen Leacock's knight leaping onto his horse and riding off in all directions or Wayne and Shuster's radio and television sketches to the craziness of SCTV, the Frantics, and the Royal Canadian Air Farce, not to mention the mimicry of Rich Little and the many writers, actors, and directors we have supplied as America's clowns for the likes of "Saturday Night Live," *The National Lampoon*, and the milder mass-market stuff of the television sitcoms.

Gothic grotesque, brutal violence, great tenderness, and wild comedy are all encompassed in one excellent Canadian feature film, *Un Zoo La Nuit* (1987). Like so much of our best art, *Un Zoo* does make clear that our dominant mode is comedy, however black, and not tragedy. There is still something protean and flexible about the Canadian character. We somehow find escape hatches, even flashes of meaning in the most desperate of situations and, at some penultimate point in life's drama, the tenacious virtue of hope. We are Ishmaels, not Captain Ahabs, survivors who can know and tell of the white monster but will not destroy a world out of lust to possess the truth or enforce an ideal.* (See footnote on page 26.)

A number of observers have remarked that the Canadian experience can be better understood in feminine than masculine terms and by a feminine rather than a masculine sensibility. Without developing the point here, it is worth noting that most of our best fiction writers over the past generaton have been women: Anne Hébert, Gabrielle Roy, Mavis Gallant, Margaret Laurence, Marie-Claire Blais, Alice Munro, Marian Engel, Margaret Atwood—to mention only the better known.

Two of the most powerful novels of the past decade, both by women, have for their themes the brutal uprooting of a whole people from its Canadian homeland. Antonine Maillet's Rabelaisian epic *Pélagie-la-Charette,* winner of France's Prix Goncourt, celebrates the return journey of a group of Acadians to Acadia after their expulsion. Joy Kogawa's *Obasan,* about Japanese-Canadians during and after World War II, explores not just the deportation of a group of Canadian citizens for racist reasons but also such universal themes as the meaning for humanity of the holocaust at Nagasaki.

If Canadians are only beginning to come to terms with the wrongs done to minority groups and to women in our society, they have at least begun to deal substantially with the oldest and deepest shame of all, the treatment of the aboriginal peoples. The government of Canada made a well-intentioned, if false, first start in 1969 when it adopted a liberal policy of integration and assimilation based on the American response to the problem of black-white relations. The model was inappropriate, as native leaders themselves made clear.

By 1981, however, it was agreed that both the aboriginal and the treaty rights of native peoples would be entrenched in the Constitution; in 1983 an all-party Commons committee even recommended that the native peoples should be recognized as having their own jurisdictions in some sense parallel to the federal and provincial governments. A crucial turning point in the 1970s was Justice Thomas Berger's exhaustive inquiry into the impact of a projected

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*In recent years Canadians have moved from seeing the U.S.S.R. as the greatest threat to world security toward seeing the risk of war as the greatest threat; more Canadians have named the U.S. than have named the U.S.S.R. as the likeliest nation to trigger events that could lead to war (a conclusion of a public opinion survey done for the Canadian Institute on International Peace and Security and published in the Winter 1988 issue of its journal *Peace & Security*).

Mackenzie Valley pipeline and the subsequent decision not to proceed. Now Canada has made huge land and cash settlements with some of the native peoples, and more are pending.

Even if the problems of racial injustice in Canada are far from being solved, Canadians in the 1980s appear to be facing up to them and to other such injustices for the first time. In doing so, however reluctantly, Canadians have begun to come into their own—no longer colonial, no longer defined in negatives only, no longer a huge blank on the map of humanity, but empowered, mature, and free at last to aspire to that multiracial democracy that a few of our number once glimpsed in dreams of the future.

A quarter century ago Hugh MacLennan prophesied that something like this might come to pass and that then the Canadian experience would be of interest to more than Canadians only:

> In the particular complex of neuroses from which the rest of the world is suffering, Canada has had an acute and extremely long experience. For not only was this country formed out of the flotsam and jetsam of defeated racial and political groups; some of these groups had once been bitter enemies. But they had to live here, and they had to live in peace with each other. And—more than any other nation—they had to live in peace with the United States, and to accommodate themselves to American methods, American attitudes, and American ability and success . . . .
>
> Americans originally were isolationists. They sought in a new continent to escape the tensions, sins and prejudices of Europe. And they sought to make everyone who entered their country as much like the original Anglo-Saxon stock as possible. Unwillingly, almost tragically, they now admit themselves to be locked up in the same world as . . . people who do not desire to be just like themselves. How familiar it sounds to us when we hear Americans say if only another country would adopt *their* attitudes, *their* values, the world's troubles would be over. A generation ago there were English Canadians who spoke in precisely the same way of French Canada. But at this moment in history, the Canadian experience is one of immense significance to mankind; if we talk truly about ourselves we will be talking not only for ourselves but for others.[12]

Canada: a Guide to the Peaceable Kingdom is the title of a book I published in October 1970, a time when terrorists had just murdered a Quebec cabinet minister and the police were making heavy-handed use of the Canadian government's suspension of civil liberties through proclamation of the War Measures Act. The book's title derives from Northrop Frye's meditation on *The Peaceable Kingdom,* a serene primitive painting by Edward Hicks. It depicts an illustration of Isaiah's prophecy of harmony in nature and among nations, a group of animals—lions, oxen, bears—and some Quakers and Indians making a peace treaty. Frye suggests that the Canadian tradition as revealed in our literature might well be called a quest for the peaceable kingdom.[13]

But the phrase has since been cited by several pundits in order to mock its supposed assumption that Canada is immune from the violence of the twentieth century. Of course it is not. Terrorists with a nuclear bomb could today hold any of its cities to ransom, and as every schoolchild knows, humanity itself could be obliterated by nuclear war tomorrow. However, the degree to which Canadian life—before, during, and since the crisis of 1970—has been free of insurrection, political kidnapping, assassination, and other forms of extreme political violence is remarkable.

Such violence in the past century and a half, a period when both governments and their opponents around the world have managed, quite apart from the slaughter of war, to exterminate many millions of human beings, has produced but a minuscule loss of life in Canada. For all its faults, this country has remained blessedly free of those deadly clashes of rival ideologies, dreams, and purities with which almost every other corner of the earth is still plagued today. To say otherwise, to state in portentous tones that our recent history too has been terrible, is about as useful as proclaiming that Canada is the worst country in the world except for the others.

ENDNOTES

[1] Mordecai Richler, *Hunting Tigers under Glass: Essays and Reports* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968), 75.

[2] Douglas LePan, "Coureur de Bois," poem in *The Wounded Prince* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1948).

[3] Cole Harris, "Regionalism and the Canadian Archipelago," chap. 13 in *Heartland and Hinterland: a Geography of Canada,* ed. Lawrence McCann (Toronto: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1982).

[4] Northrop Frye as narrator in *Journey without Arrival,* a National Film Board of Canada documentary, 1977.

[5] Douglas LePan, "In Frock Coat and Moccassins," essay in *Canada: a Guide to the Peaceable Kingdom,* ed. William Kilbourn (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1971), 7.

[6] Patrick Anderson, "Poem on Canada," in *The White Centre* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1946).

[7] Pierre Elliott Trudeau, cited in Thomas Berger, "The Canadian Constitution: the Charter and Minority Rights," unpublished lecture given at Scarborough College, University of Toronto, October 1988.

[8] Thomas Berger, "The Canadian Constitution: the Charter and Minority Rights," unpublished lecture given at Universita di Catania, Sicily, May 21, 1988.

[9] George-Etienne Cartier, as excerpted from Peter Waite, ed., *The Confederation Debates in the Province of Canada, 1865* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1964), 49–52, 58–61.

[10] George Brown, as excerpted from Waite, 49–52, 58–61.

[11] Goldwin Smith, quoted in William Kilbourn, *The Making of the Nation* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965), 35.

[12] Hugh MacLennan, "After 300 Years Our Neurosis Is Relevant," a lecture printed in Kilbourn, *Guide to the Peaceable Kingdom,* 10–11.

[13] Northrop Frye, "Conclusion," in *The Literary History of Canada,* ed. C. Klinck et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 848.

Past and Present

The title of this issue does not begin to suggest its content. The issue includes the folowing articles:

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Gorbachev and the Reform of the Soviet System

Aleksander Smolar
Jews as a Polish Problem

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F. Kenneth Hare

Canada: The Land

CANADA IS BIG—preposterously so. How can 26 million people lay convincing claim to sovereignty over 3.8 million square miles of a crowded planet? Our territories are larger than the continental United States, larger than Brazil, larger than Australia. Only China and the Soviet Union exceed us. We are spread absurdly thin.

As I sit in my Toronto home, I am 2,740 miles south of the northern tip of Ellesmere Island, Canada's northernmost land for all practical purposes. If I swivel my chair and look directly south, there, a bit over the horizon but the same distance away, is Bogotá, the capital of Colombia. The District of Columbia, in contrast, is a mere hour's travel by jet. If Canada could pick itself up, it could bury the United States. Americans inhabit almost as large a share of the planet's land, but there are far more of them to justify their territorial claims.

East–west, the distances are just as dramatic. The first navigators who entered the splendid harbor of St. John's, Newfoundland, could have had no notion that the island they had chanced upon would someday be part of a federation that would stretch to the Pacific. Or, for that matter, that the stretch would be across eighty degrees of longitude. St. John's and Victoria (the capital of British Columbia, on a Pacific island) are 3,800 miles apart. If you head the same distance east from St. John's, you find yourself in Colonel Qaddafi's tent in Tripoli or somewhere just short of Moscow, depending on what tack

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F. Kenneth Hare is Chancellor of Trent University in Peterborough, Ontario.

you take. Either destination means that you will have spanned the Atlantic, plus the entire width of Europe. I repeat: such an extent is preposterous, in old-world terms. Can such a thin scattering of people hold it together?

We are convinced that we actually do so; two national airlines—Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International—operate between the two extremities. A third—Wardair—is now challenging their uniqueness. A regional carrier flies north from Montreal to Resolute, not far from Cape Columbia. The airports of St. John's and Victoria are depressingly alike. Canada's material culture has become uniform, anonymous and placatory. People do fly from St. John's to Victoria without any hindrance except the need to change planes in Montreal or Toronto (and often Vancouver as well). Flying to Moscow or Tripoli is still a matter for cautious reflection. Only the price of the ticket is a consideration if Victoria is your target.

And, of course, I can pick up my phone and dial easily (at a price) within all of North America. I can dial New Zealand or Kenya and have done so, although I don't make a habit of it. Cablevision in Toronto provides me with all the standard U.S. channels as well as the Canadian. I watch the CBS and CNN news as a matter of course. There is no major Canadian city where one cannot do so. And the remotest parts of this vast country are all within the reach of satellite communications. The viewing and phoning habits of Canadians are firmly continentalist, though people still travel mainly east–west (except in midwinter, when Florida, California, and most Caribbean islands become Canadian provinces).

Nevertheless, notwithstanding modern communications, distance is still a central and discouraging fact of Canada's national life. It still matters that the legislators and lobbyists of the provincial, territorial, and federal governments must interact electronically rather than face-to-face. Teleconferencing and conference calls are poor substitutes for handshakes.

Even with electronic aids, the conduct of national consultation presents difficulties. The country is five and a half hours wide. If he calls the premier of British Columbia, the premier of Newfoundland must be astute about time. Otherwise, he may arouse his counterpart (whom he may want to cajole) at 4:30 in the morning—a poor hour for getting results. The same difficulty confronts the Canadian

Broadcasting Corporation when it stages the national news or televises major sporting events.

The magnitude of the country was brought home to me early in my Canadian life (I came here as an immigrant in 1945). In my native England I had worked hard on a master's thesis that involved the detailed mapping of 120 square miles of the Thames Valley. Those precious square miles (between Slough, Maidenhead, Windsor, and Beaconsfield) happened to span in their surficial geology the entire Pleistocene and Holocene epochs (and had supported a lot of human history as well, including the site of the signing of the Magna Carta). On this tiny plot of land I could work out how successive human cultures from the Acheulian onward had made use of the Thames and its gravels. Later, when my paper was read to the Geologists' Association, I was gently chided for having tried to do so much and to cover so much ground (largely on a push-bike).

But I had been in Canada less than three years when I was asked (by the Department of National Defence) to look in quick succession at two poorly studied questions. Did Hudson's Bay freeze in winter? And what could be found in the interior of the Labrador Peninsula? Hudson's Bay is over 300,000 square miles in extent—bigger than France and the Federal Republic of Germany combined. Even unnamed tributaries of the St. Lawrence are larger than the English Thames. The Labrador Peninsula is about 525,000 square miles.

It was amazing that in 1948 no one knew exactly what the interiors of these two areas were like. It was intimidating to be asked to find out. My push-bike was clearly inadequate. My English methods were absurd in this context. The answer lay, of course, in aerial photography, with airborne expeditions to establish ground truth. To meet this challenge of filling in the maps, Canadian scientists, companies, and government agencies became highly expert in remote sensing. When satellite technology became feasible, Canada took, and has retained, a prominent role in spatial mapping projects. Her major consulting companies have worldwide competence. Hudson's Bay does freeze, every year; but in 1948 even the northerners didn't know it. Today we can look down on the pack ice without leaving our work stations.

Though we have conquered distances by technical means, the gross fact of remoteness remains. If I fly to Winnipeg by night, as I often do, I see no lights for most of the way, from twenty minutes after takeoff until ten minutes before landing. And I have flown as far as from London to Rome or Belgrade, fortunately at less than half the cost. Being Canadian means taking things like this for granted.

Of course we are not alone in this situation. The Soviet Union grapples with even greater remoteness and with far more complex cultural and ethnographic diversity. The United States lives within an area close to Canada's in size. Brazil, a half-realized giant, is more compact but almost as large. So is Australia, where only half as many people as in Canada occupy a comparable extent of land. China and India are also vast but have huge populations to accommodate. Perhaps the closest parallel for Canadians, however, is Australia.

Canadians do indeed find much in common with Australians. Before this article appears in print, I shall have gone back there, to make my tiny contribution to their bicentenary. They too have great distances, and two national airlines, one publicly owned, the other private. They too are fringe dwellers. Australians live overwhelmingly along the eastern, southern, and southwestern coasts, looking outward across the Pacific, Southern, and Indian oceans, as Canadians look across the U.S. border. The heart of the continent—80 percent of Australia's territories—is nearly empty. It plays a big part in their national myths and in the folk memories of the aboriginals. But most Australians never see it. Their life is more like that of San Diego or Seattle than that of the old West. Above all, they experience heat rather than cold: much of their land is tropical or subtropical.

The emptiness of the heart of Canada is a reflection of the barrenness of the Laurentian Shield, extending from the coast of Labrador across the country to the arctic coast, just east of the Mackenzie River. The southern rim, usually rugged, can be seen from Quebec City, Montreal, and Ottawa. It can be reached in an hour from Winnipeg, across the beaches of glacial Lake Agassiz, now shrunk to Lakes Winnipeg and Manitoba. Lake Superior and Georgian Bay occupy hollows in its rim. So do parts of the northwestern lakes—Great Slave and Great Bear. From this hilly rim, densely populated on summer and winter weekends by people spilling out of the cities, the shield stretches north to the Arctic. Baffin Island is part of it. So is the great stretch of what used to be called the Barren Lands, to the northwest of Hudson's Bay. And the bay itself, surely Canada's most central feature, lies in a geologically ancient depression in the heart of the shield.

It is not merely that the Laurentian Shield (which extends into the United States in Michigan, Minnesota, and New York's Adirondacks) is made up of thin-soiled, resistant, crystalline rocks, some of them over 3 billion years old. It is that the shield served repeatedly as the gathering ground for the great ice sheets of Pleistocene time—the past 2 million years. These glaciers buried its surface, depressed it by sheer weight, and scraped away its soils. Today the surface shows extensive bare rock, with scoured basins containing thousands of lakes. About 10 percent of the surface is lake, and another 15 percent muskeg, housing much of the world's inventory of pestilential insects between them and, more happily, an extraordinary retinue of wildfowl. This was above all the land that Canada's Group of Seven—the artists who transformed the nation's perception of its own landscape—painted so acutely. It has been called the dead heart of Canada, and when today the cold of winter grips the surface, the image seems apt.

The glaciers in their successive forays into southern Canada and the northern United States, moreover, left behind as they melted the morainic ridges that are so familiar in Wisconsin and Minnesota, Indiana and Michigan, Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania (for it was in these states that the ice stopped). And across the entire shield there are sheets of glacial till, drumlins and boulder fields left behind when the ice melted. Threading among them, often for a hundred miles or more, are the extraordinary eskers—narrow, hummocky gravel ridges marking the courses of the subglacial meltwater streams. My research team measured 323,000 miles of them in Labrador-Ungava alone. It is all a splendid chaos, almost as fresh today as when the ice withdrew.

And when was that? To an excellent approximation, between 8,000 B.C. and 4,500 B.C. (about the time of the rise of agriculture and the first cities in the Middle East). In the ice's wake the Boreal Forest spread northward to cloak Canada from Newfoundland to the Yukon. No one has counted the black and white spruce, the balsam fir and larch, the jack pine, aspen, balsam poplar, and white birch that make up this forest. We have cut a great many trees down. But this is still a dark expanse, which one sees as one flies across the southern shield. It is Hans Christian Anderson country, closely similar to its analogue on the edge of that other shield, Fennoscandia, beyond the Atlantic.

Nowhere is Canada's winter harsher than over the Laurentian Shield. Latitude for latitude—and Hudson's Bay marches alongside Britain and central and southern Scandinavia—this is the world's coldest place. Not merely frigid, but also windy, and along its southern and eastern margins very snowy as well. The summer is tantalizingly short. Growth goes on for two to four months before September sees the return of killing frost. Small wonder that Jacques Cartier was moved to call the southern coast of Labrador the land that God gave Cain. ("J'estime, mieux que aultrement," he wrote, "que c'est la terre que Dieu donna à Cayn.")

Small wonder, as well, that Canadians have never settled this national heartland in any number. Agriculture is feasible only in a few tiny oases. There is nothing to tempt the colonist, though in Quebec and northern Ontario the provincial governments (and in Quebec the Church) made valiant attempts to get settlement going in the clay belt of Abitibi and around Lake St. John (the scene of many of Quebec's most enduring myths).

Yet a case can be made for the view that the margins of the shield, and the forests that cloak it, are Canada's most vital environment. These were above all the lands of the hunting Indians and later of the Métis (the people of mixed white and Indian genes). This was the main home of the trappers, and it was across this belt that the voyageurs established the canoe and bateau route from Montreal to the Mackenzie. Along this route traveled those hardy competitors of the Hudson's Bay Company, the merchants of the North West Company and its own rivals, the Americans from Oswego and even (at some inconvenience) from New York. Today, from Montreal to Winnipeg at least, dozens of jet aircraft each day cross in two hours what took the voyageurs much of a season. It is impossible not to be moved in looking down on Lake Nipissing, Sault Ste. Marie, Fort Kaministiquia, Rainy Lake, and then—in the distance—the Red River itself. I can cross them while having lunch. Our forebears did it by extreme courage and endurance laced with a little avarice.

* * *

The early European settlers must have been staggered by their first Canadian winters—if they survived the bitter cold, the endless winds, the carpet of snow. In many ways the winter was (and still is) the season of mobility, when snow and ice offered sure going for those who were prepared. The snowshoe, the sledge, the dog team, the moccasin, and now the snowmobile are all parts of a cultural readiness that no one could have brought from Britain, Ireland, or France. Nothing in the west European climates could have prepared the immigrants for what lay before them.

Yet in summer and fall the Maritime shores and the St. Lawrence Valley seemed deceptively welcoming, as did the Baie des Chaleurs to Cartier. It was not merely the surprising warmth of summer and early autumn. There on the shores could be seen familiar trees, shrubs, and vines. The forests were as lush as in Europe (except in Newfoundland and along Quebec's north shore). Moreover, they abounded in tree species. Whereas in northwest Europe there were only two oak species and one ash, here there were several of each. The same was true of pine and maple. The wild vines yielded edible grapes. On all sides were plants that, though they looked a little different, the settlers could at once give familiar names. Only the basswood needed a change, because Europeans could never agree on a common name—*tilleul* in France, *linden* in Germany, *lime* in Britain and Ireland. The glory of the fall was, however, a surprise; in genus after genus, the North American species dazzlingly outshone their sober European cousins.

But the shock of winter, with its stripping of leaves, freezing of lakes and rivers, and spreading carpet of snow, could not be easily absorbed. In this the early settlers of the St. Lawrence Valley, the Maritimes, and Newfoundland had an experience akin to that of the Pilgrim fathers, but even more severe. It was above all the changeability that staggered the observers who wrote down their impressions. Even in midwinter there were thaws; yet there could be frost in June. Europeans imagined that their native climates were erratic and topsy-turvy. Here in eastern Canada they learned that the changeability of Britain and France was humdrum monotony by comparison with what they now faced.

Eastern and central North America have a disconcertingly vigorous westerly climate, dominated by the passage of cyclonic storms, which form, for the most part, over the Great Plains and the Prairies. Northward these storms drag warm, humid air from the South. Behind the centers cold air rushes southward from the Canadian Arctic. In summer the northward tropical thrust of heat and humidity is dominant. It brings in oppressive weather, familiar enough to Sicilians and Athenians but uncomfortable for the French, British, and Irish settlers and for their descendants. By November, however, the reverse dominance asserts itself, as Canadian Arctic air sweeps southeastward with increasing frequency and penetration, often reaching Cuba and Honduras. This is a monsoonal regime, akin to the climate of China and Japan rather than that of Europe.

To find true analogues of the northwest European regime, one must go west of the Rockies or even beyond the Coast Range. Vancouver and Victoria have climates like those of western Britain, though their sunny summers—Canada's chief climatic asset—are blessed reliefs from the prolonged rain and dullness of winter. Europe, however, has nothing like the Pacific rain forests. To find analogues, one must visit New Zealand or Chile.

Between these contrasting climates, Pacific and eastern, the Prairies have a sunnier, drier pattern marked by warmth in summer, and often fully arctic cold in winter. Of the Prairie settlers it was the Ukrainians who must have felt most at home; southern Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta are similar to the steppes of the Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, of southwestern Siberia.

And finally the North—the great extent of the subarctic Boreal Forest, from Newfoundland to the Yukon and beyond, since inland Alaska is similar. These lands have parallels in northern Eurasia, from Scandinavia to Siberia. To the north of the forest, the true arctic climates support treeless tundra on the land and condemn the seas to a pack-ice cover that never fully clears in summer. It is so easy to forget how far north the North really is. Montrealers, when I was a young man, were apt to apply the word to the Abitibi region, which is in the latitude of northern France. The reality is that the Canadian Arctic extends closer to the North Pole than does Siberia. And the climate follows suit.

Canada's climates do much to determine the character of the land—the soils, the fertility, the forest, grassland, or tundra cover—and of the water supply. Climate has severely limited the extent to which Canadians can usefully settle their own territories and has restricted the productivity of their natural resources. Only 7 percent of the surface can be usefully tilled. The forests grow slowly, and it is not easy for the pulp and paper industry to compete with production in softer climates. On the other hand, the West Coast rain forests are highly productive. Unfortunately, their extent is limited by the mountainous relief. The sparse, erratic rainfall of the Prairie summer is similarly ambivalent: it accords with high soil fertility but also with unpredictable crop yields and a high incidence of drought.

What the climate delivers in superabundance is rain and snow. About 7 percent of the world's fresh water discharges to the ocean from Canadian rivers. Eastern Canada, from the Great Lakes to the Atlantic, has perhaps the world's most reliable water supply. Coastal British Columbia is also richly endowed. Yet Canada has regions of stress. There is far too little surface water in the Prairie grain belt for comfort.

One of the touchiest political issues is the reiterated demand for interbasin water transfers. Too much of Canada's stream discharge goes north to the Arctic or to Hudson's Bay and, of course, to the Pacific. Throughout this century there have been proposals to undertake huge transfers of this water into the deficient areas of the Prairies, into the Great Lakes (to offset diversions at Chicago), and into the United States for consumption on the western plains. The latest of these is the Grand Canal Project, conceived by Tom Kierans. He proposes to pump the freshwater discharge into James Bay (and thence into Hudson's Bay), back into the Great Lakes, and finally into canal systems feeding the water-deficient Great Plains and Prairies. Nothing seems to get the dander of the Canadians up faster than proposals of this kind. We persist in believing ourselves in danger of water shortage, yet we are more richly endowed with water than any other large country.

How can we trace a logic in Canada's physical geography? So many of its territories look on the map like northward extensions of the United States. Is this the whole story? Decidedly, the answer is no.

Canada faces three oceans, not two, continental U.S. style, though she pays little attention to the Arctic. *Atlantic Canada* is the polite collective now used for the Maritime Provinces—Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick—and Newfoundland put together, as they have been for four decades. Quebec must be added, since the Gulf of St. Lawrence is an embayment of the Atlantic. The St. Lawrence is tidal well above Quebec City. The Atlantic Ocean has been inescapable for Canada's European invaders and for all its easterners.

The Pacific too is a dramatically obvious element in Canadian life. The search for a route to the Pacific prompted some of the early exploration of the country. Today, Canada is seeking secure membership in the community vaguely and unhelpfully called the Pacific Rim. Vancouver has become the nation's leading port. There is a feeling abroad, almost unchanged since my childhood, that the Pacific nations will come to dominate the world and that this is a community to which Canada must at all costs belong, constructively (and profitably).

In fact, only British Columbia and the Yukon Territory have absolute claims to being Pacific Canada. Most of their territories drain to the Pacific along great rivers such as the Yukon, the Skeena, and the Fraser—and the Columbia, which, like the Yukon, reaches tidewater in U.S. territory. The Contintental Divide passes north along the Rocky Mountains.

What about the Prairie Provinces, and the North? Surprisingly, the entire prairie region itself (and most of the forested shield country of these provinces) is still within the Atlantic drainage. The great rivers—the Saskatchewan, the Assiniboine, the Red, the Churchill, and the Thelon—all flow to Hudson's Bay, which in turn communicates with the Atlantic via Hudson Strait.* Hudson's Bay is indeed northern but is separated from the Arctic Ocean by the maze of ice-choked marine passages that separate the extraordinary Arctic Archipelago—the pell-mell scattering of islands through which U.S. submarines and occasionally tankers must pass on their way to the Beaufort Sea or the ice-covered Arctic Ocean (thereby assaulting Canadian notions of sovereignty).

Atlantic Canada thus stretches, in the strict logic of drainage, to the foot of the Rockies. The Hudson's Bay Company's charter committed the company to the bay route from the Atlantic. To the company and its overland competitors from the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence, reaching the Pacific meant searching for feasible routes through the Rockies to the tumultuous Pacific rivers (of which the Columbia and the Kootenay, and not the Fraser, were the most accessible).

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*Here I follow old established usage. The apostrophe *s* on *Hudson's Bay* (but not on *Strait*) is part of our history, because the charter of the Hudson's Bay Company says so. I ignore the decision by the Canadian government to drop the *s*.

A tiny patch of Canada drains to the Missouri, and thence to the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico (which is also an embayment of the Atlantic). The fourth-ninth parallel actually comes fairly close to the drainage divide between Hudson's Bay and the gulf, though the Souris and Red rivers cross the border in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. South of the Cypress Hills, however, there is a sizable strip of Alberta and Saskatchewan that is drained by the Milk River, a tributary of the Missouri. Presumably, Spain once claimed this territory. Currently being pure W.O. Mitchell country, it shows no sign of this claim.

What, finally, of the arctic drainage? For all practical purposes it consists of the Mackenzie and its headstreams the Peace, the Liard, and the Athabasca, together with the Back and the Coppermine rivers further east. Again, the superlatives of scale are called for. The Mackenzie is slightly larger and much longer than the St. Lawrence. Only the Mississippi outdoes it in North America. The Mackenzie great lakes—Great Slave, Great Bear, and Athabasca—rival those of the St. Lawrence. Few Canadians ever see the Mackenzie and its lakes, though a thin scatter of native peoples, Dene and Inuit, with some support from southerners, populates its banks and exploits its resources.

The Mackenzie has no peers among the rivers of the Western world, but it has close parallels in Siberia. The Ob and the Yenisei resemble it. These rivers all flow away from a populous south. In terms of common perceptions, they go the wrong way. Non-Caucasian peoples colonized the rivers. Vast forests cloak their banks. And each river floods annually as its headstreams melt while the downstream stretch retains its ice cover. Each enters the Arctic Ocean through a remarkable delta or estuary. The delta of the Mackenzie is one of Canada's striking environments. Oil exploration has created new islands on the floor of the Beaufort Sea. But one does not sail from Inuvik to these islands along the sinuosities of the Mackenzie channels; one gets into a helicopter.

Canada's arctic shoreline is inaccessible from both land and sea unless one lives there, as do the Inuit, or unless one is prepared for the expense of ice-strengthened vessels or aircraft. Inuit children are used to their trips to school or hospital clinics in light aircraft. Except in the largest settlement there are no cars, but the snowmobile is the inevitable adjunct of the hunter and the status seeker. The arctic islands remain, for the most part, unsettled. A few Inuit villages remain of a once greater spread, and a scatter of mining, defense, communications, and geophysical observing sites provide a thin admixture of southerners. Nothing like these arctic islands can be found elsewhere in the world. Ellesmere and Axel Heiberg are mountainous and partly glacier covered. The east coast of Baffin is among the world's most spectacular, with its fjords, towering cliffs, and glaciers, but much of the rest is simply rolling tundra or rock desert, providing support for some large mammals, notably musk-oxen. Mercifully, there are no people over much of the surface, so the musk-oxen survive.

It is largely a fiction that Canada's fundamental geographic structure is a prolongation of units visible in the United States. Atlantic Canada does indeed continue northward the alignments of Appalachia. All four provinces (with Labrador excepted) resemble New England in topography and bedrock geology. The cultural cousinship visible wherever people have left their mark heightens the resemblance. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, in those few areas where the environment supported early settlement, still show buildings, village forms, and place names with marked U.S. affinities (especially from Pennsylvania to Massachusetts). King's College, Windsor, now moved to Halifax, does not much resemble King's College, New York City (long ago renamed Columbia College), but the Halifax buildings of the old college remind one of Atlantic America and of King's origin. In fact, the architecture and urban style of St. John's, Newfoundland, and of Halifax are akin to those of the small tidewater settlements down the East Coast to South Carolina. Only Prince Edward Island seems to me to be sui generis, unmistakably its own role model.

Similar links are visible elsewhere. Southern Ontario looks middle western to an American. Geologically speaking, this is sound. The Canadian Prairies do indeed continue the Great Plains northward. And the Canadian Western Cordillera–Rockies, the Coast Range, and the intervening plateaus and valleys are direct continuations of U.S. units.

But the fiction is made clear by the different cores of the two countries. The United States has in its heart the rich, fertile, and productive Midwest, with the Corn Belt stretching across it from Indiana to Iowa. The Canadian equivalent is the rocky, interminable

Laurentian Shield. To the south of the Great Lakes, with Chicago as the pivot, the rich core of the United States pulsates with activity. To the north of the Great Lakes is the largely empty shield. Canada's core is bleak and harsh.

Moreover, the main climatic, vegetational, and soil zones of Canada extend east–west across the country, with a longitudinal logic that is mostly absent from the United States. It is true that the U.S. South retains some nostalgic sense of unity, but the major drives of the nation in the past century have been westward and southwestward along a broad and largely uniform cultural front. The United States has spread its cultural practices and its remarkable affluence across a far more tractable land surface than has been open to Canadians. A few acres of snow Canada is not, but neither is it the rich and varied land that has become the United States.

* * *

To what extent does physical geography influence the economy, the culture, and the daily lives of Canadians? Has it in any sense dominated their history? Does their outlook confirm such influences?

Canadians and Americans both seem not much impressed by the physical world around them (and those who take umbrage at such a verdict will find themselves a small minority). Outside the windows of our transcontinental planes, a marvelous panorama unfolds. I love to look down on the Great Plains, often featureless on the ground but a checkerboard mosaic from above, or to feel a thrill as the plane crosses the Mississippi or the Continental Divide. But of course I can no longer do so. The window blinds are lowered, and a movie of monumental irrelevance wastes nearly two hours. Or I can switch on channels of musical anodynes. The airlines obviously provide these for the satisfaction of the majority of their passengers. Few want to look at the greatest show on earth—the world below.

Modern life-styles do all that is possible to tune out the reality of nature. I work and live, as do most Canadians, indoors. I am air-conditioned, heated, and to some extent soundproofed. I am most unlikely to hear the first robin in spring. My car isolates me in the same manner (though its wheels were designed for use in California), and so does my commuter train. I happen to live in a harsh climate, and I welcome the protection I am given. But I nevertheless rebel, as do many of my fellow Canadians. In spring or summer I garden, preferring the semiwild effect to the parterre. Most of my friends have summer cottages and go skiing in the winter, but few of them follow the European custom of walking through the countryside. Easterners take little joy in the real things around them. From Alberta to the Pacific the sheer splendor of nature (and the superb Straits of Georgia) make outdoor activities attractive. Easterners are less lucky.

To a European visitor, especially to someone from England, Switzerland, or Scandinavia, this preoccupation with the artificial things that have become home shows itself in many ways. Most notably there are the maps. The ones sold in our bookstores are rubbish. Our road maps tell us nothing of the countryside and show us only the main roads. Lanes and byways get short shrift, as do railways, canals, and other man-made objects that can serve as landmarks. But in Europe the map is an elegant, accurate, and compelling representation of the entire land surface. It is a call to arms, a challenge to the curiosity. One can travel sitting in an armchair, but one gets up to drive, walk, and climb because the maps beckon.

Insensitivity to nature is quite unlike the indifference to environmental degradation that is so much bemoaned. The word *environment,* and especially the derivative term *environmental quality,* both connote people-centered ideas. The true naturalist sees nature as self-justifying, as enthralling in its own right. The English talk about having an eye for country. The French speak vauntingly of the sacred soil of France. Quebecois too feel deeply about their homeland. The Swiss have an eye for the high places. But English Canadians have no equivalent terms and perhaps less sense of what they are missing.

Yet when summer comes, we seek nature out. In all this vast country our provincial and national parks have a common problem: parking. The Trans-Canada highway across Banff National Park, in spite of widening, cannot begin to cope with summer traffic. Nor can Banff itself, a beleaguered federally owned resort in the midst of some of the world's most notable splendor. Canadians have tended to find nature attractive only near beauty spots (to use an Anglicism). In between they often see it—lamentably—as tedious and expendable; hence the blinds across the aircraft windows.

It was not always like this. An earlier frontier-minded Canada necessarily took account of the natural world. Every farmer could recall how he or his father or his grandfather had cleared the land of trees or broken the tough sod of the Prairies. Every farmer's wife achieved miracles to raise her family, to tend the farm animals, and to hold hunger at bay. All were aware of the severity of winter, of the need to keep warm, of the necessity of sealing the windows from the hordes of insects. And until less than a century ago every settlement had men who knew how to take to the woods and hunt and trap, and women who would tolerate their absence as well as skin the animals. A notable aristocracy was the smaller group who knew the canoe and bateau routes westward and northward across the entire country. None of these early folk had much cause to sentimentalize the Canadian wilderness, but all of them understood it, for in understanding alone lay safety, survival, and (for some) economic well-being.

We have bulldozed this sensitivity flat. Modern civil and mechanical engineering has thrust the need for it aside and made possible not the conquest of nature but its disregard. Farmers must still watch the sky, but they too are far less subject to the weather's vagaries. Navigators on the Great Lakes or in coastal shipping are in a similar situation. For most of us, the need to take much daily account of nature has gone, and no compensating feeling for its beauty has arisen—or so it seems to the unrepentant naturalist who writes these words.

Geographers have been far less willing than historians or those hybrids, the economic historians, to talk of the effect of nature on human affairs. It is quite obvious that Canada's physical geography has at all times influenced our economic choices and heavily affected our selection of places in which to live. It was extremely likely that we would build a metropolis below the Lachine Rapids on the St. Lawrence (that is, Montreal) and another where the Canadian Pacific Railway crosses the Red River, near the Assiniboine confluence (Winnipeg). We situated other cities more arbitrarily, notably Toronto, Regina, and Edmonton. The functions that became special to these cities, however, were the products of subsequent cultural improvisation. In no sense were they the results of conditions at the sites.

The regional geographer's task has always been to reconcile these attitudes. Since the days of Ellsworth Huntington, Ellen Churchill Semple, and Griffith Taylor (among Canadian scholars), it has been unfashionable to adopt either a deterministic stance or anything like historicism. Nature, says the general wisdom, offered humankind a range of possibilities, which each generation reexamined as technology changed. In this possibilist view, modern Canada is only one conceivable response to the natural challenge. There could have been so many others, but we never seized upon them. We have inherited a very particular thing.

This view is now dated. Geographers have given up worrying about regions that are demonstrably not real, causes that are manifestly partial, and conditions that are never static. But they too have sometimes pulled down the blinds and forgotten the natural world outside the window. Their attention has been increasingly drawn to the city and the society of its residents. From being students of the world as the habitat of human societies, geographers have turned to the societies themselves and their artifacts, the cities. Most geographers have become social scientists and are classified as such in universities.

Indeed, Canadian society has become overwhelmingly urban, in parallel with the United States, Australia, and the European countries. Immigrants now head automatically into the urban labor force. When I was a student, it was still possible for the geographer to devote most of his or her time to the rural landscape and to agricultural settlement. The headlong rush to the cities, the mechanization of agriculture, the end of the hired farm work force, and the development of heavy equipment in the extractive industries—all these obvious things escaped our attention for many years. Then, quite suddenly, most geographers came indoors, especially in the United States, and concentrated on the cities. In Canada, a breed of physical geographers soldiers on, in the same departments as their socially directed colleagues. What has diminished is the number of those who still concentrate on the country's regional attributes.

But recently there has been a change of heart. A group of geographers and historians have put together a masterpiece, *The Historical Atlas of Canada,* which brings together in scholarly fashion the story of the colonization of Canada's land. In a single interdisciplinary project these academics (with great financial help from federal sources) have done far more than merely record the facts. They have analyzed those facts in a way that makes obvious the mechanics behind Canada's evolution as a populated land.

I have no wish to write about national character or national myths. What impresses me about Canadians as I travel the country is that each region, each city, even each family, is a mixture of attributes, attitudes, abilities, disabilities, and triumphs. I see no uniform thing that one can call a national character, nor can I see any obvious way in which Canadian nature affects the attitudes of mind of the people with whom I deal closely.

What I do see from coast to coast—leaving aside Quebec and the Francophone areas—is a glum uniformity of material living styles; of farms and cottages not very different from suburban homes; of the same television programs, the same department stores, the same supermarkets (even if prices vary from region to region), and the same churches. I hear a uniform accent, little differentiated by either class or location (though here I have to except Newfoundland, which is a patchwork quilt of dialects). And of course I see an astonishing mobility, because Canadians dash about throughout their lives. Attachment to place is rarer than it was, and it was never strong for most of us.

Yet regions do exist, just as they do in the United States. They do not correspond to political divisions, but they may still have political significance. These regions have gross disparities of income, and we have a long-established habit of federal subsidies that transfer funds from the purses of the big industrialized cities into the pockets of farmers, fishermen, and others in the poorer provinces. An entire federal government department, whose name is changed periodically, exists to administer some of these programs. The free-trade pact being negotiated between Canada and the United States threatens these regional transfers. Yet they are essential to national survival and reflect real differences in natural endowment. They spring, in many cases, from the character of the land itself.

Of these regions, the Atlantic Provinces have a physical layout and enough common history to justify concerted actions and, indeed, to possess formal collaborative instruments. But they remain obstinately independent in most economic domains. What unites them is the poverty of their land. Thin, infertile soils, a cloudy, wet, and snowy climate, and rocky, rather hilly relief extend through most of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Prince Edward Island is a red-soiled exception, most of her land being good for the plough. The tides flow in and out of an intricate shoreline in all three provinces. In spite of locally abundant natural resources from forest, fish, and mining areas, the economy has remained depressed. Newfoundland presents this picture even more emphatically. The Maritimes have one resource that never fails them, however—beauty. Thousands are drawn to it each summer. Newfoundland too is physically splendid, though much of its beauty is inaccessible. The Torngat coast of northern Labrador and the east coast of Baffin are wildly magnificent—and only a few see them because the ice-choked Labrador current makes navigation difficult.

Quebec is another distinctive Canadian region, but here the unity is cultural, linguistic, and political. Overwhelmingly the St. Lawrence River has been the centerline of Quebec settlement; and it remains at the heart of the Quebecois territorial consciousness, which is very strong. The distinctive long lots of the original cadastral surveys are still dramatically visible from the air. They spread back from the great river and its tributaries into the Appalachian hills of Gaspésie, the south bank, and the region of the Beauce (right back, in places, to the Maine border). They similarly spread north into the Laurentian Shield. The whole plain in which Montreal stands was so subdivided. But Quebec is as urbanized and industrialized as the rest of Canada; Quebec City and Montreal dominate its life.

Southwestern Ontario—middle western Canada—is actually a small peninsula of land separating Lakes Huron, Erie, and Ontario—an accusing hand pointing on the map toward Detroit. (From Windsor, Ontario, one actually looks north across the river to Detroit, Michigan.) Most of southern Ontario is farmed, and the resemblance to nearby southern Michigan is obvious. But this is above all Canada's industrialized heartland, currently undergoing yet another phase of economic expansion. Torontonians speak of the Golden Horseshoe of towns and cities that are grouped around western Lake Ontario. Toronto is a spectacular growth center, still largely free of decay and confusion.

Eastern Canada is well watered, with abundant, regular rain and snowfall. Hydroelectric power was at the root of the early industrial expansion of both Quebec and Ontario. Quebec is the home of some of the world's largest projects—the Bersimis and Manicouagan developments, and James Bay. Ontario, however, has long outgrown its hydraulic resources and has, within the past two decades, invested heavily in nuclear power. By 1992, she will have twenty power reactors generating 14,200 megawatts of electricity, capable of yielding more than two-thirds of her consumption.

The Prairie Provinces seem to most Canadians to be another natural region within the national framework. Again, however, it is often difficult to see any commonality of interest. As in the Maritimes, the mechanisms of collaboration exist. But political relationships are by no means close. I recall that one of the Prairie premiers, about twenty years ago, wrote to the Canadian Association of Geographers saying that he was surprised to hear us refer to the Prairie Provinces, as if they had much in common and were a natural grouping. In fact, he said, that was not the case. Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba have distinctive sets of special interests. It is the exception, not the rule, to find them in agreement.

Not one of them, in fact, is predominantly prairie. All are more forest than prairie. All have economic interests quite apart from the farming and stock rearing that have converted every square inch of the grasslands that once spread across their southern areas. Alberta has coal, oil, natural gas, and timber as well as a sizable share of the Rocky Mountains (on whose flanks the winter Olympics were recently held). Saskatchewan has timber, heavy oil, potash, and uranium ore. Both provinces have idiosyncratic and contrasting political traditions. Manitoba (until recently the only Canadian province with a social democratic party in office) has a diverse economy, with a notable surplus of hydraulic power. Winnipeg is a great city that ought to have been the national capital. In sum, the Prairie Provinces are not just prairie and certainly not uniform; they are unimpressed by the logic of geography.

British Columbia is just as diverse. The interior includes the Rocky, Purcell, and Selkirk mountains—giant alpine edifices separated by the defile called the Rocky Mountain Trench, occupied variously by the headwaters of the Columbia, the Kootenay, the Fraser, and the Peace. Then, as one goes west, a tumbling of forested ridges and plateaus, with dry, fertile, irrigable valleys (notably the Okanagan). Next, the great wall of the Coast Range, Canada's name for the Cascades. Along the coast, an inland sea, the Straits of Georgia, with tiny patches of fertile land mostly now bearing cities—Vancouver and Victoria prominently. Vancouver Island is mountainous in the center and west, low along the Georgia coast. Over it all, west of the Coast Range, there used to spread a rain forest of Douglas fir, red cedar, and Sitka spruce—an ecosystem that reached its climax on Vancouver Island and the Queen Charlotte Islands. One can sail from Tacoma to Juneau through the Inland Passage, sheltered nearly everywhere from the open Pacific. But the forest has largely gone, decimated by a forest industry that is just now assaulting the final remains.

Canadians talk about themselves and their institutions incessantly, often with tiresome insistence. Rarely do they remind the stranger that they have the privilege of living in one of the world's most dramatic environments, rich in physical beauty and natural resources. The political debate of the day is about the problems of a society that chooses to live within compact urban areas not conspicuously different from those of small countries. Outside those cities, however, the land spreads out immensely, diluting our national life and keeping us at more than arm's length from one another.

Robert F. Harney

"So Great a Heritage as Ours" Immigration and the Survival of the Canadian Polity

IN 1947 PRIME MINISTER MACKENZIE KING called for a revival of the mass immigration to Canada that had been curtailed during the depression and World War II. "The objective of Canada's immigration policy," he wrote, "must be to enlarge the population of the country. It would be dangerous for a small population to attempt to hold so great a heritage as ours."[1]

At the time of Mackenzie King's pronouncement, 50 percent of Canada's 12 million people claimed descent from the British Isles and 30 percent from France. Seen regionally, the homogeneity of the population was even more striking. In Ontario, the most populous province, three out of four residents could trace their origins to the United Kingdom or Ireland. In Toronto 80 percent were of British descent. At the same time, 90 percent of the country's Francophones were in Quebec and the adjoining French corridors of northern Ontario and northern New Brunswick.

The policy that Mackenzie King initiated has changed the face of Canada. In the four decades since the end of World War II, the country's population has more than doubled. Over 5.5 million of Canada's 26 million people are immigrants. They and their children have settled heavily in Canada's largest cities. Since the war, many of

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Robert Harney is Professor of History at the University of Toronto, Co-Director of its Ethnic and Immigration Studies Department, Academic Director of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario, and Editor of Polyphany, *the society's journal.*

the immigrants have been non-British and non-French, and since the late 1960s, non-European. They represent not only an expanding urban work force but also an enormous and highly visible increase in the country's cultural diversity. Today the effects of forty years of mass immigration, tensions between Francophones and Anglophones, the unresolved issue of the rights of the indigenous people, the disruptive pseudoethnogenesis lurking in the regionalism of the West and the Maritimes, and the traditional fear of absorption by the United States interact to make survival of the Canadian polity a recurring theme in public discourse.

Conversations about Canadian politics, society, and culture, if not saccharine accounts of the joys of multiculturalism, are full of complaint about the divisive nature of certain policies; they seem to begin and end as a "lament for a slain chieftain," the postcolonial dream of a unified, perhaps dualist, Canadian nation felled by the intrigue or ambitions of warring clans—the "French," the "ethnics," the "westerners," the "Anglo-Celts." Of course maintaining a viable political state and achieving a successful (i.e., integrative) nationalism as an ideology and an identity for those who live within that state are two different issues, but they rarely appear so in Canada. Questions about cultural diversity, population, and government policy combine as a single national obsession, a state of affairs that can be characterized as a polity in search of a nation.

"In a state of affairs," writes the philosopher Wittgenstein, "objects fit into one another like the links of a chain. In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relationship to one another." Both Canada's "state of affairs" and the debates born of differing perceptions of it are best understood against the backdrop of complex, unexpected ways in which the aspirations of the Francophones, the effects of mass immigration, and the imperatives of the Anglophone hegemony have since World War II interplayed with the drive to ensure the state's survival.

Immigration policy has always reflected a dialectic between the desired population increase and the impact of immigration on Canadian ways or on the racial and ethnocultural composition of the country. In the 1890s, when the energetic minister of the interior of the day, Clifford Sifton, initiated a policy of peopling "Canada's empty prairies" through an aggressive recruitment of settlers and the importation of migrant labor to build the railroad and industrial infrastructure, preference was shown for British and American settlers or for other "good" (i.e., northwest European) stock. The realities of the British and Scottish economy and of anti-immigrant recruitment laws in Germany meant that Sifton had to find his largest bloc of settlers not in the United Kingdom or Nordic Europe but in the Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. With remarkable resilience, the minister came to see the "stalwart [Slavic] peasant in a sheepskin coat, born on the soil, whose forefathers have been farmers for ten generations, with a stout wife and a half-dozen children" as "good quality" for the task of defending the prairie from American incursion.[2]

Five purposes of Canadian immigration policy, appearing under changing flags of convenience and employing different idioms, have remained relatively constant over the century from the 1890s to the present. Canada has needed immigrants to:

1. Occupy the country in sufficient numbers to discourage the expansionary tendencies of the American colossus.
2. Protect the Pacific Rim from heavy Asian immigration.
3. Create economies of scale and a rational East-West axis for an independent polity and a viable economy.
4. Maintain a British hegemony by combating separatism, whether in its Prairie Métis and Indian form of the last century or in its Quebecian form in this one, and to counter the *revanche des berceaux* of the *Canadiens* against the British conquest.
5. Foster the image of Canada as a new place of opportunity, a country of potential greatness, and "a land of second chance," characterized by the fairness of British institutions and now by the civility of state-sponsored democratic pluralism in the form of official multiculturalism.

The idea of using immigrants as part of a strategy to ensure the state's survival and to create a nation from former French and British colonies has two corollaries—first, a preoccupation with the country's "absorptive power," and second, a sense that the migration phenomenon exists to serve the host country, not the migrants, and that not only the flow of immigration but its sources and character are matters that Canadian authorities can and should manipulate. In

1909 J. S. Woodsworth warned his countrymen that all Canada's other problems "dwindle into insignificance before the one great commanding, overwhelming problem of immigration." Woodsworth, a well-known evangelist and later one of the founders of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (the forerunner of the New Democratic party), went on to state, under the heading "Racial Effects," that the mass migration Sifton had encouraged would have its impact on Canadians: "Canada will not remain Canadian," he wrote.[3]

Mackenzie King's views on what peoples might best serve Canada's need to expand its populace without causing a "fundamental alteration in the character" of the country remained remarkably consistent over his long and influential career. Barely a decade after Sifton had encouraged mass migration from the Continent, King, as a deputy minister of labor, advocated keeping out those "belonging to nationalities unlikely to assimilate and who consequently prevent the building up of a united nation of people of similar customs and ideals." His preferred list included American, British, French, Belgian, Dutch, Swiss, German, Scandinavian, and Icelandic settlers.[4] If the argument was not always made overtly from racialist premises about north European stock having more proclivity to orderly society and free parliamentary institutions, such premises, along with those about the compatibility of Northwest Europeans—in terms of complexion, mores, and religion—lay behind the assumption that migrants from the countries King mentioned were the most easily assimilated.

Another prime minister, R. B. Bennett, expressed this way of thinking succinctly in the 1930s: "The people [Continental Europeans] have made excellent settlers . . . but it cannot be that we must draw upon them to shape our civilization. We must still maintain that measure of British civilization which enables us to assimilate these people to British institutions rather than assimilate our civilization to theirs . . . . "[5]

King himself observed in his May 1947 statement that, "it is of the utmost importance to relate immigration to absorptive capacity" and added his well-known line that "the people of Canada do not wish to make a fundamental alteration in the character of their population through mass immigration."

Within five years of King's statement, an article in *Maclean's,* one of Canada's most influential magazines, suggested that something was awry with the new mass immigration. In an article entitled "What Kind of Canadians Are We Getting?" the alarm was sounded: "The British share of immigration to Canada has been drying up. Until 1924 it was 62 per cent. By 1948 it was down to 38 per cent. Now it's 17 per cent. Meanwhile the proportion of immigrants from continental Europe has climbed from an inconsequential 20 per cent to more than 75 per cent." A former commissioner of immigration for the Canadian Pacific Railway was quoted as saying that a "slow but certain change in the racial composition of the Canadian people is inevitable unless the trend is arrested."[6] The process begun by King ran afoul of the old dialectic.

Over time, the use of language has become more circumspect. "Founding nations" replaces "founding races" as a label for the French and British. Immigrants are categorized by their assimilability or place within a multicultural mosaic rather than in terms of their "stock." Interethnic and interracial antagonism are given the pseudodistance of social science. Immigrants of certain groups are not undesirable because of their distance from the racial and cultural core but because of the impact they may have on those already in Canada, those "somewhat nervous about rapid ethnic change." As the report of the Canadian Immigration and Population Study had it in 1975, people were "concerned about the consequences for national identity that might follow significant change in the ethnic composition of the population."[7]

By the 1980s, Canada was caught between a potential for zero population growth early in the next century and the prospect of continuing policies that seemed to promise a "fundamental alteration" of her populace, her cultural ways, and her public ethos and justification of nationhood. The central objective of Canada's immigration policy had always been the growth of Canada through the importation of foreign labor and talent. The policy's secondary purposes had to do with the disposition of the displaced and the allied after World War II and with the imperatives of the Cold War and then of good citizenship in the United Nations and the Commonwealth, especially concerning refugees and the struggle for human rights and against racism. In effect, Canada's current search for a principle of collective national identity can be traced to the impact of the postwar decision to grow through immigration and the ways that an immigration policy escapes the state's control to become an instrument of migration strategies. Canada's state of affairs today derives from what John Stuart Mill once described to Henry George as:

> two of the most difficult and embarrassing questions of political morality—the extent and limits of the rights of those who have first taken possession of the unoccupied portion of the earth's surface to exclude the remainder of mankind from inhabiting it, and the means which can be legitimately used by the more improved branches of the human species to protect themselves from being hurtfully encroached upon by those of a lower grade of civilization.[8]

When Mackenzie King and the Senate of Canada spoke to the need for a new age of mass migration policy in the late 1940s, they did so impelled by two traditions of Canadian immigration policy. First, the Canadian population needed to grow in order to defend the space it had inherited from the colonial period. Second, an expanding population was necessary for the development of a healthy economy. King had noted in his diary that all the cabinet was agreed "that in the long range view, Canada would certainly need to have a large population if she hoped to hold the country for herself against the ambitions of other countries and build her strength." Among his colleagues there were some who believed that Canada faced the possibility of a postwar economic boom that would lead her to her postcolonial destiny as a great power. That boom would be thwarted by an absence of manpower.

By 1947, representatives of Canadian industries such as mining, agriculture, and forestry had approached the government for help in finding new sources of cheap and pliable workers. Australia had already begun to tap the Continent's displaced peoples for migrants, and Canada would be remiss if she did not follow suit. When King made his views public in May, he spoke of Canada bringing over immigrants at a rate that would be compatible with the country's absorptive powers. Although the surface of his remarks dealt with this issue of absorption in terms of economics, full employment, and industrial expansion, the usual subtext about finding suitable ethnic and racial stock that would be assimilable broke through the text, especially in the explicit call for exclusion of Asian immigrants. It is clear that his colleagues and the Opposition were aware of the subtext since he was asked immediately in the House of Commons whether he had begun negotiations with the governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands about recruiting immigrants there officially.

By appeasing anti-Asian racism in western Canada (King made his remarks in the same year that the new Canadian Citizenship Act finally gave Asians the vote in British Columbia) and paying lip service to an ancillary flow of French-speaking immigrants ("born in France" was given equal footing as a category of admission with "British subject"), the government freed itself to act. In the aftermath of the war, there seemed to be pools of prospective immigrants from Europe who could fulfill long-range demographic needs while nicely satisfying, or at least not antagonizing, the constituencies in Canada. Within the atmosphere of the Allies' goodwill, thousands of veterans of the Polish army in exile began arriving in Canada after 1946. The specific terms of payment for their ship's passage, even with the not entirely altruistic help of the British government in dispersing them through the Empire, often led to a period of what amounted to indenture in the Canadian North or in specific industries in need of workers. Canadian Jews and Ukrainians lobbied the government to help their kinsmen who had either survived death camps or were in displaced-person (DP) camps. Such lobbies would prove that in a democracy, existing groups must be heard, but immigration officials were often more interested in developing systematic recruitment in Holland, Scandinavia, and the United Kingdom.[9]

The four forces shaping recruitment choice, then, were: (1) the racialist or cultural assumptions of officials and many politicians, (2) the ethnic lobbies in Canada, (3) the availability of potential migrants of certain nationalities because of wartime and aftermath displacement, and (4) the voracious hunger of Canadian heavy industry for workers who could stand up under strenuous, dangerous, and dirty work done in remote and unhealthy places. The competition among these four forces distorted the population policy King initiated. In the collective memory of the immigrants of the 1950s and 1960s, being able to show an immigration inspector calloused hands and a body ready for hard work is remembered as a more essential rite of passage than questions about ethnicity or wartime politics.

At first the DPs provided ideal, almost chattel labor. Moreover, their recruitment satisfied that other goal of Canadian policy, the maintenance of a reputation for high moral purpose among the community of nations and the image of generosity of spirit in providing access to a land of second chance. Bulk labor schemes worked out with the International Relief Organization soon brought large numbers of Balts and other East Europeans to join the displaced Poles. The discourse's subtext, that immigrants should not only fit into the economy but also into the ethnic and racial needs of the country, continued to break through the surface. Of the first thousand women recruited from the DP camps as domestic servants, the recruiters in the field were reminded that "Protestant girls are preferred, possibly Estonians and of the best type available."[10] Only a year after the war, a Canadian Institute of Public Opinion poll showed 49 percent of Canadians against Jewish immigration as opposed to only 34 percent who would have barred Germans.[11] Race clearly mattered more than politics for most Canadians when it came to an immigrant's credentials. However, the Canadian Jewish Congress sought more vigorous screening of those who had fought with the Axis, and the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians had to remind the government that it should give priority to those immigrants who had fought against Nazi Germany and her satellites if it wished to pay honor to the Canadian war dead.[12]

Elements in the primary sector of the economy—mining, timbering, railway work, industrial agriculture such as sugar beet production—some of which had used POWs as labor during the war, were in great need of manpower. Many industries also saw the chance to keep native-born labor off balance and to dilute the power of unions. The representatives of these industries shared King's view that coming to Canada was not "a fundamental human right" but a "privilege," a privilege that desperate men would acknowledge by being grateful and compliant in the workplace. An official of one of Canada's largest sugar companies described how his firm could use the Polish army veterans. They "could be quartered in the existing [POW] camps . . . . These camps could be operated successfully in a manner similar to the former camps but with much less expense and organization since no guards would be needed."[13] In the 1950s, at least 80 percent of the immigrants who were Poles, Ukrainians, Balts, Dutch, Germans, and British had Ontario and Quebec as their targets. They were accompanied, after the lifting of the Enemy Alien Act, which had excluded citizens of Axis countries from Canada, by a growing stream of Italians, and then by Portuguese and Greek immigrants. Over two decades, Ontario's population of 4.5 million was swelled by another half million immigrants.

Efforts to control the flow of migrants once in Canada and to define areas of settlement were difficult in its context of democracy and free enterprise. Although most mining and railway towns in the North had prewar enclaves of East Europeans, the arrival of large numbers of Polish veterans, displaced Lithuanians, Slovaks, Croats, Ukrainians, Donau-Schwabs, and other German peoples revivified the ethnic collectivities—often, however, with misunderstanding and conflict between the Left and the Right, and the old and the new immigrants. At the same time, many migrants, after an initial stay in the smaller work sites, moved on to Montreal or the megalopolis of the Golden Horseshoe in southern Ontario. Others joined one of Canada's oldest and strongest migration patterns by seeking entry to the United States. Dutch and German settlers were distributed more evenly by occupation and geography across Ontario and the West. The country received the new immigrants with mixed feelings; the DPs were anti-Communist (usually committed to capitalism) and had a higher percentage of educated people among them than earlier waves of immigrants. Many, especially among the Dutch and the Balts, were of the Nordic physical type idealized in Anglophone-Canadian culture. In this respect they were welcome, but the signs of ethnic persistence they showed from the beginning were less so.

By the late 1950s, the numbers of immigrants from northeastern Europe, which the DPs represented, had begun to dwindle, but Canada's need for manpower had not. The coming of Italians in large numbers and the urban pattern of their settlement brought tension between the demographic and the racial goals of the immigration policy. The matter was rarely couched in language quite so bald. Both the lessons of World War II and the United Nations Charter caused civilized nations to give up talk of the right stock. Sentiment changed more slowly, and issues such as sponsored versus independent migration, assimilability and enclaving, and the appropriateness of recruiting more actively in the British mother country were the media within which the Italian question was studied. Ontario had had since the turn of the century its own immigration and colonization department. In keeping with that province's reputation as a loyal outpost of the British Empire, the department focused on recruiting immigrants from the United Kingdom, but it saw in the Dutch and Scandinavians appropriate surrogates. In 1947 Ontario's premier, George Drew, began a successful effort to airlift 10,000 British immigrants directly to Toronto.[14] As late as 1964, Ontario's deputy director of immigration toured northern Europe in search of settlers who presumably might counterbalance the heavy flow of Southern Europeans.

That tour took place about five years after the moment, startling to some Canadian authorities, when Italians, who had been listed as "nonpreferred stock" in prewar immigration department documents, surpassed the British in numbers entering Canada in a year. The Italian flow, although partly induced by renewal of earlier chain migration, had been, in the main, a flow of labor to capital, of migrant brawn to crude workplace. The subtext about their suitability as new Canadians and assimilability was always present. As the Italians, along with the Portuguese and the Greeks, became the engine of the rapid urbanization of much of southern Ontario, their visibility changed. Massive ethnic enclaves in the city were not the same as a quaint, impoverished Little Italy clinging to the sides of a smelter, mine, or railway yard. Given the traditional assumption that immigration policy was an aspect of population policy and that regulatory manipulation could fix rates of flow that went awry, it is instructive and a fillip to the anarchist to note how completely the Italian immigrants defeated the Canadian "gatekeepers" between 1947 and 1967.

The Immigration Act of 1952 was intended to secure the type of immigrants that Canada's political leadership had sought shortly after World War II. In the discretionary powers accorded the minister and bureaucrats under the act, the imperatives of the subtext on suitability of stock became text but were couched in a manner that would not insult the U.N. Charter. An immigrant could be prohibited from entering Canada for reason of nationality, geographic origin, peculiarity of custom, unsuitability of climate, and probable inability to "become readily assimilated." A 1952 *Maclean's* piece railed at "Ottawa's zealous publicity men" who were obscuring the impact on the Canadian future that emerges from an honest analysis of the "characteristics, moral fiber, skills and racial composition of the hundreds of thousands of immigrants" then passing through reception centers. The article added that the people in public relations "don't tell you that our most adaptable class of immigrants, the Briton, is an ever declining proportion of our total immigration."[15]

The 1952 act, then, reflected the view of much of the Anglophone host society. In 1956 an influential series of articles in the *Globe and Mail* described the virtue of some German, Dutch, and Estonian immigrants. Nonetheless, it added that "people from the British Isles are more rapidly accepted than those from European countries."[16] Although Barbadian Canadians successfully challenged the systematic exclusion of blacks as unassimilable and unsuitable for reasons of climate[17] and even though southern European migrant laborers, with the Italians as bellwethers, shattered Canada's dream of keeping the population northwest European, attempts to control the flow of immigrants from certain backgrounds continued until the late 1960s. A spate of press accounts about illegal Chinese immigration schemes was followed in May of 1960 by concerted Royal Canadian Mounted Police raids on all of Canada's major Chinatowns in search of incriminating evidence. Whatever else the raids signaled, they showed the government still to "be on guard" for white Canada against a change in its "fundamental character."[18]

The impact of the new mass migration has been especially unsettling for Ontario. In the forty years since the war, the population has gone from 3 out of 4 to less than 3 out of 6 residents of British descent. (It should be added that such figures beg the question of whether using the census category "British" and the political term *WASP,* which mask traditional Celtic-English divisions and the generational distance between new immigrants from Brixton and the Midlands and the old stock, are of any value. They lump together people of such diverse cultures and backgrounds.) A polity that had about 100,000 foreign-born in 1951 had more than 2 million two decades later.

The impact of mass immigration on Quebec was even more unsettling, although it was less a matter of numbers than of the fact and image of non-French-speaking strangers massing in Montreal and the French-Canadian interpretation of that invasion. Between 1946 and 1971, 3.5 million immigrants arrived in Canada. Only about 15 percent of the newcomers settled in Quebec, but fewer than 5 percent of those who did were Francophones. Although many of the educated DPs and Italian and Portuguese migrant laborers who reached Montreal could function in French, they seemed to identify with the Anglophone culture and with Canada as a polity rather than with *Francophonie* and Quebec. Quebec's nationalist view, and perhaps the French-Canadian view generally, was that "le Ministre de l'Immigration a introduit le cheval de Troie au Canada française" in order to pierce "une muraille imprenable."[19]

Since the number of immigrants coming from France between 1946 and 1986 was not only less than the number coming from the United Kingdom but also less than the contingents of Italians, Portuguese, Greeks, West Indians, Poles, Germans, and those from Hong Kong and the Indian subcontinent, *la survivance* of the *Canadien* required higher fertility rates among French Canadians and an ability and a willingness to acculturate immigrants. By the 1980s, the Quebecois birth rate was among the lowest in Canada; a combination of turning inward to Quebec rather than a pan-French-Canadian strategy and the assimilation by law, if necessary of all immigrants in the province, recommended itself. Immigrants arriving in Quebec usually had little idea or interest in the fact that they were entering a cultural and political battle zone. The gallicization of Montreal and the defeat of the Anglophone hegemony were the front, and it was not a place for noncombatants.

English as a language had higher status than any other in Canada, in North America, and in the world, and since their strategies required a primary interest in mobility, the immigrants saw the acquisition and use of standard English as crucial. Learning French might help one get work on the telephone exchange or the police force and might be necessary to a small shopkeeper, but it did not open the door to greater North American opportunity. Moreover, the nationalism, not to say racism, of the Quebecois enabled the immigrants to claim with some justification (although the same point could certainly have been made about Montreal's Anglophones of British descent) that the fault lay with the Francophones themselves, "who, as xenophobes, were not inclined to accept the immigrants and who would claim that those same immigrants could neither speak nor learn French correctly."[20]

Something of a self-confirming hypothesis existed on both sides. In 1962–1963, 25 percent of the Italian immigrant children were in the French-speaking school system; by 1971–1972 the figure was 10 percent. More than that, it is probably true, as some scholars have pointed out, that the initiation price for acculturation into *Anglophonie* is acquiring a certain disdain for "the French fact" and for speaking French in Canada.

Since the perception and reality of the urban Italian communities as potential centers of political power were a major element later in making the "third force" of non-British, non-French descent more than a Prairie-based Slavic movement and in contributing to the assertion of a public policy of multiculturalism, one can say that the failure of the immigration authorities to maintain a flow "consistent with the country's ability to absorb" had serious consequences for the forging of the Canadian nation. One should add that the image of Montreal's Italian immigrants of the 1950s and 1960s choosing *Anglophonie* in preference to assimilation to a sister Latin culture, especially since many prewar Italians had become gallicized, played a significant role in Quebec's separatism as well. It is not as if the authorities did not attempt to manipulate Italian immigration from the beginning. There is even some suggestion that Canada's doors opened to Italians in the late 1940s, not just because of the pressures for family reunification and labor needs but because of the NATO allies' fear that Italy's population problems would improve the chances of the Communist party coming to power there. Canadian officials showed the traditional concern for cutting a good figure among their senior allies. As a dispatch from the Canadian Department of External Affairs had it, "Any increase in emigration to Canada would be of practical help to Italy in tackling her greatest problem. It would also be a small, but distinctly Canadian, contribution to strengthening the present democratic 'western' government . . . ."[21]

Canada had always preferred northern to southern Italian immigrants. That preference was couched in terms of skills and adaptability by the 1950s but steeped in assumptions about the "Germanic" roots of the Friulians and other northerners and the Mediterranean ways of the southerners. Some authorities felt that opening recruiting stations south of Milan would not "draw the best class of immigrant." As sociologists have shown about Italian migration to Australia, in the struggle between "the manifest function of bureaucracy" and the "latent function of informal networks," the latter—family strategies, chain and serial migration, and ethnic group networks of assistance—are always faster, more resilient, and smarter than government agencies.[22] As a result, Italians, predominantly from the South, appeared for more than a decade among the top five arriving groups in Canada.

The government estimated with a note of terror that every Italian male laborer who entered Canada in the 1950s was responsible for forty-nine other Italian immigrants. When efforts were made to manipulate the regulations in order to slow the Italian flow, restrictive definitions of who could be sponsored, previously applied only to the Chinese, were tried. "I doubt if we could get away with it but one step worth considering might well be to announce that 50% of the total Unemployment Insurance Commissions claims in the Toronto area . . . are Italians," wrote a deputy minister of citizenship and immigration in 1960, but he knew better: "We must not make the mistake again of letting the story get abroad that anything we may be attempting is designed to cut down Italian immigration."[23] The immigrants had become political clientele, and the conditions for mass immigration to turn to polyethnicity, and for polyethnicity to lead to multicultural politics, had emerged.

There are a number of ways to tell the story of how the visible polyethnicity that accompanied postwar immigration intruded on the exigencies of French-English relations and of how that intrusion led, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, to a revolution of policy and rhetoric, if not of sentiment. As the charter groups sought to define the new Canadian nationhood in terms of bilingualism and biculturalism, a third force emerged demanding multiculturalism rather than biculturalism. Canadians as "the other North Americans" needed an identity that would no longer be subordinate to the British metropole, that would dampen the appeal of separatism in Quebec, and that would continue to sustain political, social, and cultural values assumed to be distinct from those of the United States. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, established in the early 1960s, had as its main task the search for that new identity and for an amicable and more equal sharing of power and culture by the two "founding races." The commission was "state intervention to restructure the symbolic order" in Canada.[24] The French-British dualism that had in the past been seen as a tale of mutual antagonism, of exploitation and inequality, as an impediment to the emergence of the Canadian, would now be refurbished as a national virtue.

Along with it came revival of the old saw that *la survivance* of the *Canadien* was a key element in the survival of the Canadian in the face of the American urge to continental imperium and vice versa. Any assessment of recent Canadian history has to include the sense of surprise, sadness, and anger felt by the mainstream when its effort to build national independence on dualism (in the form of an official bilingualism and biculturalism) foundered on the ethnocentrism of some Anglophones, the extremism of some Quebec separatists, and an unanticipated demand on the part of those claiming to represent a "third element," or "third force." These were the one-quarter to one-third of the population who were of neither French nor British descent and who wanted to share power and help formulate the country's culture.

Some explanations of the events of the late 1960s and early 1970s may seem more cynical than others, and some have more explanatory power and appeal for one set of players than another, but all have the sort of truth described by the Indian from James Bay who told a Quebec judge that he could not swear to tell the truth but only what he knew. One can view the public policy of multiculturalism that has emerged since 1971 in four different ways—as:

1. A product of the postwar convergence of arriving nationalist DP intellectuals—Poles, Balts, and Ukrainians especially—and a failure of the will to assimilate on the part of Anglo-Canadian officials.
2. An innovative and altruistic civic philosophy of democratic pluralism to replace loyalty to the British Empire as a legitimizing principle for the Canadian state.
3. A device used by Anglophones to minimize the uniqueness of the French minority in Canada.
4. A tactic of venal politicians to find a medium of exchange and thus a way of controlling new ethnic and immigrant voting blocs.

Whichever narrative proves most elegant, they all include the same three mythic protagonists: the British (sometimes and not exactly synonymously identified as the Anglophones or Anglo-Celts), the French (sometimes and again not synonymously described as *Canadiens,* Francophones, and Quebecois), and the "other ethnic groups."

Moreover, there is in all of the accounts a sense of the intrusion of the ethnic groups into an antique struggle between the real Canadians/*Canadiens*.

For, although some of the spokesmen for the settlers of the Prairies, especially the Ukrainians, spoke as if they were a third founding nation, in the belief, one assumes, that as the first to break the prairie sod, they met the white man's definition of proprietorship through exploitation and settlement, and although later Ukrainian immigrants spoke as if traces of the failed Hapsburg monarchy had crossed the sea with them, no one until the 1960s thought of Canadian history except in terms of the titanic contest between the British and the French. Both saw immigrants and Canadians of other backgrounds as potential Anglophones and, to paraphrase H. L. Mencken, as "assistant Canadians" brought in to counterbalance *la revanche des berceaux*. They romanticized the presence of the Prairie isolates such as Mennonites, Hutterites, Icelandics, and Galicians. One participant in the second Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism in 1976 recalled the way in which a more diffuse pluralism had always been used to combat dualism: "Ukrainians, Germans, and others could provide a kind of counterweight to the French Canadians." Faced with claims and complaints from the French, the English of western Canada could come back with "What about the Ukrainians?" He added, perhaps giving away too much about the caretaker's reasons for supporting multiculturalism, "More broadly and generally, the tension when two social groups compete within a polity seems likely to be reduced insofar as there are a number of groups."[25]

The 1960s saw the transformation of polyethnicity from a social consequence of recent immigration to its assertion as a permanent feature of the Canadian political landscape. Polyethnicity evolved along with multiculturalism, an idea en route to an ideology fashioned from the rhetoric of ethnocultural impresarios huckstering for the folkloric and visiting British royalty searching for a way to describe the colorfulness of the colonies (no doubt after countless onslaughts by Cree, Blackfoot, and Ukrainians in full ethnic battle dress, herded by red-tunicked guardians of "the Canadian way"). The speed with which the newcomers, in alliance with some older Prairie ethnic elements, managed to become players in the shaping of the new Canada, is evident in the last-minute addition to the mandate of the royal commission of a study of the third element. The study is summed up in the fourth volume of the commission's report, entitled *The Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups*. This title seems less startling when one thinks about the rapid concentration in urban enclaves of the new immigrants: 84 percent of the Greeks, 82 percent of the Chinese, and 75 percent of the Italians are in cities of more than 500,000 inhabitants. Also important were the revitalization of some ethnic groups engendered by the arrival of large numbers of their countrymen (already mobilized by nationalist sentiment) and the salience that the issues of ethnocultural rights and ethnic identity acquired in Canadian public discourse because of the separatist movement in Quebec. Among the immigrants and the spokesmen for the third element there was a natural uneasiness that "a deal was being cut without them." As the noted Canadian sociologist Raymond Breton has observed, "the name of the Royal Commission [on Bilingualism and Biculturalism] itself was a symbol generating status anxiety [for the third element] as were several other themes permeating the debate: founding peoples, charter groups, the two nation society."[26] Many immigrant intellectuals also lived with a misunderstanding—reinforced by the fact that they first encountered and understood Canada through the medium of the Anglophone hegemony or the ethnoverted discourse of their own kind—of Quebec as an *ethnie* overreaching itself rather than as a suppressed nation engaged in a "quiet revolution," or, in the case of the fanatical few, an insurrection.

Several other factors contributed to the rapidity with which immigrants regrouped and underwent the sort of ethnicization that led them to participate aggressively in the debate about Canadian identity under way in the 1960s and 1970s. Some of the groups arriving—especially the Polish army veterans, the Baltic DPs, and the Ukrainians (veterans of war or labor camps)—saw themselves as "saving remnants" of their people, as nuclei of nations in exile. In all cases, they were peoples who, through long stretches of their history, had had to sustain their national identities without having at their disposal the machinery of nation-states of their own. The democratic structure of Canada and the uncertainty of the Canadian host society and government in responding to the tactics of group persistence of the ethnonationalists encouraged the building of ethnies. It is fair to add that among the same DPs and among immigrants from other parts of continental Europe, there were many who advocated democratic pluralism, or multiculturalism, not as a device to facilitate the maintenance of the nation in exile or to forge ethnic groups but rather as a humane and civil form of nationhood to replace the very ethnonationalism they saw as a cause of World War II.

Distortions and ambiguities in the way Canadians think and talk about ethnicity also have contributed to the impact of the immigrants, and of the third force generally. Politicians and the public have confused the fact of polyethnicity with the idea of multiculturalism, and the latter term has generally been used to apply to both.[27] Leaders have generally preferred to think of those they represent as ethnic groups rather than immigrant groups since *immigrant* conjures up the thresholds of acculturation while *ethnic* implies a permanent quality of otherness. However, as we shall see, the penumbra of the Greek meaning of *ethnos* persists in English, so that to be called ethnic in Canada is to be called less, as in "ethnic writer," and marginal, as in "ethnic enclave." The word *ethnic* has, from the beginning, raised the conundrum of whether multiculturalism is "for all Canadians," including "the founding nations," or just for "ethnic Canadians." Avoiding the term leads to lexical monstrosities such as "the multilingual press" and references to "multicultural groups" or "we multiculturals." The increasing diversity of the population was further magnified by the workings of the Canadian census, which until recently required everyone to list patrilinear ethnic origin and rejected "Canadian" or "American" as answers except for Amerindians. This official definition and measurement of ethnic group membership, maintained at the insistence of French Canada (which saw in it a way to assert the size of the *Canadien* nation by descent since the more subtle calibration by mother tongue and home language showed great attrition outside Quebec and the adjoining corridors of northern Ontario and New Brunswick), also served ethnic and immigrant leaders well. They could ignore the workings of acculturation and the question of intensity of participation and feeling within the group. At the very least, reference to the census abetted those who played the numbers game; it also encouraged the impression that phalanxes of like-minded immigrants and ethnics were massing behind their leaders, an image bound to frighten or fascinate elected politicians.

Within a year of the great commission struck by Lester Pearson to "inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races," a Ukrainian-Canadian senator from the Prairies—Paul Yuzyk—rose to give his maiden speech in the Senate. The speech was entitled "Canada: A Multicultural Nation," and Yuzyk used the occasion to denounce biculturalism as a misunderstanding of Canadian reality, which, he said, had "changed from paramountly British and French . . . to multicultural."[28] He went on to speak of the third element, to which one-third of Canada's people belonged according to the census data the senator produced. It was one of the first of years of "arguments from the census" to define the Canadian future, a phenomenon that in Canada has always carried the uncomfortable implication that everyone must have a tribe to belong to, that ethnic identity is stamped at birth and is neither volitional nor processual, and that *census group* and *interest group* are synonymous. "Do you know," wrote another ethnic leader, "that the 5,764,075 so-called 'others' outnumber the entire population of seven provinces, the Atlantic and Prairie provinces combined . . . and that the 1,317,200 German Canadians are more numerous than the total population of provinces such as Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Nova Scotia," that there are "more Ukrainians [in Canada] than people in Newfoundland?"[29]

Since the spokesmen for the third element rejected the idea of a separate *Canadien* nation, they tended to see the argument over dualism and the commission's bilingual and bicultural mandate as one about power, not history. In this view, ethnic numbers, density, intensity, and perhaps even hints of societal strife were the strategies by which the Quebecois, if not the *Canadiens* of other provinces, had forced the British to negotiate. As an exasperated Ukrainian leader put it, "Is it necessary for all these people to establish their own ethnocultural enclaves before their cultural and linguistic aspirations are truly respected and encouraged?" In their speechmaking, the politicians who have advocated multiculturalism have flexed the muscles of the third force as if they were their own. From the beginning, then, the politicians have confused (usually purposely) immigrant first-settlement areas with permanent ethnic enclaves, and immigrant sentiments of "fellow-feeling," as well as the reality of diglossia, with a sense of ethnic community, group maintenance of boundaries, and shared destiny in Canada. With the French Canadians, some of the ethnoreligious groups of the Prairies, and the Ukrainians as models, the idea of ethnic persistence rather than inevitable Anglo conformism could be brandished as both a norm and an ethos to be pursued, even if statistics on language loss and intermarriage over generations suggest that only extreme geographical and religious isolation has slowed the rates of assimilation.

One of the best and most influential examples of the rhetorical uses of immigration statistics to promote both uniethnic persistence and multiculturalism came from Ontario's minister of citizenship in 1972:

> No other part of the globe, no other country can claim a more culturally diversified society than we have here in this province . . . . But does everyone really grasp that Ontario has more Canadians of German origin than Bonn, more of Italian origin than Florence, more Canadians of Greek origin than Sparta? That we have in our midst, 54 ethnocultural groups, speaking a total of 72 languages . . . ? Just 100 years ago the Canadian identity was moulded in the crucible of nationalism; it is now being tempered, tempered by the dynamics of multiculturalism.
>
> One effect of the postwar boom in third element immigration has been to bolster ethnocultural groups, some of which have been here through four generations. The government has welcomed and encouraged this immigration. We have recognized and helped to foster all our constituent cultural communities. Is it then any wonder that these communities have heightened expectations in many areas?[30]

The commissioners and researchers preparing *The Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups,* Book IV of the royal commission report, were by the late 1960s operating on vanished premises. On the one hand, a new Quebecois identity, based on a geographically, demographically, and institutionally compact and self-contained nation in one province, was rising to challenge the diffuse legal and linguistic ideal of a Francophone-Anglophone partnership stretching from sea to sea. On the other hand, few spokesmen for the third element—ethnic leaders as opposed to caretakers in support of multiculturalism—were content with this volume. Its authors observed that: (1) it should be "noted immediately that while the terms of reference deal with questions of those of ethnic origin other than British or French, they do so in relation to the basic problem of bilingualism and biculturalism from which they are inseparable"; (2) "that acculturation is inevitable in a multi-ethnic country like Canada"; and (3) that "multiculturalism within a bilingual framework can work, if it is interpreted as it is intended—that is, as encouraging those members of ethnic groups who want to do so to maintain a proud sense of the contribution of their own group to Canadian society .... If it is interpreted in a second way—as enabling various peoples to transfer foreign cultures and languages as living wholes into a new place and time—multiculturalism is doomed."[31]

Book IV, then, was the first modern public recognition of the possibility of group cultural rights for minorities and of limits for Anglo conformity and gallicization. The volume clearly set the limits of acceptable diversity as well. The commission envisaged study and celebration of pluralistic origin, and expressed a willingness to tolerate, even to encourage, the maintenance of ethnocultures, especially for immigrants and their children. Neither political nor linguistic pluralism would be possible, however, and the issue of what amounts of public money and what sort of public programs would be directed toward the support of ethnies remained ill defined enough to offend all three players—the British, the French, and the third element.

Looking back now through some of the havoc and bad feelings about ethnic politics and population policy to the 1970 convergence of "apprehended insurrection" of the Front libération de Québec, through the declaration of a multicultural policy by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau and the reaction of Anglophones to what many saw as the country "coming unraveled," it is helpful to borrow from the thought of the Italian Marxist anthropologist Ernesto De Martino. He said that groups despairing for the survival of their ways are not likely to feel much generosity of spirit toward the cultural rights of others.[32] In 1970 the two founding nations, the Prairie ethnic blocs, and the new immigrant ethnies all thought their pieces of the pie and the survival of their cultures were threatened. The sense of impending cultural and demographic doom affects the Anglophones because of everything from Quebec separatism to the ravishes of American cultural imperialism; the sense of survival that has always informed Quebec nationalism is nothing but a prolonged struggle against the apocalypse, the disappearance of the French language and culture from the continent.

It is easy to see how the arrival of masses of French immigrants to their chief city, Montreal, and the apparent anglicization of those newcomers could signal both the impotence of their nation and its imminent destruction. As political scientist Karl Deutsch has observed, the condition of being immigrant is always apocalyptic in that each generation must make reflective and ideological efforts to counter the effects of acculturation and slippage.[33] The rhetoric as well as the behavior of all groups toward one another since the uncertainty of the late 1960s reflects the scars of those times as much as or more than it does the putative cultural arrogance of one group or another.

Only with this point in mind can one make sense of how shrill the debate over immigration and multiculturalism can become. Certainly the policies and programs the government initiated after Trudeau announced the government's response to Book IV in October of 1971 were not so far ranging, expensive, or intrusive as to fire up the opponents of multiculturalism. "We believe," the prime minister said, "that cultural pluralism is the very essence of Canadian identity. Every ethnic group has the right to preserve and develop its own culture and values within the Canadian context. To say we have two official languages is not to say we have two official cultures, and no particular culture is more 'official' than another. A policy of multiculturalism must be a policy for all Canadians." Between Trudeau's pronouncement—his first and last parliamentary utterance on the issue—and the Multicultural Act, Bill C-93, brought before the House of Commons in Ottawa late in 1987, there has been no enabling legislation of any kind about multiculturalism or ethnic group rights.

Since 1973, there has been a multiculturalism directorate within the Department of the Secretary of State. Through grants to scholars, the arts, and ethnocommunity organizations, the directorate seeks to carry out the three chief goals of multiculturalism: (1) to help maintain ethnic group life and culture, (2) to foster cross-cultural understanding, and (3) to integrate immigrants through teaching the two official languages. These goals hardly promise balkanization, and the granting structure does not approach the resources available to mainstream cultural activities through the Canada Council and other agencies.

One might suppose that the ethnic and immigrant clientele would lead the hue and cry against the limited and perfunctory implementation of multiculturalism. To a certain extent, it has. Despite the truth of the remark that the "concerns of the non-British, non-French segment of the society were not primarily with cultural maintenance" and were instead with "status anxiety—fear of being defined as second class citizens,"[34] immigrant and ethnic leaders, even on advisory bodies carefully selected by the government, have protested the degree to which the integrative aspects of multiculturalism have been advanced over programs to sustain their own cultures. These programs, which they see as the government's obligation, are modeled on the federal programs that provide funding to prepare and pay teachers of French outside Quebec. The report of the very first Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (CCCM) has as its paramount concern the relationship between language retention and the preservation and future development of the ethnic group:

> Without language, cultural pluralism (or to use the contemporary term, multiculturalism) emerges as truncated multiculturalism, confined to such aspects as folk dancing, native costumes, special foods, embroidery, instrumental music or even folk songs with words which few can understand or are encouraged to learn.[35]

While Canadian teachers ran "pizza and pysanky" days and educators met to complain that "all too often such organizations [ethnic clubs and halls] plan extensively for the enrichment and enhancement of their own images and unique purpose without appropriate acknowledgement of all other groups," the politicized ethnic clientele of the government's multicultural policies saw only trivialization of their ethnocultures. The federally funded community cultural centers and multicultural centers that were to implement these policies were, according to the CCCM, more "compatible with the melting pot concept" than with pluralism. In 1977, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee made its dissent clear:

> Any attempt to develop and maintain the various cultures simultaneously as distinct yet intermixed together in a multicultural centre is a contradiction, as it leads to one blend or mass . . . . [36]

Perhaps the two charter groups would have thought the demands of "the ethnics" excessive under any circumstances, but the strong, though rarely garish, funding programs and the accompanying "ethnicking" for votes clearly fueled the conflict. There were dark mutterings of not dispensing government funds to help "keep ex-fascists dancing in their church cellars." A guest editor in *Maclean's* described English Canada as being "in danger of having its old, familiar British North American culture half bludgeoned to death by the cast iron balalaikas of multiculturalism," while the helpless Canadian taxpayer watches as "in the name of 'heritage' programs, he pays for Polish and Swahili Canadians to be taught in Polish and Swahili in the supposedly all-Canadian public school."[37]

Multiculturalism as a policy was denounced for many of the same reasons assimilationists have always objected to the maintenance of ethnicity. It would breed "double consciousness"—loyalty to more than one country; it would contribute to turning immigrant quarters into permanent ethnic ghettos; it would slow the process of overcoming the ignorance of English and French that made the immigrants exploitable. Part of most ethnic heritages is a traditional enmity for some other group. Was the Canadian government intending to contribute to that problem by funding ethnocultural organizations? Among the English-speaking, hostility to multiculturalism ran from the viscerally xenophobic to well-reasoned preference for a laissez-faire approach to liberal meritocracy and an abhorrence of state intervention in the issue of group status, even if a hierarchy of privilege based on ethnicity and class was obvious in the economy. Sometimes, of course, the viscerally xenophobic and the apparently reasonable became confused with one another. "You and me and our children have enough to do with the basic problem of hyphenated Canadianism, that is the French and English duality, without enshrining the whole world's diversity within our history and our borders," a well-known journalist and legislator told the Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism, and many well-intentioned Canadians of every ethnic background agreed with him.[38]

The need to involve newcomers and to inject multiculturalism into the effort to encourage the growth of a new postcolonial Canada seemed initially to confuse many mainstream intellectuals, Anglo-Celt in origin or not. Although embracing multiculturalism as an alternative to the hateful melting pot practiced to the south should have worked as well as paeans to dualism as a basis for a unique history, the mainstream often reacted defensively and a bit meanly. Some, for example, whittled away at the authenticity of the figures that gave "the others" one-third of the population.[39] Failing that, the Anglo-Canadians tended to speak of themselves in the 1970s as a "vanishing breed," to add hastily how nice their ethnic cleaning ladies were, and to point out that anti-British feeling, or the myth of British bigotry in Canada, was too negative a thing upon which to build the new multicultural Canada. The report of the Commission on Canadian Studies, issued seven years after Trudeau had declared the multicultural policy, was entitled *To Know Ourselves*. It contained only one reference to any ethnic group: "The remarkable Celtic contribution to the life of this country for example has received little attention. The British or Anglo-Canadian heritage is in danger of being ignored by scholars who fail to perceive that it, too, is part of the Canadian mosaic."[40]

The French-Canadian response to the declaration of the policy was, if anything, more ferocious and more consistent. Although in the last several years Francophones in the Prairie Provinces and Ontario have cooperated to gain heritage language rights, no sympathy, to say the least, existed among Francophones for multiculturalism during the 1960s and 1970s. The *Canadiens* who resided outside Quebec saw themselves orphaned by the Quebecois, who increasingly turned to strategies of seizing control in their own province, or *independantisme*. Despite government promises of protection under the Official Languages Act, they also saw multiculturalism as a device directed against them. As a French-Canadian prelate and scholar from Nova Scotia put it, quoting a *Le Droit* editorial, "We cannot help but see this as an insidious and steady shift away from biculturalism toward a crushing of *Francophonie's* special needs under the political weight of multiculture . . . ."[41] The response from Quebec nationalists like René Lévesque was less civil and circumspect: "Multiculturalism, really, is folklore. It is a 'red herring.' The notion was devised to obscure 'the Quebec business,' to give an impression that we are all ethnics and do not have to worry about special status for Quebec."[42]

It could be argued that the emergence of the multicultural policy was a godsend for Quebec separatism. It offered proof that the thousands of new immigrants who had come to Montreal since

World War II were not prepared to become Francophones; it seemed to promise that bilingualism on a national scale would fail and thus confirmed the Quebec nationalist's view that only a core of unilingual Francophones could guarantee the future of the French culture in Canada. On the other hand, the French-Canadian reaction guaranteed that most immigrants would see support for multiculturalism as their only refuge from cultural genocide and the English language as their only avenue of socioeconomic mobility. Two headlines in an Italian newspaper in Toronto reflect the tone of the relationship between the immigrants and the advocates of the new Quebec in the 1970s: "É Assurdo Dover Studiare Il Francese" ("It is absurd to be made to study French") and "I Franco-Canadesi Vogliono Francesizzare Gli Italiani Del Quebec" ("The French Canadians want to gallicize the Italians of Quebec").

Two French-Canadian intellectuals, one a professor at the University of Montreal and the other Quebec's ministre d'état au développement culturel, expressed the Francophone view of the policy most forcefully. The first, Guy Rocher, had his remarks read to a federal conference on multiculturalism.[43] Rocher saw the policy as a continuation by other means of an Anglophone campaign to define the French Canadians as first among the minorities rather than as a second nation within the Canadian polity. He pointed out that without biculturalism, the French language would function within bilingualism as merely an administrative and a government language. Multilingualism would, he believed, eventually appear to be the logical corollary of multiculturalism and then the uniqueness of the French existing in Canada would be lost. "At a time when 90 percent of the ethnic minorities of Quebec are opting for the English language and the *Anglophonie* culture," he wrote, "thereby constituting one of the most serious threats both politically and culturally to the Francophone community of Quebec, the federal government has undertaken to define Canada as a multicultural nation."

A year later the minister, Camille Laurin, lectured the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association, meeting in Quebec City, on the difference between an *ethnie* and a *nation*. An ethnie "renvoie à un ensemble de caractéristiques et de traditions dont l'existence ou la persistance peuvent se verifier au niveau des individus et des familles." A nation, however, is "une société globale, une société complète, qui possède ses caractéristiques propres en tant que société, qui a son propre mode d'organisation et de fonctionnement, qui a sa propre continuité historique, une tradition juridique et politique et enfin, un territoire bien identifié." Laurin went on to point out that all nations had the right to make their mother tongues official languages and to expect minorities to learn those languages. Those who "immigrated to a fully formed nation should not expect 'to modify the character and structures' of their adopted land" but should rather "accept the nation and share its destiny."[44]

While the larger Canadian state has groped toward a public policy of pluralism, Quebec has sought to acculturate its immigrants. Once French Canada saw immigration as a threatening program of the federal government and immigrants as allies of "les héritiers des conquérants," but because of the decline of the French-Canadian birth rate and the nationalists' and separatists' dreams of nation building Quebec now sees immigration as a way to draw and assimilate newcomers. This is especially so since natalization programs to encourage Quebec women to have more children seem unsuccessful. Provincial legislation in Quebec has clearly been an instrument to use the state to ensure *survivance,* but the terms of such laws have as their target the immigrants, not merely the vestiges of the Anglophone hegemony. Loi 63 (1969), "pour promouver la langue française au Québec," was directed toward ensuring the use of French in the workplace; Loi 22 (1974), "sur la langage officielle," had as its purpose forcing non-Anglophone immigrant children to attend the French language school system; Loi 101 (1977), "Charte de la langue française," required the use of French in all domains of social life—public administration, justice, commerce, small business. Its purpose was to make Quebec unilingually French. Although less than 100,000 of the 250,000 immigrants to Quebec spoke French on arrival, the success achieved in gallicizing the instruments of the provincial government seems to have made Quebec society more confident in its dealings with immigrants of every kind. It is not so much that 25,000 Haitians present less challenge to assimilation than the Italians and Portuguese who preceded them but rather, I believe, that great psychological gain has accompanied the rise and success of *independantisme* in Quebec, even among those who see it only as a tactic for improving French-Canadian fortunes within confederation. Seeing itself as a colonized majority in its own land, with a small colonialist elite to neutralize and immigrants to acculturate through state mechanisms, rather than as part of a shrinking minority in a vast land, Quebec can act out of confidence that it will survive rather than fear that it will die.

Despite the hostility and cynicism of much of the intelligentsia, which speaks for those born to or acculturated to one of the charter groups, and despite the limited definition of multiculturalism as an instrument of "gentle canadianization" held by educators and caretakers, the idea has become a political system and an ideology for many. Ambiguities about what *multiculturalism* should mean, what constitutes an ethnie, and how this policy affects individuals' negotiation of identity remain and may even facilitate the exchange between the government and its clientele, the citizens. The Canadian mosaic, the rainbow, polyphony, and the symphony orchestra have all been tried as images, and the first governor general of non-British and non-French descent—Edward Schreyer—spoke of Canada as a cathedral. In his installation speech, he quoted Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who at the turn of the century had called for a Canada on the model of a Gothic cathedral of granite, oak, and marble: "It is the image of the nation I wish to see Canada become. For here, I want the granite to remain the granite, the oak to remain the oak, the marble to remain the marble."[45]

The politicians and the intelligentsia have proven more adept at using metaphors for multiculturalism than at drafting legislation and programs to encourage the emergence of a public ethos of pluralism that both the charter groups and the other ethnic groups could share. In response to the programs of Ottawa and the provinces, an ethnic clientele has grown up that politicians and civil servants try to manipulate. It is easy enough to see the political exchange between the two sides, but it is difficult to see in the exchange more than symbolic gestures and partisan politics. Of the four elements of the policy—integration, the right to cultural retention, cross-cultural understanding, and equality of access and opportunity—the ethnic (at least the white) clientele is most interested in the parts of programs that help ethnic groups persist. They wish to see as corollaries access to the mainstream through acquisition of the official languages, the sort of intercultural understanding that affords each group a good status and a distinct identity in Canadian life, and an end to bigotry and discrimination. Most spokesmen and leaders, however, begin from the premise that the numerical and institutional strength of the ethnie and the coherence of its political mobilization are the prerequisites for gaining the government's attention.

The government, in turn, has an interest in dealing with a limited number of effective leaders from well-organized ethnic blocs. The multiculturalism sector of the federal government runs a program to organize advocacy for newer, less demanding, or more fractious ethnic collectivities. One astute social scientist has observed that the associational structures of most Canadian ethnic groups have so many personnel who represent the "organic intelligentsia" of state-sponsored multiculturalism and depend so heavily on government grants to operate that they cannot be considered independent spokesmen for ethnic feeling any longer.[46] Those who are uncomfortable with the low status of the adjective *ethnic* now favor the term *multicultural,* as in "multicultural group" or "multiculturals." To the extent that ethnic groups become the creations of government rather than representations of the natural sentiment of those of the descent group, this usage, which seems a semantic monstrosity at first, may be sound usage.

The most ambiguous aspect of multicultural politics, and one that makes the policy and ethos suspect to many, can be summed up in a few unanswered questions: What is the relationship between negotiating one's personal ethnic identity and dealing with the politics of the ethnie's status? What is the ethnic interest (which the Quebecois might call *un projet social ou national*) of an immigrant ethnie? In other words, what do immigrants or ethnics want, and does the existence of organized ethnic leadership and a multicultural policy provide what they want? How can government recognize the ethnic group except through funding ethnocultural activities and associations? Recognition of ethnies has received an especially bourgeois and hierarchical spin and reminds one of the quip by the great Italian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci that in the exercise of hegemony in a parliamentary context, "corruption or fraud stand midway between consensus and force." Since 1972, advisory councils composed of ethnic representatives, always appointed rather than elected, have recommended that "persons of various ethnocultural backgrounds" be named to boards or hired by a great variety of government agencies.

In 1976 the minister responsible for multiculturalism, John Munro, reacted to criticisms of the policy by denying that it was "a cheap political bone" thrown to the so-called professional ethnics. The policy, he said, was for all Canadians. It was not an English plot to subvert official bilingualism and to dilute the French voice in Canada. Nor was it tokenism or a smokescreen to make the imposition of bilingualism on the third element easier.[47] Despite such disclaimers, largesse for ethnic organizations and activities, whether doled out by Liberals or Progressive Conservatives, whether handled by federal or provincial civil servants, has often had a distinctly partisan appearance and the scent of the patronage pork barrel. The policy has always been linked to the idea that particular parties can control the votes of particular immigrant or ethnic groups by forms of patronage bestowed in the "legal tender" of the day—magistracies, commission seats, and so forth—on the notables from each collectivity. Prominent politicians make visits to the ethnie's central institutions and pay at least lip service to the ethnie's concerns that arise from "double consciousness" (its interest in the homeland of origin and the foreign policy objectives that go with that interest). Especially significant in the exchange between government and the displaced peoples has been public anti-Sovietism and support for the "captive nations," in some ways a less expensive price for politicians to pay than honest responses to later demands for a piece of the pie in Canada.

It is unclear what underlies the apparent convention in Canada that the interests, standing, and amour propre of the ethnie coincide with the personal negotiation of status and identity by certain ethnoverted individuals. Collective status and personal mobility come together in the form of the parceling out of an appropriate number of appointive offices. An elaborate list of sinecures, honorifics, and appointments has become the medium of exchange between the ethnic groups and the political parties and bureaucracies. There are as well the inevitable new plaques and parks named after notables and ethnonational heroes to compete with older Anglo-Celtic filial pieties.

These activities are accompanied by grants for community-based historical research and ceremonial ethnonational toponymic changes as well. In the belief that history is infinitely malleable to the civic purpose, the government makes funds available for the rewriting of the national history of Canada, with the third element in. Although such programs provided some leaven to the peculiarly ethnocentric and elitist national historiography, their chief result often seems to be an intellectual steeplechase to prove longevity in the land, rather like the "Mayflowerism" that once characterized ethnic history societies in the United States.

The Canadian party system, as well as the colonial inheritance of competent and intrusive public administration, led to a species of ethnic "wardheeling" in which the entire ethnic group rather than that of a single political constituency was seen as a source of votes in return for attention, jobs, and favors. Such ethnicking was highly visible for several reasons.[48] For one thing, until very recently, the third element was underrepresented among both civil servants and elected politicians. "Although these groups comprised a quarter of the population by ethnic origin in the early 1960s, they elected only 4.4% of new members of the House of Commons and controlled an even smaller proportion of Cabinet positions."[49] As a result, the exchange of everything from money for a new ethnic hall or old-age home to funds to teach "ancestral" or "heritage" languages for bloc votes—as portrayed in the media—had a quality of capturing charter group politicians and ethnic leaders *in flagrantis*. Generally, the problem is less the local candidate's ethnicity or networks of influence with the ethnic groups in his riding than the party's relationship with each group on a national scale. If the local politician delivers grants and honors with fanfare, it is the quieter funding of ethnic persistence through civil services controlled by one party or another that can affect political choice. John Kenneth Galbraith, with a disarming ethnocentric fall from grace to absolve his Scots-Canadian kinsmen, has observed the game of ethnic politics where groups are "solicited, by oratory, unconvincing efforts at identification and inspired banality."[50]

Galbraith and others who criticize politicians for mongering for ethnic votes miss an essential point, usually because they hold too simple a view of the ethnics and the dynamics of maintaining an ethnie. At the level of symbolic politics and the forging of the instruments that enable ethnic leaders to promote ethnogenesis and then ethnicization of the immigrants (that is, to mobilize them politically toward group objectives), there is very little gullibility and a perfect understanding of the exchange of gifts. (Anyone who has spent two decades, as I have, watching politicians struggle to say a few words in the heritage language and promising funds for new wings on ethnic halls, as if the money came out of their own pockets rather than the taxpayers', while ethnic leaders lead rounds of applause as proxies for future votes they cannot deliver, learns not to gag on his pasta or cabbage rolls and gains a new understanding of the "social contract" in a pluralist society.) There are in Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta politicians who are legendary for the number of ethnic groups with which they claim blood ties. One is described derisively by those among whom he "ethnicks" as claiming descent from all the peoples whose homelands touch the Vistula, the Danube, and the Dnieper.

If the claims of politicians on the multicultural stump are suspect, so are the claims of leaders and spokesmen who say they represent coherent ethnies but are more often self-appointed or government-designated than elected. Of course, opponents of the multicultural policy make much of how unrepresentative ethnic leaders are and of what a corrupting and trivializing effect ethnicking has on issue-oriented politics. A more accurate critique of multiculturalism would be that the policy may serve to perpetuate the hegemony of the British as the elite of Canada. By encouraging political loyalties on lines that cut across class and by rewarding leaders and spokesmen whose concerns are ethnoverted rather than class oriented, multiculturalism softens issues of immigrant exploitation and representation and removes them from the frame of the flow of labor to capital. A 1973 study found members of ethnic groups more concerned with problems of cultural and linguistic retention than with inequality of opportunity and prejudice in the job place.[51] It is unlikely that a survey of members of visible minorities who arrived in Canada after the impact of the relaxing of racialist immigration restrictions in the 1970s would have similar results.

At the same time, equality of access to services, the struggle against bigotry in the host society, and the guarantees of social mobility are added to the multicultural texts. Most of these issues have no intrinsic relationship to group life, and all of them have objectives that could be met by enforceable legislation. These additions may serve both hegemony and the participants in the ethnic discourse who use the idiom of culture rather than that of law, power, and class to define the immigrants' situation.

The problem with a pluralism based on assumptions about ethnic persistence among immigrants is simply that ethnicity is more and less than a biological given or census fact. It is processual. Canada may tolerate or promote ethnies, but, as Camille Laurin warned, they are not nations. Immigrants and their children negotiate their own identities, and the texts of the ethnoverted leadership are but one level of discourse among many. Without renewal through continual heavy migration and without a territorial base, with porous boundaries and the lure of the mainstream culture, with a public school system and intermarriage, the question becomes less whether intermediaries and leaders represent ethnies and more whether the ethnie is merely an epiphenomenon of immigration that will disappear unless regularly funded institutions of ethnic maintenance are legislated. Recently a Ukrainian Canadian observed rather bitterly that he and others had deluded themselves. He had come to realize that the Prairie Ukrainians were the only ethnic group in the third element. The rest were postwar immigrants facing rapid generational slippage and loss of ethnoculture.[52] An informal count of the leadership of most groups as well as of those who serve on the various multicultural advisory boards shows a majority to be foreign-born.

Measuring the differentials among the census categories "ethnic origin," "mother tongue," and "home language" suggests that, despite the declared policy of multiculturalism, the optimistic or obfuscating claims of ethnic spokesmen, and the presence of extensive heritage language programs, immigrants to Canada and their children are acculturating rapidly. "Linguicide," the label that advocates who believe multiculturalism will be credible only if multilingualism is possible, seems inevitable under current conditions. To the extent that a subculture needs a subsociety in which to embed itself, only geographical, cultural, and institutional isolation could preserve language. The prevailing situation is diglossia—immigrants speaking English as a second language, with all the limits that implies, and at the same time slowly losing their mother tongues. Their children speak English as a first language at school and on the street and are either bilingual or unable to speak their parents' language.

The leading ethnolinguist, Joshua Fishman, has noted that within three generations the language of the street usually becomes the language of the cradle. Only about half of those who describe themselves as Italian Canadians use Italian as their home language. That number is even less than the number of foreign-born in the group. In the 1971 census, only 71,000 Poles spoke Polish at home regularly, although 135,000 claimed Polish as their mother tongue and over 315,000 as their ethnic origin. For the Dutch in Canada, a group for whom assimilation is considerably easier, the figures are 36,000 speaking Dutch at home out of 425,000. The majority of these speakers of Dutch live in fairly isolated rural settings or have religious ties that are strongly ethnoverted. Since it is the Ukrainians who have led the way for the third element and who have made the most concerted effort to join various of their immigrant cohorts in a single "nation in exile," one would expect language retention to be high. Only about half the census group lists Ukrainian as its mother tongue, and only about a third speaks Ukrainian regularly in the home.

There are, of course, bases of ethnic identity, if not of ethnoculture, other than retention of the mother tongue. Generally, however, Canadian ethnic spokesmen, dismissive of what they view as decultured third- and fourth-generation ethnic identity in the United States, emphasize language as the cement of community. (I am aware of ethnic hockey and basketball teams that have collapsed, not for want of athletes of the descent group but because speaking the heritage language was a requirement for making the team.) Studies of the intensity of associational life and commitment to the discourse of ethnoculture are rare, and sophisticated ones are even rarer. A study of the National Congress of Italian Canadians a few years ago showed only about 30 percent of Canadians of Italian descent active in any ethnic institution except the parish.[53] It is such results that cause ethnic leaders to hesitate before analyzing the ethnie publicly.

Ethnic leaders have reason then to seek means as quickly as possible to turn living immigrant ethnocultures into ethnies with institutions that can aid group persistence through future generations, even if immigration ceases. The texts that they produce for discourse with both the immigrant community and the government more and more emphasize this Canadian rather than the old-country side of their double consciousness.

Canada's new Constitution, born of the British juridical and political tradition, is a document about individual rather than group rights. Such an approach to rights and freedoms fits ill with political pluralism. One result has been to add group rights to the document; such an attempt is the Meech Lake Accord, which recognizes Quebec as a "distinct society." The result for ethnic leadership has been disappointment that there are no justiciable multicultural rights in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Article 27 speaks of multiculturalism as a quality of Canadian life and promises that all other articles of the Charter will be interpreted in a manner consistent with multiculturalism. It is, then, an affirmation of multicultural ideals but not a statement of ethnic rights or multicultural obligations. No ethnies will be "distinct societies." *Canadien* spokesmen and those of the aboriginal peoples, Indian or Inuit, can write and speak of pluralism of destination, of the right to public funding to create institutions of otherness as part of a permanent status within Canadian confederation. It is not at all unusual or destructive of consensus in the political discourse for such leaders to describe policies that encourage acculturation and assimilation into Anglophone Canada as cultural genocide. Very few Canadians would, however, tolerate expressions of a similar kind about the rights of ethnic groups.

After the new Charter of Rights failed to address ethnic group persistence directly, many hoped that Bill C-93, the Multicultural Act, brought before Parliament in 1987, would offer redress. The bill is also long on affirmation of the polyethnic Canadian reality and the value of a multicultural ethos but short on enforceable programs. Affirming multiculturalism while legislating first bilingualism and then Quebec's right to a "separate way" in Canada puts the government's view of the rights of immigrant and ethnic minorities in perspective. As always, however, the lack of shared definitions of the boundary and content of multiculturalism as well as uncertainty about the nature and life cycle of group ethnicity itself has been as much an impediment to the development of a public policy as its ideological enemies have been. There is disagreement about whether a minister of multiculturalism would ghettoize those he served, whether a commissioner of multiculturalism could work as effectively as the commissioner of official language has functioned in enforcing bilingualism. Could such a public servant enforce sensitivity toward ethnic cultures and a fair distribution of jobs without appearing to be tainted with a species of pluralist McCarthyism? Should the mainstream be multiculturalized rather than vice versa? In other words, should the secretary of state for multiculturalism or the minister of culture and communications take over all funding for the arts, control of the CBC, and allocations for research?[54]

Is this then "the way the world ends, not with a bang but a whimper?" Without the possibility of enforcement through either the Charter or the act, this would be a multiculturalism that would amount to more than the modest statement made in 1969 in Book IV of the royal commission report about "encouraging those members of ethnic groups who want to do so to maintain a proud sense of the contribution of their own group to Canadian society. . . . " Both ethnic and panethnic associational spokesmen have suggested tactics for funding ethnic group persistence, from annual group maintenance grants to tithing. One suggestion is that each Canadian taxpayer could assign 1 percent of his or her taxes to an ethnic umbrella organization, presumably one of his or her choice, not one determined by the census. The possibility of extending tax credits of the kind allowed for charitable donations to gifts given to ethnic associations has also received consideration. The vexing questions of how much this would cost the community and whether the mainstream is obligated to support alternative cultures arise. Politicians usually prefer not to look at them directly.

For those who speak for ethnies formed from the DP experience or from a history of prairie isolation as well as for the immigrant Italian ethnie, numbers are crucial. Ever since Senator Yuzyk raised the census artifact of ethnic origin to forge the third element, both individual ethnic groups and the third element have depended on the threat of bloc votes and the moral suasion of rights by magnitude to press their case. A guest editorial in response to the proposed new Multiculturalism Act recently appeared in the *Ottawa Citizen.* It represents a genre of texts going back to remarks by John Yaremko, Ontario's first minister of citizenship and culture, to Heritage Ontario in 1972, a provincially sponsored forum on multiculturalism. Yaremko assumed, or chose to assume, that census identity and personal ethnocultural sentiment are synonymous, that polyethnicity automatically engenders multiculturalism: "According to the 1986 census, 38% of the Canadian population have origins other than British or French. Cultural diversity is not a fringe factor as was the case at the time of Confederation."[55]

It is in this context that one must understand the politics of census taking in Canada. Changes in census categories that allow the recording of multiple identities and alternatives to a patrilineal definition of ethnic origin and that make the reporting of ethnic origin voluntary threaten to strip the generals of their field forces. According to the assistant statistician of Canada, more and more people "simply refuse to report origins no matter how we attempt to phrase the question. They steadfastly insist that they are Canadian . . . ."[56] The census, he added, "is a questionnaire which is completed by the respondent, and the respondent's perception is what determines what the respondent will answer." Such a democratic and volitional approach to ethnic identity can hardly be faulted, but it causes major problems for those who use ethnic origins as an instrument of political power. The assistant statistician went on to observe that his office had many requests for information from ethnic associations. He also showed some of the wisdom that comes from long experience with the ethnic numbers game:

> A related problem stems from what we might call old world conflicts, in which rival groups will object to the inclusion of each other in the census counts. For example, spokespersons for the Armenian community might object to any associations in the enumeration with Turks. Spokespersons for the Greek community may insist that Macedonians not be counted separately, but be included in the count of Greeks, and spokespersons for the Macedonian community will demand exactly the opposite. There will be complaints that the Irish are included with the British in the summary tables . . . .

For all the concern with ethnic origin statistics and the maintenance of ethnies, there seems remarkably little information about how the public policy affects the quality of life in other than cultural or psychological terms. If immigrants have prospered or remained niched at the bottom of the economy, what role, if any, has the policy had in bringing about such results? It is forty years since the new mass migration began and over twenty years since John Porter published *The Vertical Mosaic,*[57] a study of ethnicity, stratification, and social mobility. His book has proven to be the antitext to the multicultural canon and a vade mecum for those who believe that liberal principles of individualism and meritocracy along with benign (i.e., unbigoted) forms of assimilationism are the only fair and effective policies for an immigrant nation.

Porter contended that Canada's charter groups had remained in terms of wealth, power, and status in a relatively unchanged relationship to the other ethnic groups. He used indices of disproportionate representation in various occupations and strata to show the British group's hegemony and dominance of elite positions in business and other professions, politics, and cultural life. He attributed this dominance more to longevity of residence, networks of influence, and the low "entry status" of many non-British immigrants rather than to systemic racialism operating against Southern Europeans and other minorities. For Porter, a policy of multiculturalism risked enshrining inequality and low social-class niching for certain ethnic groups. After showing that Porter overemphasized the lack of change to fit his central thesis, his followers, both sympathetic and hostile, have attempted to test his views on the increasingly polyethnic Canadian reality.[58] Thus a 1975 study, using measurements similar to those Porter used in the 1960s, found that although the non-British and non-French components in the higher levels of management and the professions had gone from 1 percent to 5 percent, and although French-Canadian access to the elite had grown a bit, the control of elite categories by the British had only declined from 92 percent to 86 percent in a country in which they made up about 50 percent of the population. A study in Toronto at about the same time showed "significant inequality of income opportunity among immigrant men." The kind of choices available to Canadians, with the exception of the Jews, fairly well paralleled earlier immigration department information about what was possible for preferred and nonpreferred stocks: opportunity was best for the English and decreased to less and less for the Jews, the Italians, the Slavs, the Greeks, the Portuguese, the Asians, and the blacks, in that order.[59]

Such attempts to relate ethnicity to stratification and social mobility are fraught with risky inferences. The numbers game may be the only way the third element can maintain political clout, but it is not a sufficiently sophisticated way to measure immigrants' life choices, levels of satisfaction, or intensity of ethnic identity. It is clear that Porter and others underestimated the strength of parallel pyramids of opportunity. In the face of the barriers of discrimination and denial of access to mainstream economies and elites, alternate strategies do develop. It is clear that both the Jews and the Italians have prospered from such parallel economic structures or from concentration in occupations less attractive to charter group elites, such as the construction industry and retail or wholesale commerce. Other ethnic groups have found similar, if less profitable, niching in the food services industries and control of airport limousines. New generations of professionals from the children of these immigrant groups find their clientele within the niche but begin to circulate in the larger society and economy as well.

However, among continental European immigrants, especially those from southern Europe, there remains a mixed sense of place in Canada. Books with titles like *Don't Feed Us on Lentils* and *Bastards of the Nation* remind us that immigration has been painful and that the first purpose of all Canadian immigration policy has been to find the manpower the country needs. For all the talk of seeking skilled immigrants, the policy continues to mean, in the words of the most recent annual report of the minister of immigration, finding people to "accept jobs at distant and remote locations" and to "take jobs that are not accepted by residents."[60] The least unionized, lowest-paid, and most unpleasant urban work in Canada is done by immigrants, especially immigrant women. Latin Americans, Middle Easterners, Asians, and East Africans now do what Slavs did in the 1950s, Italians in the 1960s, and Portuguese and Greeks in the 1970s. No number of individual immigrant or ethnic success stories, either heralded by multicultural or ethnic flacks, or splattered across the country's slick magazines with innuendos about organized crime, fraud, and swindling, can obscure the low entry status of most non-British immigrants to Canada. What immigrants have added to the civility and vibrance of Canada's cities, especially as shopkeepers and restaurateurs, testifies to a presence that has enriched the whole economy.

Almost fifty years after the mass migration of the non-British and the non-French began to intrude into the struggle for *Canadien survivance* and for the survival of the Canadian polity, the situation remains inchoate. It is inchoate in Wittgenstein's sense that the determinate relations between subjects and the nature of objects themselves seem only now to be forming. French-Canadian *survivance,* despite recent successful tests in the Prairie Provinces of the Charter's guarantee of French language rights, is now condensed into the concept of Quebec as a distinct society or the dream of an independent Quebec. *English Canadian* has increasingly become a linguistic rather than an ethnic or a sentimental designation as the third element has been acculturating and the distance from British roots for all Canadians growing. As a corollary, despite the Charter, the pending Multiculturalism Act, and highly differentiated ethnic and panethnic organizations, there are many signs that ethnicity is proving itself an epiphenomenon of several postmigrant generations rather than a basis for permanent communal differences.

Meanwhile, the external threat to the polity takes two forms. Canadian fertility rates and those of white immigrants are below replacement level. Canada faces zero growth and, to sustain itself, will have to turn to races and ethnic groups that Mackenzie King, not to say other Canadians, might not welcome. The second external threat to the Canada that King would have recognized comes from attempts to create a North American free-trade zone.

The current public discourse about Canada's state of affairs reminds one of the advice of German Marxist philosopher Walter Benjamin that the only way to understand the times one lives in is to try to catch "the dialectic at a standstill" by observing the contradictions and choices available to men and women in a "present without resolution." Benjamin went on to suggest the writing of a book made up solely of quotations to fulfill this purpose.[61] I will end with something of the sort.

The Saskatchewan Multicultural Association believes that it has found a "determinate relation" of significance: "If free trade in multiculturalism means adopting the concept of the melting pot rather than cultural pluralism, then multicultural organizations must oppose free trade." Importing the myth of the melting pot, it adds, "would be a far more significant threat to multiculturalism than the Meech Lake Accord." Meanwhile, that accord, with both its promise of special status for Quebec and its implication that such a status might include separate Quebec policies on immigration and the maintenance of ethnic groups, leads to a chorus of protest from the third element. The Canadian-Jewish Congress and the National Congress of Italian Canadians denounce the idea. Some Prairie Ukrainian leaders offer a smug "I told you so" and dream dreams of a strategy for Alberta like that of Quebec that would create a regional Ukrainian-English bilingualism.[62] They can point to some stunning facts: that the number of bilingual Canadians has not risen much from the 15 percent it was when the Official Languages Act came into force a decade ago; that in 1986 Statistics Canada reported under 5 percent for Ontario and under 3 percent for British Columbia of non-Francophone children in French immersion programs; that Quebec nationalists also view a national bilingual policy with suspicion, as a "trojan horse"; and that more often than not, bilingual Francophones outside Quebec become unilingual Anglophones, usually within a generation.

The effects of Meech Lake are apparent already. The accord establishes the idea that Canada is a dual society, but it does not oblige the English-speaking provinces to increase their bilingualism. A recent revolt of Tory backbenchers, mainly from the West, is attempting to thwart efforts to reconcile the new Charter of Rights with the Official Languages Act. In 1988 the premier of Ontario rejected a call to make Ontario officially bilingual. The call came from a Franco-Ontarian association, which speaks for the province's 500,000 Francophones, orphaned by the Quebec nationalist strategy and the Meech Lake Accord. At about the same time they were making their appeal, a witness before the parliamentary standing committee on multiculturalism, meeting in Toronto, told the legislators that:

> multiculturalism is totally meaningless without multilingualism. The equity envisioned in the act is not possible in our Canadian school communities, unless the languages of the children in the community are used. . . . Song and dance is not enough.[63]

In April 1987 Keith Spicer, a former commissioner of official languages and the influential editor of the *Ottawa Citizen,* spoke out. He saw the matter starkly:

> The final question runs deeper—isn't the time coming to stop making a religion of mosaics altogether and to start fostering a national spirit we can all identify with? With constant intermarriage, for how many generations more must an English- or Ukrainian-Canadian revere his presumed roots?[64]

Only a naif would ask why Spicer did not add French Canadians to his list; that would be to step outside the limits of legitimate discourse. He went on to accuse the government of "making a virtue of a weakness, a glory of a hindrance to nationhood; we pay people to have foreign roots."

One wonders if those engaged in the Canadian discourse about identity and policy now are ready for the next intrusion. With

Canadian fertility rates unable to sustain growth, with the natural decline of immigration from Europe because of similar birth rates there, new Canadians will increasingly come from the Third World. This trend began in 1968 with the end of racialism in immigration legislation.[65] In that year 65 percent of the immigrants to Canada came from Europe. By 1984 the figure was down to 24 percent. The Asian share of immigration rose in that same period from 12 percent to 50. In 1961 no Asian country was among the top sending countries; by 1984 five out of ten were. Caribbean and Central American immigration has also risen rapidly since the early 1970s. Those who deal with the dialectic between the need for numbers and the desire to maintain the "right stock" are at work again.

A demographer for the Department of National Health and Welfare recently told the parliamentary standing committee on multiculturalism about the demographic situation of Canada. He reminded them of the decline of European fertility and went on to describe the impact on immigration of "lumpy events" such as the reversion of Hong Kong to China in the near future. One cannot think of the possibility of other lumpy events, in Johannesburg, Belfast, the Punjab, Sri Lanka, and the West Bank, which could change the pools of potential new Canadians. Would large numbers from any of these places, labeled refugee or DP, start the same problems that began in Canada after World War II? How would their coming affect multiculturalism and bilingualism?

If this has been a darkling portrait of Canada's population policies, it should be balanced against some thoughts about the quality of life amid what amounts to a pluralism of pluralisms. Practical acceptance of polyethnicity and the presence of free and fair institutions make daily life in Canada rich, safe, and hopeful. The economy inclines to meritocracy and free flow despite the hold of old elites upon it and the aspirations of those who believe in corporate rights and freedoms to control part of it. It works for most immigrants, although not without the economic struggle and scarring that accompany insertion into a strange, and often hostile, social and cultural environment. It clearly does not work for the native people and some of the native-born poor, who lack the networks and the strategies that the newcomers have developed to carve out patterns of survival and mobility. If Canada can be saved from the full realization of anyone's dream of multiculturalism—that of the ethnic leaders, the "caretakers," or the politicians—we will continue to live in a civil polity between balkanization and assimilation, between petty nationalism and laissez-faire continentalism, between a begrudging, ungenerous dualism and a separated Quebec. Robert Louis Stevenson once remarked that the "pleasure was in the traveling, not the getting there." For Canada, survival lies in the traveling toward an identity, and we will all be better served if that traveling itself remains our identity.

ENDNOTES

[1] The text of King's statement appears in Hansard, *House of Commons Debates,* 1 May 1947, 2644–47. It is reproduced as Appendix A of the *Report of the Canadian Immigration and Population Study (CIPS): The Immigration Program* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1947). There is no general history of Canadian immigration policy and immigration. For the postwar period, see D. C. Corbett, *Canada's Immigration Policy* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, University of Toronto, 1957); F. Hawkins, *Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972); and R. Whitaker, *Double Standard: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration* (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1987).

[2] For studies of the earlier mass immigration see D. Avery, *'Dangerous Foreigners': European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1896–1932* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979); R. C. Brown and R. Cook, *Canada, 1896–1921: A Nation Transformed* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974).

[3] J. S. Woodsworth, *Strangers Within Our Gates; or, Coming Canadians* (Toronto: F. C. Stephenson, 1909), 162.

[4] See King's 1910 report, as quoted in *The Immigration Program,* 9.

[5] Quoted in J. S. Frideres, "British Canadian Attitudes toward Minority Ethnic Groups in Canada," in *Attitudes Toward Minority Groups in Canada—Ethnicity, no.5* (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1978). See also H. Palmer, "Reluctant Hosts: Anglo-Canadian Views of Multiculturalism in the Twentieth Century," in *Multiculturalism as State Policy,* conference report of the Second Biennial Conference of Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply, 1976), 81–118.

[6] F. Bosworth, "What Kind of Canadians Are We Getting?" *Maclean's* (15 February 1952):17.

[7] *Demography and Immigration in Canada: Challenge and Opportunity* (Ottawa: Employment and Immigration Canada, November 1987):18–20.

[8] John Stuart Mill to Henry George in October 1869, quoted in R. Takaki, *Iron Cages: Race and Culture in Nineteenth Century America* (New York: Knopf, distributed by Rando, 1979), 245.

[9] I. Abella and H. Troper, *None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1937–1948* (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1982), chap. 8.

[10] M. Danys, *DP, Lithuanian Immigration to Canada after the Second World War* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1986), 134.

[11] N. Tienhaara, *Canadian View on Immigration and Population: An Analysis of Postwar Gallup Polls* (Ottawa: Department of Manpower and Immigration, 1974), 59.

[12] Brief of Association of United Ukranian Canadians on immigration submitted to the Senate, 5 June 1947, 149, reprinted in *Anglo-American Perspectives on the Ukrainian Question 1938–1951,* ed. B. S. Kordan and L. Luciuk (Kingston, Ontario: Limestone Press, 1987).

[13] Quoted in M. Danys, *DP,* 84.

[14] F. Hawkins, *Canada and Immigration,* 201–2.

[15] F. Bosworth, "What Kind of Canadians Are We Getting?"

[16] "Gateway to a New Life," *Globe and Mail,* 12 September 1956, 7.

[17] D. C. Corbett, *Canada's Immigration Policy,* 52–53.

[18] E. Wickberg, ed., *From China to Canada, A History of the Chinese Communities in Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), 214–15.

[19] R. Morin, *L'Immigration au Canada* (Montreal: Editions de l'action nationale, 1966), introduction.

[20] N. E. Assimopoulos and J.E. Humblet, "Les Immigrés et la question nationale: étude comparative des sociétés québecoise et wallonne," in *Studi emigrazione/Etudes migrations* 24 (86) (June 1987):155–86.

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[25] N. Keyfitz, "How the Descendants of English-Speakers See the Speakers of Other Languages and Their Descendants," in *Second Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism Conference Report* (Ottawa: Minister of State, Multiculturalism, 1976), 69.

[26] R. Breton, "The Production and Allocation of Symbolic Resources," 55.

[27] E. Kallen, "Multiculturalism: Ideology, Policy and Reality," *Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d'etudes canadienne* 17 (1) (Spring 1982):51–63.

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[32] E. DeMartino, *La fine del mondo* (Turin: Einaudi, 1978).

[33] K. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication, An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953).

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[35] *Report of the First Conference of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism* (Ottawa: Minister of State, Multiculturalism, 1972), 4–5, 18–20.

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[38] D. Fisher, presentation in *Multiculturalism as State Policy* (Ottawa: Minister of State, Multiculturalism, 1976), 15.

[39] For a discussion of these matters, see J. Burnet, "Myths and Multiculturalism," *Canadian Journal of Education* 4 (4) (1979):43–58.

[40] *The Symons Report,* an abridged version of vols. 1, 2 of *To Know Ourselves: The Report of the Commission on Canadian Studies* (Toronto: Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, 1978), 60.

[41] Rev. Léger Comeau, "Multiculturalism—A Francophone Viewpoint," in *Second Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism Conference Report* (Ottawa: Minister of State, Multiculturalism, 1976), 27.

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[45] See the imagery of Yuzyk's 1964 speech. Governor General Schreyer quoted Laurier in his address at his installation, Ottawa, 22 January 1979.

[46] D. Stasiulis, "The Political Structuring of Ethnic Community Action: A Reformulation," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 12 (3) (1980):18.

[47] Address by the Honorable John Munro, minister responsible for multiculturalism, in *Multiculturalism as State Policy.*

[48] "Now I have had experience as a politician, and I recognize the temptation of what I used to call 'ethnicking' in John Diefenbaker's day. . . . " D. Fisher, presentation in *Multiculturalism as State Policy,* 17. "Today's official multiculturalism leads to the worst of demagogueries: for example, John Diefenbaker promising to liberate the Ukraine, and all this for a handful of Ukrainian Canadian seats; Joe Clark moving embassies for a fingerful of Jewish seats. . . . " L. Zolf, "How Multiculturalism Corrupts," *Maclean's* (15 November 1982):21.

[49] D. Stasiulis, "Cultural Boundaries and the Cohesion of Canada" in R. Rosandric, ed., *Cultural Pluralism and Cultural Identity, The Experience of Canada, Finland and Yugoslavia,* final report of the UNESCO Joint Study on Cultural Development in Countries Containing Different National and/or Ethnic Groups (Paris: UNESCO, 1985), 79.

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[52] M. R. Lupul, "The Tragedy of Canada's White Ethnics: A Constitutional Postmortem," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 7 (Spring 1982):5–7.

[53] *Italian Canadians: A Cross Section, a National Survey of Italian Canadian Communities* (Ottawa: Congress of Italian Canadians, 1978). It is only fair to add that it took some courage to publish the report and that the research was flawed and the statistical base insufficient. Its result does, however, dovetail with many other informal indicators of low ethnoversion in terms of participation, except world-cup soccer and family and paese rites of passage.

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[55] L. A. Cardozo, "In Defense of the Federal Government's Multicultural Policy," in "Guest Column," *The Ottawa Citizen,* 19 January 1988, C-1. The columnist is

the executive director of the Canadian Ethnocultural Council, an organization that receives large annual grants from the Multiculturalism Sector within the secretary of state.

[56] Testimony of a demographer for the Department of National Health and Welfare and of the assistant archivist of Canada before the Standing Committee on Multiculturalism, *Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Multiculturalism,* House of Commons, no. 13, February 1988 (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1988), 23.

[57] J. Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965).

[58] The most important correctives and confirmations of the truth of Porter's general points are G. Darroch, "Another Look at Ethnicity, Stratification, and Social Mobility in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 4 (1979):1–25; W. Clement, *The Canadian Corporate Elite, An Analysis of Economic Power* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975); and various investigations by J. Reitz, conveniently synthesized in his book *The Survival of Ethnic Groups in Canada* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980). In a lighter vein, Peter Newman's book *The Canadian Establishment* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976) confirms Porter's view.

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[61] W. Benjamin, *Reflections, Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings* (New York: Schocken, 1986).

[62] *Saskatchewan Multicultural Magazine* 6 (3) (Fall 1987):1; *La Voce del Congress* (February 1988), open letter from National Council of Italian Canadians presidents to the prime minister expressing misgivings about the Meech Lake Accord; "Meech threatens rights, Jewish group says," *Toronto Star,* 24 February 1988, A2; "Peterson rejects demand for official bilingualism," *Toronto Star,* 18 February 1988.

[63] Remarks of representative of Ontario Coalition for Language Rights in *Minutes of Proceeding and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Multiculturalism,* House of Commons Issue, no. 11 (December 1987).

[64] *The Hamilton Spectator,* 15 April 1987, A7.

[65] *Canadian Ethnic Studies/Etudes ethniques du Canada,* special issue: *The Green Paper on Immigration* 7 (1) (1975). See especially P. Cappon, "The Green Paper: Immigration as a Tools Profit," and G. Singh Paul, "The Green Paper and Third World Immigrants, A Subjective Analysis."

Religion and Education

Dædalus

Spring 1988

"To look at education and religion—in the largest frame—is to look at the culture of a society."

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David H. Flaherty

Who Rules Canada?

MOST CANADIANS HAVE an ambivalent, perhaps even innocent, relationship with power. It is a subject that is not talked about very openly in our society, as if, with vestiges of Victorian prudery, it were somehow an unseemly topic—like sex. Perhaps we feel that patterns of power relationships are well established, divinely ordained, self-evident, unlikely to change, and hence unworthy of continued attention. Unlike the legacy of the founding fathers in the United States, we have no traditional, generalized suspicion of the exercise of power by elites, government, and business.[1]

Few Canadians take refuge in such nostrums as the belief that politicians run our democratic society on the basis of individual votes. Surely even fewer believe that power relationships are acted out only in the public realm and are all above board. Yet someone like sociologist Wallace Clement, who has examined the makeup of political and corporate power in Canada, is generally viewed as studying something improper or is dismissed as a Marxist; such matters are better not spoken about in a polite, law-abiding, deferential society like our own. How gauche, appalling, perhaps even un-Canadian, for social scientists to write about the common ideology of the Canadian capitalist class.[2] It is almost as if power relationships had been determined in biblical times and, as semisacrosanct matters, were not to be discussed; indeed, they may be perceived as incapable of change in any event.[3]

David H. Flaherty is Professor of History and Law and Director of the Centre for American Studies at the University of Western Ontario.

What follows is one person's reflections on the current state of political and economic power relationships in Canada, an impressionistic report on who rules and who exercises power in domestic affairs, and how those relationships may change in the foreseeable future. Even though no single segment has absolute power, the corporate elite is in a predominant position in the late 1980s. Since the conceptual boundaries of capitalist ideology affect both the dominant, mainstream politicians and the corporate elite, they have no need to be conspiratorial. Instead, they function in a symbiotic relationship with one another.

THE POLITICAL ELITE

A skeptic might wonder whether anyone could ever rule this vast, unwieldy country of tremendous geographical expanse sprinkled with scattered settlements, most of which huddle in a few urban areas near the southern border. With its geography and with a federal system, a peculiar and changing distribution of constitutional powers, and a nonrevolutionary tradition, Canada simply survives. In many ways, this situation suits the general public because it has little confidence in the desirability of government ministers tinkering much more with the status quo and considerable anxiety about Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's multiple initiatives on taxation, free trade, and constitutional reform.[4] We Canadians are usually quite satisfied, sometimes smugly so, with our achievements as a country. Fine tuning and improvements such as national day care and the creation of new jobs are admittedly needed, but life at present is decidedly attractive for most of us in an aging, largely middle-class population.[5]

Politics, at least in good times, is thus regarded as a form of spectator sport that regularly matches the standard offerings of television. The best political philosophy, from this perspective, is to rotate the rascals in and out of office (even though we do not do this very often). When despair begins to surface about the capacities of both the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives, it may be time to consider electing the New Democratic party (NDP), which has not held federal power since its formation in 1961.

In the exercise of political and economic power Canada's two largest provinces, Quebec and Ontario, have preponderant roles because of their concentration of wealth, population, and industrial resources. Within central Canada, Ontario, particularly metropolitan Toronto, dominates in economic power, and the nation's political capital, Ottawa, is conveniently located in the same province. To the extent that regions rather than individuals shape political decisions, central Canada prevails over the periphery. References to "central Canada" by those living elsewhere are not terms of endearment, and regional grievances against existing concentrations of power are strong. In Canada we have not experienced the massive decentralization of economic power that has occurred in the United States since the Second World War.

Moreover, we have too many official holders of governmental power for the size of our country. One of the ten provinces, Prince Edward Island, has a panoply of public officeholders for a population of 127,000; there are 23 Canadian cities with larger populations than that. Quebec and Ontario, with more than 60 percent of the Canadian population, coexist in a confederation that often approximates one province, one vote in federal-provincial relations.[6] This fundamental power relationship is a reflection of the constitutional compromises the fathers of Confederation made more than a century ago. The Canadian provinces are much more powerful in governance than the American states. The provincial premiers are independent actors in relations with the prime minister. They show little of the deference of state governors to the U.S. president.[7]

The exercise of political power in Canada is initially circumscribed by a somewhat irrational sharing of power between the federal and the provincial governments, at least as compared with the American and the West German models. The 1987 Meech Lake Accord is tilting power in favor of provincial dominance. This controversial constitutional agreement is the result of Brian Mulroney's negotiations with provincial premiers as part of his effort to win Quebec's acceptance of the patriated Constitution of 1982 by recognizing Quebec as "a distinct society" and by amending the Constitution to devolve certain powers to the provinces. These powers include the right to opt out of proposed national programs (with federal compensation), control of the nomination of senators and Supreme Court judges (who are federal officials), and increased participation in the amending process (which must now be unanimous on certain issues). All federal political parties support the accord, but at least two of the provinces are resisting it. All of them must ratify it by June 1990.

Meech Lake is especially attacked as a massive transfer of power to the provinces in a country that has traditionally required strong central direction.[8]

But surely even this modest initial attention to public power holders begs a whole series of questions about the distribution and exercise of power. Should one start with Canadian voters, who have displayed increasing acuity in recent years by removing long-time incumbents or encouraging their retirement (as were former Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and Premier Richard Hatfield of New Brunswick)? The voters have also had a propensity to ensure that the party in power at the federal level does not reign for long in the provinces. Brian Mulroney's 1984 federal Tory landslide has been followed by Liberal sweeps over Conservative governments in Ontario (by David Peterson) and in New Brunswick (by Frank McKenna). Yet the voters, who turn out in large numbers, must realize that elections every four or five years have only minimal effect on the actual exercise of power, however much people sometimes savor opportunities to remove incumbents from office. Elections are barriers at irregular intervals that incumbents can normally surmount through public relations and the manipulation of issues.

Moreover, in the Canadian party system, the elected leader of a majority government can theoretically do almost anything. Although consultation with the party is desirable to maintain unity, the leader has such control of all the levers of political power that he can risk informing only the party's caucus of elected members, even about decisions on major policy issues, if he decides to play the game that way.[9] Members of Parliament (MPs) and of provincial legislatures are quickly educated about the narrow confines of their own power as directly elected representatives of the people; this limitation can be a source of enormous frustration and/or cynicism for them. The situation is especially discouraging for government backbenchers, since they have to adhere so closely to the party line; the most ambitious and talented among them have even more reason to defer to their entrenched seniors, since promotion to the cabinet is otherwise at risk. Party discipline is of course essential to the workings of parliamentary government. Yet it means that Canada rarely enjoys the type of independent leadership that comes from American senators and congressmen, who have their own power bases.[10]

Under Mulroney, there has been some effort to enhance the power of members of Parliament and its committees in their relations with the executive branch.[11] This is at least a fledgling effort to liberate MPs from the excessive yoke of party and caucus discipline. For the first time, specialized standing committees of the House of Commons exercise continuing oversight of certain subjects. The government must respond to their reports and recommendations within a specific time. While this arrangement may make MPs feel better about themselves, the experience of 1987, when the cabinet ultimately rejected substantial parts of unanimous recommendations from several such committees, shows that the cabinet is still very much in control.[12] Such episodes are good examples of the ultimate exercise of political power by the elite inner cabinet. Since most federal parliamentary committees lack specialized staffs and independence from the executive branch of their U.S. congressional counterparts, there is some skepticism about their ability to function effectively in the exercise of power. Beyond the right to put private pressure on the cabinet during caucus deliberations, MPs from the governing party can exercise only a very controlled form of power under this kind of cabinet government.

Provincial legislative committees have continued to display their customary weakness vis-à-vis the cabinet except during limited periods of minority government, such as that of the Liberals in Ontario from 1985 to 1987. Since the government cannot control them, committees in such circumstances can influence and shape government proposals for legislation. Normally, the premier, the key members of the cabinet, and their associated mandarins monopolize and control the exercise of power in the public arena by making appointments, proposing government legislation, and exercising discretionary power in every aspect of provincial life. Cabinet members shepherding a bill through a particular committee are usually very much in control of the situation because their officials have drafted the legislation and their party comprises a majority of the members. For example, a provincial caucus may simply learn from the premier and cabinet that they are or are not supporting free trade. Sometimes the cabinet itself receives such treatment, although a few strong individuals in any cabinet who have their own political power bases and connections can usually lead a premier or a prime minister to tread warily.

The nucleus of any Canadian federal or provincial cabinet shares excessively in the exercise of power, so that the corporate elite need address only these select few on matters of moment in order to try to shape the political agenda.[13] A handful of such politicians wields enormous power in choosing between sets of options for action or inaction (within a framework at least acceptable to the corporate elite). This inner political elite is no more likely to be monolithic than its business counterparts on specific issues, not least because of competing regional and provincial interests, but the tradition of cabinet solidarity toward the outside world produces a united front. These key persons are also instruments for the pursuit of the prevailing vision of the prime minister, the premier, or the political party of the moment. Within elite parameters, such a set of priorities can be enormously influential in taking society in new directions. Trudeau's and Mulroney's competing visions of Canadian federalism, one centralist and the other decentralist, are two such examples of "vision" as a motivating force and an admittedly powerful shaper of the directions of society.

Yet, does a federal or a provincial leader largely respond to external pressures to make a choice, which can only be delayed so long for international or economic forces to be measured and ascertained? Is a leader simply tackling the impossible task of satisfying competing interests? Yes is a cynical and unsatisfactory answer to these two questions, since politicians clearly have the ultimate power to make actual decisions, whatever the motivation. For example, hard times on the prairies in 1987 led to billion-dollar assistance to farmers, although the country has an annual budget deficit of approximately $30 billion, the reduction of which is a competing priority. Prime ministers and premiers are among the few who do have the potential to exercise real power in choosing between alternatives on the basis of a political or a patronage assessment (government contracts to repair airplanes in Montreal instead of Winnipeg or to build frigates in New Brunswick rather than Quebec, for example).

The main political parties in Canada—the Liberals, the Progressive Conservatives, and the New Democrats—have an important relationship in the exercise of power, for they articulate a semi-ideological series of positions on all kinds of issues and then try to shape the policies and priorities of government. Membership in any party or interest group remains one of the main vehicles for a self-selected group of ordinary (and not so ordinary) people to try to shape the future of their country and themselves at a level more meaningful than simply casting votes in an election.[14] Working in a political campaign is also a hobby for these people, who feel enlivened by associating with political power.

The parties set their formal agendas at conventions, but they differ little in the limited extent to which these pronouncements actually make an impact on the party in power. The New Democrats and the Parti québecois are more democratic in this sense than the other parties. The closer an Opposition party is to actual power, the less likely its leading lights will be much influenced by the party's formal positions, especially if they are somewhat controversial. This situation is especially likely when a position is fairly strong, such as the NDP's proposal to withdraw Canada from NATO. The Liberals and Conservatives in power tend to be footloose and fancy free when it comes to paying serious attention to official party platforms, since opinion polls seem to have a far greater influence on the policies of a prime minister or a premier when it comes to actual decisions (or their avoidance).

The standing of political leaders at any time is greatly affected by the results of regular public and private polling by Gallup, Decima Research, and others. Although such companies claim that they are simply measuring opinion in an objective fashion and giving politicians a road map of voter attitudes, one suspects that the published results of their polling shape reality as much as reflect it. Polls at least influence everyone's perception of the present.

Parliamentary government generally restricts real decision-making power to a small number of hands. They are reinforced by a cadre of key unelected political and public service advisers, such as those in the office of the prime minister or premier, and, what is most important, the decision makers are subject to the wishes, or at least the acquiescence, of the mandarin class. Newly elected governments frequently promise to clean house in the senior bureaucracy but rarely do more than remove a few people too publicly identified with the previous government. Even the Conservatives under Mulroney, who had been in the political wilderness for most of a generation, only minimally disturbed the senior public service.

The actual chief of staff of the office of the prime minister and the prime minister's principal secretary have traditionally been among the most powerful people in the country because they control access to, and the agenda of, the incumbent; they and their provincial counterparts are the equivalent of key White House staffers. Predecessors in these posts remain influential within their respective parties and as consultants on public policy. Other equally influential, but sometimes less visible, advisers reside in such internal oases of power as the federal Privy Council Office, whose clerk is the senior public servant and chief of the other deputy ministers.

The mandarins are the various deputy ministers, assistant deputy ministers, and high-level advisers who are the effective leaders of individual government bureaucracies. At least 100 persons have deputy-minister status in the federal government, but a much smaller number actually run significant departments. A similar pattern prevails in the provinces. While the political elite is responding to every crisis and fire alarm in the media and on the floor of the legislature, these key bureaucrats wield significant power, except for final choices on the most important matters; at the very least, they limit the range of acceptable political options on most issues because of their influence over access, information, and analysis.[15] Canadians view the BBC TV series "Yes Minister" as a penetrating satire of the reality that those who brief the minister shape his or her attitudes and decisions. Although they speak about being subject to political masters, the mandarins have mastered the intricacies of many subjects. Their brainpower and their long, varied experience in the venues of power mean that usually their political masters are no real match for them. It is much easier for cabinet ministers to follow their guidance. Moreover, the public service can sabotage the implementation of an unacceptable option approved by the cabinet.[16] When Progressive-Conservative party leader Joe Clark made a surprise announcement in 1979 that he wanted to move the Canadian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, his advisers when he subsequently became prime minister used key businessmen active in the Middle East to change the decision.[17] The mandarins are the high achievers in a relative meritocracy, and no one can easily question or dispense with their talents.

As mentioned earlier, the Canadian Constitution shapes the division of powers between the federal and the provincial governments, although the latter largely function like the former in terms of external and internal restraints on the exercise of political power. The federal government exercises considerable power over the provinces because of its massive taxing capacity and the continuing impact of its transfer of federal funds to the provinces for purposes such as higher education, health, and welfare. The smaller provinces are especially dependent on the federal government for its efforts to equalize provincial government revenues and public services across the country. Yet provinces are now very powerful in constitutional terms, and Quebec has even taken the independent course of opting out of a significant number of federal cost-sharing programs.

The devolution of power to the provinces represented by the Meech Lake Accord will inevitably reinforce this situation and perhaps even ensure provincial veto power in certain fields if the agreement is eventually ratified by all the provinces. At the same time, the Meech Lake agreement is a tribute to the vision (and power) of Prime Minister Mulroney. In just one term of office, he has considerably shaped the future direction of Canada (in federal-provincial relations, tax reform, and free trade with the United States). These last two items are clearly in accord with the corporate agenda. It is also a tribute to the solid political power of the office and to Mulroney's political acumen in handling Quebec that his opponents, both in and out of politics, have been able to do little so far to stop his initiatives. The eventual implementation of a free-trade agreement will test some prime minister's mettle, since provincial cooperation may be necessary for matters within provincial jurisdiction.

THE CORPORATE ELITE

To what extent does political power in Canada simply respond to economic imperatives as expressed by the corporate elite, its organized pressure groups, and trade associations? Assessing support for the argument that political leaders respond in large measure to powerful economic forces first requires a venture into the realm of ideology. The dominant political and economic elites, with a few aberrations, hold fast to a capitalist ideology in which the marketplace and capital are held to be irrefutable, perhaps even infallible, guides and dominant measures of achievement. These elites believe in a global market ideology, a worldview that confirms and confines their perspectives on Canada and encourages politicians to tolerate corporate concentration because of the apparent imperatives of the world scene. The standard symbols of power for the corporate elite are extremely bourgeois (and North American)—signs of conspicuous consumption such as limousines, sumptuous homes, trendy automobiles, exclusive clubs, deluxe foreign travel, and private schools.[18] A primary measure of "success" for both elites remains the acquisition, retention, and display of wealth, preferably generated by a high-status occupation or profession.

This commitment to capitalism partly reflects the fact that Canadians, on the whole, really worship wealth; it is one of the few almost totally acknowledged symbols of achievement and power. They can also mock its vulgar excesses, as when it was revealed that the Mulroneys had had a closet built in the prime minister's official residence that could hold seventy-two pairs of Gucci loafers.

There is very little questioning of the fundamentals of the political and economic status quo in Canadian society except by New Democrats. For voters of French or English heritage, the choice of being Liberal or Conservative on matters of public policy is nearly instinctive. Long-term adherence to one of the two major political parties is almost hereditary, even if many are quick to vote for any party or candidate on a specific issue or in a particular election. Moreover, for the most part, very few of the corporate elite read seriously, nor are they interested in ideas beyond a few simplistic and strongly held notions that are thought to descend from the Mosaic Code, the Decalogue, and/or Adam Smith (that government should not expand social programs, for example).[19] Their own defense is that they do not have time for such time-consuming matters in their heavily scheduled lives. Moreover, the business elite dismisses traditional academics and intellectuals as largely irrelevant and powerless.

These attitudes are especially characteristic of the truly powerful corporate elite, persons of both inherited and earned wealth who are the presidents, chief executive officers, and directors of the approximately 100 dominant corporations, and those of all ages who are jockeying to succeed them. This corporate elite has its own rankings and criteria for status and power, but for present purposes one must emphasize its control of capital, especially through the five dominant national banks, and its ready access to those holding political power.[20] As talented people, the survivors of what they believe to have been a Darwinian struggle, this elite holds decisive power in corporate decision making about capital investment, wage levels, and plant locations that fundamentally affect the lives of large numbers of working people, at least in Canadian companies. Their dominant ideological and economic thrust is toward the sound bottom line in the profit and loss statement, satisfying foreign and domestic owners and shareholders, and the achievement of rational efficiency. The sheer amassing of money eventually loses some of its ability to motivate them; like true "power junkies," they turn to the struggle for more and more corporate and market control as an alternate "fix." A certain amount of American contagion and emulation helps to explain this phenomenon; role models in all aspects of Canadian life are increasingly chosen from south of the border. Of course, this trend produces intramural competition in which there are both winners and losers, and new faces are constantly coming to the fore.

The corporate elite is not uncaring, as evidenced by its prominent role in fund-raising campaigns for major charities, hospitals, and universities, but its members perceive themselves as bound by the inexorable laws of capitalism and, in promoting this message, they have few problems in gaining and holding the attention of the key politicians. In one memorable twenty-four-hour period in the 1970s, Bell Canada's chairman, Jean de Grandpré, managed to see fourteen cabinet ministers and deputy ministers in an attempt to ward off an attack on the company's monopoly of services.[21]

Members of the corporate elite are the prime external players in the exercise of political power at all levels of society. Politicians frequently make choices under their aegis and/or that of capitalistic forces.[22] In the first place, most of the successful politicians are largely (or would like to be) the same sort of people as the corporate elite: many come from a background in business or in service to it (they are lawyers, accountants, consultants). They have adopted the rhetoric and beliefs of the business community as their own. The notable exception is the New Democratic party, whose "socialist" nostrums and attacks on business-government links send shivers down the spines of the corporate elite, especially when they receive high ratings in the public opinion polls. The federal NDP leader, Ed Broadbent, projects an attractive personal image in comparison with both Brian Mulroney and John Turner, the federal Liberal leader, who lost some of his charisma and political touch while he practiced law for eight years with an elite firm in the center of capitalist Canada, Bay Street in Toronto.[23]

There are good public examples, on occasion, of the symbiotic relationship between the dominant political and corporate elites, facilitated by their respective careers as lawyers and businesspersons. The Canadian Alliance for Trade and Job Opportunities, a pro-free-trade lobby group, is cochaired by Donald Macdonald, former Liberal finance minister and recent head of a major royal commission on the economy, and by Peter Lougheed, former Conservative premier of Alberta. Both now belong to leading law firms and serve as corporate directors. Even Trudeau, who enjoys inherited wealth, joined a Montreal law firm and now helps with such corporate tasks as promoting sales by a Canadian engineering firm to the Soviet Union. Although he did publicly criticize the Meech Lake Accord in August 1987, Trudeau is now paid by the private sector for his advice. When the World Economic Forum held its annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, in 1988, Canadians in attendance included the premier of Ontario, his deputy premier, the federal minister of finance, a Quebec cabinet minister, three bank chairmen, and at least seventeen other presidents or chairmen of major Canadian companies.[24] The same elites regularly encounter one another at events in Canada itself.

The corporate capitalist message in the political sphere is effectively advanced by powerful lobbying associations like the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Business Council on National Issues, which brings together the chief executive officers of the largest corporations (as the Business Roundtable does in the United States). Through effective monitoring, lobbying, and analysis of topical issues, aided where necessary by professional lobbying firms, which regularly employ former civil servants and politicians, these national organizations and other more focused interest groups influence the direction of national and provincial policies. As major power brokers, such organizations help to establish or reinforce the reigning orthodoxy in public policy and keep it from straying too far from the mark.[25]

The current influential role of this type of business lobby is a departure from the postwar Canadian tradition, since such former prime ministers as John Diefenbaker, Lester Pearson, and Pierre Trudeau were either suspicious of big business or lacked direct personal ties to it. Trudeau in particular took a number of initiatives that were hostile to some corporate interests, especially those that were American controlled. Examples are the 1973 Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) and the 1980 National Energy Program (NEP). Yet business pressure also forced Trudeau and his successors to weaken their impact.[26] Special interest groups from the corporate sector such as the Canadian Manufacturers Association and the Canadian Bankers Association use a combination of public and private communications to influence the disposition of specific issues that affect them. In comparison with less powerful groups representing the general public, these elites and their targeted interest groups, such as the Canadian Petroleum Association, are guaranteed the careful attention of federal and provincial cabinet ministers. Problems arise only when elites from different sectors or within the same sector, such as the steel industry, conflict on an issue. Politicians are then compelled to make unpalatable choices.

The ultimate connection between the corporate elite and influential politicians is that the latter generally accept the prevailing capitalist orthodoxy and/or they have to pay more than lip service to it because of corporate influence. Senior politicians and their advisers obviously exercise the balance of political choice among competing alternatives or elites and seek to minimize damage to the party's central goal of maintaining power. Of course, the corporate elite occasionally loses in a process where populist, purely political, and/or noneconomic considerations prevail. It is hard to imagine any single corporate leader winning a head-to-head battle with any prime minister on a major aspect of public policy, since the general public can be mobilized against the corporate elite if the political need arises (in itself a rare occurrence and likely to remain so). Business tried to shape, but could not totally dominate, Minister of Finance Michael Wilson's modest tax reform initiatives, which created some corporate losers.

The corporate elite would prefer single-minded pursuit of capitalistic market ideology (reinforced by patriotism and concern for the family); hence, the evident disappointment that the massive federal Conservative victory in 1984 still led to politics as usual in such central areas of corporate concern as limiting public subsidies and reducing government spending. Mulroney took only the semblance of steps toward a conservative Reagan-style revolution and rapidly abandoned most of them. The corporate elite ultimately has to accept the conditions in a welfare state, which makes it almost impossible for political leaders to control government in the same way businesspeople control their corporations. Some businesses also have to lose when they compete with one another for government favors.

Canadian capitalists have essentially accepted the type of social-welfare state that has developed in this country during the last half century, perhaps because its natural wealth in resources has enabled them to support public welfare programs. Either they have come of age with the welfare state, or its presence as they came to power illustrates the normative power of the actual. There is thus at least grudging acceptance of the social security net in place for individuals. The Canadian corporate elite are not Reaganites in terms of commitment to laissez-faire ideology, despite their continuing bows to free-market competition. The state played a critical role in the creation of Canada, and state intervention is a time-honored tradition.[27]

In Quebec today government and the corporate world have a sort of intimate relationship that may shock American capitalists, even though the province has spawned a whole new generation of successful entrepreneurs. Because of the pre-1960s history of Anglophone economic dominance, the government of Quebec has decided to stimulate economic development through massive hydroelectric projects and state-run companies and to encourage the growth of the indigenous private sector.[28] This decision has led to considerable government intervention in corporate affairs.[29] A giant pension fund, La Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, created in 1965, manages assets of more than $30 billion and owns major stakes in private corporations. More so than in other provinces, the political and corporate elites in Quebec have frequently changed roles. Many of today's capitalist leaders were active in the Quiet Revolution, which was a highly successful French-Canadian effort to take political and economic control of the province away from the Anglophone corporate elite. Nevertheless, the largest corporations based in Quebec, such as Bell Canada Enterprises, the Royal Bank of Canada, and the Bank of Montreal, are owned across the country.[30]

A credible conception of the public interest does not dominate the domestic political agenda, whatever the rhetorical excesses of any given moment. The public interest is only weakly represented in the public and corporate arenas. Public interest groups are usually perceived to be out of the mainstream and inherently suspect, whatever the obvious merits and relative effectiveness in certain situations of such groups as the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Consumers Association of Canada, and the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (the latter two being heavily financed by the federal government itself). In fact, public interest groups make a valiant effort to intervene in the status quo by trying to exercise effective power in such diverse realms as rate hearings and parliamentary committees, where the public is otherwise underrepresented in comparison with the corporate elite. Unlike the United States, Canada has yet to develop truly effective public interest groups; we live with the mirage that politicians somehow represent us rather than themselves, their party, and the corporate elite.[31]

There are other nonbusiness groupings whose interventions in the power arena are more substantial—in particular, labor unions. They exercise power most effectively by threatening to engage in strikes. Although unpopular, strikes get results, at least those of national unions, because they interrupt the flow of business and government services and profits. Such was decidedly the case in the 1987 strike of the Canadian Auto Workers Union against the major North American automobile manufacturers, which achieved a historic breakthrough in indexed pensions for retired union members. Its leader, Bob White, has emerged as a powerful figure, not least because his break with the American United Auto Workers allowed nationalists a rare opportunity for celebration.[32] On the other hand, the Canadian Union of Postal Workers was forced by federal legislation to return to work in October 1987. The legislation included a clause prohibiting any leader convicted of violating the law from serving in, or running for, union office for a five-year period. The unpopular postal union was simply not strong enough to attempt open defiance of this union-bashing law and was forced into expensive legal challenges to the constitutionality of the measure.

Labor unions remain more flourishing at present in Canada, where they enroll close to 40 percent of the nonagricultural labor force, than in the United States.[33] Yet Canadian trade unions are increasingly unpopular among nonmembers, especially for the public sector, and they are perceived as too often running against the collective interests of a capitalist economy. The corporate elite is generally hostile to such unions. Nevertheless, the willingness of unions to mobilize, to capitalize on effective leadership, and to strike definitely makes them a significant force in the country. They are effective because they are so unlike most Canadians, and so like businesspeople, in the public pursuit of their self-interest; unlike an individual, unions have the power to act in specific situations, although some observers question their effectiveness as a general political force.

One significant area of change in the exercise of power in Canada since the early 1960s has been a reduction in the political influence of organized religious groups. While adherence to a church is still important to many individuals, the organized churches have lost the kind of automatic entrée into the corridors of decision making that they once enjoyed. The role of the Roman Catholic church in Quebec politics, for instance, has vastly diminished since the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s. The organized churches do not shrink from making their views known to the media on issues they perceive to be relevant, such as the availability of abortion or limiting commercial activity on Sunday, but for the most part they have begun to concentrate on issues that fall within the traditional areas of concern for the religious forces in North America. Priests, ministers, and laypersons are now articulating the needs of the poor and the underprivileged in society, who are otherwise powerless, and have been especially active in the campaigns against capital punishment and restrictive immigration laws for refugees. Canadian churches, working like other pressure groups, have in a sense returned to the moralistic view that is deeply suspicious of power as a corrupting force. Adherents of this view include Bishop Remi DeRoo of Victoria, former chairman of the Social Affairs Committee of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, and Anglican Primate Edward Scott of Toronto, former president of the Canadian Council of Churches. Specialization in certain issues may restore some traditional political power to the churches, at least on matters that appear to be within their competence.

Another way to understand the limits of political and economic power in Canada is to consider the international forces that have an impact on its use. An argument can be constructed that Canada is ruled from abroad and/or by the forces of international capitalism. Despite its membership in the Group of Seven, Canada is a marginal player on the world scene, at least as dominated by the traditional and emerging superpowers.[34] Our monetary policy is effectively tied to the American dollar, and we depend on the United States for defense in this nuclear age. As a trading nation with a small domestic market, we are subject to the ebb and flow of foreign protectionism, inflation, and Third World indebtedness, which narrowly circumscribe the range of options available to government and financial leaders as they shape a Canadian response.

None of this should be surprising. The essential point is that Canada is a small North American nation with all the benefits and weaknesses of such a vulnerable position.[35] We have an enormous commitment to protect our standard of living and to avoid personal sacrifice in normal times if there are economic costs. The contrast with the collective achievements of Sweden as a trading nation is striking. Like Japan, Sweden has a collective vision and an integration of the public and private interests that has proven enormously successful in economic and social terms. Canadian capitalism would resist such an effort at synthesis because it allegedly flies in the face of the conventional wisdom that government and the corporate world should be countervailing forces. The Swedes can be dismissed as aberrant northern socialists.

Canada also views the exercise of power in the context of its relations with the United States. The argument of political economists is that economic and cultural realities severely limit Canada's ability to exercise its independence, even prior to the implementation of the pending free-trade agreement. Significant proportions of its manufacturing operations and oil companies are foreign owned and dominated.

Despite the customary veneer of Canadian management and share ownership, the real power in U.S. multinationals resides in the mother country. Canadian managers, for example, frequently require home-office approval for major capital expenditures and investments. Plant openings and closings remain very much subject to the global, or at least North American, strategy of the parent company. Thus, a plant closing in southern Ontario by an American-owned company, with its often serious impact on human welfare, may be dictated by considerations well beyond the control of Canadian managers, a further illustration of how the exercise of power in this country is intimately tied to capitalist dictates. Some subsidiaries are run on a very tight leash in Canada, so that the chief executives cannot make any important decisions without foreign approval.[36]

For most of the major branch-plant operations, becoming president and chief executive officer of the Canadian subsidiary is simply another step up the corporate ladder in the parent company. Promising foreign executives are parachuted into the country for a few years of seasoning as local managers.

The overall message is that Canadians, in general, have very little economic power; even foreigners, if major capitalists, can have more impact than most ordinary Canadians. Moreover, if its critics prove correct, the pending free-trade agreement may transfer even more influence over Canadian economic and political decision making to the United States.

One irony of this discussion is that large Canadian enterprises have been rapidly expanding in the United States. There is the modest reverse side of American economic dominance in Canada.[37] In 1988 Americans were surprised to find some of their most famous department stores falling into the hands of Robert Campeau, whose Toronto-based Campeau Corporation successfully took over Federated Department Stores Inc. In such cases the paramount consideration is the interest of the shareholders. In contemporary Canada, these shareholders are often a handful of corporate conglomerates dominated by a few extremely wealthy families, including the Bronfmans, the Desmarais, the Reichmanns, the Westons, and the Irvings.[38] Although Canada has always had wealthy families, the extent of their current control of capital is new. Sometimes such wealth is associated with one person who comes to personify financial and business acumen, such as aspiring press baron Conrad Black, Toronto businessman Robert Campeau, and Montreal financier Paul G. Desmarais, Sr.[39] The humble origins of the two latter entrepreneurs reinforces the myth that social mobility exists for everyone and that society is classless.[40]

Because considerable accumulations of capital and a willingness to take risks give them the leverage to borrow vast sums from banks, these major families and their associates are achieving more and more economic and political influence on the Canadian and the American scene. They are able to parlay their substantial wealth into controlling interests in major conglomerates that they have no need to own outright. This increasing and, indeed, excessive concentration of wealth is a worrisome trend. For the moment, as in the past, the political will to fashion effective antitrust laws to counter such developments does not exist.[41] It would require politicians to use their ultimate power in a democratic society by legislating against the corporate elite.

Just how such economic power translates into political power is difficult to specify, since so little is publicly visible. The appointed Senate is still a haven for prominent business leaders, whose directorships of leading corporations provide an entrée for the corporate elite to political inner sanctums.[42] The superrich have the ability to retain the best lawyers, accountants, and tax planners to guide them through the maze of governmental attempts at regulation and control. But the role these families play in politics does not go much beyond ensuring that politicians do not intrude too much onto their playing field and giving financial support to political campaigns. One clear exception is Paul Desmarais of the aptly named Power Corporation of Canada, who has hired a number of politically ambitious men, including at one time Paul Martin Jr., to help run his business empire.[43] At a New Year's eve party at his Palm Beach mansion in the mid-1980s, Desmarais entertained Prime Minister Mulroney, Premier William Davis of Ontario, and former Prime Ministers John Turner and Pierre Trudeau.[44] The Reichmanns made a comparably astute move by hiring Mickey Cohen, the influential former deputy minister of finance in Ottawa, to run their nonproperty businesses, which are international in scope. Increasingly, as in the United States, leading former politicians and mandarins from the federal government and provinces join or rejoin similar large corporate concerns and consulting companies.[45]

These great corporate enterprises, which are a source of pride and envy for many Canadians, exercise considerable power inside the country, especially by furthering the dominance of the prevailing ideology. The possibility for a small number of families to use the system—political, tax, and financial—to acquire control over such large amounts of capital also says something about the relative freedom to exercise economic power that the country allows.

One should also emphasize the extent to which these influential families have concentrated media control, at least in terms of ownership. Thomson Newspapers Ltd. owns *The Globe and Mail*, the only nationally distributed newspaper, and thirty-six other daily newspapers. Power Corporation owns *La Presse* of Montreal. Other leading families control the country's broadcast and television outlets.[46] The Thomson chain and Southam Inc. own 55 of the 110 newspapers that belong to the Canadian Daily Newspaper Publishers Association; these 55 control almost 48 percent of total daily circulation in the country. Moreover, 90 dailies hold local monopolies, while only eight communities have competition among newspapers.[47] This situation raises serious questions about excessive media influence in the political realm, even if corporate advertisers have their own opportunities to try to shape the situation. The media are thus a nexus for corporate influence in all aspects of Canadian life, protected as they are from foreign ownership. The corporate elite responds that the press has no single editorial line despite the degree of concentrated ownership and that the general public benefits from the existence of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation as a counterbalance.

SHAPING THE FUTURE

Although we have no reason to expect the current pattern of dominance by the political and corporate elites to alter dramatically in the foreseeable future, there are portents of change. One of the most fascinating adjustments to power relationships under way in Canada is a result of the 1982 addition of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the Constitution. A document with considerable parallels to the U.S. Bill of Rights, it has catapulted the judiciary into the exercise of political power, for government action must now meet the constitutional standards of the Charter. Canadian courts now have the power to act more like their American counterparts as sensitive issues of public policy reach, or are pushed into, the judicial arena. Examples to date include the validity of Sunday closing laws, the extension of state aid to Catholic schools in Ontario, federal election funding, cruise missile testing, and the use of breathalyzer tests. The Charter offers politicians the distinct advantage of being able to avoid highly charged issues by referring them to the courts, which can, in return, cause them even more problems. Those who shaped the Charter seem at least mildly surprised by its results to date.

A major illustration of the new power of the courts is the Supreme Court's decision of January 1988, which found a section of the federal criminal code on abortion unconstitutional on grounds comparable to the U.S. Supreme Court's *Roe* v. *Wade* decision in

1973.[48] In the Canadian court the majority emphasized the right to "security of the person" granted under Section 7 of the Charter, while the American court relied on the more nebulous right to privacy. Politically, the case was the culmination of a long series of prosecutions of Dr. Henry Morgentaler for operating private abortion clinics in Quebec and Ontario. Juries were in the habit of acquitting him anyway, but the Ontario attorney general's department appealed the last acquittal. The Supreme Court of Canada has now established "principles of fundamental justice" with which any future federal or provincial legislation, regulations, and policy on abortion will have to comply. This requirement ensures that litigation will continue, as in the United States, because anti-abortion forces are active.

Many Canadians resisted the Charter because of the Americanization process it seemed to initiate. The *Morgentaler* decision reminded politicians that their formerly vaunted parliamentary supremacy is no longer as supreme, even if Parliament can still enact criminal laws on abortion. However, under Section 33 of the Charter, it is possible for federal and provincial legislative bodies to act "notwithstanding" the Charter with respect to fundamental freedoms, legal rights, and equality rights. This "override" power has had little use to date except by Quebec.[49] Nevertheless, it is available to overrule any court decision considered to be too much out of step with the legislators' perceptions of public opinion.

One of the by-products of the new power of the judiciary is expected to be an improved legislative mechanism for screening candidates before their appointment; here again, the traditional legal elite will recoil in horror at American federal practice, especially after the dramatic 1987 hearings on Judge Robert Bork. Any inclinations toward reform on the part of the Canadian Bar Association will seek to perpetuate the legal elite's influence in the process, but perhaps the format will become more public.[50] Judges, moreover, are normally part of the political and corporate elite, at least in their earlier incarnations, and some segments of the public perceive the courts as generally pro-business.

The Charter has also provided new avenues for interest groups to influence the direction of public policy in a situation that was previously under the full control of cabinets and senior public servants.[51] Government action at every level can now be challenged as unconstitutional. Litigants with the financial backing and guidance of such bodies as the Canadian Council for Social Development and the National Citizens Coalition have put the Charter to use. In accord with Canadian practice, the council enjoys direct and indirect federal and provincial government funding to intervene on behalf of the public interest in certain cases. The irony, of course, is that the funds are almost invariably used to challenge government legislation. The National Citizens Coalition, a right-wing lobbying group, is enjoying some success in using private funds to challenge many of the traditional practices of labor unions, which are accustomed to having considerable clout in the legislative arena, not least because of their direct links to the New Democratic party. They are now being forced to defend themselves in costly court proceedings under Section 1 of the Charter, which states that its guarantees of the rights and freedoms of individuals are subject "only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."[52]

Many Canadians welcome the new constitutional protection for their rights against the government. Over time, this provision could considerably augment the citizen's power in relation to the state, particularly in the area of law enforcement, but this change will require some stimulation of Canadian society, which is traditionally nonlitigious, at least in comparison with that of the United States.[53] Such activity also runs against the grain of the Canadian tendency to defer to authority.

The Charter is having the further effect of highlighting the power of lawyers and of elite legal firms, which has been increasing during the past generation not least because of substantial growth in their numbers. Although most lawyers have ordinary practices that at best connect them to the exercise of power in their local communities, the large law firms of Toronto and Montreal are not only powerful instruments of the corporate elite but also backroom operators in the corridors of political and economic power in their own right. There are certain law firms known to be "political" whose traditional law practice seems to be secondary to living off the various levels of government as clients or as their clients' representatives before government bodies. As in the United States, all major law firms, whether or not dominated by current or former politicians as partners, appreciate that the government is an excellent client and a stimulant to business through its legislative and regulatory interventions. Since a large proportion of every legislative body consists of lawyers, their multiple talents get much appreciation from legislators. Lawyers in elective politics can also contemplate a return to more lucrative settings on a full-time basis at the next turning point in their political careers. Even the Liberal populist Jean Chrétien joined a major law firm after he failed to secure the leadership of the federal party.

Canada, like other countries, has a network of local elites which runs matters that are voluntary or subject to local control.[54] Because of the power of voluntary contributions from corporations, wealthy people, and their charitable foundations, the local elites, which hold the purse strings, are very influential on their own turf. They can be found on the boards of governors of local universities and holding honorary positions in the leading cultural and charitable organizations. Not surprisingly, many of these people are very well off, often the beneficiaries of inherited wealth. The wealthier (or more philanthropic) they are, the more likely they are to serve on prominent boards of directors such as the Stratford Festival and the National Ballet of Canada. A similar situation prevails for senior business leaders in the local community, who will only achieve national position and status if their companies are also national. The exception to these statements is that Ontario's elites are almost automatically national elites in English-speaking Canada because of the province's dominant control of corporate assets.

Political fund-raisers are usually members of the local elite of professional people; they have access to their peers for contributions. Although Canadian political campaigns are inexpensive by American standards and involve no powerful political action committees, because of government funding and controls on election spending, fund-raising is especially important for parties and candidates. They try to persuade individuals to take advantage of the generous tax credit for political contributions. The parties do raise considerable sums from small contributors by direct mail, but serious players in every riding collect money from other well-to-do individuals on an ongoing basis. This funding guarantees citizens a hearing by politicians, especially on specific issues. The most important fund-raisers shape the general agenda and decisions of politics; they are the bagmen and sometimes the key backroom operators for the major parties. Many lawyers who raise such funds also serve as *eminences grises* for parties and politicians. A few of these political operators are a key part of the tiny national elite that runs the country.

How else will the future exercise of political and economic power differ from what it has been in the recent past? Since the Second World War, direct British political influence and power in Canada has almost completely disappeared and French Canadians have joined the power elite, in both government and the corporate world. The latter development offers no assurance that separatism will not again challenge the continued association of Quebec with the rest of Canada. In many ways, this province already functions as a separate country within Canada.

Japan is making significant incursions on the Canadian scene, both in direct investment and in the purchase of government securities. Since U.S. and European investors also continue to regard Canada as a safe haven for investment, the dominance of foreign ownership in this country is not about to end.

The signs are in place as well for women to enlarge their share of political power in what has traditionally been a male-dominated world. The Ontario government in particular has demonstrated an appreciation for the role of women in government. David Peterson has appointed a number of females to his cabinet and to the senior civil service. On the whole, the women's movement continues to make some gains, and the world will indeed become different as women are taken more seriously. Men accustomed to power can be expected to make more complaints about the evils of reverse discrimination than they have in the past, since men have always assumed that they achieved power on the basis of merit and talent, not gender. The level of female participation in political life seems sure to increase, but one must be less sanguine about the short-term prospects for significant growth in their membership in the dominant political and corporate elites, given how little the membership of these elites has changed since World War II.

The most prominent ethnic minorities will challenge the dominance by men from outside Quebec who are WASPs and by French-Canadian Catholic men inside the province. Because they dominate certain ridings in large urban centers, for instance, the Italians and the Chinese are already getting considerable attention from the political parties. The ethnic origins of a quarter of the population are neither French nor English, so that political parties now cater more directly to multiculturalism, which is also producing the nonfounding elites described elsewhere in this issue by Robert Harney.

Canada continues to be run by a small network of intertwined, yet competing, elites drawn from the corporate, political, and administrative worlds. Every aspect of Canadian life is imbued with their power. For the most part, within each elite group and even among them, the links are more important than the rivalry and competitiveness over profits, regional interests, and power. This assessment of how Canada is run generally corresponds with other authors'.[55] The exercise of power in Canada is not much different from the prevailing situation in other Western industrial democracies. Our power centers, however, especially in comparison with those of the United States, are highly concentrated in both numbers and places, are subject to a considerable degree of foreign influence, and do not consider the military an important elite.

As the dominant elites in Canada know all too well, foretelling the future is a perilous activity in any sphere, so it is very difficult to predict in advance how structural and socioeconomic changes, at least those known and anticipated, will affect the exercise of economic and political power. A prudent assessment would suggest that nothing can be expected to change the dominant role of the current corporate and political elites in the foreseeable future.

ENDNOTES

A number of friends and colleagues, including the contributors to this volume, have helped me considerably by commenting on drafts of this essay. It is impractical to name all of them, and some may prefer to remain anonymous, but I am especially grateful to B. B. Kymlicka, John W. Grace, Seymour Martin Lipset, John Meisel, James D. McNiven, Deidre Smith, Denis Smith, J. Neville Thompson, Barbara Todd, and Robert Young. Naturally, I assume full responsibility for not accepting all of the good advice that I have received.

[1] Compare Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, *The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind* (New York: The Free Press, 1983), 378–84.

[2] See Wallace Clement, *The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975); *Continental Corporate Power:*

Economic Linkages between Canada and the United States (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977); *Class, Power and Property: Essays on Canadian Society* (Toronto: Methuen, 1983); and Michael Ornstein, "The Political Ideology of the Canadian Capitalist Class," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 23 (2) (1986):182–209.

[3] The pioneering study was by John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965). See James Heap, ed., *Everybody's Canada: The Vertical Mosaic Reviewed and Re-examined* (Toronto: Burns & MacEachern, 1974); and Harvey Rich, "The Vertical Mosaic Revisited: Toward a Macro-sociology of Canada," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 11 (1) (1976):14–31.

[4] See, for example, Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, *The Gallup Report* (Toronto: Gallup Canada, Inc., 1987), for polls taken April 27, June 18, and November 16, 1987.

[5] Ibid. for polls of October 19 and December 24, 1987 and of March 3, 1988.

[6] Representation in the House of Commons and provincial legislatures is by population.

[7] See Seymour Martin Lipset, "Canada and the United States: The Cultural Dimension," in Charles F. Doran and John H. Sigler, eds., *Canada and the United States* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 154–56.

[8] See Al Johnson, "Weakened Bonds of Nationhood," *Policy Options* 9 (1) (January 1988):18–20. Johnson is a former leading federal and provincial mandarin.

[9] The use of sexist language here is conscious, since women have not yet achieved selection as prime minister or premier.

[10] See Hedrick Smith, *The Power Game: How Washington Works* (New York: Random House, 1988). A comparable volume does not exist for Canada.

[11] See *Report of the Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons* (The McGrath Report) (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, June 1985).

[12] Compare, for example, *Open and Shut: Enhancing the Right to Know and the Right to Privacy*, report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Solicitor General on the Review of the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act (Ottawa: House of Commons, 1987); and the government's response: Department of Justice Canada, *Access and Privacy: The Steps Ahead* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987).

[13] Recent research has documented the very substantial links between the state and corporations in Canada, especially at the political level. See John Fox and Michael Ornstein, "The Canadian State and Corporate Elites in the Post-War Period," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 23 (4) (1986):481–506.

[14] Although voter turnout is high in comparison with that of the United States, few Canadians actually belong to a political party.

[15] See Colin Campbell and George J. Szablowski, *The Superbureaucrats: Structure and Behaviour in Central Agencies* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1979); and Dennis Olsen, *The State Elite* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980).

[16] The work of Jack Granatstein shows the origins of the mandarinate and their exercise of considerable centralizing power in the era of the Great Depression, the Second World War, and the Cold War. See J. L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins 1935–1957* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982).

[17] There is competition among the mandarins representing various governmental interests, and they do not automatically serve business. The same incentives to identify with the corporate elite, which I view as operating in the case of politicians, are less applicable to career civil servants, so this is one sense in which their political masters set the ultimate directions of public policy. Moreover, the public servants in economic fields, such as the Department of Finance (the equivalent of the U.S. Treasury), are aware of the economic forces limiting their freedom in decision making.

[18] See *Debrett's Illustrated Guide to The Canadian Establishment* (Agincourt, Ontario: Methuen, 1983), which features an informative essay by the volume's general editor, Peter C. Newman, "The Power Network: Patrolling the Perfumed Stockades of Canada's Establishment." Newman is the most celebrated chronicler of the Canadian elite.

[19] See Ornstein, "Political Ideology of the Canadian Capitalist Class," 189–204.

[20] See Clement, *Canadian Corporate Elite* and *Continental Corporate Power*; also Jorge Niosi, *Canadian Capitalism: A Study of Power in the Canadian Business Establishment*, trans. Robert Chodos (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1981).

[21] Diane Francis, *Controlling Interest: Who Owns Canada?* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1986), 279–80. The fact that de Grandpré was unsuccessful is a reminder of the ultimate power wielded by the political elite.

[22] Trudeau was something of an exception to this prevailing rule since he pursued alternative visions: integration of Quebec into the federal structure and constitutional reform.

[23] Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, *The Gallup Report*, poll of September 24, 1987.

[24] Rosemary Sexton, "Ontario Premier leads group at Swiss forum," *The Globe and Mail* (2 February 1988).

[25] Thus ensuring, for example, that Finance Minister Michael Wilson's tax reforms did not seriously match the achievements of the Reagan tax cuts in raising corporate taxes. See John Sawatsky, *The Insiders: Government, Business and the Lobbyists* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987); and Linda McQuaig, *Behind Closed Doors: How the Rich Won Control of Canada's Tax System . . . And Ended Up Richer* (Markham, Ontario: Viking, 1987).

[26] Mulroney's Conservatives changed the name of FIRA to Investment Canada and reduced its powers.

[27] See Lipset, "Canada and the United States," 139–44.

[28] All Canadian governments own Crown corporations, which serve as relatively independent instruments of government economic policy. As of July 31, 1987, the federal government's 54 parent Crown corporations and their 114 wholly-owned subsidiaries employed 183,000 persons and had total assets of $59.6 billion.

Leading examples include Petro-Canada, Canadian National Railways, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and Air Canada (which the government has announced plans to privatize). See President of the Treasury Board, *Annual Report to Parliament on Crown Corporations and Other Corporate Interests of Canada, Public Accounts of Canada, 1987,* vol. 3 (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1987), iii, 362.

[29] The reverse phenomenon features the corporate elite pressing for government grants, incentives, and favorable policies and trying to play off provincial against federal governments in order to create a climate that fosters their interests most vigorously.

[30] For this paragraph, see, generally, Matthew Fraser, *Quebec Inc.: French-Canadian Entrepreneurs and the New Business Elite* (Toronto: Key Porter, 1987), 74–76, 78–82, 93–94, 104, 166–67, 213, 219, 247, 258–61; and Niosi, *Canadian Capitalism*, chap. 3.

[31] For a more positive view, see A. Paul Pross, *Group Politics and Public Policy* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986).

[32] See Bob White, *Hard Bargains: My Life on the Line* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987). White is also a senior elected official of the New Democratic party.

[33] For an explanation of these Canadian-American differences that emphasizes the impact of diverse national values, see Seymour Martin Lipset, "North American Labor Movements: A Comparative Perspective," *Unions in Transition: Entering the Second Century*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1986), 440–50.

[34] For a contrary view, see the article by the Canadian ambassador to the United States, Allan Gotleib, "Canada: a Nation Comes of Age," *The Globe and Mail* (29 October 1987).

[35] See David H. Flaherty and William R. McKercher, eds., *Southern Exposure: Canadian Perspectives on the United States* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1986), 6–19.

[36] See John Ralston Saul, "The Secret Life of the Branch-plant Executive," *Globe and Mail Report on Business Magazine* 4 (January 1988):81–86.

[37] However, Eric Kierans, an elder statesman experienced in both the corporate and the political world, views the free-trade agreement as a pact between the giant Canadian and American corporations that will lock Canada into being a North American corporatist state, wherein "the dominant institutions are the large corporations, which pursue growth in wealth and power as their single, overriding objective . . . ." ("A Cruel Joke," *Policy Options* 9 [1] [January 1988]: 21–23).

[38] The lavish details can be found in Francis, *Controlling Interest,* 14–25, 43–53, 100–105, 111–38. These five families control a total of 624 companies (Statistics Canada, *Intercorporate Ownership* [Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, April 1988], 5–6, 10–12, 22–23).

[39] See, for example, Dave Greber, *Rising to Power: Paul Desmarais & Power Corporation* (Toronto: Methuen, 1987).

[40] These myths were first exploded in John Porter's *The Vertical Mosaic.*

[41] Francis, *Controlling Interest*, chap. 6.

[42] Francis, *Controlling Interest*, 274–75.

[43] Martin, now the sole owner of CSL Group Inc., is a Liberal candidate from Quebec in the next federal election.

[44] Francis, *Controlling Interest*, 274.

[45] For example, after almost three years as deputy minister of finance, Stanley Hartt returned to his Montreal law practice (*The Globe and Mail*, 9 April 1988). The conflict-of-interest code that governs senior appointments precludes him from dealing with any department of the federal government for one year after his departure from the public service.

[46] See Francis, *Controlling Interest*, 143, 278–79, and especially 313–17. The Kent Commission studied newspaper concentration, but the federal government ignored its recommendations (*Report of the Royal Commission on Newspapers* [Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1981]). Governments appoint such commissions when they do not know what to do about a perceived problem or want to do nothing.

[47] John Partridge, "News Makes Money," *The Globe and Mail* (6 February 1988).

[48] *Dr. Henry Morgentaler, Dr. Leslie Frank Smoling, and Dr. Robert Scott* v. *Her Majesty the Queen and the Attorney General of Canada, January 28, 1988, Supreme Court Reports* vols. 1, 30.

[49] The provincial government included a notwithstanding clause in every legislative act so as to escape the coverage of the Charter, which formed part of the Constitution patriated without Quebec's agreement.

[50] The federal government has announced plans to set up appointment review committees in each province, including representatives from the legal profession, the judiciary, and the general public, to review the suitability of federal judicial candidates below the level of the Supreme Court (*The Globe and Mail*, 15 April 1988). David Beatty made the case for public confirmation hearings before a parliamentary committee of Supreme Court nominees (*The Globe and Mail*, 27 May 1988).

[51] F. L. Morton, "The Political Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 20 (1) (1987):39–43.

[52] *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,* section 1, being Part I of the Constitution Act of 1982.

[53] See, generally, Joseph M. Weiler and Robin M. Elliot, eds., *Litigating the Values of a Nation: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (Toronto: Carswell, 1986).

[54] Local politicians primarily control sensitive matters such as private development by large national companies. Their revenues are so committed and limited that provincial and federal politicians make most of the decisions really affecting local matters, since they control the purse strings for discretionary issues, such as the building of highways, bridges, and major sporting facilities.

[55] See S. J. R. Noel, "Political Parties and Elite Accommodation," in Peter Meekison, ed., *Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1971): 121–40; Robert Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*; Clement, *The Canadian Corporate Elite*; and William K. Carroll, John Fox, and Michael D. Ornstein, "The Network of Directorate Links Among the Largest Canadian Firms," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 19 (1) (1982):44–69.

Lloyd Axworthy

The Federal System—An Uncertain Path

AN OLD CANADIAN JOKE GOES AS FOLLOWS: Three politicians, from France, the United States, and Canada, were asked to describe an elephant. The French *député* waxed eloquent on the elephant as a symbol of national power and glory. The American congressman spoke of the strategic importance of the elephant in the East-West conflict. And the Canadian member of parliament described the elephant as a federal-provincial problem.

As the story implies, federalism is a national preoccupation in Canada. It is seen as far more than just an institutional arrangement, setting out power and duties between central and regional governments. It is both a clear reflection and a necessary means of defining the diverse Canadian reality. It has enabled Canadians to forge a reasonably effective, stable form of democratic government for over a century and a quarter. It has supported a form of mixed political economy where state initiative has been used to shape distinctive social, economic, and cultural goals. It is an essential element of the Canadian identity.

Governing Canada is not an easy task. The huge land mass of Canada is broken only by a thin strip of population strung along the U.S. border. The vast hinterlands have few people and are hard to reach. Disparities in wealth, power, and entitlement are endemic to the geography and the economy. In its history the country has had sharp divisions along regional, linguistic, and cultural lines. To survive, it has had to publicly support various programs of nation

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Lloyd Axworthy is a Liberal Member of Parliament for the constituency of Winnipeg-Fort Garry and Trade Critic for the Official Opposition.

building: east-west transportation and communication links, carefully defined programs of regional economic development, national social programs such as unemployment insurance, medical care, and pensions for senior citizens.

These efforts have required skillful use of the federal system, a balancing of national initiatives against regional sensitivities and rights. Thus, the institution of federalism, the activity and role of the various governments, has been crucial to Canadians in constructing their nationhood. Canada has had a truly political economy, a shaping of the economy by political action. Through this strategic intervention of public policy, Canada has avoided the sundering so many other countries with similar centrifugal tendencies have experienced.

Yet, the Canadian federal system is heading into the next century on an uncertain course. Changes in the political, economic, and social life of the Canadian nation, to say nothing of changes outside Canada, are causing major alterations in the Canadian polity.

Compare: In 1867 the founders of Canadian federalism established a strong central state that would enable the four British colonies to create a country different and independent from its southern continental neighbor, a nation capable of developing an east-west economic union while maintaining a British parliamentary system. The provinces were given powers that would allow them to represent the distinctive economic, cultural, and religious differences of the regions but made them clearly subordinate to the national government. In introducing the British North America Act to the House of Lords, Lord Carnavon said:

> The real object we have in view is to give the central government those high functions and almost sovereign powers by which general principles and uniformity of legislation may be secured in those questions that are of common impact to all the provinces; and at the same time to retain for each province so ample a measure of municipal liberty and self government as will allow them to exercise these local powers which they can exercise with great advantage to the community.[1]

One hundred and twenty years later, Lord Carnavon would scarcely recognize the object of his affection. Canadian policy decisions are increasingly made through an emerging form of executive federalism in which the federal prime minister and the provincial premiers sit down as equals in an interminable number of federal-provincial conferences to bargain away issues without any real reference to the elected bodies. An intricate intergovernmental, bureaucratic network has arisen as part of this development.

Recent constitutional changes have introduced a new regime of individual rights and have augmented the power of the judiciary. There are proposals pending that would greatly enhance the power of the provinces and give constitutional definition to the notion of Quebec as a distinct society. And Canada is involved in negotiating a massive free-trade agreement with the United States that will substantially alter the flow of continental commerce.

Thus, it appears that many principles of the forefathers are being overturned by their latter-day political successors. The Canadian federal system may go off on a new tangent that could end up altering the system to such a degree that it will change the way Canadians govern themselves.

OLD PARADOXES—NEW FORCES

Canadian federalism has centered on three tensions: first, the intricate balancing of language and culture—the French-English duality of the country; second, the perpetual pull between the center and the periphery—the national versus the regional views of the country; and third, the struggle to preserve the country's sovereignty and independence while sharing North America with the most powerful nation on earth.

Donald Smiley, a noted Canadian political scientist, has pointed out that the Confederation arrangement of 1867 and the subsequent national policy of promoting western expansion and tariff protection for industries was an attempt to deal with these three fundamental tensions. "Any adequate explanation of the Canadian federal experience," he says, "would analyse the inter-relationships among these three axes since Confederation."[2] Smiley then wisely forswears trying to take on this monumental task of analysis.

But the task cannot be avoided. As Smiley mentions, contemporary forces, both internal and external, are altering the basic relationships. Take, for example, the substantial change in Canadian demographics since World War II. Because of recent immigration, better than a third of all Canadians are now of neither French nor English background. This third force, the multicultural factor, is beginning to have a strong bearing on the perception of what Canada is. No longer can we conceive of Canada through the prism of French-English relations alone. The traditional view of Canada as a tolerant society is coming into question. Anxiety over race relations, particularly in response to immigration, is becoming a serious item on the political agenda.[3]

The rise of powerful new interest groups is also strongly affecting politics in Canada. Women are becoming major economic and political players. Groups of native people and senior citizens, anti-poverty associations, and environmental movements have generated a whole new set of issues. They cut across the traditional regional, language, and cultural differences.

New technology is affecting how Canadians work, how they see each other, how they behave politically. Television has become a powerful medium of political expression, bringing political debate into the living room every night. Data processing and computer-based business information systems are altering the economic landscape of the country. Here again, how to manage through a federal arrangement of separate jurisdictions the social and industrial forces this technology unleashes is a serious problem of governance for the nation. Trying to form an industrial policy for Canada by harnessing these new developments is an elusive goal. Conventional approaches to regulating business and financial markets on a national scale are fragmenting. Regional development programs cannot compensate for the new wealth being created in the major information service centers concentrated in central Canada.

Perhaps most profound is the pressure from the external environment. It is no accident that it was a Canadian, Marshall McLuhan, who coined the term *the global village*—for no other nation is as sensitive to international vagaries and continental forces as Canada. The dependence on trade, the powerful role of multinational corporations, the high level of foreign ownership in Canadian industry are all dominant factors influencing Canada. They are forcing Canadians to rethink the issue of sovereignty and independence, especially in relation to the United States.

How is the Canadian federal state adjusting and evolving in light of these changed circumstances? Obviously, the definitive answer is beyond the scope of this essay.[4] Perhaps all that one can do here is to look at some of the important markings of recent change as seen by a less than dispassionate participant and deduce from them some forecast for the future of Canadian federalism.

CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

An understanding of the turbulence in recent Canadian political development begins with the Quiet Revolution in Quebec in the early 1960s. Quebec had for centuries jealously guarded its prerogatives on language, culture, and religion: there has always been Quebec nationalism. But, the pre-1960s province of Quebec was characterized by a very conservative—almost reactionary—political-economic system, a social structure dominated by the Catholic church and an economic structure dominated by an Anglo elite. These together produced a passive provincial government. When it came to pushing Quebec's interests in the federal union, the Francophone federal members of parliament were compliant.

As a result, the national government and the rest of Canada were able to substantially ignore the increasing threat to the preservation of French culture in Canada. The interests of Canadians in early postwar decades was to promote economic growth and advance the social security systems. This was a role the national government undertook, with general acquiesence from the provinces. It appeared to be a very successful model, in keeping with the original blueprint of Confederation.

All that changed in 1960 with the election of a new activist Liberal government in Quebec, reflecting a demand for change that finally burst through the walls of inertia and repression in that province. This change in government unleashed a torrent of reform in the arts, education, and economic development as Quebecers sought quick acceleration into modern society. It also spawned powerful expressions of Quebec nationalism. Sensitive to the vulnerability of being a minority of 6 million French-speaking inhabitants enveloped in the North American English-speaking continent, Quebecers were no longer prepared to let the rest of Canada ignore their grievances.

While there was a shared recognition of the problem, Quebec's political society polarized into two camps when it came to solutions. Some sought to change the federal system to accommodate the demands. Others decided that they would no longer be a subjected people and worked toward independence from Canada.

Gérard Pelletier, journalist, ex-Liberal cabinet minister, and important participant in the heady upheavals of those days, describes the debate in his memoirs. Many Quebecers saw themselves as North American Algerians fighting against colonial status. And then there were advocates like Pierre Trudeau, who fought against separation, as did Pelletier, believing that the best way to protect the interest of French Canadians was to restructure Canadian federalism so that Quebecers could play a commanding role at the national level. As Pelletier wisely noted at the time,

> Canadian federalism has not failed: the truth is that it has never really been tried. Neither by our English-speaking partners who had abused their position of strength, nor by ourselves because we had not known how to put to work the means we actually possessed.[5]

Because of this reawakening in Quebec and the debate that followed, the Canadian federal state would never be the same. From that point on, the dominant feature of Canadian politics centered on the need to respond to and accommodate the demands of Quebec.

THE TRUDEAU RESPONSE

A major event in shaping the response was the recruitment to the federal Liberal party of prominent leaders of the Quebec revolution and in particular the surprising emergence of Pierre Trudeau as Liberal leader and prime minister in 1968. Trudeau quickly became the dominant figure in Canadian politics because of his powerful personality and his articulate prescriptions for change in the Canadian federal system. He represented the heady mood of innovation that characterized Canada in the late 1960s. In him Canadians saw a strong leader, capable of overcoming old traditions and surpassing conventional wisdom.

In a fascinating essay, the young writer B. W. Powe, who was only thirteen when Trudeau came to power, says this:

> For sixteen years a civil war was waged in Canada. . . . The civil war had one champion, one general architect: Pierre Elliot Trudeau. His goal: a bilingual, cosmopolitan state unified by a central, nationalist idea. His war was fought against those who sought to fracture the

> nation into a loose federation; it was waged against the passive and dull, against isolationists.[6]

Trudeau had an answer for the grievances of the French-speaking Canadians. It was to extend them the right to use their own language throughout Canada. He explicitly rejected the demand that Quebec be given special status and special powers and opted instead for an approach based on individual rights protected and promoted by the central government. In this he was reflecting a view of federalism that had been at the bedrock of Canadian liberalism for a long time. To Trudeau, the answer was that:

> Canada must become a truly bilingual country in which the linguistic majority stops behaving as if it held special and exclusive rights and accept the country's federal nature with all its implications.[7]

To give credence to his words, his government embarked on a massive program of reeducating Canadians. Thousands of federal civil-servant positions were declared bilingual, and major programs of retraining were introduced. The use of both official languages was implemented in all federal services such as post offices and airlines and in all government documents and publications. Even the labels on cereal boxes had to be printed in both languages.

This unique experiment was designed to give French-speaking Canadians a sense of belonging to Canada, of having their rights recognized, and of being encouraged to fully participate. Its purpose was to head off the kind of fractious divisions that have split so many countries that have large minorities with grievances. To Trudeau, the most effective antidote to the separatist urgings of Quebec nationalists was to make Quebecers full partners in the governing of Canada.

Trudeau's endeavor was not without its problems. Many Canadians outside Quebec—particularly those in the West and those who had non-English or non-French origins, resented the federal imposition of bilingualism. They sought solace by engaging in combat with Trudeau through their provincial governments or by joining federal political parties that opposed the language laws. The Liberal party, in consequence, lost a substantial number of its parliamentary seats in 1972, especially in western Canada, and has yet to recover politically in that region.

Trudeau was also opposed in his own part of Canada by strong Quebec nationalists who were after more power for their province. In their view, it was the province that should act as the defender and promoter of French culture and language. This was a position strongly held even by the provincial Liberal government in Quebec as it tried to establish special guarantees and provisions. It did win the right to opt out of certain federal financing programs for education and old-age pensions.

EMERGENT PROVINCIAL POWER

This alternate view of provincial rights had a resonance in other parts of Canada. Other provincial governments joined Quebec in challenging federal power and championing regional interests. The province of Alberta began to wage a major war with Ottawa over the issue of controlling energy resources, just as the federal government was trying to find ways of cushioning the impact of the global oil crisis. The provinces increased their efforts to direct their resource industries, their tax bases, and their social services. Emerging was a clear provincial interest in reducing the primacy of the national government in the federal system.

In the mid-1970s the provincial governments won a major victory when the federal government agreed to a system of financing higher education by transferring funds unconditionally to the provinces. This victory signaled a major shift in power to the provinces, for they regained control of many essential services such as health and education, which had been subject to federal initiative since World War II.

It also heralded major alterations in jurisdictional relationships. The federal government became a senior partner in the federal system, not the controlling interest. Decisions on public policy were increasingly made on the basis of shared responsibility—when and if agreement between the levels of government could be found.

In these battles, Canadian loyalties were torn between the newfound assertion of regional, cultural, and linguistic interests as expressed through provincial governments and the role of the national government as the central force holding the country together. It caused continuing dispute and debate, making federal-provincial relations a dominant feature of Canadian politics.

This tension accelerated in 1976 with the surprise election of the Parti québecois (PQ) as the new government in Quebec. This was an avowedly separatist group that began a consistent attack on federal powers while building up Quebec institutions and activities through a highly *dirigiste* form of government intervention. The stage was set for a major clash between the opposing forces competing for the allegiance of Quebecers.

It came in 1980, when the PQ government called for a province-wide referendum to support a formula for "sovereignty-association" for Quebec. It was the supreme test for Canadian federalism. The federalist forces led by Trudeau and the Quebec provincial Liberal party, with substantial assistance from the Anglophone minority in Quebec, succeeded in defeating the referendum—but the issue was far from over. While losing the referendum, the Quebec nationalists had exacted a price that was to reverberate throughout the federal system.

A NEW CONSTITUTION

One of Trudeau's promises to Quebec during the referendum was to make a new constitutional deal. It became the priority of his government in the early 1980s. The original objectives were to repatriate the right of constitutional amendment from Great Britain, where it remained as a last vestige of colonial dependency, and to establish certain language and cultural guarantees. But that soon blossomed into a plan for a broadly based charter that would inscribe a whole new set of individual rights in the constitutional framework.

The Quebec government, still smarting from the referendum defeat, was naturally opposed to this sweeping change in the Constitution. But major resistance also came from western Canadian and Maritime provincial governments, who were harboring their own grievances against the economic and political dominance of central Canada. They joined Quebec in fighting for major concessions from Ottawa in return for approval of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This battle between the different conceptions of what Canada should be played out in full during the very intense constitutional debate that dominated the political scene in the early 1980s.

Finally, after a series of conferences, court referrals, and substantial compromises in favor of the provinces, the Constitution Act was passed in 1982. As its centerpiece it had the Charter of Rights, which gave extensive guarantees for the use of both languages, equality of the sexes, and the status of ethnic groups and the disabled. At that moment, it seemed as if Trudeau's vision of Canada had prevailed.

THE CHARTER GENERATION

The Charter of Rights is a very potent instrument of change. The courts can now exercise real power in determining relations between the state and the citizen. Parliamentary sovereignty now has clear limits, and provincial rights and prerogatives have the potential to override federal prescriptions.

As the authors of a major research piece on federalism for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada noted,

> Enactment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 was thus the most important constitutional innovation since 1867. While it does not shift authority from one level to another it will deeply influence all future discussions of the division of powers.... In the hands of an activist court, such provisions shift 'rights discussions' away from the negative protections of citizens from government and toward an assertion of positive rights to government services.[8]

Just how important the Charter will become in redefining the meaning of positive rights can be seen in the recent landmark case in which the Supreme Court struck down laws limiting access to abortion. It was a judgment that rocked the political system in a dramatic way.

The Charter reflects how the dialogue over rights has escaped beyond the boundaries of the traditional English-French duality. The political battle over the Charter fully engaged the women's movement, the ethnic communities of Canada, the disabled, and the aboriginal people. Thus, it signified a major broadening of the field of human and civil rights in Canada and in this way brought the constitutional, indeed the entire political, framework into greater conformity with the far more pluralistic and heterogeneous society that Canada has become.

The Charter debate has also acted as a springboard for these new political forces to ally their success on the Charter with new demands for laws legislating equality in the workplace and enlightened programs on day care, the abuse of women and children, and pornography. This "Charter generation" of Canadians represents a very powerful group of advocates for further public entitlement. They will have a profound influence on the federalist arrangements of the country. Some argue that they transcend the traditional regional divisions and may therefore strengthen the central government.[9] On the other hand, the provinces have clear jurisdiction on civil and property rights and dominant jurisdiction in areas such as housing, family programs, training, and education. Thus, the provinces offer important channels through which this generation of Canadians can enhance their role. In this way, the provinces can enlarge their jurisdiction.

Where and how these nascent political forces channel their attention and energy will strongly influence the future shape of Canadian federalism. Depending on where they direct their demand for change—at one or the other federal or provincial systems—this Charter generation, the new force in Canadian politics, will determine where the political dynamo of the system will operate.

THE RISE OF EXECUTIVE FEDERALISM

While the emergence of the equality issue can be seen as a broadening of the democratic base of Canada, there was a price to be paid. The constitutional debate signaled a further decline in the role of Parliament as an effective forum where crucial issues can be discussed and decided.

The new Constitution was clearly a creation of the political executives—the prime minister, the premiers, and their advisers. Back in Parliament and the legislative assemblies, there were the forgotten rows of elected officials. The important events affecting Canada were taking place in a different arena—in the federal-provincial conference.

The emergence of this new center of power has been called executive federalism—decision making by political CEOs around the negotiating table, with little accountability to democratically elected bodies.[10]

In some ways it was a necessary invention. As the scope and size of government expanded, the operation and delivery of programs became a shared responsibility, calling for greater coordination between governments. As provincial governments won control over more and more policies and programs, they put a higher and higher premium on consultation and agreement.

This administrative and bureaucratic imperative was reinforced by the changes going on in the political parties and the media. Like most democracies, the political parties have increasingly become dominated by their leaders. Elections, since the advent of television, are more and more determined by leadership image. This has given political leaders immense control over their elected members—a fact further enhanced under the parliamentary system, in which the chief executive controls appointments to the cabinet and the timing of election calls.

The federal-provincial conference, the summit meeting of executive federalism, gained even further stature in the age of television as the names of premiers from the smallest of provinces became household words and heroes to the folks at home because of their video exposure. What better soap opera was there than watching a battle between the colorful colloquial premiers and the cerebral, at times caustic, Trudeau. These frequently televised rendezvous became a staple of the Canadian political diet and only further fed the power of the political executives.

In combination with the fuller power the Charter endowed the courts with, the apparatus of this executive federalism represents a substantial change in the policy-making system of the Canadian federal state. It clearly added to the diminution of the elected representative bodies and the enhancement of the power of the executive, who works as a member of an exclusive federal-provincial club. Executive federalism is a trend that was to become even more pronounced and more entrenched as the Trudeau years ended and a new government with a different philosophy took power.

ANOTHER RESPONSE—COMMUNITY OF COMMUNITIES

The Constitution Act of 1982 did not bring the modern Canadian obsession over constitution making to an end.

That Quebec was not a signatory to the new act created a new political problem: although Quebec belonged to the new constitutional regime legally, it did not see itself as a willing partner and refused to participate in further constitutional discussions. Many Quebecers viewed this state of affairs as a continuing insult, and all national parties as they approached the 1984 election made reconciliation with Quebec a priority.

It was up to the new Conservative government led by Brian Mulroney to meet that issue and to initiate a very different response—one that would set in train a reversal of the Trudeau initiatives. While the Trudeau Liberals during his fifteen years of government had stood generally for a strong central government, and against any special status for Quebec, the Tories had the more decentralist view that Canada is "a community of communities."

In this view, first articulated by the Quebec Conservative Marcel Faribault with his "deux réalités" philosophy but given clear exposition as a governing philosophy during the short-lived Conservative government of Clark in 1979, Canada is an amalgam of separate regions and provinces. The governments of the constituent parts are to work out their relationship in a collegial fashion. The federal government is to be one of the players, at most the team captain. This view is a rejection of the Liberal stance that French-Canadian grievances could be met by extending individual rights and emphasizing instead a more classical Conservative view based on the group, corporate, and territorial character of federalism. The decentralist stance was compatible with the modern-day Conservative party's antipathy to strong interventionist central government, an approach favorably received by the Conservative provincial premiers, who in 1984 were holding sway in seven of the ten provinces.

This stance also coincided with the mutual political interests of Brian Mulroney, who wanted to build a strong political base in Quebec, and of Robert Bourassa, the new premier of Quebec who, while a Liberal, did not agree with Trudeau about how to meet the Quebec issue. Both believed the answer lay in strengthening provincial powers rather than enhancing individual rights.

This compatibility of views led to a new round of constitutional negotiations, culminating in an extraordinary session of amendment making in the fall of 1986. Over two weekends the ten premiers and the prime minister met in secret sessions to hammer out a major new constitutional agreement called the Meech Lake Accord. Neither Parliament nor the respective assemblies were given a chance to debate the issue until it was a *fait accompli.* Public involvement was nonexistent. It was an extraordinary example of just how far toward executive-dominated federalism Canada had come. Without any reference to democratically elected forums, eleven chief political executives made fundamental decisions on the basic law of the land behind closed doors. The subsequent parliamentary hearings and approvals by the elected bodies were merely rubber stampings of these executives' resolutions.

Under the agreement, the Constitution Act would recognize Quebec as "a distinct society," a provision the Quebec government interpreted as the prerogative to override other provisions of the Charter in order to preserve the French language and culture. All the other provinces gained individual vetoes over substantial areas of constitutional amendment, received the right to submit lists of appointments to the federal Supreme Court and Senate, and won new powers in the area of immigration. The federal government also agreed to pay compensation to any provincial government wishing to opt out of a national program that impinged on provincial jurisdiction. All this was intended to ensure that Quebec would agree to sign the accord.[11]

Needless to say, the secretive way in which this new constitutional deal was decided and its major implications for the federal system became explosive issues. The Liberal party split over these matters. Former Prime Minister Trudeau spoke forcefully against it, while his successor, Mr. Turner, guardedly supported the agreement because it did make Quebec a constitutional partner. The other Opposition party, the New Democrats, also supported the agreement. But this compliance did not quell the expression of outrage across the country.

Critics were disturbed by the substantial shift in power toward the provinces, the granting of a form of special status to Quebec, the override of previous gains won in individual rights, and the introduction of a rigid amending formula that would freeze the preeminence of provincial power achieved under the accord. Robert Fulford, former editor of *Saturday Night* magazine, one of Canada's thoughtful journalists and a critic of the accord, pungently summed up the reaction:

> Mulroney . . . is making Canada what the Premiers want it to be: a collection of ten independent duchies with a central clearing house in

> Ottawa for tax collection, foreign relations, and fitful gestures in the direction of defence.[12]

On the other hand, another veteran political commentator saw the deal as a major step forward:

> Quebec gets recognition for its distinct identity, which any idiot can see that it has and always has had—while the other provinces get greater control of constitutional arrangements and Canada as a whole gains.[13]

What both critics and proponents could agree on is that the accord, if ultimately ratified, would represent a major new stage of power for the provincial governments and a rejection of the pan-Canadian approach that had dominated thinking about the Canadian federal system for decades.

Take for a moment the matter of regional grievances from western Canada and the Atlantic region, which are not based on language and culture but on a sense of being peripheral to the economic wealth and political power of the central regions of the country. People in these regions favored basing Canada's elected Senate on the American model, which would strengthen their voice in the national government and inject a new political balance into the national system of decision making. The Meech Lake Accord would negate the possibility of Senate reform along these lines because of the unanimity requirement for constitutional amendment. It would be hard to imagine the central Canadian provincial governments relinquishing their power in this way.

One would think that western and Atlantic premiers would have objected strenuously. On the contrary, what they saw very clearly was that the Meech Lake Agreement would further entrench the role of provincial governments as the repositories of regional interests—a position they wouldn't want to surrender to a reformed Senate at the national level.

The same push toward decentralization and shifting of control to the provinces could be seen in the vital area of economic development. In addition to the Meech Lake Accord, the Mulroney government began a program of dismantling the federal apparatus and transferring responsibility for training, education, and economic development to the provinces.[14] This added further weight to the expanding role and reach of the provincial governments. For example, they have made serious inroads into the federal field of communication, become far more sophisticated in their industrial incentives activities, and introduced their own research and development programs. The administration of resource policy is clearly in their hands, and many provinces have begun major international initiatives to attract capital, immigrants, and trade.

One of the ironies of present-day Canada's federal system is that at a time when the demand to meet economic pressures at home and abroad would appear to call for a more concerted national effort, the capacity to mount such an effort is being fragmented and decentralized. There are those who argue that this is an appropriate way for Canada to meet the new postindustrial information age. The Royal Commission on Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada has postulated a model of competitive federalism in which each of the governing units would pursue its own interests and, by the magic of some invisible hand, help Canada meet its economic challenges. It is an argument that arises from a market orientation and the antigovernment bias of the royal commission, and it reflects a pattern of thought increasingly prevalent in elite government, business, and academic circles.[15]

It is an approach, however, that turns its back on the historical lessons of Canadian federalism that have shown the necessity of having strong national policies. It ignores the backlog of billions of dollars of work on infrastructure, and the deteriorating state of universities, the increasing disparity in wealth and growth, the poor Canadian record on research and development, the poverty of the native people and of millions of other Canadians. These are problems that need collective national action. Yet, such action is becoming increasingly difficult to mount because the government's structure is incoherent and many of Canada's decision makers and opinion makers have abandoned the levers of the political economy. One of the by-products of executive federalism is the thwarting of major national initiatives. Decision by consensus is not the way to launch bold policies.

And there is the question whether this shift in power to the provincial governments, this weakening of the national government and the emergence of a collegial form of policy-making between the units of government, will secure the firm adherence of Quebec to

Confederation. On the surface and for the moment, it may appear so. But there is cause for concern. Quebec is becoming economically self-sufficient and less dependent on the rest of Canada. It has developed its own provincially based financial institutions such as the Caisse de dépôt et placement, which by managing government pension funds, has become the largest pool of capital in the province—in fact, in the country.

Through the careful nurturing of preferred government contracts and procurement, mighty international corporations such as Power Corporation, Bombardier, and Lavalin have developed. And Quebec has a very active new entrepreneurial class. The former fervor of political nationalism has gone into economic activity. While this may seem a positive sign, the new economic players in Quebec are decidedly uninterested in the rest of Canada. They don't believe they need it. In the 1980 referendum debate, one of the compelling arguments for keeping Quebec in the Confederation was the economic attachment. It is possible to foresee another wave of *indépendantiste* thought, but the same sense of economic linkage and connection to the rest of Canada will be lost. In other words, the seeds of a different kind of separatist appeal may now be in the ground.

A THIRD RESPONSE: CONTINENTAL MARKETPLACE

Just as the fear of splits along regional or language lines has not been put to rest, neither has the long-standing pull of continentalism. A growing body of powerful interests views the Canadian nation-state as obsolescent. The thinking and action of major big business interests in Canada has been to push for less government action in securing national goals. There is little support in Canada's business community, as there once was, for the notion that the north-south continental market pull should be resisted through public sector action. Instead there is belief that the move toward close economic integration with the United States is inevitable. Eric Kierans, former Liberal cabinet minister and president of the Montreal Stock Exchange, states why clearly:

> Canada's major corporations have accumulated assets and productive capability that exceed the needs of the Canadian nation for goods and

> services. Large corporations do not want to be limited by national jurisdictions or sovereignty.... Political or national identity is a handicap that must be shed if they are to pursue growth.[16]

The United States has always exerted a powerful influence on Canada. History tells us that the Canadian fathers of Confederation were motivated in large part by fear of American expansion after the Civil War and created a federal system that was designed to preserve a different society in the northern half of North America.

At the same time, the strong economic, cultural pull to the south has been strong. The Canadian economy is based in large part on selling staple resources to the United States—energy, pulp and paper, minerals—and Canada is certainly the largest customer for U.S. goods.

Since the Second World War, American companies have become the prime owners of Canadian assets, except in those sectors of the Canadian economy where public policy provides for restricted entry. In fact, Canada has the highest level of foreign ownership of all industrially developed nations.[17] Some commentators suggest our large level of economic dependency on the United States puts Canada in the category of a developing nation.[18]

In cultural terms, there is an equivalent integration. Canadian movies, television, and books are overwhelmingly controlled and dominated by U.S. products and U.S. ownership. The common language shared by the Americans and two-thirds of the Canadians makes it easy for exchanges to flourish, and there are literally thousands of contacts occurring daily across the border.

Yet Canadians have ambivalent feelings about this close U.S. relationship. While wanting to be friendly, Canadians also want to be different from the Americans. The prevalent Canadian view is that our society is more orderly, less violent, and less subject to extremes then the American society.[19] Our opposition to U.S. policies in Vietnam and in Central America has been substantial. Canadians do not share the same views on the Cold War as Americans and take pride in Canada's role as an international peacemaker.

In various periods of Canadian history these feelings have resulted in demands to preserve and protect Canadian identity. Canadian governments of different stripes have responded by setting up investment controls, restrictive entry for foreign companies, protections for industries such as banking and for certain cultures, and transportation regulations. These responses have often led to disputes with American multinationals and with the U.S. government, which always acts to protect the extension of U.S. interests in Canada.

This love-hate relationship exploded into a major confrontation in the early 1980s when the Trudeau government brought in a national energy program. Under this program foreign ownership of Canadian energy resources was restricted. Certain property rights of the multinationals were confiscated, preferences in exploration and development went to small Canadian companies, and the role of the national Crown corporation—Petro Canada—was enhanced in exploration and development. The American-owned oil companies were incensed and made sure that the Reagan administration in the United States pressured the Trudeau government to soften the measures. It was clear that the Canadian government of the day had stepped beyond the line of what the multinational business community thought acceptable public sector behavior and it made every effort to bring this errant government back into line.

The coming of the Mulroney government signaled victory for the corporate business community. The new prime minister declared to a blue chip New York audience that Canada was open for business, and he meant it. The new government got rid of the national energy program, changed the rules on foreign investment to make them virtually meaningless, and initiated a program of deregulation and privatization.

The master stroke in this blueprint of business power, however, has been the Mulroney initiative to negotiate a free-trade agreement with the United States. Trade with the United States has always been a contentious issue in Canada. In 1911, the Laurier Liberal government was defeated because of its plan to establish a free-trade area. Ironically, in the postwar decade over 80 percent of trade between Canada and the United States had become tariff free, primarily because of various General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. Nevertheless, in the 1980s such trade erupted as one of the most divisive problems facing Canada.[20]

In response to business's fear of U.S. protectionism, the Mulroney government sought as its priority a comprehensive trade pact with its southern neighbour. By the end of December 1987, the Mulroney and Reagan governments had agreed on a final text and proposed January 1, 1989, as the date of implementation.

Obviously, this is not the place to argue in full the merits of the free-trade deal, nor to predict the eventual result. But it is important to note the significance of this initiative for the Canadian federal state and for answering the perennial question of who governs Canada.

The proposed Canada-U.S. trade agreement is far-reaching, going way beyond the normal terms of a trade pact. In addition to eliminating all tariffs between the two countries, it applies the principle of national treatment to energy, services, investment, and agriculture. Canada has agreed to share energy resources with the United States and to limit the governments' right to set different prices. There are provisions limiting any action by the Canadian government in perpetuity for controlling U.S. investment. There are strict limitations on the development of Canadian Crown corporations, restrictions on direct subsidies for industry, and a loosening of rules governing banks, financial services, and the service sector. A new dispute-settlement mechanism is to be created that will review countervail and antidumping cases and a cross-border trade commission to handle other forms of trade disputes.

To many Canadians—and this includes the two Opposition parties, the labor unions, the coalition of churches, and cultural and social agencies—this agreement represents a severe limitation of Canadian rights to choose their form of political action and a further shift toward continental economic integration. To them, it is a repudiation of one of the original reasons for Canada's existence in the first place, and it threatens Canada's future efforts to protect and define its own identity.

For the proponents of the deal, and this includes a powerful coalition of businesspeople, academics, economists, and most of the provincial governments, the arrangement is a formula for economic growth based on market forces, access to the U.S. market, and the chance to become competitively "lean and mean."[21] This formula raises fears about the survival of Canada in a tough international economy. The old easy days when Canadian resource exports found ready markets is no more. There is a whole field of new competitors in the world market, and there is uncertainty about whether the international trade system under GATT can offer sufficient recourse and remedy to increasing protectionist forces. Thus, seeking refuge as part of a continental trade area appears to this group of Canadians as a comforting course to take.

There is a price to be paid, however, and that price just might be the undermining of the basic elements of the Canadian federal state. No one sees a withering away of Canada if the so-called free-trade deal goes through. But there could be a very different kind of Canada, with far less ability to shape the contours of its economy and its society.

Like the Meech Lake Accord, the trade proposal would obviously have major repercussions for the channels of policy-making, the role of government in the economy, and the functioning of federalism itself. A bilateral trade agreement would result in further reduction in the role of the national government. At the same time, paradoxically, provincial and local governments would also face real limitations because the federal government by the terms of the agreement must compel their compliance. To do so, the Mulroney government has had to unilaterally assert the primacy of federal jurisdiction in a number of key areas of provincial involvement. This necessity is causing even further federal-provincial muddle. For the long term, there is real fear that free trade will increase the pressure to harmonize the tax systems, environmental standards, labor codes, and social practices of Canada and the United States.

There would also be a shift in economic linkages to a north-south axis. Transportation proximity would mean that British Columbia trade, commerce, and communication would become more integrated with those of California than with those of Nova Scotia. In sharing less, the provinces would begin to lose their sense of political community.

New institutional arrangements would be required to administer and manage a whole number of measures under the proposed agreement. They would lead to bilateral agreements on exchange rates, on investment programs, on common tariffs with third-party trading counties, on energy. Thus, substantial areas of decision making would move under new agencies, and matters of subsidies, tariffs, and customs inspections would be far removed from the control of Parliament and the legislative assemblies. The massive delegation of authority to the executive group to pass orders in council and execute wide-ranging directions in interpreting the obligations under the trade bill would exacerbate the problem. The trade issue alone, then, would move Parliament even further away from relevance in governing the country. As Donald Smiley has correctly stated,

> A free trade agreement would not be self enforcing and would require a supernational agency able to police effectively the actions of national and sub-national governments in their inevitable tendencies to erect non-tariff barriers, sometimes in collaboration with powerful private interests within their respective boundaries.[22]

We have already noted the establishment of new institutions of federal-provincial decision making. Now we see the possibility of yet another type of institution on a bilateral cross-border basis, further *shifting power away from the traditional representative democratic* institutions and eroding the sphere of action of Canadian governments.

While no one can predict the final outcome of this crucial development, that Canadians are embroiled in such a debate points to a perennial problem. The Canadian nation-state was conceived as a political entity that would work against the natural disunifying forces of geography and economics. Its continuance has depended on a skillful blending of public action in a marketplace defined by a federal system that could balance competing interests and claims.

Today, the world economy conspires to erode the capacity and competence of nation-states. Money moves across national borders in seconds. Economic decisions are made in boardrooms far removed from national control or accountability. Great power blocs jostle for military, economic, and political control. The global village is very much upon us, and Canada, for reasons of history and proximity, is on the front line of this phenomenon.

At the same time, Canada faces major internal pressures to give its regions more clout, to shift the pendulum toward decentralism and to lock it into that position by dint of constitutional entrenchment. The powerful provincial governments and the institutions and practices of executive federalism will not go away.

Yet, there is clearly a new and different agenda of public policy issues facing the federal system. The shifts in population and emergence of new interest groups bring to the fore issues of immigration policy and human rights. The continuing disparity of the regions in resources, wealth, and population in an economy dominated by information services and technology poses brand new questions on regional entitlement. The sensitive matter of public regulation of business, especially the need to hold accountable the increasing concentration of private wealth and economic power operating across national borders is becoming a severe test for the Canadian political system. It must find a way to maintain the nation's sovereignty and integrity against an age of continental and international pressures. Forging a new balance among all the competing forces will require major effort and strong leadership.

These are big issues of governance that this generation of Canadians faces. The political system is fragmented and seems to generate a national consensus only when an extraordinarily strong leader emerges whose ideas and energies overcome the division. Media attention is on the horse race between leaders, not the issues—part of a television entertainment system dominated by ratings and public opinion polls.

There is also a certain exhaustion of political ideas and imagination. Political power in Canada traditionally has gone to the party that has found a pragmatic hold on the center. But that conventional wisdom of Canadian politics has little use at a time when the course of Canadian federalism is so divided. The Trudeau-Liberal interventionist response of the past decade no longer fully applies to contemporary conditions; the market-decentralist and the neoconservative continentalist approach of the present government emphasize market responses rather than new political solutions. There is no commanding vision on how to meld together the volatile elements of the Canadian polity into a national course. As a result, the system is in danger of slipping away into a loose confederation of competing power centers. The Canadian federal system may have to await a new generation of political leadership to renew its sense of national purpose.

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[14] "In perhaps the most abrupt reversal of previous Liberal policy, Mulroney's new federalism seems set to give provincial governments a major partnership role in both the development and delivery of Ottawa's policies and programs." Gilles Gherson, "The New Federalism, Mulroney Style," *Financial Post,* 23 February 1985, 9.

[15] Norrie, Simeon, and Krasnick, *Federalism and the Economic Union.*

[16] Eric Kierans, "A Cruel Joke," *Policy Options* (January 1988):21.

[17] In 1985, 44.1 percent of all taxable income was generated by foreign-controlled corporations, according to a Statistics Canada report for 1985, *Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act,* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1988), 18.

[18] Melissa Clark Jones; *A Staple State—Canadian Industrial Resources in Cold War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).

[19] In a major national survey conducted for *Maclean's* magazine, 67 percent of the Canadians polled said that Canadians are less violent than Americans. See "Maclean's/Decima Poll, Canadians Speak Out on Issues and Hopes," *Maclean's* (4 January 1988):45.

[20] In the same major survey, 49 percent of the Canadians surveyed thought free trade with the United States would be good for Canada, and 44 percent thought it would be bad (ibid.).

[21] For an examination of views pro and con, see *The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,* a report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, tabled in the House of Commons, 15 December 1987.

[22] Smiley, *Federal Condition,* 186.

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A reprint edition of the Summer 1986 DÆDALUS

ISBN 0-8191-6678-2 (paper) $12.75
0-8191-6677-4 (cloth) $26.50

Available from the University Press of America
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Robert G. Evans

"We'll Take Care of It for You" Health Care in the Canadian Community

THE "SCIENTIFIC" UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN HEALTH and illness, the collection of life sciences and associated technologies that generate the intellectual basis for clinical activity, is an international cultural enterprise. Differences among nations are at most different accents in a common language. Patterns of medical practice, "who does what and with which and to whom," may vary internationally depending on where a new drug, technique, or piece of equipment happens to have been developed first. But diffusion, like treason, is largely a matter of dates.

The provision of health services, the application of this common intellectual property, is carried out by trained individuals and within organizations that are also quite similar, throughout the developed world at least. Physicians, hospitals, nurses, pharmacists, dentists are virtually universal features of the international health care landscape, although their definitions and competencies may vary in detail. But their patterns of work and their interrelationships are more diverse, being powerfully influenced by the specifics of each national reimbursement system—the set of institutions and processes whereby financial resources are assembled from the general population and then distributed among the providers of care.

This health care "industry" accounts for a very large proportion of economic activity in all modern societies—between 8 and 12 percent of national income.[1] Each country has evolved a distinctive way of

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Robert Evans is Professor of Economics at the University of British Columbia, National Health Research Scientist, and Fellow of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research.

organizing, and especially of paying for, its provision of health services. Through these systems societies show their individuality. Thus, the Canadian health care system, as distinct from the Swedish, or the American, or the British, is a particular style of organization and payment rather than a type of medical knowledge or practice.

To suggest that each country has chosen a distinctive form of health care financing, however, is to create an incomplete and misleading picture. While policy analysts of various persuasions treat organizational structures, on paper at least, as readily adjustable mechanisms or as means to general social ends, the reality appears to be more organic and evolutionary. Each nation is both legatee and prisoner of its own history and its enduring cultural values and symbols.

Students of comparative health care systems emphasize the fundamental continuity of institutions, despite occasional announcement of radical reform and the continuing background rhetoric of rapid change. When "revolutions" occur—the creation of the National Health Service in the United Kingdom, for example, and of the universal public health-insurance plans in Canada—they turn out on close examination to have deep historical roots and to represent the continuation of old traditions under new names.[2]

This underlying stability reflects the fact that a nation's health care system is a massive and complex social undertaking, not to be tampered with lightly. The system in place at any moment balances a multitude of conflicting interests and objectives, both overt and covert. But it also serves as a symbol of the fundamental shared values of the society.

Health care is perceived (not always accurately) as a matter of life and death. Access to care may determine the very continuation or termination of the individual, a matter in which the community as a whole is deeply concerned. More generally, the health of an individual is regarded in most societies as a precondition of full participation in the life of the community, like legal or political status, and not merely a "commodity" of purely private interest.

The financing of health care thus serves as a mirror or a lens in which those dominant cultural values can be viewed and compared from one society to another. The comparison between Canada and the United States is particularly instructive, for they have done a sort of natural experiment in health care financing. These very similar societies with very similar systems of medical care have developed radically different funding systems. The behavior and subsequently the organization and performance of the two systems have increasingly diverged in response to markedly different financial opportunities and constraints.[3]

For the student of health care systems, the interesting question is how various financing systems have influenced system behavior and organization. The deeper and more difficult question is why the two societies have evolved such radically different ways of funding health care. The first is a generic question about the behavior of health care systems; the second is a specific question about Canadian, and American, society.

For the differences *did* evolve. They were not, like the parliamentary and presidential systems of government, matters of inheritance. Modern systems of health care finance are a response to technical and social pressures that developed in the twentieth century, and it is within the last forty years that the Canadian and American roads have diverged so sharply. The public systems of hospital insurance were put in place in each of the Canadian provinces between 1946 and 1961, and the medical insurance systems between 1962 and 1971, with supporting federal legislation and cost sharing in 1957 and 1966 (effective 1968) respectively. The American system took on its modern form in 1965.[4]

Thus, English-speaking Canadians who seize on their health care system as one outstanding illustration of a rather elusive cultural identity ("Are we *really* different from the Americans?" they ask) have got it right. The Canadian approach to funding health care may be markedly superior to the American on various objective and widely held criteria—many students of health care, including this one, believe that it is—and if so, the Canadian system is an important and rather rare collective achievement.[5] Like beating the Russians at hockey, beating the Americans at anything is a source of considerable satisfaction.

The more basic point is simply that the Canadian health care system, precisely because it *is* different, responds to and reflects significant, if perhaps subtle, features of "Canadianness." It is one of the most convincing forms of evidence, perhaps *the* most convincing, that we are not Americans after all. (It may be difficult for non-Canadians, whether Americans or others, to appreciate what a relief that is.) But our approach differs from the various European health care systems as well, although we are closer to Europe than to the United States, and again the differences are indicative of underlying cultural values.

To fully describe the health care funding and delivery system of each Canadian province would be a mammoth undertaking interesting only to the most dedicated specialist. Each province is different, and the picture is constantly changing in detail. Nor are the details unimportant. There are significant differences in system behavior from one province to another and over time. Analysts who insist that "the Canadian system" is not one but ten (twelve, if one counts the territories) are right.[6]

But those who perceive a well-defined common pattern within the diversity are not wrong either. From the point of view of the ordinary Canadian citizen, playing the various roles of potential or actual patient, of taxpayer, and of voter, the form of organization and payment is essentially similar across all the provinces. Moreover, from the user's perspective, the system has remained more or less stable for about twenty years. The major conflicts and changes of this period have deeply concerned providers and governments at both the federal and the provincial level[7] but, with few exceptions, have not directly affected the ordinary citizen as he, or more often she, has used and paid for health care.

That Canadian-in-the-street, confronted with what she believes to be a health problem, may decide to consult a physician. She will normally go to a general practitioner in independent private practice (though she may approach any physician she chooses), and the physician may or may not accept her as a patient. Free choice of physician—and patient—is an established principle, subject only to the qualification that if no practitioner were willing to take a particular patient, the medical community as a whole would have some obligation to offer service. Exactly how that responsibility would be discharged and by whom is, however, somewhat obscure; the problem rarely arises.

When the patient arrives, the physician will do the sorts of things physicians do—taking a history and noting the symptoms; performing, prescribing, or recommending various diagnostic and therapeutic maneuvers, drugs, or further consultations; and if the condition warrants, sending the patient to a hospital at which the doctor has admitting privileges. Almost any specialist consulted will also be a private practitioner, having a close association with one or more hospitals but not usually being a hospital employee. At no point will there be any charges to the patient for the services of the physician or the hospital, although obviously there are both monetary and nonmonetary costs involved in seeking and receiving care.[8]

The physicians will be reimbursed for their services by an agency of the provincial ministry of health, according to a uniform schedule of fees negotiated at periodic intervals by that agency and the provincial medical association. With minor exceptions, however, the decisions about which services to provide or recommend are entirely up to each physician and subject to the compliance of the patient.

Claims for reimbursement are checked for correspondence with the rules for payment, included as part of the negotiated fee schedule in force, and "practitioner profiles" are screened to identify patterns of practice that are extraordinarily unusual relative to norms defined by the behavior of a physician's peer group, but these are very wide bounds. In general, the clinical autonomy of the physician is maintained.

The hospital, however, will not be reimbursed directly for the particular services provided to this patient. Hospitals are supported through global budgets negotiated annually with the ministry of health. Salaries of physicians employed by the hospital—residents and interns, salaried chiefs of service, emergency-room staff—are paid from the global budget. Diagnostic services and prescription drugs provided to inpatients are likewise included, but diagnostic services provided to ambulatory patients, by either hospitals or free-standing facilities, may be paid for through fees for individual services.

The hospital and medical services are thus almost entirely (between 90 and 95 percent) reimbursed from government budgets. The overall share of public funding for health care is substantially lower, about 75 percent, because expenditures for dental care and nonprescription drugs, and a significant share of those for prescription drugs, are met through direct patient payment or private insurance.

There is also substantial direct payment for long-term institutional care, although the public/private split here is largely a matter of bookkeeping. Patients in extended-care hospital beds and publicly supported residents in other long-term care facilities are charged a per diem fee, calculated not on the basis of the actual charges but as a share of the minimum public pension. The logic of this charge is that the few patients who are in such care (and who now account for a large, and growing, share of hospital days) are in effect being provided with room and board by the hospital. Since the public pension is also intended to provide a minimum standard of living, there is no obvious justification for the state to pay twice. But insofar as this component of private payment represents absorption of another form of public support, its privateness is more form than substance.

From general taxation and federal grants, provincial ministries of health raise the revenue to support the health system, which is their largest single activity. In the beginning, these grants were proportionate to the provincial outlays on medical and hospital care, but since 1977 they have been set by formulas unrelated to actual outlays. Accordingly, while a high proportion of health expenditures is actually funded through federal taxation, provincial governments are entirely at risk for any increases in costs (and are the fiscal beneficiaries of cost containment).

Three provinces retain a system of "health insurance premiums," but these are insurance premiums in name only. They are uniform charges unrelated to the risk faced by the person covered or to the overall cost of services. They are de facto compulsory for most of the population, and most importantly, no one can be denied services for failure to pay. The uninsured resident who uses services may be billed for back premiums but not for the cost of the services. (In the same way, the property owner who has not paid municipal taxes will be billed for back taxes but will not be denied the services of the fire or police departments upon need and will not be billed for the actual costs of the services received.) Accordingly, these premiums are treated by all analysts as part of the general tax system, not as a separate "insurance" system.[9]

Stripped of a vast array of fascinating detail, the Canadian health care system is a fully linked triangular relationship. Members of the public receive care "free" as patients and pay for it through the general tax system. Professional providers determine the appropriate care to be provided to patients, unencumbered by any considerations of what the patient is able or willing to pay for, and are reimbursed in forms and at rates determined in negotiation with provincial governments. Those governments, in turn, raise the necessary revenues through taxation and distribute them to providers.

This picture is incomplete, however, in that it presupposes a health care system with fixed capacity, a given stock of manpower and facilities such as hospital beds and equipment. But physicians cannot admit patients to beds that do not exist, or refer for diagnostic or treatment services that are not available. Nor can patients be seen by physicians who have not been trained. The reimbursement system thus must cover not only the cost of current operations but also the costs of reproducing, expanding, and upgrading the existing system. These capital costs, in the broadest sense, include new technology—equipment and techniques and the financing to support them—as well as the construction of new hospital capacity and the training of additional professionals to direct its use.

The flow of capital into the health care sector and the determination of the amount and type of service it will offer is also negotiated by the professional community and the provincial governments, partly directly and partly through political pressure. Some hospitals also make direct appeals to the general public for charitable funding, but this source, while of increasing interest to hospital managements, is significant only for a very few high-profile hospitals.

This negotiation of system capacity is a natural extension of the professionals' role in negotiating their own reimbursement. The billing opportunities, the incomes, of professionals who are reimbursed by fees for services depend heavily on the extent of their access to the "free" capital equipment and supporting staff provided through the hospital system. New technologies and expanded facilities thus permit physicians to provide more services, to raise their "productivity," and to capture this increase in the form of higher incomes at any given level of fees.

Negotiation of capacity also reflects the overlap between two different bases for public decision making, both generally accepted as legitimate and thus a source of conflict. The professional community is believed to have special expertise in deciding what services are required to meet the needs of the population served. In each medical case, the provider determines what is medically necessary, what clinical interventions are appropriate in the care of the patient. Clinical autonomy at the level of the individual, then, logically extends to questions of what types and amounts of facilities and personnel should be available to meet the needs of patients collectively.

The provincial government has an equally legitimate role, however, in deciding what to pay for, where, and when, so long as it acts (and in this field it does) with broadly based public support. This right to make legitimate choices among medical and nonmedical priorities on the community's behalf is further strengthened by the fact that, as a matter of common observation, the skills and knowledge acquired and deployed in the clinical setting with individual patients do not in general carry over to the epidemiological or planning context. The whole is not simply the sum of the parts.

Nor, as I have indicated, is the practitioner a disinterested interpreter of the community's needs. New facilities translate into expanded practitioner incomes and professional opportunities. Negotiations over access to new capital inevitably respond to provider as well as patient interests. Furthermore, the interests of patients, individually or collectively, are not coterminous with those of the community as a whole: the average patient and the average citizen are different people. The tension among competing sources of legitimacy in decision making is a theme to which we shall return.

These formal and informal negotiations, over both current reimbursement and expansion of system capacity, take place almost entirely between providers of care and governments. The public is involved in the negotiations as voters, appealed to by providers as potential patients—to support campaigns for more services—or by governments as taxpayers interested in containing overall outlays. But the system of funding does not allow for separate financial arrangements between providers and individual patients with respect to services covered by the public plans.

Physicians cannot "extra-bill" their patients by demanding additional payments above the negotiated fee schedule payable by the provincial government in return for covered services. (Services deemed not medically necessary, on the other hand, are to be charged to the patient in full, at any amount the physician chooses, in principle. In practice, these turn out to be rather rare.) Looked at from the other side of the coin, patients cannot offer physicians side payments for more favorable consideration.[10] The economic link between use of care and contribution to its cost has been disconnected through the public programs. The surrounding regulatory structure makes attempts by either providers or patients to reconnect that linkage difficult or impossible—and is intended to do so.

This balance of rights and responsibilities among individuals, the community, and providers of care reflects the attitudes and values of the Canadian population. It would be naive to imagine that many Canadians had actually thought through in any coherent way the system of values of which their health care system is the concrete expression, let alone that they would all agree. But the level of public support for the present system is extremely high. The system has successfully withstood challenges to its basic principles from several quarters—from medical associations, some provincial governments, the private insurance industry—and continues to hold off such challenges because most members of the population approve of it. They believe it works and that it is "right."

At the most basic level, the public funding system embodies a view of the relationship between the individual and the environment. Nature is, at best, rather hostile and difficult to control. With no regard for virtue or vice, illness or injury can strike anyone. There is no moral reason why the victim should be exposed to financial insult on top of physical injury. Health care in Canada is free, because to charge the patient is to tax the sick.

Indeed, even if the victim *did* contribute to his or her own misfortune—as the smoker with lung cancer or the teenage motorist has—risk taking is not a calculated, voluntary act. Stupidity is as much a natural force as an unanticipated blizzard, and foolish behavior arises in a social context. There may be good reasons for taxing cigarettes and for identifying and penalizing dangerous driving, but charging health care costs to the estate of the lung cancer victim or denying him care if he cannot afford to pay is inherently offensive and serves no useful social purpose.

A person holding an alternate view might say that the natural environment provides ample opportunity to look out for oneself. Illness and injury are indicative of avoidable carelessness, correctable incompetence, or even punishable moral turpitude. ("Bad luck" may be evidence of divine displeasure.) People who get into difficulty should therefore bear at least part of the financial consequences, as well as the physical ones. Such a distribution of burdens is fair (why should others bear the cost of an individual's decisions?) and also tends to encourage "better" behavior. Being responsible for one's own acts is a mark of maturity and morally uplifting. It signifies that one takes care and tries to be competent.

The Canadian funding system implicitly rejects the latter view and treats illness as primarily the result of natural or social malevolence rather than personal default. This view in turn is consistent with a deep sense of the powers of the individual in relation to the environment. The system implies a further judgment about the relationship between individual choice and professional authority. When the patient recognizes a problem, he takes it to a professional, who diagnoses it and determines what treatment is medically necessary.

The legislation governing the public plans explicitly identifies medical necessity as the ground for reimbursement. The individual is not expected to manage the care episode himself but to draw upon professional services as he sees fit. Furthermore, the professional provider is assumed to be equipped with both a base of knowledge sufficient to determine what ought to be done and an ethical imperative to ensure that he will do it without undue regard for his own interest—that is, he will act "professionally."

In this context, there is no particular point in involving the patient economically. The typical patient follows the orders of authority, and that authority acts responsibly in giving orders.

Still another alternative is to take a more activist view and to see the patient, in choosing among providers and the forms of advice given, as manager of his or her own care. This perspective may also include the concern that providers tend to slant their advice in the direction most profitable to themselves unless monitored by vigilant patients protecting their own economic interests. There may be no unambiguously right response to the patient's problem—it is a matter for individual choice—and even if there is, the professional cannot be trusted to recommend it.

This third view underlies the line of argument that has always been of most interest to economists, particularly those who have limited familiarity with the health care field. Patients, they say, should be exposed to some part of the costs of their own health care, whether or not they are wholly or partly responsible for their illnesses (the ethical case gets a little fuzzy here), so that they will either be more careful shoppers for care and/or keep the professional ambitions or the greed of providers in check. Free care leads to abuse and overuse through inappropriate behavior on the part of patients, providers, or both.

To some extent, these three views are amenable to empirical testing. One can bring certain sorts of evidence to bear, although the long-continued debate and deep disagreement of academic specialists in this field indicate the difficulty of unambiguous resolution.[11] While these debates go on and provide entertainment and employment for academics, health care consultants, and public relations specialists, however, the Canadian health care system puts a particular judgment of the issue into practice, as it has done for decades.

In a very real sense, the manipulation of evidence has been irrelevant. The Canadian public has accepted, and continues overwhelmingly to support, a system of health care and health care finance whose basic structure implies that, in this domain, the individual is not responsible for his own misfortunes (or at least no useful purpose is served by treating him as if he were). Further, the proper response to such misfortune is to seek and rely on duly accredited professional authority. Such authority can in general be relied upon. Presumably, that is what most Canadians believe. And presumably, citizens of the nations that have evolved reimbursement systems that place direct economic burdens on the users of care implicitly take, on balance, a different view.

But that is only the beginning of the story. The collective funding structure implies that the community accepts responsibility for ensuring that the individual will have access to needed care. In itself this is not unusual; the collective provision of the preponderance of, if not all, funding for hospital and medical care is universal in the developed world.[12] A society that expressed indifference, in principle, to the potential and preventable extinction of some of its members could hardly claim to be called a society at all. What is less common is the degree to which, in Canada, this collective responsibility is placed on the shoulders of government and then interpreted as requiring not only ensurance of access but access on equal terms and conditions.

"Equal terms and conditions" lies behind both the removal of all direct financial barriers to the public system and the discouragement or suppression of private arrangements, so that everyone has access to the same system. "Equality before the health care system" has been established as a political principle similar to "equality before the law."

The contrast with the United States is obvious, but in this case comparison with the United Kingdom is perhaps more instructive. There the National Health Service (NHS) is a public program, funded from tax revenue, accessible to all. But individuals can, if they choose, seek care in a private system, which is generally perceived to be more convenient and to provide a better quality of service.

U.K. citizens continue to pay into, and have the right of access to, the public system, and they generally use that system if severe illness or emergency strikes. But for "cold surgery," minor illness, and the non-life-threatening problems of the basically healthy, the private system provides an attractive alternative for those who can afford it. Employee groups can also buy private insurance for private care, coverage whose cost can be kept down because it is to a limited degree subsidized through the income tax system and because it is understood—sometimes explicitly—that any major, expensive illness will be cared for by the NHS. Moreover, employee groups are a self-selected population with low risks and adequate economic resources—precisely the people any rational insurer looks for.

In most of the Canadian provinces, patients' private payment for medical or hospital care is not directly prohibited. What is not permitted, however, is for physicians or hospitals to be both in and out of the public system, as they are in Britain. This is a critical constraint. The British private consultant can use his dual role to select and steer patients according to their resources and the nature of their problems. He can even use his position within the NHS to manipulate waiting lists and other aspects of access so as to ensure that private care will be preferable to those who can afford it. The Canadian physician who chooses to "go private" must go all the way. He cannot use a strategic position within the public system to cream off only the profitable patients for his private services.

The hostility toward "multiclass medicine" in Canada is thus partly based on straightforward grounds of prudence. The private alternative is not simply an expansion of the choices and opportunities available to patients—a form of rhetoric to which it would be difficult to object. It may also represent a constraint on the services available to users of the public system insofar as their access becomes limited or other aspects of their care degraded through the strategic behavior of providers with an economic interest in the private sector.

Developments in the United Kingdom in 1987 and 1988 illustrate a still more extreme form of this risk. Strategic behavior may not be limited to providers. An ideologically hostile government may seek, and certainly is suspected of seeking, to undermine a popular public program that it does not dare to attack directly. A policy of restricting funding in the public sector is much more acceptable politically if several of one's most influential supporters are already users of the private sector. The maintenance of a constituency in support of a public program is much easier, on the other hand, if everyone has to use that program. Concerns over quality and access find louder voices in support.

Such interactions between the presence of a private alternative and the quality or even viability of a public system are of considerable interest to students of health care systems. They are important questions, and they weigh with some who are in a position to shape policy. But it is doubtful whether these questions are really fundamental to the differences in public attitude between the United Kingdom and Canada. Is the average citizen even aware of these issues? It seems more likely, at least to this observer, that private medicine in the United Kingdom is simply a continuation of the good old British tradition of snobbery and class privilege, which many an earlier generation of immigrants to Canada was glad to leave behind.

In the United Kingdom most citizens find it right and proper that the "better" class of people should receive their care under more genteel surroundings and pay for the privilege. Yet most Canadians find this opinion offensive. Health care touches the individual so closely—again the perception of life and death—that it is difficult to separate class-specific medicine from the implication that some people's lives are worth more than others'.

Indeed, Canada has a deep-rooted suspicion of class-based systems of any kind. Private schools are a minor part of the educational picture, private universities are nonexistent, and public transportation is all single-class, with the exception of the airlines (why?). Canada may not be a classless society, but Canadians are strongly attached to the belief that it is.

Several of the European health care systems also seem to have a class component in their funding, perhaps a remnant of Bismarck's influence. When health insurance was originally provided for the German workingman, it was provided by a government under the control of other interests, attempting *inter alia* to undermine the appeal of socialism. Given this objective, there was no obvious reason to include other classes in the program. Furthermore, the European reliance on various forms of payroll tax draws on labor income alone. By relying on general (primarily income and sales) tax revenues, the Canadian system spreads the burden over all income earners.

As the technology of health care has evolved and its potential costs have grown beyond the reach of almost anyone's budget, more and more groups in the European populations have gained some form of insurance. But coverage in many countries remains linked in one way or another to status. The German sickness funds are defined by occupations, with regional funds for those without an occupational base and private coverage for those with the highest incomes. The Dutch compulsory coverage, again, applies only up to a certain income limit. The Belgian funds recruit on a religious basis.

In general, competition for enrollees is limited. Rather, each fund tends to serve a distinct and separate population. Moreover, above some income level, individuals are expected to pay for their own care and/or purchase private insurance, which may be publicly subsidized. All forms of coverage may be regulated and supplemented to ensure universal coverage but not all in the same system or fund.

That both physicians and patients seem to prefer this approach suggests the symbolic importance of special treatment for the upper classes and of direct access to the patient's own resources for the physician. The right to charge some patients directly, even if only a small fraction of them, rather than having to deal with a bureaucracy (whether public or private) seems very important to physicians in all countries.

The bitter battles over extra billing, culminating in the Ontario physicians' strike of 1986, made clear how important such a right is to physicians in Canada. These struggles, which went on for a number of years before and after the enactment of the Canada Health Act of 1984, made equally clear the extent and the depth of the popular opposition to this practice.[13] This conflict drew sharp lines of battle between the majority of physicians in the country and the majority of the population. The population won.

Thus, while Canadian health care shares with European systems the underlying judgment that illness is an unavoidable misfortune, to be remedied by seeking and following professional advice with funding provided entirely or almost entirely through collective mechanisms, it differs in its powerful commitment to the principle that the provision of care and the pattern of funding should be the same for everyone. We are all equal when faced with disease or death, and our institutions reflect that sense of equality.

It is no coincidence that the historical origins of the Canadian health care funding system were in the province of Saskatchewan at a time when its population was almost entirely made up of small farmers and people who supported and depended on the farming industry. Weather and world markets, both beyond any control, dictated everyone's fortunes, and everyone went up and down together. The sense of equality before shared adversity that was natural in this environment also seems to have struck a resonant chord in the rest of the country.

The reliance on collective funding through government was a natural response to a communitywide problem. It was also the usual Canadian response to the country's predicament of how to deal with a small population thinly distributed over a large landmass. In the European countries, highly differentiated and concentrated populations made it natural to begin with aggregations intermediate between the individual and the state—with workers' friendly societies or religious organizations. In an earlier and simpler state of medical and administrative technology, such groups were large enough to pool the expenditure risks of their members, and, most important, linked by an affinity that makes people willing to share their misfortunes and their care.

In Canada, however, the natural focus for collective activity has always been government. As residents of a small country heavily dependent on world markets, flanked on the north by a large and hostile wilderness and on the south by a large—and, well, large—neighbor, Canadians have instinctively turned to the state as the instrument of collective purposes. A multiplicity of competing organizations is a luxury we cannot afford.

Nor is private organization and competition accorded the intrinsic value in and for itself that it receives in the United States. In the rhetoric of the business and economic community, which so strongly influences U.S. policy, even a badly functioning private marketplace often appears to be definitionally superior to a well-functioning public agency. Americans seem to accept the form of economic organization as an end in itself, independent of any external performance criteria. This ideology has never put down deep roots in Canada, where both public initiatives and semiprivate regulated monopolies that pursue some version of public purpose (along with private profit) are a tradition older than the country itself.[14]

Accordingly, the collective funding of health care costs takes place through the monopoly suppliers of hospital and medical insurance in their respective regions—the provincial governments. The Canadian system is socialized insurance, not socialized medicine. But the provinces are also the predominant buyers of hospital and medical services from private physicians and hospitals. This kind of monopsony has become central to the control of health expenditures, and through them, to the management of health care delivery.

The recognition of this power, a counterweight to their professional authority and a threat to their economic position, lay behind the opposition of physicians to the creation of the universal public plans. Indeed, the subsequent political struggles over extra billing have served to define more clearly the limits of "physician autonomy."

Medical associations have always attempted, in Canada and elsewhere, to extend their claim of special expertise in the clinical setting to include control over the broader questions of how the delivery of medical care should be organized, how physicians should be reimbursed, and how much.[15] In the debates surrounding Medicare, the passage of the Canada Health Act, and the physician strikes in Saskatchewan (1962) and Ontario (1986), these claims to wider political authority were put very explicitly, in direct confrontation with the power of elected governments. The majority of the population decisively rejected these claims. Whether their rejection will have consequences for the authority of the medical profession in other spheres or for the doctor-patient relationship is difficult to calculate.

Yet, at the time the public plans were set up, there was no general public sentiment in favor of limiting physician autonomy. Indeed, the report of the Royal Commission on Health Services (the Hall Commission) expresses the opposite intention, that the public funding system should not interfere with professional independence.[16] What was perhaps not appreciated was the extent to which organized medicine interpreted that independence as depending upon, and therefore conferring, special authority over the whole field of health policy.

The advocates of public insurance emphasized instead the manifest inability of private insurers—privately organized competitive forms of collective financing for health care—to cover the entire population. The laws of the marketplace dictate that competitive for-profit insurers, responsible to their shareholders and competing for subscribers, must inevitably exclude those in greatest need and those least able to pay for either insurance or care.[17] In the majority of cases such persons would, then, go without or become a charge on the public purse. (European systems built up from several or many funds can maintain universality because the funds are not in competition for enrollees or organized for profit.)

The real options in Canada, or anywhere else, are not public-versus-private forms of collective funding. Private insurance for the whole population is impossible in a competitive marketplace because insurers cannot cover the poor and the ill, and remain competitive. Still less likely is a real choice between individual and collective funding; the patterns of distribution of needs and of economic resources rule out self-payment for the bulk of health care. The only choices, unless a society is prepared simply to accept the exclusion of a significant proportion of its population from the health care system, are universal public coverage or a mixed public and private system, with the public system covering those with the greatest needs and the least resources.

But this mixed approach, so the Hall Commission argued, would be both administratively much more expensive than the other approach and incapable of providing coverage to much of the population, not only on equal terms and conditions but at all. The history of the United States system, with the world's highest and most rapidly escalating health care costs, the highest proportion of funds going to administrative costs, and nearly 20 percent of its population uninsured (and perhaps another 10 percent grossly underinsured), bears out the Hall Commission's predictions rather well.

In summary, then, the Canadian health care system reflects a strong commitment to egalitarianism combined with a strong respect for, and substantial confidence in, duly constituted authority.[18] This authority includes both the politically legitimate authority of the state and the professionally legitimate authority of the providers of care.

These attitudes stand in sharp contrast to those lying behind the American approach, where the health care funding system, like many other institutions, responds to a combination of individualism and suspicion of authority. But the emphasis on egalitarianism also distinguishes the Canadian approach from those in a number of the European countries, where remnants of class- and status-based funding and care persist.

The reliance on government raises one of the most fundamental questions in Canadian political organization: Which government? The longest and most carefully defended border in the world is between the government of Canada and the governments of each of the provinces. Canadians have a fascination with federal-provincial relations that most other nations reserve for religion or sex.

It is inevitable that the health care funding system as the expression of many of our national symbols and values should provide a setting for playing out federal-provincial conflicts. These, in turn, reflect the extraordinary ambiguity of Canadians' feelings of nationality: Are we really citizens of one country or of ten provinces in a loose association of convenience? Well, it depends. In the particular case of health care, it depends on either creative federalism or constitutional subterfuge, according to one's point of view.

The British North America Act of 1867, the act of the British parliament that until 1982 provided the constitutional basis for the government of Canada, specified that matters pertaining to health care were under the jurisdiction of the provincial governments. Such matters were at that time seen as local problems, of no great interest to the national government. The federal government has, accordingly, no constitutional authority to run a health service or a health insurance plan for the general population, and it does neither. Strictly speaking, Canada has no health care system, only a collection of provincial plans.

The federal government does have constitutional authority to raise revenues by direct or indirect taxes and to make grants or other distributions of those revenues. It can make conditional grants to provinces, which can establish and administer public health insurance programs conforming to federally established standards. These standards form the core of Canadian health insurance—public administration, comprehensiveness of benefits, portability between provinces, universality of coverage on equal terms and conditions, and accessibility.

The essential similarity of the provincial plans thus derives from the requirements imposed at the outset as conditions for federal support. That support was initially in the form of cost sharing; the federal government returned to the provinces roughly 50 percent of all outlays on "allowable" health services. An offer of finance on that scale was obviously one that no province could refuse. In 1977 the federal contribution was changed to, in effect, a block grant unrelated to actual health care outlays. The contribution remained conditional, but in the new environment the conditions were much more tenuous. In 1984 the federal Canada Health Act made the conditions more explicit and provided for penalties—cash withholding—for provinces whose plans were in default of the federal standards.

This form of organization, provincial administration under broad federal guidelines and with major federal funding support, has worked out rather well in practice. But it has provided a continuing focus for conflict—sometimes just grandstanding but sometimes real—between the federal and the provincial governments. Political profile and large amounts of money are available and at risk in these arrangements. Underlying the conflicts, moreover, are both political and constitutional ambiguities or contradictions that go to the heart of Canadian political life.

Before passage of the Constitution Act in 1982, those ambiguities were solely political. The principle of absolute parliamentary sovereignty was as clearly established in Canada as it was in Westminster, with the minor qualification that it might not be clear, for any given issue, in which parliament—federal or provincial—that sovereignty resided. Hence, the long and endlessly fascinating history of federal-provincial diplomacy, negotiations between what, from some perspectives, are sovereign powers with overlapping and competing jurisdictions.

Both derive their legitimacy from representing the same population. If they disagree, which is the true representative? Provincial governments have from the beginning of the health insurance plans argued, with considerable justification, that the imposition of federal standards on health insurance, clearly a matter of provincial jurisdiction, was illegitimate federal incursion into their political territory.

No provincial government, however, has ever directly challenged the validity of the basic principles of Medicare—public administration, comprehensiveness, universality, portability, and accessibility. This acceptance reflects their support by a large majority of the populations in each of the provinces. Provincial governments have argued, rather, that they should have the right to interpret these general principles on their own initiative. The role of the federal government should be limited to sending checks.

On the other hand, it is quite clear that from time to time provincial administrations have been elected with broad support within the provinces but do not share (or in some cases even understand) these basic principles. Between the shift to federal block funding in 1977 and the reassertion of federal standards in 1984 were several provincial initiatives that were very hard to reconcile with these principles. At the same time, public opinion in those provinces remained strongly supportive of Medicare.

In moving to clarify and provide ways of encouraging conformity with national standards, the federal government was both asserting a national interest in this field and acting according to the clearly expressed wishes of its electorate. The federal Parliament passed the Canada Health Act unanimously, despite the opposition of a number of provincial governments. All federal parties were acutely aware of the level of public support; to be against Medicare would be political suicide.

But the opposing provincial governments were also duly elected and explicitly sovereign in the field of health care and health policy. They had every right to claim to be speaking for the people of their provinces. An outside observer, listening to the tone of their comments and watching their maneuvers, might well conclude that on this issue they were not, that some at least intended to proclaim the letter and kill the spirit. But no one elects outside observers.

Who speaks for Canadians? We do not know. On this issue, partly because public opinion was so clear-cut but also in large part because of the particular personalities involved and the federal political balance at the time, the federal government overrode the provincial objections.[19] It did not, constitutionally could not, impose regulatory constraints on provincial behavior in this sphere. But it could and did use its spending power to create incentives for provincial governments to conform.

The ambiguity, however, remains. We do seem to have a habit of electing governments with conflicting principles and objectives and of hoping that, between them, they will thrash out an acceptable compromise in areas of competing jurisdiction.

The political ambiguity is now taking on a legal and constitutional dimension. Since 1982, the role of the courts in resolving conflicts of sovereignty between Canadian governments has dramatically expanded. And with the proclamation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, we have been moved into a world in which parliamentary sovereignty is itself abridged by the recognition of the fundamental rights of the individual (fundamental, that is, unless the government in question chooses to invoke the "notwithstanding" clause and abridge them anyway).

Does the new Constitution limit the federal spending power insofar as that spending may intrude into areas of provincial jurisdiction? Or does the answer depend on the relation between the extent of the intrusion and the objectives of the measure? Will the courts take a narrow view of their own role, leaving political questions to the politicians, or will they expand their legislative activities? To take one example central to the structure of the Canadian health care system, does the virtual elimination of the economic relationship between provider and patient violate some fundamental economic right of either provider or patient, or both?

The United States Constitution, for example, is interpreted by the courts as entrenching certain fundamental *economic* rights. The rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" seem for Americans to refer, self-evidently, to the pursuit of money. On the other hand, as Canadians are fond of pointing out, the corresponding fundamental constitutional principle in Canada is the preservation of "peace, order, and good government." The new Charter rights refer to "the security of the person," which the courts have so far interpreted as meaning physical security rather than constitutionally protected rights to engage in economic activities.

It would be premature to suggest that the jurisprudence has even begun to settle down in this area. We are probably in for years, if not decades, of extensive public and private support of the legal profession, some of whose members refer to the new legislation as their pension plan. A constitutional challenge to the federal Income Tax Act, for example, has been rejected in the Alberta Supreme Court but has yet to reach the Supreme Court of Canada. Courts of appeal in Ontario and British Columbia have just given contradictory rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory retirement. In due course that too will go up to the Supreme Court. And so on.

It is no exaggeration, then, to say that we do not know what our fundamental law is on the allocation of authority between federal and provincial governments or between government and the individual. On the first allocation, of course, we never really did know with any great assurance. The boundaries of jurisdiction were negotiated politically and have shifted over time. The second interface is quite new. The whole situation is new in that we may be facing a major shift in the processes of conflict resolution, from the political to the legal. Or we may not, for the courts may throw these issues back to the politicians.

The impact of these broad constitutional changes on the medical care funding system could be profound. Indeed, constitutional challenges to specific pieces of health legislation are among the judicial vehicles through which these questions may be resolved. The Canada Health Act is under challenge as intruding on provincial jurisdiction; the Ontario legislation making extra billing a punishable offense and the British Columbia legislation restricting the numbers of physicians entitled to bill the provincial plan are both being challenged as violations of individual rights under the Charter.[20]

All these challenges are coming from medical associations, even the dispute of the Canada Health Act—in part because medical associations tend to be wealthy and combative and in part because physicians believe that the political process surrounding Medicare has not adequately reflected their views and interests. In the courts they hope to win back what they have lost in the legislatures.

In this field the political system seems to have responded quite well to the wishes of the general population. The constitutional challenges thus underline the extent to which the views and the interests of the medical profession have diverged from those of the rest of the Canadian community. It will be more than a little ironic if the legal system overrides the political process so as to enable the medical profession to enforce its preferred forms of health care organization and financing on a reluctant public—all in the name of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms!

Conflicts between providers and governments are, however, inherent in the structure of the Canadian health care funding system and have been from the beginning. They are traceable to yet another ambiguity. It is easy enough to say that the Canadian system reflects a combination of egalitarianism and respect for authority—but which authority?

The patient brings his problem to the professionals, who decide what is to be done. The sum of their decisions defines the level of activity of the health care system. But independently of these decisions, provincial governments decide, with minor exceptions, what the level of spending on medical and hospital care will be. Hence the chronic and occasionally strident complaint of the medical profession that the system is globally "underfunded."

No government, no society, seems willing to make available sufficient funds to support all the activities that health care providers would like to offer their patients or to supply the incomes that the providers would like to receive. The continuing conflict is partly about who should have the authority to determine the size and shape of the health care system and partly a struggle over income shares, over how much doctors, nurses, and other providers should earn relative to the rest of the population.

The conflict, like that between the federal and the provincial governments, is a genuine one between legitimate forms of authority. No politically responsible government can give a private group the key to the public treasury, particularly a group whose priorities include not only making health policy but writing their own income checks. The electorate has given the Canadian governments a clear mandate to manage the overall level of health care expenditure.

On the other hand, governments have never been given a mandate to determine the content of medical practice. Canadians trust their physicians a good deal more that they trust their politicians on such technical matters, and both groups know it. The Canadian system gives governments control over the reimbursement function, not the delivery of care; it is a public health insurance system, not a public health service.

When the two sources of legitimacy collide and professionals' demands exceed public allocations, how should the issue be resolved? Physicians, or at least their organizations, have consistently argued for resolution through a third principle of legitimacy—consumer sovereignty. If the recommendations of professionals exceed what the legitimately elected and supported government wishes to provide, let individuals register their choices in "the marketplace"—let a private system of payment emerge to pick up the difference. Provincial governments, tired of the constant struggle to limit the growth of health outlays on behalf of a rarely grateful public, often find the same concept tempting.

Yet opponents are quick to point out that the consumer sovereignty principle, the individual's "right" to spend her own resources as she sees fit, has minimal relevance in a marketplace that self-regulating providers control. A genuinely *free* market in health care, with no public or private regulation over who may provide services and how, has never been observed anywhere in the modern world. Such a market has no political support from any serious participant in or student of health policy (or from the general public), in Canada or elsewhere, and interests only the economic lunatic fringe.

In a professionally controlled and publicly regulated market, which is the only form we have or are ever likely to see, consumer sovereignty as an ethical principle loses much of its attraction.[21] It becomes merely a justification for mechanisms whereby professionally determined priorities can override those determined through the public political system, which is exactly why professionals favor it. But the determination of who gets what on the basis of the principle of consumer sovereignty yields results that are inconsistent with the other basic values expressed through the health care system—egalitarianism, collective responsibility, and reliance on professional judgment of medical necessity instead of patients' ability to pay (or to buy private insurance).

Canadians have therefore chosen to leave the resolution of the contradiction between professional priorities and political constraints to negotiation between the two parties and have thus far not permitted them to mitigate their mutual conflict by agreeing to reopen channels to the patient's resources. Legitimate sources of authority should be able to work out their differences somehow, without necessarily requiring any clearly defined means of resolving the dispute (such as the courts or gunfire). They should be able to discover, and be guided by, the broader public interest—it is the Canadian way.

A nation's health care financing system is not merely a complicated mechanism for displaying its predominant moral and cultural values. It must also do its basic job, raising the resources necessary to support the provision of an acceptable standard and distribution of health care and contributing to, or at least not getting in the way of, the effective management of that care. A system that was grossly underfunded, whose political system was incapable of reflecting the priorities of its citizens, or whose citizens were unwilling or unable to respond to the fiscal needs of the health care system, could be putting its population's health in jeopardy. So could a system constantly wracked by conflicts, strikes, slowdowns, and general demoralization.

On the other hand, devotees of rather simple-minded economic views of human behavior constantly insist that free care leads to overuse, abuse, waste, and exploding costs. This would appear on the surface to be a testable empirical issue. But a fascination with "the price system," or "the market," which in some systems of thought plays a role very similar to that of God for the eighteenth-century Deists,[22] leads to the conviction that "free" anything is profoundly immoral as well as fattening and therefore ought to be illegal regardless of its consequences.

If we stick to what is truly consequential, we may return to the point made at the outset, that medical technology is an international enterprise. Furthermore, the job of organizing, applying, and paying for that technology has very similar objectives in all countries, even if the criteria for evaluation may differ somewhat. This similarity suggests that comparisons of systems' performance around the world should provide a reasonable basis for evaluation. In particular, it enables us to contemplate the consistency (or otherwise) between the symbolic and the functional roles played by a health care funding system. Do different symbolic expressions of values make it easier or more difficult to do the job?

Such a discussion must include a clear sense of context. All health care systems are in perpetual crisis. Cycles of media attention rise and fall, but the same issues come up over and over again in each system. Crises may play an important role in the normal operation of health care systems. Perhaps the prolonged absence of a crisis would indicate a serious problem.

The Canadian approach to funding was declared unworkable by its opponents—physicians and private insurers—in the early 1960s, and the same interest groups have continued to detect imminent collapse right up to the present. The American health care system is well into the third decade of the longest-running cost explosion since the great inflation of the sixteenth century. The British National Health Service is presently gripped by what appears to be the most bitter of its periodic crises. All over Europe, governments are struggling to contain costs in the face of aging populations, advancing technology, and growing professional numbers and ambitions. (Their academic advisers, particularly economists, sometimes suggest that they look to the United States for solutions, which makes about as much sense as looking to the U.S.S.R. for advice on organizing grain production or to the U.K. for ski-jumping coaches.)

Still, individuals often regard their own health care systems as the best in the world.[23] Like confidence in one's own physician, confidence in one's own national way of organizing health care seems to be a natural, and perhaps quite functional, response to uncertainty and incomplete information. It may also reflect the adaptation (and perhaps the contribution) of each system to underlying cultural values.

Thus, Canadians consider getting sick in the United States as the equivalent of a rather severe mugging. It has similar economic and physical consequences, and provincial governments have sent medical evacuation flights to rescue their citizens from the U.S. hospital system. In contrast to humane and civilized Canada, Americans are left to die in the streets after their money runs out. Nevertheless, Americans continue to refer to their health care system, whatever its problems may be, as the world's best and, to the astonishment of Canadians, appear to be serious (the poor, benighted devils)! And Americans would be equally astonished, perhaps with as good reason, to see the attachment of the British to their National Health Service, which in the United States is called a nightmare.

Popular acceptance, therefore, is no basis for discrimination among national systems. What can be compared most readily (though comparing them is by no means easy either) is relative overall costs and the stability of those costs over time. Though it might seem the least important aspect of a health care system—compared with, for example, what that system does to and for its patients—

comparative cost performance does interact with issues of equity and access and perhaps of effectiveness.

The connection arises because although there are no clear, or at least operational, criteria for deciding how much is enough for any country to spend on health care, it is clear that continuing escalation of costs relative to national resources is not a sustainable situation. All developed countries have in the last decade come to place a high priority on stabilizing the growth of health care costs in their national systems. A system that fails to do so will be changed—it is simply a question of when—and will go on being changed, in increasingly radical ways, until some degree of stability can be attained.

For nearly two decades, the Canadian health care system has achieved a remarkably good record in both preserving universal access to comprehensive coverage and moderating the growth of health care costs. This performance has been outstanding in comparison with that of the United States system, which displays accelerating cost escalation, increasingly radical institutional change, and deteriorating equity.[24] The Canadian performance also looks good in comparison with that of the other OECD countries—a more demanding comparison.[25] On the whole, the European countries have been much more successful in stabilizing their systems than has the United States but less so than Canada; and concerns about equity and access are starting to emerge in those systems that have never had the same firm foundation of egalitarianism.

A more detailed analysis, however, brings out the falsity of the often-asserted conflict between the overall control of the size of the health care sector and the preservation of access and quality of care. A comparison of the Canadian and the United States experience, for which detailed data are readily available, shows that the greatest differences in costs—contained in Canada and exploding in the United States—are in the administration of the payment system and in the inflation of physicians' fees.[26] Canada gets an outstanding bargain on the first, and reasonably good performance on the second. In the United States, both are escalating at an accelerating rate. Neither of these components of health expenditures translates into clinical services for patients. The first is simply system overhead—in the United States, pure waste motion—and the second is the result of a struggle over income shares.[27]

There is also a marked difference in the technical intensity of servicing within hospitals, the number and cost of diagnostic and therapeutic maneuvers that the average patient undergoes.[28] But since many observers of North American hospital care have long expressed concern about overtreatment in hospitals, and since reduced use of hospitals is a major thrust of U.S. health policy, the difference in treatment intensity cannot be taken as an a priori indicator of reduced access to effective care in the Canadian system.[29]

The Canadian system is by no means a model of efficiency in any absolute sense. As in every other system, there are wide variations in servicing patterns and costs that have no apparent connection to the underlying needs of the populations served. Much of what is done is ineffective, unnecessary, or unnecessarily costly. But these are not problems peculiar to Canada. While it is true that the funding system provides few, if any, rewards or incentives to providers for efficient performance, the same could be said (and has been) for all other national systems. The organizational problems health care poses are devilishly difficult, and Canada has not found a solution that has escaped everyone else.

We have, however, succeeded in removing the economic barriers to access to high-quality health care for the whole population. At the same time, we have stabilized the overall share of our national income taken up to pay for care, and we have shifted the economic burdens from those who happen to be ill to those who can afford to pay. While people in every country may profess to believe that their own health systems are the best ones, the level of satisfaction of Canadians with their arrangements must be among the highest in the world. To a certain extent, our satisfaction reflects our tendency to be smug about our own decency and moral rectitude, but we do get some reinforcement from external observers.

On the other hand, there is also evidence that the compromise between professional autonomy and public fiscal responsibility, which has been central to the operation of the Canadian system, is starting to fray. Provincial governments are finding that moderating expenditure growth is requiring increasing attention to "utilization control"—service patterns and volumes—rather than simply restraint of fees and of hospitals' global budgets. Even moderate increases in health care costs absorb virtually all the governments' fiscal maneuvering room, simply because health is such a large proportion of provincial budgets.

The provincial governments are trying to put explicit caps on overall outlays, and while these may not directly impinge on the clinical activity of the providers, the caps' indirect effects are becoming stronger. As each funding system moves toward overt recognition that it steers health care practice, the system's managers may have to negotiate with providers more explicit objectives and criteria for system performance.[30]

Explicit attention to the outcomes of health care, however, exposes what may be the most puzzling feature of the Canadian, and perhaps any other, health care system. What is it trying to do? What is the enormous commitment of resources expected to buy? The easy answer—improved health—is indeed what most citizens, patients, and taxpayers think they are getting, and they may be right. But like the Zen archer, the Canadian health care system hits its target (if it does) by not looking at it. The clinician worries about the impact of his interventions on his patients. The managers of the whole health care system, however—clinical as well as financial—pay little attention to explicit measures of the population's health.

We know, of course, that in a general way our various morbidity and mortality rates are improving. But we have little idea how, if at all, this improvement links up with the enormous effort we devote to providing health care. When physicians complain about underfunding, they are arguing that more expenditure would improve their patients' health; when governments restrain budgets or manpower, they are implicitly arguing the reverse. The evidentiary base for either position is rudimentary or nonexistent.

Moreover, such evidence as there is raises more questions than it answers. Various not very satisfactory measures show improvement in both Canada and the United States, and at about the same rates.[31] There is no evidence that the massive additional expenditures in the United States buy any better outcomes. Americans now spend about 30 percent more, in relative terms, than we do, and the gap is widening. Conversely, the better access for the whole population that universality implies yields no clear-cut Canadian advantage.

When we look at the distribution of outcomes through the population, we find marked correlations of socioeconomic status with health. The rich live longer and better. But these gradients are observed in the United Kingdom with the National Health Service, in the United States with a highly unequal and for some, inaccessible system, and in Canada with its egalitarian insurance sytem. We know that the public insurance plans did redistribute care down the income spectrum, and cost burdens in the reverse direction; but it is not clear that there was any corresponding equalization of health. The health of individuals and of populations depends on much more than their health care, and how a society organizes and pays for its health care system may not greatly affect this pattern of dependence.[32]

Thus far, the general population has been left out of the discussion of such complex issues and has not had to deal with the disturbing questions they entail. When one takes a problem to a physician, one does not want to consider in detail whether his interventions have any scientific (or other) basis or are doing more good than harm. Let the authorities worry about that. And acceptance of the idea that poor health and early death—for some—are built into the structure of our society and are beyond the reach of health care, implies that we either consider more radical interventions (against poverty, for example, or unemployment) or simply admit that we do not care much.

Even more stark dilemmas lurk in the care of the elderly, which is absorbing an increasing proportion of total health spending.[33] To a considerable degree, present medical technologies prolong, not living, but dying. As one author puts it, declining mortality is the principal source of increasing morbidity.[34] The very comforting fiction, or at best part-truth, of an increasingly powerful "life-saving" health care system is preferable to the realities of salvage, and very partial and temporary salvage at that. "Humankind cannot bear very much reality," T. S. Eliot has pointed out.

Or perhaps we can, but why should we? Unpleasant prospects that we cannot do very much about do not deserve extensive contemplation. So long as the interaction between the political and the professional authorities results in compromises that are financially bearable, and apparently satisfactory in terms of health outcomes (at least we have no information to the contrary), then why should the general public get involved?

It should only if the combined impact of demographic change and the deployment of health technology seems to be leading to a shift in the terms of those compromises. Politicians and bureaucrats do not dare to be seen taking decisions with life-and-death implications. Providers of care seem to be becoming more reluctant to set limits on their own, to let the deformed infant or the elderly stroke victim go quietly. The "spare parts" society, whether dream or nightmare, is coming closer.

Nor are the penalties for faulty decisions merely financial. It is our own future that is in question: we as individuals will have to forego or undergo the interventions our health care system provides. The "stroked out" ninety-year-old in the nursing home or the intensive care unit may be me. Is that where I want to be? Nunc dimittis. On the other hand, a new pair of knees so that I can play golf may be just the ticket. (I could never play golf before.)

Of course, there is more to the well-lived life than simple survival, and more to health than health care, as we in Canada and everyone else can see. If we focus more on health than on health care, we will have to recognize the inherent limits of medicine. But our health care system is controlled by the providers of and the payers for health *care,* not health.[35] Can we continue to rely on our professional and government agents to thrash out these decisions on our behalf? Or will they perpetuate a care system that meets *their* needs rather than ours—a compromise between esoteric medical intervention and fiscal controllability that we find less and less relevant to us?

The challenge for the future may be to find ways to discover and express our collective values with respect to the definition of health itself. What sort of outcomes as opposed to services do we as a community think worth buying? And through what institutional channels, present or projected, do we give effect to those views?

If history is any guide, we will be able to watch these issues debated in an open free-for-all in the United States, thoroughly entangled in a web of competing economic interests. The debate will produce analyses of extraordinary competence and clarity, which will not, however, be decisive for actual policy.

Meanwhile, in Canada we will rely on the responsible authorities to come up with some sort of solution or at least a response. As agents, they are very far from perfect, but they may be the best we've got. In the final analysis, defects and all, the system we have seems to be a remarkably good compromise of quality, affordability, equity, and humanity. Not bad, eh?

ENDNOTES

[1] G. J. Scheiber and J.-P. Poullier, "Trends in International Health Care Spending," *Health Affairs* 6 (3) (1987):105; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Financing and Delivering Health Care,* OECD Social Policy Studies no. 4 (Paris: OECD, 1987); A. J. Culyer, *Health Expenditures in Canada: Myth and Reality, Past and Future* (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1988).

[2] T. R. Marmor, "Doctors, Politics and Pay Disputes: Pressure Group Politics Revisited," in T. R. Marmor, ed., *Political Analysis and American Medical Care: Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); W. A. Glaser, *Paying the Doctor* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1970).

[3] T. R. Marmor, "Comparative Politics and Health Policies: Notes on Benefits, Costs, Limits," in Marmor, *Political Analysis.*

[4] M. G. Taylor, *Health Insurance and Canadian Public Policy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978); M. G. Taylor, "The Canadian Health Care System 1974–1984," in R. G. Evans and G. L. Stoddart, eds., *Medicare at Maturity: Achievements, Lessons & Challenges* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press for the Banff Centre, 1986); R. Fein, *Medical Care, Medical Costs: The Search for a Health Insurance Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).

[5] R. G. Evans, "Health Care in Canada: Patterns of Funding and Regulation," in G. McLachlan and A. Maynard, eds., *The Public/Private Mix for Health: The Relevance and Effects of Change* (London: Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1982); R. G. Evans, "Finding the Levers, Finding the Courage: Lessons from Cost Containment in North America," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 11 (4) (1987):585.

[6] M. L. Barer and R. G. Evans, "Riding North on a South-Bound Horse? Expenditures, Prices, Utilization and Incomes in the Canadian Health Care System," in Evans and Stoddart, eds. *Medicare at Maturity;* M. L. Barer, R. G. Evans, and R. J. Labelle, "Fee Controls as Cost Control: Tales from the Frozen North," *The Milbank Quarterly* 66 (1) (1988).

[7] Taylor, "The Canadian Health Care System."

[8] All generalizations, including all those in this paper, are false. There will be charges for services that are judged "medically unnecessary"; in some provinces such charges include self-referral to a specialist. Private hospital accommodation that is not in the physician's opinion required by the patient's condition may be had on payment of a "preferred accommodation differential." Elective cosmetic surgery is likewise chargeable to the patient. Finally, prescription drugs outside the hospital and dentistry are not covered under the universal hospital and medical insurance plans. Individual provinces have prescription drug and dental insurance plans, but these usually cover only part of the population and/or part of the outlay.

[9] The general population, however, does not appear to realize this. If the retired population, whose premiums are not deducted at source, simply stopped paying their premiums en masse, not much could be done about it. The "tax" is in effect voluntary!

[10] In some provinces a physician has the option of simply not participating in the public plan, in which case neither he nor his patient is reimbursed. He may then charge whatever he likes for his services. But he cannot work both sides of the street, seeing some patients and/or conditions privately and setting his own fees, and yet also seeing others under the public plan. Furthermore, no private insurer can sell coverage for services already covered under the public plans, so the nonparticipating physician must make his entire practice from uninsured, self-paying patients. Not surprisingly, few practitioners make this choice.

[11] M. L. Barer, R. G. Evans, and G. L. Stoddart, *Controlling Health Care Costs by Direct Charges to Patients: Snare or Delusion?* Ontario Economic Council Occasional Paper no. 10 (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1979); J. P. Newhouse, "The Demand for Medical Care Services: A Retrospect and Prospect," in J. Van der Gaag and M. Perlman, eds., *Health, Economics, and Health Economics* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1981); R. G. Evans, *Strained Mercy: The Economics of Canadian Health Care* (Toronto: Butterworth's, 1984); W. G. Manning et al., "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," *American Economic Review* 77 (3) (1987): 251.

[12] Scheiber and Poullier, "Trends"; OECD, *Financing and Delivering*.

[13] S. Heiber and R. Deber, "Banning Extra-Billing in Canada: Just What the Doctor Didn't Order," *Canadian Public Policy* 13 (1) (1987):62.

[14] It is not so long ago that most of the land area of what is now Canada was controlled by the Hudson's Bay Company ("Here Before Christ"), a private company whose history is substantially longer than that of the Canadian Confederation.

[15] R. G. Evans, "The Political Economy of Health Care," in J. N. Clarke et al., eds. *Health Care in Canada: Looking Ahead* (Ottawa: Canadian Public Health Association, 1987).

[16] Royal Commission on Health Services (Hall Commission), *Report,* vol. 1 (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1964), especially chap. 1.

[17] Royal Commission on Health Services, *Report,* especially chap. 18; R. Fein, *Medical Care, Medical Costs,* especially chaps. 2, 3.

[18] In practice, of course, the American health care system is predominantly collectively funded. The realities of modern health care do not permit any other approach. But the collective instruments created for this purpose are a bewildering variety of private organizations. The state steps in only as the insurer of absolute last resort for groups—the elderly and the poor—who cannot by the most extreme stretch of the ideological imagination meet their own needs through some private coalition.

[19] A most unpopular federal government, reaching the end of its mandate and its life, hoped to trap the Opposition into being "against Medicare," on the assumption (probably inaccurate) that this was the only issue significant enough in the public mind to turn the tide. The Opposition avoided the trap and in 1984 came to power with an overwhelming majority.

[20] M. L. Barer, "Regulating Physician Supply: The Evolution of British Columbia's Bill 41," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 13 (1) (1988):1.

[21] What self-governing professions offer the consumer is not a competitive market but "guild-free choice," a sophisticated form of restraint of trade. Alain Enthoven draws this distinction particularly clearly in "Managed Competition in Health Care and the Unfinished Agenda," *Health Care Financing Review*, Annual Supplement (1986):105. He also emphasizes the impossibility, indeed the absurdity, of a "competitive marketplace" in specific health services for individual consumers. If genuine competition in health care is possible at all, it can be only among integrated organizations contracting to provide a combination of insurance and care on a capitated basis, as American HMOs do, for example. See his *Health Plan: The Only Practical Solution to the Soaring Cost of Medical Care* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1980).

[22] A. J. Cuyler, "The Quest for Efficiency in the Public Sector: Economists versus Dr. Pangloss (or, Why Conservative Economists Are Not Nearly Conservative Enough)," in H. Hanusch, ed., *Public Finance and the Quest for Efficiency* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1984).

[23] J.-P. Poullier, personal communication subsequent to the OECD study of international health care financing and delivery systems.

[24] Evans, "Finding the Levers."

[25] Cuyler, *Health Expenditures.*

[26] Barer, Evans, and Labelle, "Fee Controls as Cost Control."

[27] U. E. Reinhardt, "Resource Allocation in Health Care: The Allocation of Lifestyles to Providers," *The Milbank Quarterly* 65 (2) (1987):153.

[28] A. S. Detsky et al., "The Effectiveness of a Regulatory Strategy in Containing Hospital Costs: The Ontario Experience, 1967-1981," *New England Journal of Medicine* 309 (3) (1983):151; Barer and Evans, "Riding North."

[29] D. Feeny, G. Guyatt, and P. Tugwell, *Health Care Technology: Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Public Policy* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1986).

[30] R. G. Evans et al., "Boundaries to Experience, Barriers to Understanding: The Reality of Health Care Cost Control in Canada," *New England Journal of Medicine* (forthcoming).

[31] R. N. Battista, R. A. Spasoff, and W. O. Spitzer, "Choice of Technique: Patterns of Medical Practices," in Evans and Stoddart, *Medicare at Maturity.*

[32] D. Black et al., *Inequalities in Health: the Black Report* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1982); D. B. Dutton, "Social Class, Health, and Illness," in L. Aiken and D. Mechanic, eds., *Applications of Social Science to Clinical Medicine and Health Policy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1986); R. Wilkins and O. Adams, *Healthfulness of Life* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1983).

[33] Though not, despite popular wisdom, because of the increased numbers of elderly persons. The average per capita use of care by the elderly, the things done to and for them by the health care system, is rising much more rapidly than their numbers alone. See M. L. Barer et al., "Aging and Health Care Utilization: New Evidence on Old Fallacies," *Social Science and Medicine* 24 (10) (1987):851.

[34] L. M. Verbrugge, "Longer Life But Worsening Health? Trends in Health and Mortality of Middle-aged and Older Persons," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Health and Society* 62 (3) (1984):475; L. M. Verbrugge, "Recent, Present, and Future Health of American Adults" in L. Breslow, J. E. Fielding, and L. B. Lave, eds., *Annual Review of Public Health,* vol. 10 (Palo Alto, Calif: Annual Reviews Inc., 1989).

[35] Accordingly, we spend more and more to "save" lighter and lighter neonates with ever more severe problems, but we make very little effort to prevent low birth weight in the first place.

Futures

Summer 1987

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Geraldine A. Kenney-Wallace and J. Fraser Mustard

From Paradox to Paradigm: The Evolution of Science and Technology in Canada

To fulfill its citizens' expectation of prosperity, this peaceful, resource-rich country must see innovation through science and technology as an imperative for nation building in the twenty-first century. Now that natural resources are no longer the most valuable currency, Canada must shift its attention to developing its human resources. People with knowledge who live in a culture where they are free to take the risks involved in investigating and inventing are the greatest resources a nation has. To support their scientific research and technological innovation is to invest in our future in Canada.

We have no choice but to put science and technology to work by linking imagination and ideas to industrial innovation and market performance. Paradoxically, the richness of our natural resources has helped establish a culture in which this necessity has not been grasped. The new economic paradigm is international, and yet we in Canada, who come from all over the globe, continue to focus on growth only inside our nation. We possess a village rather than a global mentality. Ironically, it was a Canadian, Marshall McLuhan,

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Geraldine Kenney-Wallace is Chairman of the Science Council of Canada, a member of the Prime Minister's National Advisory Board on Science and Technology and the Premier's Council in Ontario, and Professor of Chemistry and Physics at the University of Toronto.

J. Fraser Mustard is President of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, a member of the Prime Minister's National Advisory Board on Science and Technology and the Premier's Council, and Emeritus Professor of Pathology, McMaster University.

who in the 1960s coined the internationally known term *the global village*. In Canada, the focus has fallen on the word *village,* not the word *global,* for indeed peoples came here to live in a village peace.

Thus an essay on science and technology and science policy in Canada is intrinsically an apologia on culture and the cultural politics of Canada. Science is becoming increasingly important to society as the driver of science-based innovation for many technological advances, whose broad purpose is to serve, for example, the environmental integrity and the defense of the planet or a nation, or the well-being of individuals. With such visibility, the century-old debate about the relationship between science and government and between the university and industry reaches a new level. The debate today is vigorous, the scenes are rapidly shifting, and decision making has taken on a new sense of urgency. An external challenge to any nation's values produces a response whose roots lie in the cultural ethos of the people.

Canada is a large country with a small population whose colonial history has made an imprint on its administrative structure and government. Its trading partners, from the Commonwealth to the United States, have been partners in prosperity for the past 100 years. But when natural resources are no longer the most valuable currency, can Canada sustain the prosperity that she and her citizens demand? The threat of war and oppression produces strong convictions and actions to preserve freedom. A threat to language or culture produces a strong and sometimes coherent reaction from Canadians to rekindle interest in their literature, music, and arts. Threats can also turn into opportunities. Nations have been built on the cultural ethos and the challenges and discoveries of earlier times.

In an era of international trade competitiveness, whose hallmarks are the quality of tradable goods and services and reputation for excellence and performance in a global economy, Canada can no longer rely solely on the comparative advantages of its resource-rich land for generating wealth. Now we have to create our own comparative advantage.

Slowly, a small but significant paradigmatic shift from the dominant thinking of the past century is occurring. This is not to say that Canadians are about to jettison their strong commitment to social equity and tolerance of social diversity. People who are used to three decades of planning on the basis of a lively resource-rich economy do not change overnight. But perhaps just in time, some leaders in key industrial, academic, and government decision-making positions are now realizing the need for an indigenous and vigorous research and development (R&D) base in Canada.

To accomplish this, the cultural ethos must be expanded to include science and technology as an explicit and intrinsic part of the living culture, to accept risk, risk sharing, and the management of risk as a natural part of imagination, discovery, invention, and competitiveness.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE NATIONAL MIND-SET

Spanning the geographical immensity and connecting the diverse regions of Canada have from the beginning posed tough technological problems, the significance of which Harold Innis, the political economist, explored so well in his study *The Bias of Communications.*[1] The country moved from the routes of the fur traders of the eighteenth century to the Canadian-Pacific railroad as a national project in the nineteenth century and then on to the St. Lawrence Seaway, the Beaver and Otter bush planes, the Bombardier snowmobiles, the world's longest microwave transmission system, the Anik-Alouette satellites, and Northern Telecom's first-in-the-world all-digital communications system in the twentieth century. In this project of binding the parts of the nation together, the quality of Canada's engineering has been superb. Yet, with its thin population widely dispersed in a few major metropolitan centers surrounded by massive rural and forest areas, Canada has always been a "small" country in the global economy of science and technology, a country unsure of the place to accord science and technology in the pursuit of national identity and prosperity.

The words "peace, order, and good government" in the British North America Act, contrasting as they do with the words "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" in the Declaration of Independence, recall the hybrid colonial-evolutionary context within which Canada has survived and reflect its ingrained cautiousness. What a country invests in science and engineering and what it achieves in technology are intimately related to its economic structure, its perception of itself, and its potential for change.

Canada has been characterized as "a hewer of wood and drawer of water," first as a colony of Great Britain and then as a trade partner of the United States. Following the decline of Britain as a superpower in the twentieth century, Canada made a massive shift in its trade. Now, perhaps despite the expectations for bilateral free trade, the issue surely is to hew and draw in the global economy. Canada's status among developed nations has been largely won by trading grains, fish, metals, lumber, paper, oil, gas, and electricity. The domestic manufacturing base, long protected by tariffs that encouraged the building of branch plants, grew strong after 1945. In contrast with other small countries such as Switzerland, Holland, and Sweden, however, Canada has not developed a similar number per capita of world-scale, home-based multinational corporations.

The founding of the Royal Society of Canada in 1882 was a key step in organizing scientists into a more united effort to increase exploration in all the natural sciences. Despite the establishment of many diverse chairs in universities during the 1830s in Upper and Lower Canada, the sciences were still perceived at the time of Confederation in 1867 as the handmaiden of professional schools in such fields as medicine and mining. Indeed, this attitude reflected those in Europe and, not surprisingly, only began to change when the emphasis on experimental physical sciences was highlighted by (for example) the establishment of the first chair in experimental physics at Cambridge in 1870. When well-equipped buildings wholly devoted to the study of chemistry were built at the University of Toronto and McGill University in the 1880s, then too the attitudes of university students changed; research and development flourished in the chemical sciences, and the pursuit of chemical knowledege by industries rapidly expanded. Industrial research in any organized form, however, was still essentially nonexistent.

Furthermore, education being firmly under provincial jurisdiction (as a result of the British North America Act of 1867) meant that no national commitment to the financial means and institutions, which would have enabled the universities to fully adopt the German model of research-based graduate studies, was yet in existence. Except in a few departments of the federal government, Canada developed little *national* capability or goals in science and applied science before World War I. In 1886, for instance, the agriculture department established its Dominion Experimental Farms System, which exerted considerable influence on the development of botany and collections in Canada). Other exceptions include the departments of mines, with long-standing linkages to the Canadian Geological Survey (1842) and fisheries, whose Biological Board of Canada (1912) was the result of a sustained effort since 1893 to establish Atlantic (1907) and Pacific (1908) biological research stations.

Canada first recognized the importance of science and technology to national industrial development by establishing the Honorary Advisory Council on Scientific and Industrial Research in 1916. Initially it worked mainly in engineering and on a program for national scholarships to foster a scientific corps. The council's laboratories were established in Ottawa in 1929 and became the forerunner of the National Research Council—a shorter title. Remarkably, the council was given the status of an agency of the Crown operating outside the Civil Service Commission. Parliament provided it with a separate vote and gave it the authority to dispense funds granted to it. By reporting to a committee of the Privy Council (essentially of the cabinet) rather than directly to a minister, it could protect itself from direct ministerial and bureaucratic control. The council was a seed of the effort Canada has made to nurture science, engineering, and technology. It is probably fair to say that the governments of the day (and perhaps the current government) have had little understanding of what they created.

From the beginning, the role of the council was to stimulate research that would not otherwise be done through government departments and that would stimulate the development of industry. In its historical development, the NRC came to be analogous to an amalgam of the U.S. Bureau of Standards and the National Science Foundation. Until 1978, it nurtured university science through scholarships and grants-in-aid of research. Because the British North America Act put education under the jurisdiction of the provinces, the federal government has, to this day, not been prepared to fund the indirect costs of research in our universities. However, a significant portion of all the expenditures of the provinces on postsecondary education is provided by the federal government through global fiscal transfers.

The second stage in the evolution of the National Research Council came when it acquired the basis for a system of national laboratories in 1932. From the 1930s to the 1960s, the laboratories of the National Research Council did a great deal of work in both pure and applied sciences in areas outside those claimed by the regular departments of the federal government. Gerhard Herzberg, long director of pure physics in the NRC laboratories, won the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 1971. John Polanyi, a professor of chemistry at the University of Toronto who shared the Nobel Prize for chemistry in 1987, spent his postdoctoral career in the NRC laboratories from 1952 to 1954.

In the third stage of its evolution, the NRC formed, in effect by spin-off, the Defense Research Board (1947), Atomic Energy of Canada (1952), the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council (1978)—the Canadian equivalent of the U.S. National Science Foundation—and the Medical Research Council (1960)—modestly analogous to the U.S. National Institutes of Health. Thus the National Research Council divested itself of its major granting relationships with university science and engineering in Canada. The development of the Medical Research Council and voluntary agencies such as the Heart Foundation and the National Cancer Institute have played a major role in sustaining a strong medical research base of high quality across Canada. Canada's first Nobel Prize was won in 1923 by Frederick Banting and John Macleod for the discovery of insulin at the University of Toronto, research done on their own initiative. Later substantial private-sector support led to the establishment of the Banting and Best Institute.

The National Research Council was founded in particular to stimulate the application of science to industry and has ably assisted the small fraction of Canadian industry that has been aware of the need for such help. In 1923, for instance, the problem of the discoloration of canned lobsters was solved through the investment by the council of $2,000. The fishing industry readily accepted the solution, which thereby prevented an annual loss of some $700,000, a sum equal to the entire cost of the National Research Council from its beginning to the time of this discovery. More recently, it was NRC laboratories that identified a new toxin in mussels that halted East Coast U.S. and Canada mussel sales temporarily in 1987.

The early deliberations of the council included the concept of guilds for cooperative industrial research under which firms in industrial sectors could combine their resources and carry out research in the laboratories of the council. In 1928 one industrial sector, namely the forest products industry, acted independently to establish the Pulp and Paper Research Institute in affiliation with McGill University. A levy on the value of the sales of each corporation funded this institute. In contemporary circumstances, such consortia may once again prove critical to Canada in broadening applied research capacity in industry, as we mention later.

This brief history shows what a seminal role the NRC has played in Canada's science and technology. In large measure our provincial research councils, national institutes, and initial grants to researchers within the universities owe their present strength in science and engineering to the visions of the early presidents of NRC and its institutional children. But national development has been uneven, given political pressures and apathy. French Canada did not begin to achieve its full potential until after the so-called Quiet Revolution of the 1960s. Further, the nation's quest for regional socioeconomic equity, within the provinces as well as among them, has argued against the emergence of major concentrations of excellence in research.

CANADA'S R&D FUTURE

Although for decades the combined efforts of the National Research Council and a few major universities and departments of the federal government had been the principal national influences in research and development (R&D) in science and engineering, the changes in the 1960s and 1970s and the global realities of the 1980s have brought new influences. The universities with their significant but still underfunded research strengths are expressing a new intent to collaborate with industry. A small number of industrial corporations have the capacity to put the burgeoning knowledge base of science and engineering to use in the design of new products. Around Ottawa there is a small Silicon Valley, and scattered across the land are numerous small companies, such as International Submarine Engineering (ISE) and MacDonald Dettwiler and Associates Limited (MDA) in Vancouver, British Columbia; MPB Technologies in Montreal, Quebec; and Linear Technology in Burlington, Ontario. ISE's program in remote-control submarine vehicles is an example of the niches of leadership these companies have carved out. The current questioning of the role of the national laboratories of NRC is a symptom of a maturing national environment for science and technology and of an expectation of transition to a better articulated framework of national policy.

The decline in commodity prices and the prospering of Japan as a major economic power without many natural resources, save its people, has shaken the confidence of the Canadian banking and government establishments in extracting and selling natural resources as the basis for the country's prosperity. There is in Canada, as in most countries in the West, a growing awareness of the importance of science and technology to the nation's well-being. Technology, engineering, and science are now of necessity on political agendas everywhere in the world.

Science-based Innovation, Economic Growth, and Small Countries

For an industry or a country to be effective in the new global economy, it must have enough manpower and financial resources to produce tradable goods and services. Because of these resource requirements, one view is that countries with small populations like Canada should concentrate on importing technology for application to industry and not try to compete in producing innovations through research and development. This policy has implications for the research and development capability a country develops. It also has implications for a region's capacity to import and effectively use new technology to produce tradable goods and services.

While some economists have emphasized the importance of national research and development for economic growth, there has been, from a Canadian viewpoint, less than enthusiastic acceptance of these arguments. For example, in its 1985 report on the economic development prospects for Canada, the Macdonald Commission came to the conclusion that in relation to research and development "the study on industrial strategy done for this Commission argues for much more generous support. Its arguments require attention, but not necessarily an immediate policy response."[2]

Gradually, Canadians' view about what the role of science and technology should be has started to change. Prime Minister Mulroney reflected this new view in his statement in 1987 that science and technology are important to Canada's future economic growth.[3] The question is no longer whether science-based innovation is important for economic growth but how to maximize the benefits of research and development for economic growth.

Research and development contribute to the economy not only through innovations that lead to new products and services but also through incremental innovations that enhance productivity. Small countries that must trade in today's economy of science-based innovation have no choice but to mobilize their scarce resources so as to optimize their research and development capacity. For small countries, however, the challenge is difficult and greatly influenced by attitudes and the proportion of their industry that is research and development intensive.

Size alone does not determine innovative capacity. Sweden and Switzerland compare favorably with the United States and Japan in their levels of innovative activity[4] and economic performance.[5] Some larger countries, such as the United Kingdom, have not fared as well. Science-based innovation requires an industry with a high quality of research and development capability that can easily interface with the results from basic research.

Nations large and small that are effective at maintaining and enhancing their economic strength have innovative competence.[6] Countries showing weak performance in this area are Canada and the United Kingdom. It is interesting that the United States has not shown growth in innovation for at least a decade and now has a negative balance in trade in a number of advanced technologies. In 1986, a congressional study reported that the U.S. trade surplus in high-technology goods had fallen from $27 billion in 1980 to $4 billion in 1985 and was headed for a deficit.[7] Since the 1970s, American industries' investment in high-quality, long-term research has fallen; this fall may be affecting its innovation capacity.[8] The recent Japanese impact on the U.S. semiconductor industry is considered by some to be an illustrative case of the failure of U.S. industries to adjust their scientific and technological capability to meet new challenges.[9] Thus, it is not only the size of the country that influences how it responds to this new challenge; it is also the characteristics and cultural values of the country.

Small countries that established science and technology-based industries before the Second World War have expanded their capacity and remained highly competitive in the growth since that time. These countries have a number of world-scale companies capable of science-based innovation. Sweden has electrical firms such as L. M. Ericsson, Switzerland has electrical and pharmaceutical firms such as Ciba-Geigy and Hoffman-LaRoche, and Holland has Philips and Unilever. The countries that did not establish this capability before the Second World War are weaker in their science and technology-based industries. In a report on technology and competitiveness from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands were placed in a group of countries with considerable advanced technological capability.[10] Canada was placed in a second group of countries with weaker industrial science and technology along with Belgium, Norway, Finland, and Austria.

For a small country that does not have major industries that are research and development intensive, building the link with basic research is very difficult. Universities and government laboratories are often expected to act as surrogates for industry. There are some expectations in Canada for university and government laboratories to play such a role.[11] Countries with weak industrial research and development have problems supporting and focusing their basic research. If the link between industry and basic research is weak, the basic research thrust will be primarily determined by the links that scientists form with their peers in the international basic research community or in industries in other countries with strong, long-term, applied research capabilities. Countries strong in industrial innovation tend to focus some of their basic research on industrial innovation, and consequently industry there becomes a strong advocate for strengthening basic research.

Canada's Science and Technology Base

Because our businesses have been resource based, we have not had the range and depth of experience in dealing with the global market in scientific technologies that other nations with advanced technologies have. Canada's expenditure on research and development as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) has varied between 1 percent and 1.4 percent over the last two decades. When compared with other OECD countries, Canada has been a low spender (see Table 1). Given the relatively small size of our economy, the differences in absolute dollars when one compares Canada with countries such as Germany and Japan are large. Industry-funded

TABLE I. Canada's Performance in Research and Development

Measure of Competitiveness in Science and Technology	How Canada Ranks among Seven Comparable Countries*
Government-performed R&D/GDP	Middle
Advanced degrees awarded (by population)	Middle
Government-funded R&D/GDP	2d Lowest
Higher education R&D/GDP	2d Lowest
Domestic patents granted per 100,000 inhabitants	2d Lowest
Gross R&D expenditures as a percent of GDP	Lowest
Industry-funded R&D/GDP	Lowest
International patents granted (by population)	Lowest
Scientists and engineers in labor force (by population)	Lowest
Number of technology-intensive industries with positive trade balances	Lowest

*United States, Germany, France, Sweden, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Japan.

Source: Adapted from *Competing in the New Global Economy*, report of the Premier's Council on Science and Technology, vol. 1 (Toronto: The Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1988) and developed by Canada Consulting (Toronto, Ontario) and Telesis (Providence, Rhode Island); based on OECD documents.

research and development as a percentage of the gross domestic product is also very low in comparison with that of the nations with which Canada must compete. The Canadian government's allocation to research and development as a percentage of the GDP is lower than that of the other major OECD countries, with the exception of Japan. As a successful resource-based economy with substantial branch-plant manufacturing, we have not had to develop a strong science and technology-based capability until now.

Canada invests much in postsecondary education[12] and produces a reasonable number of people with advanced degrees in natural sciences and engineering (see Table 1). But they do not always have the expected good employment opportunities because of the weak industrial research base, and there is some concern that this number of specialists is declining. Clearly, in some R&D areas in high-growth industries, the demand far exceeds the supply of highly qualified human resources.

TABLE 2. Percentage of R&D Sales in Canada's Most R&D-Intensive Industries (by industry and control, 1983)

Industry	Under Canadian Control	Under Foreign Control
Business Machines	11.0 %	2.1 %
Other Machines	3.8	1.4
Aircraft and Aircraft Parts*	19.3	5.3
Other Electrical Products	3.3	1.4
Communications Equipment	16.4	6.4
Drugs and Medicines	16.4	4.1
Scientific and Professional Instruments	16.4	1.4
Other Chemical Products	1.8	1.1

*1979 figures.

Source: Statistics Canada, *Industrial Research and Development Statistics* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1986) and *Science and Technology Indicators* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985).

As one might expect, the expenditure on research and development by Canadian-owned firms is a much higher percentage of their sales than the percentage spent on research and development by foreign-owned firms (see Table 2). However, the low overall research and development expenditure by foreign-owned firms is only part of the explanation for the weak Canadian industrial R&D base.[13] If one compares the expenditure of Canadian-owned firms in a variety of industrial sectors with that of U. S. companies in equivalent industrial sectors, the weakness of the Canadian research and development effort becomes readily apparent. Canadian-owned companies spend substantially less than U.S. companies do as a percentage of their sales across a whole range of industrial categories (see Table 3). Only in telecommunications and aircraft does Canada substantially surpass the United States. Canadian industry does not have a strong research and development base, and most of the research it does carry out is developmental. Canada's industrial capability to do long-term, strategic, applied research is very small. It is not surprising, then, that Canadian resource-based companies in such industries as forest products still import a large part of the technology they use, although attitudes are changing.

TABLE 3. Canadian versus U.S. R&D Intensity by Sector (includes companies' own funds only, no government assistance)

Sector	Canadian R&D/Sales U.S. R&D/Sales
Auto	0.10
Pulp and Paper*	0.15
Business Machines	0.30
Scientific and Professional Equipment	0.29
Chemical Products	0.39
Manufacturing	0.50
Ferrous Metals	0.50
Drugs and Medicine	0.50
Food and Food Products	0.80
Machinery	0.80
Nonferrous Metals	1.15
Telecommunications†	1.65
Aircraft‡	2.95

*Does not include Pulp and Paper Research Institute of Canada (PAPRICAN). Pulp and paper companies in Canada contribute to PAPRICAN, thereby reducing their internal expenditures.

†The much higher Canadian rate of expenditure also reflects differences in corporate structure. Many U.S. telecommunications firms have service revenues in their base, thus reducing research and development as a percent of sales. Northern Telecom does not have this problem, for it is kept separate from Bell Canada in these statistics.

‡That U.S. aircraft firms receive a much higher proportion of their research and development funds from the government than Canadian firms explains the much higher rate of company spending in Canada.

Source: Statistics Canada, U.S. Commerce Department, and *Competing in the New Global Economy*, report of the Premier's Council on Science and Technology, vol. 1 (Toronto: The Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1988).

The size of Canada's industrial research base is illustrated by the fact that fifty companies in 1985 did 63 percent of the total industry-funded research and development in Canada. If one examines the actual expenditure by industries in Canada, only three non-Crown corporations have R&D expenditures of more than $100 million per year.[14] In contrast, Japan's six largest electronic companies spend some $6 billion (in U.S. dollars) on R&D annually. This sum is more than the total amount spent on research and development by each of all but the five largest OECD countries. Canada is weak in science and technology in comparison with eight other OECD countries (see Table 1). This comparison means that Canada's corporate structure still does not adequately support the kinds of strategies necessary for science-based innovation. This lack of support is one of the major factors, if not the major factor, limiting the growth of science and technology in Canada and has long roots to before World War I.[15]

Universities and Basic Research

A strong basic research capability competitive with the best in other countries is a key part of science-based innovation.[16] Canada's support for university research is on a per capita basis among the lowest in the major OECD countries. As a percentage of GDP, the funding of research in universities by the granting councils is less today than it was in 1970. The recovery in the early 1980s from the low point in the mid-1970s has been followed by a substantial decline since 1985.[17] The government's announcement in May 1988 of increased funding for the granting councils will help correct the decline but does not address the urgency of full cost funding for research because of residual jurisdictional issues.

A problem for basic research in Canada has been the difficulty in creating the concentration of research resources that other countries have been able to achieve through research-intensive universities or research institutes. Given Canada's social and political history and culture, it is highly improbable that private research-intensive universities capable of achieving high concentrations of research talent will emerge. With the propensity of provincial governments to fund primarily the education function of universities and the tendency of federal research support to be dispersed rather than concentrated, despite firm recommendations to the contrary, Canada has a need for innovation in institutional arrangements that could create critical masses of talented scientists.[18] The Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIAR) has developed such a concentration via the network concept. The Centres of Excellence program initiative in Ontario in 1987 and the recently announced Federal Centres of Excellence program (to be completed by Spring 1989) are also new and important initiatives that focus on excellence, foster critical masses of researchers, and promote university-industry consortia with a span of pure and applied research goals.[19] Such organizations help the country to develop effective use of fiscal and human resources for strategic and long-term research as well as the manpower and the funding it needs to compete effectively with its international peers in other regions of Canada.

Government Laboratories

The major role that government laboratories have played in developing Canada's science and technology is changing.[20] Their mission of the future will not be a linear extension of the past. There are strong pressures to reduce the support for the government laboratories and to do more of the research in universities and industry.[21] Would anything be gained by removing support of government laboratories without first creating an equivalent university and industry-based research capability?

In its early days, the NRC considered making some innovative arrangements that would have enhanced the interaction between government laboratories and industry.[22] Such arrangements deserve further consideration. One example is the involvement of government laboratories with new industrial research consortia such as PRECARN (the Pre-Competitive Applied Research Network, established in 1986, a recent initiative from CIAR to stimulate industry to build a base of interactions focused on artificial intelligence and robots). Many university-industry research centers have sprung up across Canada in the past decade, and university spin-off firms abound.[23] Furthermore, although some basic research now done in government laboratories might more appropriately be done in universities, it could not be transferred unless the universities were given funds to cover the indirect costs of such research together with the type of facilities required in a university setting. There are, of course, major national needs for research related, for example, to the environment, to the setting of national regulatory standards of all kinds, and to national security, for which government laboratories naturally must assume the major responsibility.

Industry

Canadian industries fall into three categories: (1) resource based, (2) manufacturing, and (3) new technology. As we have said, the amount of research and development Canadian companies do in categories 1 and 2 is very small. In category 3, only one of the indigenous Canadian firms—Northern Telecom—is of world scale in R&D, and it must be considered a young company that is at high risk in competition with multinationals.[24]

We have the basis for developing world-scale research and development in our resource-based corporations such as Alcan International, Noranda, and MacMillan Bloedel. Most of our research-intensive firms are small, and each time one of them tries to create a new technology and compete in the world market, the firm has to "bet the entire company."[25]

Canada must develop strategies to enhance the research and development capacity of its industry, find ways to allow new high-technology companies to turn into multinationals, and create a national environment that encourages new business initiatives. Without these strategies, our basic research will remain unfocused and Canada will have only limited job opportunities for science and engineering graduates. Furthermore, a weak science-based capability will lead to problems in sustaining and enhancing our prosperity. Our support for science will weaken and along with it, our system of social justice.

Since it was established in 1967, the Science Council of Canada, an arms-length advisory council on science and technology policy isssues to the federal govenment, has tried to maintain a national perspective while dealing with issues on industrial policy, infrastructure, and the impact of science and technology on society. Its distinguished membership from academe and the private sector as well as its independence have been both its strength and its source of struggle in advising on the allocation of resources and the change in attitudes required. Arm's-length activity is not necessarily intimately coupled with political decision making, except by personalities. In 1986 the province of Ontario established its Advisory Council on Science and Technology, known as the Premier's Council. This is a new institutional innovation. The council, always chaired by the premier, is composed of members of Parliament (five cabinet ministers) and leading individuals from the private sector, academe and labor. The committee has established a new perspective in Ontario's industry that could enhance industry-based research and development because of its direct allocation of significant R&D funds.[26] Other provinces have established similar advisory councils, namely, the B.C. premier's

Advisory Council (1987), the Nova Scotia premier's Advisory Council (1987), and the Newfoundland Advisory Council on Science and Technology (1988), with Quebec's Conseil de sciences et technologie (1983) of longer standing. Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick have just established science and technology councils, and Saskatchewan is moving in the same direction. In 1987 the government of Canada established the National Advisory Board on Science and Technology, chaired by the prime minister. All these initiatives represent a major change in our attitude toward the development of technology and science, and for the first time science and technology are becoming a major issue on the public policy agenda. We hope fervently this is not a fleeting reference for future policy initiatives.

Science-Based Innovation and Canada's Adaptation

Canada has a sound economy with reasonably good economic growth. In such circumstances, it is difficult for the public to be concerned about how the science and technology revolution in the world outside will affect our future, particularly if the anticipated changes will cause many institutions to undergo complex readjustments. It can be quite reasonably argued that Canada will best serve its future by continuing its present economic pattern of maintaining a substantial branch-plant economy, importing technology from other countries, and applying it to our resource-based industries and our manufacturing industries. This strategy will, however, further erode the science and technology base in Canada, and in turn our prosperity.

While Canada is in the midst of an economic boom, it is showing clear signs of having problems competing in the global economy. The prime minister of Canada has recognized the need for Canada to respond to this situation in his recent speeches and has stated:

> Science and technology are not only a means of securing and enhancing our prosperity, they are vital to promoting our national sovereignty and our well being as a people. . . . This is our enormous Canadian challenge—the need to meet the new international competition and to prepare and strengthen our competitive advantage around science and technology.[27]

This year Canada will have a current account deficit of more than $10 billion (in Canadian currency). This is one of the highest per capita deficits in the industrial world. To avoid the further weakening of its international trade position, Canada has two options. One, we can devalue our dollar again so as to increase exports. This option would lead to the decline of our standard of living in relation to those of other developed countries, with all the negative consequences that would have for the prosperity of our economy in relation to those of other developed nations. Our second option is to improve the quality of our exports and to lower their cost through increased productivity. This option would sustain and perhaps enhance our prosperity, but to achieve this goal we would have to increase our innovation capacity.

It is clearly easier for a country to adjust to the future when it has the resources to do so than when its resources have substantially declined. Argentina and the United Kingdom are examples of countries that had a high standard of living at the beginning of the century but that have had difficulty making adjustments to sustain their standard of living in comparison with those of other developed countries. Both Argentina and the United Kingdom illustrate how a relative decline in prosperity has a negative impact on social structure and the health of a population.

Since the science and technology revolution has now become a clearly recognizable and important factor in innovation in the global economy, the key question for countries such as Canada is, How can we adjust to this challenge?

If it wishes to be an effective competitor in the production of tradable goods and services in today's global economy, a country or a region must take five steps. It must: (1) establish an effective science-based innovation capability; (2) create an effective global marketing capability; (3) develop mechanisms for financing high-risk, long-term research and development that are equivalent to what is done in other regions; (4) establish institutional arrangements to mobilize the scarce high-quality resources necessary to be effective in all aspects of the innovation process, including people and money; and (5) establish an effective consensus mechanism between the private sector and government to develop appropriate strategies.

BUILDING A CONSENSUS TO CHANGE A CULTURE

Creating new products and services for world markets requires some focusing of basic research on areas that are relevant to long-term applied research. (This is very much what the Bell Laboratories and other major industrial laboratories in the United States have been able to do in this century). Developmental research has to be concerned not only with the production of products and services but also with the incremental innovations that influence the quality and efficiency of the production process. Two authorities on U.S. industry consider this process of cyclic development to be an essential but neglected component in innovation today. They summarize the balance between science-based creation of new technology and incremental innovation as follows:

> Much of what needs to be changed in U.S. industry involves close ties to manufacturing, design for manufacturability, a rapid design cycle, and up-to-date technical knowledge on the part of the engineers themselves. Being up-to-date requires conscious company effort. Traveling to meetings, reading the technical literature, and being a part of the engineering community are necessities . . . .
>
> Outside the product improvement cycle, a research (as opposed to development) organization in industry must have close ties to development and manufacturing in order to succeed. With these close ties, researchers can understand the progress of the cycle and can introduce new steps at the appropriate time and in an acceptable form.
>
> The United States must learn to succeed, not only in the ladder type of innovation in which a wholly new idea from science creates a wholly new product (the science-dominated process at which we have succeeded in the past), but also in the rapid, cyclical, engineering-dominated process of incremental product improvement.[28]

While the internationalization of science is creating new institutions to do basic research (often outside universities), it is important to keep in mind that to the extent that basic research is moved out of universities, new institutions will have to be created to prepare trained manpower.[29] In addition to the questions concerning the institutional settings for doing basic research and training manpower, Canada will have to consider carefully how to focus its basic research in relation to the needs of science-based innovation.[30] Its basic research must be of high quality and backed up by enough resources to facilitate Canada's participation as an equal partner in the basic research being done in other countries. The Centres of Excellence programs help, but industry in several areas of our country still lacks the capacity to link its work with the basic research groups in universities. Attention must now go to developing such industrial capacity. Corporate leadership must recognize the importance of industry-based, long-term, applied research, which requires a different research environment than does developmental research. The achievement of a critical mass is important for effective science-based innovations.

Canada will have to initiate a policy of developing industry's capacity to do the long-term applied research necessary for science-based innovation. The failure of Britain to link its strong capability in science to innovation has contributed, in the eyes of many observers, to its inability to sustain and enhance its prosperity.[31] Britain's inner-city problems and its weakened support for health and education are all outcomes of its failure to generate the income necessary for its future. The lessons for Canada are clear. But will they be recognized in time?

Any strategy for enhancing research and development in Canada must lead to industry increasing its expenditures on research and development and to institutional changes involving the private sector and the government. Without these changes, it is difficult to see how Canada can become an effective participant in the science and technology revolution. Some nations have developed strategies to build consensus between government and the private sector.

In Japan, the key advisory body for science, engineering, and technology is the Council for Science and Technology, chaired by the prime minister. This council operates with a number of subcommittees and focuses primarily on policy issues. It has direct access to the prime minister to give its advice. The Science Council of Japan is related to the policy and granting councils for science and technology and for medical, social science, and humanities research. The Japanese have admirably established consensus between the private sector and government without giving the government control of industry.

In Sweden and Germany, consensus setting is informal but still very real. The private sector meets with the government to articulate priorities for science and technology, and together they define policies and ways to implement them.

Over five years the European Community is spending 3.2 billion European currency units (half government, half industry) on Esprit II. This precompetitive research program on information-processing research is a unique model. The Council of Ministers makes broad research allocations, industry sets the priorities, and a government-administered framework implements the policies.

All of these models can to some degree be applied to the Canadian context. From the Japanese model we can take the view that the involvement of the prime minister helps build consensus. From the Swedish and German models we can take the lesson that implementation roles should be defined after priorities and strategies are set. The mission for national laboratories in Germany follows the industrial priorities of the country very closely. From the EEC and Japan we can take the concept of industry setting the major priorities for science-based innovation (except for pure research and specific programs that are in the national interest, e.g. space, defense, and standards).

Canada should establish a partnership between the private sector and government to develop a shared vision of our national goals in science, engineering,and technology and then gain the agreement and commitment of all parties to national strategies based on those goals. The establishment of the National Advisory Board on Science and Technology, chaired by the prime minister, is a step in that direction. The science and technology councils established by some of the provincial governments also reflect this goal. The Science Council of Canada has urged repeatedly that to compete internationally we must cooperate nationally.[32] The recent reports from the National Advisory Board on Science and Technology and from the Premier's Council on Science and Technology in Ontario show what can result from the collective effort of the private sector and government.[33]

From the experience of other countries Canada can learn certain principles that underlie any effective consensus building in science and technology:

1. A sense of mutual trust must pervade relations among government, industry, labor, and the academic community.

2. National leadership must have a clearly defined vision of a technologically advanced economy committed to participating in the growing volume of world trade in the global economy.

3. Industry must determine the priorities for science-based innovation.

4. All important and relevant political structures, provincial as well as federal, must be involved in decision making and committed to the success of the effort.

5. Industry and government participation must be at the most senior levels.

6. All strategies must be developed with the "bottom up" participation of companies and research organizations and must reflect the need to build consensus among all the groups.

7. Resources allocated to science, engineering, and technology should be seen as an investment and not an expense.

Gilles makes the point that:

> Canada is involved in a race between political will and institutional inertia and international change. At the moment international change is winning, and the Canadian standard of living is falling. If Canada's future is to be as prosperous as its past, if Canada is not to be forever in a stage of immature development, the appropriate processes for making economic policy in a period of rapid change must be adopted and activated.[34]

Canada has the capacity to participate in the international scientific and technological revolution today and to make innovations that are essential to producing tradable goods and services. Our governments can facilitate the process, and indeed, must use their institutional capacity for this purpose. The leadership, however, must come from the private sector, from business and the universities. Without their effort, we will be unable to integrate the basic, applied, and developmental research that is essential for science-based innovation. If we are to continue living in our village peace, Canada must learn how to be an effective partner in the new global economy.

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Eleanor Cook

"A Seeing and Unseeing in the Eye" Canadian Literature and the Sense of Place

THERE IS A SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF LITERATURE written in Canada that calls itself the Association for Canadian and Quebec Literatures/Association des littératures canadiennes et québecoises. When I once objected to this name on the ground that a federalist could not belong in good faith, I was told that it avoided the awkwardness of hyphens. Ever since, I have been interested in hyphens and hyphenated conditions, especially in relation to Canadian literature.

PREFACE: THE PLACING OF HYPHENS

Apart from the political difficulty of the phrase "Canadian and Quebec," is it useful as a nonhyphenated equivalent for writing in English and in French? Well, no. This association is not at all the same as an association for English- and French-Canadian literature (alphabetical order). Or as an association for French- and English-Canadian literature (chronological order, beginning with Marc Lescarbot, chronicler of the short-lived Acadian colony of Port-Royal, whose play was performed there in 1606). For where does the present association place the work of Antonine Maillet, voice of the Acadians, scholar of Rabelais, and creator of the memorable cleaning

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Eleanor Cook is Professor of English and Associate Dean, Faculty of Arts and Science, at the University of Toronto.

woman La Sagouine? Acadians know what it means to be excluded, whether by deportation or by current categories. (The 1755 deportation is the subject of Longfellow's *Evangeline,* and the return from exile the subject of Maillet's *Pélagie-la-Charette,* which won her the Prix Goncourt in 1979.) One possible name would be the Association for Canadian Literature in the French and English Languages; this, of course, would shift the categories.

La Sagouine reflects on categories when the census taker appears in order to "cense" her. Here she is, in the Acadian French that Maillet has done so much to record and keep alive—"un langage d'avant l'Academie"[1]:

> Ta nationalité, qu'ils te demandont. . . . C'est malaise à dire.
>
> Je vivons en Amarique, ben je sons pas des Amaricains. Non, les Amaricains, ils travaillont dans des shops aux Etats, pis ils s'en venont se promener par icitte sus nos côtes, l'été, en culottes blanches pis en parlant anglais. . . . Nous autres je vivons au Canada; ça fait que je devons putot être des Canadjens. . . . Ben ça se peut pas non plus, parce que les Dysart . . . ça vit au Canada itou [mais] ils sont des Anglais, pis nous autres, je sons des Francais. . . . je pouvons pas dire ça: les Français, c'est les Français de France. . . . Je sons putot des Canadjens français. . . . Ça se peut pas non plus, ça. Les Canadjens français, c'est du monde qui vit à Québec. Ils les appelont des Canayens, ou ben des Québecois. . . . Pour l'amour de Djeu, où c'est que je vivons, nous autres? . . . En Acadie, qu'ils nous avont dit, et je sons des Acadjens. . . . je sons les seuls à porter ce nom-là. . . . [mais] les encenseux . . . ils avont eu pour leu dire que l'Acadie, c'est point un pays, ça, pis un Acadjen c'est point une nationalité. . . . je leur avont dit de nous bailler la nationalité qu'i' voudriont. Ça fait que je crois qu'ils nous avont placés parmi les Sauvages. . . .
>
> Ils te disont ben que t'es un citoyen à part entchere; ben ils pouvont point noumer ta citoyenneté. T'es pas de trop, peut-être ben, mais t'as pas ta place au pays.[2]

The single most important statement about Canadian cultural identity is by Northrop Frye. La Sagouine is a living example of his argument:

> When the CBC is instructed by Parliament to do what it can to promote Canadian unity and identity, it is not always realized that unity and identity are quite different things to be promoting, and that in Canada they are perhaps more different than they are anywhere else. Identity is

> local and regional, rooted in the imagination and in works of culture; unity is national in reference, international in perspective, and rooted in a political feeling.[3]

La Sagouine has no problem of identity. (This malady is not as widespread in Canada as some suppose.[4]) What she has is a problem of unity, of her place in the country:

> The essential element in the national sense of unity is the east-west feeling, developed historically along the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes axis, and expressed in the national motto, *a mari usque ad mare*. The tension between this political sense of unity and the imaginative sense of locality is the essence of whatever the word "Canadian" means. Once the tension is given up, and the two elements of unity and identity are confused or assimilated to each other, we get the two endemic diseases of Canadian life. Assimilating identity to unity produces the empty gestures of cultural nationalism; assimilating unity to identity produces the kind of provincial isolation which is now called separatism.[5]

La Sagouine has no desire for isolation. It is just that others have not seen her. La Sagouine is here, in this place, yet not fully here. She has and makes a powerful sense of the place called l'Acadie, a place that both is and is not on a map. (True places never are, said Melville.) Yet the census taker finds her hard to place and so makes her wonder about her "place au pays." She is a useful starting point for this essay, which has to do with two different, though related, senses of place. The first is *place* in the more usual meaning of the sights and sounds, smells and tastes, the textures of a place, the sensing of its natural landscape, its streets and buildings, its inhabitants. The second is *place* as category—of cultural identity, of the various filters through which we see and read actual, palpable place.

Canadians tend to be aware of categories, of hyphenated conditions. Founded by two imperial powers, situated between the two current superpowers: for us, such awareness is natural enough. In our writing too, we are aware of categories, of how things get put together. An older, fuller literature has a sense of something already put together (with all the concomitant problems for the artist). The British poet Geoffrey Hill writes of an England put together so long ago that one can forget it was put together. A Canadian finds his extraordinary poem *The Mystery of the Charity of Charles Péguy* especially interesting because of the way Hill relates French and

English (peoples and languages) by rhyme and word root and hyphen. His poem enriches our sense of how we place ourselves: how we come together, stay apart, form bonds, break bonds. It challenges unexamined notions of oneness and of fragmentation, just as Frye's remarks do in a different way. Words do not fit neatly into French-English, as if that hyphen were an international boundary. But then international boundaries do not divide neatly. Very few human things do, Hill's poem reminds us.

In Canadian literature there is much less sense of a place already put together than in British literature. Rather, there is still a sense of getting things together, not so much in narrative or argumentative plotting as in form. It turns up in the strong schematic skeleton of much Canadian writing, whether the anatomy is neatly carved or experimentally pieced together. Here are the bones, here is how they may be put together, here is how these bones may live, may be articulated. It turns up in the often-remarked absence of realism in its pure form. (Realistic Canadian work tends to turn into magic realism or into mythically informed realism.) It turns up in the often-remarked Canadian gift for irony and satire and self-mockery. (The late George Ferguson, the crusty editor of the *Montreal Star,* used to say that what this country needs most is a good five-cent bullshit-filter. That is yet another use for a hyphen.) Such characteristics mark a self-consciousness about the sense of place.

A word on the phrase "sense of place" before going on to particulars. These are not precise rhetorical or logical words in the way that a synecdoche or a syllogism is. They are not to be found in the glossary of Northrop Frye's *Anatomy of Criticism* or in the analytical index of *PMLA* (Publications of the Modern Language Association of America). Nonetheless, they remain among those enduring, useful, general words or phrases on which we center certain kinds of observation. And this phrase can provide a useful way of introducing or reviewing literature that comes from a certain area. I am speaking, of course, about "sense of place" in the first and usual meaning noted above, as when Dame Helen Gardner says she would recognize the garden of T. S. Eliot's *Burnt Norton* if she were brought blindfolded to the place. Or as when Browning, visiting Italy, laughed aloud in pleasure at recognizing a sorb tree because of Shelley's poem "Marenghi." This is the imaginative (and so, the precise and memorable) fixing of a landscape in words. We inherit this topographical sense most immediately from eighteenth-century English locodescriptive writing, and our mimetic expectations for a sense of place are still much governed by those eighteenth-century conventions. This remains true, even though modern writing is altering our codes for perceiving place.

For we do not see or read place except through some code, some filter, some set of categories. It is always worth stepping back to consider, as best we can, how these filters or categories place us in the very act of our seeing and reading place. Categories are best understood not just as pigeonholes where we put things after seeing or reading them but as problem-solving models without which we can hardly see or read at all. (See Alastair Fowler on genres, for example.[6]) And we all know, thanks to E. H. Gombrich's *Art and Illusion,* how schemata filter our seeing, how there is no such thing as Ruskin's innocent eye. This second sense of *place,* the place that conditions place (so to speak), is the subject of the last part of this essay.

THE SEEING OF OUR PLACES

A sense of place usually has to do with landscape, whether rural or wild or urban. "The aim of poetry is to saturate every terrain, every city, every village, so that every American child might find a native landscape invested with language. This was, after all, the normal condition for the European child. The *genius loci* lives only where poetry creates it." This is Helen Vendler speaking of American poetry.[7] The aims of Canadian writing resemble the American in this, though Canadians also live with the knowledge of vast northern terrains that resist saturation. What sense of place may be found in major or representative writers in Canada? This will give a mental set, a schema. And if ordinary mimesis is not found, this too gives information: what is not seen can be as important as what is seen. (One says this knowing that later generations will see where we are blind and will miss some of our seeing, "and least will guess that with our bones / We left much more, left what still is / The look of things."[8]) What sense of place, then, may we find in our various terrains and cities and villages where our writers have invested them with articulate presence? To take a handful of excellent writers from the last generation or two and ask this question is to begin to make a map. Everyone has a mental map; this is a personal one.

Consider the world of Hector de Saint-Denys-Garneau, who died in 1943 at thirty-one (French Canada's most eminent poet, said Etienne Gilson). Usually, the middle ground is altogether missing. The space of his poems is occupied by large foreground figures and a large sky; the middle ground is empty. So also in the work of the painter Jean-Paul Lemieux, the foreground figures commonly break the margins of the painting and look directly out with haunting eyes; the background is a vast sky. The angle of viewing varies; sometimes it makes the foreground figures huge, as if seen by a child; their presences overwhelm. In Lemieux's paintings, as in Saint-Denys-Garneau's poetry, we have the self and space. *Regards et jeux dans l'espace* is the title of Saint-Denys-Garneau's first collection. Here the tension of holding self and space in relation is extreme, and sometimes snaps. The double (there are a lot of doubles in Canadian writing) walks with the poet to the corner, then goes the other way (in "Accompagnement" we hear: "Je marche à côté d'une joie"). Absence of community is a felt thing.

> Mes enfants vous dansez mal
> Il faut dire qu'il est difficile de danser ici
> Dans ce manque d'air
> Ici dans l'espace qui est toute la danse.
> Vous ne savez pas jouer avec l'espace
> Et vous y jouez
> Sans chaînes
> Pauvres enfants qui ne pouvez pas jouer. . . . [9]

In the end, the tension split altogether and Garneau retreated into silence, unable to put things together in his work. His close friend, the remarkable essayist Jean Le Moyne, accused clerical Quebec of having killed the poet—of having killed him through a hatred of life, a fatal dualism that ignores Easter and hates women. Le Moyne's passionate attack is against a clericalism whose power waned with the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s. (There were other attacks too: Claire Martin's memoir *Dans un gant de fer,* 1965, is one of the best known.)

This changing sense of Quebec alters the very look of the landscape, for we live not just in a territorial country but also in a country of the mind. It is not just the look of Quebec's church buildings (whether active or deserted or converted to other uses), of its shrines and clergy, that is informed by Saint-Denys-Garneau's poetry and Le Moyne's essays. It is the look of the very air of Quebec, its great spaces, the dance lines cut by hills or by buildings. Le Moyne's ample imagination abhors confining boundaries and holds itself open, for example, to Henry James, to music. (Glenn Gould knew and loved the music essays in Le Moyne's collection *Convergences,* where the essay on Saint-Denys-Garneau also appears.) Walls are metaphysical as well as physical, and these mental walls and boundaries are a most important part of a general sense of place. Mental boundaries and walls and hyphens come before the physical ones we construct. They are the cause (formal, perhaps teleological) of the physical ones.

A similar tension appears in the work of Saint-Denys-Garneau's cousin, Anne Hébert, where the self wanders not so much under a great sky and against a huge landscape as in a domestic scene. But the self is equally alone. As with Garneau, there are bones, a parceling out of the body, of detached hands that no synecdoche will make whole, of bones with no desire for flesh:"Je suis une fille maigre / Et j'ai des beaux os" (from "La Fille maigre": "I am a thin, thin girl / And I have beautiful bones. . . . I polish them ceaselessly"). The self wanders the ancestral home and from a mirror pulls a ghost, a dead damp possessing spirit, clinging like seaweed or like a lover ("Vie de château"). "The first voices of our poetry speak to us of unhappiness, of solitude," Hébert once said.[10]

In the back-and-forth of active looking, which is also a possessing of the landscape, one sees the manor houses of Quebec differently after one reads Hébert. One sees differently those beautiful long houses on the north shore between Quebec City and Montreal with their steep-sloping roofs. They not only become invested with the nostalgic charm of Robert Laroque de Roquebrune's classic memoir *Testament de mon enfance.* They also become invested with the ghosts of a certain past, like the river of Hébert's well-known short story "The Torrent." Canada is a land of violent contraries. (Perhaps that is why we value the peaceable kingdom, the middle way, the rituals of courtesy.) When Hébert plays with her familiar contraries in her novel *Les enfants du sabbat,* we find a more sophisticated, funnier treatment of John Updike's theme in *The Witches of Eastwick.* More is at stake in Hébert's book; these are her own hauntings, treated in fine black farce, convent life alternating with "cabane" (or shanty) life, the whole thing ludicrous and powerful. She holds and turns those inimical and similar worlds back and forth, making actual Quebec ghostlier and more real all at once.

One modern form of this Quebec may be found in the powerful, violent work of Hubert Aquin, to which I shall return. An ardent Quebec nationalist (that is, a separatist), Aquin is an urban writer, more Gnostic than Gothic, a French Canadian with a hunger for absolutes, a hunger thwarted and diverted, never sublimated.

For the sense of place in a more everyday Quebec, we might turn to Roch Carrier, whose short story "The Hockey Sweater" is a Canadian favorite. This is also the story of any Canadian country boy: the old Eaton's store catalogue (not Sears), the hockey (not baseball, not soccer). Carrier said in a recent interview that ice was meant, first, for hockey and, second, for keeping meat. The paintings of William Kurelek, a primitivist of rare genius, show a prairie boy's sense of this world of snow and ice, meant for play. This world is all one, Quebec or Manitoba. It is Rabelais against morbidity. "The same degree of morbidity is quite common among us," wrote Le Moyne, but against this, Rabelais keeps turning up, for Carrier as for Maillet. (If the conjunction sounds odd, we might compare U.S. Southern writing.) Satire, self-mockery, humor: these are strategies for survival, and even for a kind of celebration, as well as art forms. (But then, art forms *are* strategies for survival.) And satire, self-mockery, and humor are the kinds of literature in which Canadians shine.

Quebec's vital Jewish presence is caught in Mordecai Richler's fiction, and we in turn may catch the look of it as we walk Montreal streets. So may we with the work of A. M. Klein. The poems one returns to are precisely those that give a sense of place: Jerusalem alive in Canada, late-winter sugaring troped as a modern type of crucifixion, the rocking chair (used as a title for one collection), evoking those front porches on which one sits and watches. "Political Meeting," Klein's memorable poem about the conscription crisis, shows another kind of watching:

> The whole street wears one face,
> shadowed and grim; and in the darkness rises
> the body-odour of race.

"Rises . . . race." All the poem's risings come to rest on the tension of that closing near-rhyme. The political meeting is in a room with a crucifix: what rising thence? Klein's Quebec is not simply a place of picturesque sights and sounds, sugar bush and rocking chairs. It is a place of conscience too. So also, Jewish Montreal, evoked by Richler, by the poets Irving Layton and Louis Dudek, by the scholar Leon Edel.

The Montreal of F. R. Scott, the distinguished jurist and poet, is a Montreal of sights and sounds and conscience in another way. It is a Montreal of crisp, elegant wit. Scott has an eye for satire and a passion for justice, whether he is defending *Lady Chatterley's Lover* or spotting funny bilingualisms. Scott works in areas mastered by W. H. Auden—fine occasional verse, satiric quatrains:

> I went to bat for the Lady Chatte
> Dressed in my bib and gown.
> The judges three glared down at me
> The priests patrolled the town.

Or, from "Bonne Entente":

> The advantages of living with two cultures
> Strike one at every turn
> Especially when one . . . sees on the restaurant menu
> the bilingual dish: Deep Apple Pie
> Tarte aux pommes profondes.

On the other hand, Mavis Gallant's Montreal stories of Linnet Muir, in *Home Truths,* are imagined through the eyes of someone who knows struggle from the inside out. It is a different Montreal:

> One day, standing at a corner, waiting for the light to change, I understood that the Sherbrooke Street of my exile—my Mecca, my Jerusalem—was this. It had to be: there could not be two, It was *only* this . . . . Reality, as always, was narrow and dull.

To return again to the Atlantic region is to return to Newfoundland (part of Canada since 1949) and to the Maritimes (including the region of Acadia). It is to see the North Atlantic through the eyes of E. J. Pratt, whether in the fine narrative poem *The Titanic* or in shorter poems like "The Shark." Pratt knows the everyday heroisms of seagoing life.[11] His whole sense of place is heroic, where heroism is an outward struggle, not a fight "against the trolls within" (Ibsen's phrase, put to such good use by Robertson Davies in his novel *The Manticore)*. Pratt is Saint-Denys-Garneau turned inside out. He has the Newfoundlander's genial and exuberant imagination, together with an intelligence about the world of everyday society and action. All this informs his best work: the wartime parable *The Truant* (which spoke so strongly to the young Northrop Frye); *The Titanic;* and the best of his narratives, *Brébeuf and his Brethren,* on the martyrdom of the French Jesuit missionaries in what is now Ontario. Pratt's type of heroism and his favorite genre of narrative poetry are both out of fashion. The genre is just now coming back into favor, though not in the old way of telling. The type of heroism is too recent to exercise the historical imagination, though we still sometimes look at seascapes and landscapes with Pratt's eyes. But his instinct for the inclusive myths of this country was unerring.

The Maritime sense of place is not the same as the Newfoundland sense, for all that it shares a knowledge of the sea. It is not just the look of the countryside. It is the voice of that countryside, as distinctive as a New England voice. Elizabeth Bishop has heard it in her fine poem "The Moose," for which Canadians owe her a special debt. That voice, quiet and as sardonic as the occasion demands, belies any bucolic placidity. Thomas Chandler Haliburton, the nineteenth-century Maritime judge and creator of Sam Slick, also heard that voice. He is every Canadian's forefather, just as Sam Slick is every Canadian's typical Yankee salesman. Sam is the master of what we now call the soft sell; Haliburton called it soft sodder.

The map of Ontario is now filling rapidly, thanks to the work of Robertson Davies and Alice Munro and Margaret Atwood. Thanks also to the continuing work of the poets, who began to fill the map earlier. James Reaney's poetry and drama, for example, trace the alphabet of southern Ontario; they are possessed by a fury of pastoral vision to set against false pastoral. Reaney writes a series of Spenserian eclogues, *A Suit of Nettles:* it is anserine rather than ovine. He also knows, as did Milton and Pound, the force of place-names. (Canada is a land of extraordinary place-names: the Indian names with their mysterious etymology, improbable names like Moose Jaw, anglicized French-Canadian names like Bien Fait, pronounced "bean-fate", names of sheer delight like Saskatoon and Saskatchewan.) Margaret Avison's work belongs here ("Nobody stuffs the world in at your eyes / The optic heart must venture"). So do the unforgettable cadences of Jay Macpherson ("And Memory, alas to me / A half-regained Eurydice / Is veiled and cannot speak"). So does George Johnston's light verse with its dark touches that leave a sense of something unspoken and sinister, as James Merrill puts it.[12] ("Don't be nervous, Mary Anne, / Don't be nervous, dear! / Carry a little water can / To catch the quiet tear.")

Ontario is a seemingly placid province, especially in its southern areas: the Golden Horseshoe metropolitan region rounding the end of Lake Ontario, the rolling rich agricultural land, the five different Great Lakes (huge inland waterways with their own lacustrine lore). The sudden change to rock and evergreens along the border of the Laurentian Shield introduces the country of those knowledgeable in the ways of wilderness, the resort country, the mineral and lumbering country, the country of countless lakes, the country now oddly browning as pollution rains down from what Marianne Moore called "the sequestered brilliance of Canadian skies."[13] This is a tourist-poster, an industrial-appeal Ontario. To see the place through its writers can give a sense of vertigo. Can these bones live so? Are some apparently placid Ontarians possessed by such mythic energy? Nonsensical stereotypes of the stolid northerner can be deceptive. (For an excellent attack on climatic arguments for national character, see Carl Berger's essay "The True North Strong and Free."[14])

To an outsider, the world of Robertson Davies, to say nothing of James Reaney's, may appear essentially as fantasy. I suppose the world of William Faulkner could also appear to be fantasy. Yet we know how the satire of Stephen Leacock's best book, *Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich,* regularly repeats itself in actual academe, stock exchange, church, and social scene. A new university in Montreal, in fact, took on the name of Leacock's much-satirized fictional university, Concordia. Those who come from small Ontario towns read Davies's apparently fantastic Deptford trilogy and more recent novels with fascination. "How does he know?" they ask. And one drives through those towns, with their barbershops and festivals and churches and few prominent houses and local newspapers, wondering, wondering. So our sense of place in many a town and village in Ontario has been changed, has come alive, with knowledge that is both welcome and unwelcome. In many a city too, though Ontario's cities have not as yet the articulate presence of well-imagined Montreal.

Davies has a strong sense of the religious texture of Canadian life, which has never succumbed very far to American deism or to American fundamentalism. (PBS's series on fundamentalism has addressed a U.S. phenomenon.) It is worth noting that Canadian writers are generally informed about such things as the main Protestant denominations, their doctrines and influence. This has nothing to do with personal belief. Atwood's sure touch in her novel *The Handmaid's Tale* tells her that someone in an Anabaptist tradition would never collaborate with an oppressive state religion. Gallant's Linnet Muir thinks: "Even in loss of faith, they [her parents] were unalike, for he was ex-Anglican and she was ex-Lutheran and that is not your same atheist—no, not at all."

The prairies speak differently in different seasons. Prairie writing is exuberant, hyberbolic, and it is also the contrary, brooding and meditative—like the landscape, one wants to say, knowing such analogues are false ones. A child's vision, says Eli Mandel, a child yearning for a true home. Mandel's bleak Estevan poems are paradoxically rich in Jewish presence. W. O. Mitchell writing in the tradition of Twain and Leacock, Rudy Wiebe finding a Mennonite voice, Gabrielle Roy speaking for the Franco-Manitobans—all make a prairie place for us. In Roy's story "Ely! Ely! Ely!" the dark, vast, flat land engulfs a passenger set down at the end of a long train, a train that has made a special stop for her. That railway line ("railroads" is American) is metonymically Canada itself, for demographically Canada has the shape of Chile, though its territory is third in area only to the U.S.S.R. and China. Under the huge dome of a prairie sky, the elements take on mythic force. Westerners hear Aeolus differently from Ontarians. ("The Wind, Our Enemy" is Anne Marriott's title for a poem about prairie drought.) The towns are peopled by outsize, mythic characters, as in two novels: Margaret Laurence's typic old woman, Hagar, from *The Stone Angel*, Robert Kroetsch's new Odysseus from *The Studhorse Man*.

Interior British Columbia is inhabited by haunting presences from Sheila Watson's novel *The Double Hook*, which has gone on speaking to younger writers for years. As a well-known man of letters says, "Mrs. Potter, the old fisherwoman, and James, her son and murderer, and Greta, her daughter . . . move in and out of a bright mythological light and yet, at the same time, in outward appearance, are the kind of cattle-raising people one might encounter any day riding on the back roads of the Cariboo country."[15] The mountains and the West Coast we have seen for some time through Emily Carr's autobiographical writing in *Klee Wyck* as well as her painting, through the fiction of Ethel Wilson, and through the poetry of Earle Birney and P. K. Page. And now through Joy Kogawa's *Obasan,* that beautiful, unbearable novel of the deportation and dispossession of Canadians of Japanese origin. As her grandmother is cremated on a pyre in the British Columbia forest, Naomi thinks of other bones in that vast countryside. Some of her grandmother's bones and ashes are joining this soil, inextricably a part of this country she has tried to make her own. Vancouver, the mountain ghost town, the huge forest, the little settlement, the sugar-beet farm worked by forced labor—all are seen anew.

Our most extraordinary literary imagination does not work with poetry, prose fiction, or drama. It belongs to an essayist, the one who wrote *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays.* It belongs, most of us would say, to someone who has a genius for category, someone hardly to be associated with the country called Canada. Yet Northrop Frye is also of his time and place in a profound way that is sometimes hard for outsiders to grasp. One example is his speaking and writing voice, which can indeed be placed regionally by those familiar with the area. Here is that Maritime voice, as described by the daughter of two other Maritimers:

> The things that intimidated other people did not intimidate me. The deadpan delivery, the irony, the monotone, and the concealed jokes, may have seemed odd to those from Ontario, but to me they were more than familiar. In the Maritimes they're the norm . . . and no Maritimer could ever mistake a lack of flamboyance for a lack of commitment, engagement, courage or passion. Light dawned when I found out Frye had originated in New Brunswick.[16]

The speaker is Margaret Atwood, who has heard the regional sense of identity in Frye's voice. The reader hardly needs to be told to remember Atwood's own writing voice as well. That Maritime perpective informs Atwood's central Canada too.

Can we say that the person who writes an epic criticism is our epic poet? It is Robert Kroetsch who has suggested this idea,[17] knowing how Frye's sense of place allows us to walk around inside it with no sense of restriction. More than any writer of this country, Northrop Frye has taught us how to see.

I want to end this section by observing how important local context can be, for Canadian as for other writing. It is true that in some writing "whereabouts is as immaterial as in Kafka."[18] Yet how do we know this unless we know something of the whereabouts? John Bayley also writes that "Chekhov's 'Lady with the Dog' could only have taken place as it did where it did," an assertion that comes out of his knowlege of the time and place.[19] I make the point because Canadian writing is sometimes read in ignorance of its context—worse, in ignorance that it might have a context that matters. Three examples where context does matter, where our ordinary "sense of place" needs more detail, follow.

The first is the recent popular Quebec film by Denys Arcand, *Le Déclin de l'empire américain.* Its eight men and women dance out their roles (sexual, cultural, professional), balancing, reversing, together, apart. We see a dance of modern love and work. But the film is also profoundly Quebecois. It opens thus: "Il y a trois choses importantes en histoire. Premièrement, le nombre. Deuxièmement, le nombre. Troisièrement, le nombre." Arcand does not say what his characters know very well since they are members of a department of history at a Quebec university: these are well-known sentiments from the prominent Quebec historian Michel Brunet. One must read the title not just generally but also in the context of a Quebec that knows something about empires and their effects. *Déclin* shows decline, questions decline (depending on whether Quebec is inside or outside *l'empire américain),* echoes Gibbon, and puns on *déclin* as a decline in numbers, in the birthrate.

For a second example, try this: read "Les offensés," the poem by Anne Hébert; then read the English translation by Geoffrey Hill, titled "Homo Homini Lupus." The poem takes on a different context; it becomes a Hill poem, though in French it remains an Hébert poem. This is one of the most interesting effects of translation (one thinks of translations of the classics, say, of Catullus's "Vivamus mea Lesbia" rendered in English by Ben Jonson). Since Hébert went utterly unidentified in the English periodical *Agenda,* where Hill's translation appeared, readers might not be aware of her context.

For a third example, take the last novel by Hubert Aquin, *Neige noire,* translated as *Hamlet's Twin.* This novel-cum-script may seem simply the sophisticated revision of *Hamlet* that it patently is. Its incest, ritual murder, lesbianism may seem the near-parodic outdoing of current conventions of violence that they patently are. The place, Montreal: what has this to do with Aquin's Montreal in *Neige noir?* When read in context—say, against Saint-Denys-Garneau and Le Moyne—the novel alters. It becomes the Gnostic parable, the heretical defiance of Quebec and Canadian myths (above all, of Christianity) that it also patently is. Gnostic diction in the new-creation closure alerts us. We recall the ritual slaying with eating of flesh and remember the crucifixion. We recall the incest and remember the father-son story, here a modern father-daughter story. We recall James Joyce, who also saw that *Hamlet* could serve as a God-the-Father/God-the-Son story. Quebec remembers its fathers, and crucifies the daughters who cleave to those fathers, and goes out to make a film about it all. The new world, monstrously heretical to orthodoxy, can only arise from Fortinbras of Norway, here Eva. Aquin superimposes a Scandinavian, a Hamlet's, North on Montreal—or disinters it from Montreal. This is not the cheerful-northern, the hard-primitive sense of place, not the North of the novel *Maria Chapdelaine*. Aquin has a nihilist ferocity; he is intelligent, unrelenting, unsparing. His artistry is sophisticated almost as a matter of course. (You want postmodernism? Nothing easier.) How to look at the places of our seeing after this? Aquin's work shames any easy seeing. It tells us we must earn our sense of place.

THE PLACES OF OUR SEEING

I have been tracing how Canadian literature makes a "sense of place," in the usual meaning of that phrase—its ways of putting and holding things together, the sometime violence when they will not stay together, the consciousness of a massive, powerful land. The placing of Canadian literature itself has been changing at astonishing speed over the last two decades. Now, a body of Canadian writers, not just individual writers, is generally accepted in and beyond this country. It took American literature until the early decades of this century to reach this invaluable stage, and many a recent debate over Canadian literature has replayed old arguments about American literature at that time.[20] The early activities of the "CanLit" industry caused some smiles, but we should say of it what Seamus Heaney says of the Celtic Twilight in Irish literature: "Although it has long been fashionable to smile indulgently at the Celtic Twilight, it has to be remembered that the movement was the beginning of a discovery of confidence in our own ground, in our place, in our speech."[21] And Marie-Claire Blais has warned against "the modesty that can be disastrous for a writer."[22] One wants acceptance of a nation's literature in order to stop thinking of it as such, and to get on with helping and preserving the best possible reading and writing.

I want to end by returning to a more general sense of *place,* that is, place as category. And I want to come back to the question of "seeing and unseeing," as for example, with La Sagouine, and to the question of hyphens.

In any seeing and unseeing in the eye, one wants to ask about motes and beams. If Canadian literature is finding a place for itself, it is also still learning of communities unvoiced or ignored. Thus the work of Maillet and Kogawa. There is yet another community that we are only just beginning to see, though it has been here all the while. It has a lot to do with our sense of place, our sense of putting things together here, in this particular place. It has to do with the fact that this is neither a new country nor an empty country. It has been inhabited just as long as most other countries. (So has Australia, as Judith Wright points out.[23]) It is just that we have not seen the inhabitants, just as the "censor" could not see La Sagouine, as men may not see women, as Americans may not see Canadians. They are here, in this place, yet not fully here, not here in the sense that others are here. Their tragic history, like the tragic history of the eighteenth-century Acadians, is part of this place. Their legends of this country preceded any stories of our own. This is not to prescribe any one specific action; it is to prescribe awareness.

I am speaking of the native population, of course, both Inuit and Amerindian. To see our terrain through Inuit or Amerindian stories is to shift our sense of place, to see it already inhabited by *genii loci,* just as Europe was inhabited for the European child. It is to take on a burden of knowledge and another sense of place, to remember Indian teenagers who commit crimes in order to get to the comforts of jail, to remember a Winnipeg doctor who stitched a string of Indian beads into an incision on the body of an Indian woman as he sutured it. (What an awakening was there: coming out of anaesthetic into the clear, tangible evidence that she had trusted her body to a healer and found the contempt of a white man.) When one's land is at once more theirs, and less, how does one possess it?

Writers have always been aware of this community (the work of the Confederation poet, D. C. Scott, Al Purdy's poem "Lament for the Dorsets," Leonard Cohen's novel *Beautiful Losers,* Rudy Wiebe's novel *The Temptations of Big Bear,* Robert Kroetsch's "Stone Hammer Poem," and the poetry of Susan Musgrave and John Newlove). But general awareness, here as elsewhere, is still deficient. Nonetheless, a 1987 *Illustrated History of Canada* begins with some eighty pages entitled "When Two Worlds Met." And M. T. Kelly's novel *A Dream Like Mine,* a 1987 governor general's awardwinner, treats the Ojibway. There are ways of not seeing a place, but such unseeing can be hazardous. Frye observed in a 1986 interview that:

> you can't found a culture on a pure destruction of another culture; otherwise you'll be haunted by guilt feelings all the time. You have to establish some kind of continuity with it. The moment when the indigenous people seem to be at their last gasp . . . is the point at which cultural backlash begins, just as it has done in French Canada.[24]

Another kind of seeing and unseeing in the eye is made possible through the work of Alice Munro. (I am reading *unseeing* here in Wallace Stevens's second sense: that of unlearning an old way of seeing.*) A non-Canadian may not realize the particular effect that some of Munro's recent work in the *New Yorker* has on a Canadian. To hear part of oneself voiced for the first time—this is an extraordinary experience. And to sense a very good writer still actively growing—one holds one's breath, wishing only to let her mind move upon silence. Munro sees the stories of money that possess some imaginations, especially men's. She sees them not inimically, but as a matter of fact, knowing the dangers, the excesses, but knowing also the day-to-day work, what it maintains as well as what it does not maintain. So too with the stories of love that possess some imaginations, especially women's. She sees them not naively but as a matter of fact, knowing the dangers, the excesses, but knowing also the day-to-day work, what it maintains as well as what it does not. Stories of money and stories of love both go into making a sense of place. Both kinds of story are schemata through which the landscape is seen and inhabited. Both possessed the first explorers of this country, as Champlain's presence in her recent remarkable story "Meneseteung" suggests. It would be easy to exploit the differences in these schemata and to write a simple female-versus-male, love-versus-business, ecology-versus-industry, native-versus-European narrative. But Munro refuses easy either-or hyphens. She reads the land-as-woman metaphor in no easy self-congratulatory way. In "Meneseteung," the grapes, the river, the violence done to the town whore, the unspoken contract in looking at her nakedness: all these things make a sense of place, past and present, where a burden of knowledge yearns for relief, as just before the menstrual flow, until the words come coursing like the river Meneseteung itself.

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*"A Seeing and Unseeing in the Eye" is taken from Stevens's poem *Notes toward a Supreme Fiction,* part 1.

So Munro suggests a new seeing and unseeing in the eye, a seeing that might include more fully a woman's perspective. One can work out the simile of Canada as a female: the occluded partner whom strangers find more exotic than do close relatives. (Atwood also works with this analogue.) We might wish our large partner on the American continent to see more fully from a Canadian perspective and not to assume too readily a Canada in the role of supportive, placid, reliable, flatterable partner, providing essential goods and services, taking care of dirty jobs, in the supporting, the unnoticed, role. More and more, our sense of place makes us watch metaphors and narratives, for these govern our decisions about living in a place, about changing a place. If, all too often, place has been seen by males using female metaphors (as Annette Kolodny argues in her critical work *The Lay of the Land*), can females themselves speak out of their sense of place, as it were, for place? Someone as good as Munro will see with piercing clarity the old exploitations, yet refuse an easy either-or, female-versus-male, love-versus-money categorization. She can see the "male" (business) and the "female" (domestic, and in early settlements, artistic) senses of place. In "Meneseteung," Munro plays on two meanings of the one word *speculation* to hold before us two senses of place in one:

> Would she herself, knowing that there was salt in the earth, discover how to get it out and sell it? Not likely. She would be thinking about the ancient sea. That kind of speculation is what Jarvis Poulter has, quite properly, no time for.[25]

Munro might show us a truer sense of place, teaching us to know one particular place, to acknowledge viewpoints we have ignored, to acknowledge the shame as well as the glories of this place.

I began with a question about hyphens and hyphenated conditions, and that is where I want to end. Northrop Frye argues that hyphens may not be so deleterious, after all, when we are thinking about cultural identity and national unity. We can make the tug in identity-unity or local-national into a creative tension rather than a schism. I have introduced a number of hyphens into the last few paragraphs, literally and metaphorically: female-male, Canadian-U.S., native-latecomer. And I noted earlier a certain self-consciousness in Canadian literature about how things get put together, about the hyphens, so to speak, latent in all our unities. Canadian writing has a few general characteristics, such as the tendency toward satire, self-mockery, and humor. But to me, these general characteristics are not the most interesting and useful area of Canadian literature to explore. To me, the most interesting and useful area of Canadian literature—whether in its rhetoric or its dialectic—is the area of the hyphen, including the metaphorical hyphens within this country. In a world where all our imagination and intelligence is needed to deal with such hyphens, the best of this country's writing, French and English and other, essay and prose fiction and drama and poem, has something important to say.

For most of us our sense of place is still new, still being put together, but we all put it together as against a deluge.

ENDNOTES

[1] Andre Prevos, *Journal of Canadian Fiction* 28 (9) (1980):204.

[2] Antonine Maillet, *La Sagouine* (Ottawa: Lemeac, 1974), 191–2. "Yer nationality, they ask you. . . . Hard to say. We live in America, but we ain't Americans. Nope, Americans, they work in 'em factories in the States, and in summer, they come around, visitin' our beaches in their white trousers 'n speakin' English. . . . Us, we live in Canada; so we figure we mus' be Canadians. Well, that ain't true either, cause the Dysarts . . . they also live in Canada [but] the're English, 'n us, we're French. . . . can't say that: the French folks is the folks fr'm France, *les Français de France*. . . . We're more like French Canadians, they told us. . . . Well, that ain' true either. French Canadians are those that live in *Québec*. They call 'em *Canayens* or *Québecois*. . . . Fer the love of Christ, where do we live? In *Acadie*,

we was told, 'n we're supposed to be *Acadjens.* . . . [but] them censors, the way they sees it, seems *l'Acadie* ain't a country, 'n *Acadjen* ain't a nationality . . . . we told 'em to give us the nationality they wanned. So, I think they put us down with the Injuns. . . . Sure, they says you're a full-fledged citizen; but they can't name yer nationality. Maybe you ain't in the way, but you don't have yer place in the country." Antonine Maillet, in *La Sagouine* (Toronto: Simon & Pierre, 1979), 164–6. The translation is by Luis de Céspedes. Other translations from the French in this article are my own.

[3] Northrop Frye, *The Bush Garden: Essays on the Canadian Imagination* (Toronto: Anansi, 1971), ii.

[4] Cf. Mavis Gallant: "I suppose that a Canadian is someone who has a logical reason to think he is one," in *Home Truths* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1981), xiii.

[5] Northrop Frye, *The Bush Garden,* iii.

[6] Alastair Fowler, *Kinds of Literature: An Introduction to the Theory of Genres and Modes* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).

[7] Helen Vendler, ed., "Introduction," *The Harvard Book of Contemporary American Poetry* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 14–15.

[8] Wallace Stevens, "A Postcard from the Volcano."

[9] "My children, you dance badly./It has to be said that it's hard to dance here,/in this lack of air,/here without space, which is everything in dance./You don't know how to play with space,/and you play in it/(not chained)/you poor children who cannot play" (from "Spectacle de la danse.")

[10] Anne Hébert, *Poèmes* (Paris: Seuil, 1960), 71.

[11] Recent interest in the sinking of the *Titanic* evoked a letter to the *New York Times* recounting the heroism of Ida Straus, who chose to go down with her husband rather than take her place in a lifeboat. Americans were being informed of a piece of their history that many a Canadian student knows very well from Pratt's poem.

[12] *Recitative: Prose by James Merrill* (San Francisco: North Point, 1986), 28.

[13] *The Complete Prose of Marianne Moore,* ed. Patricia C. Willis (New York: Penguin, 1986), 265.

[14] In *Nationalism in Canada,* ed. Peter Russell (Toronto, New York, London, Sydney: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 3–26.

[15] George Woodcock, "Introduction," *Canadian Writers and Their Works: Essays on Form, Context, and Development,* ed. Robert Lecker, Jack David, and Ellen Quigley, vol. 7 (Toronto: ECW Press, 1985), 9.

[16] Margaret Atwood, "Northrop Frye Observed," in *Second Words: Selected Critical Prose* (Toronto: Anansi, 1982), 403.

[17] Robert Kroetsch at the "Ritratto di Northrop Frye," University of Rome, May 1987.

[18] John Bayley, "Up from Under," *London Review of Books* (18 February 1988):9.

[19] Ibid.

[20] One variation is the problem of where to place Canadian literature. The Modern Language Association, at its 1987 convention, simply bifurcated it. French-Canadian works fell under "Literature in French outside of France." But of course there was no parallel category, "Literature in English outside of England." There were two large categories, "British Literature" and "American Literatures" (including Chicano, but not Canadian, so that *American* here meant United States). Canadian writing in English fell under the category "Literature in English other than British and American," as did contemporary but not older Irish writing. This allowed "British Literature" to claim Yeats and Joyce. The Irish are a comfort in these anomalous situations.

[21] Seamus Heaney, "The Sense of Place," in *Preoccupations: Selected Prose 1968–1978* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux), 135.

[22] Marie-Claire Blais, "Introduction," *Oxford Book of French-Canadian Short Stories*, ed. Richard Teleky (Toronto, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), xiii.

[23] Judith Wight, "Landscape and Dreaming," *Dædalus* 114 (1) (Winter 1985):31, 55.

[24] Northrop Frye, interview in *Scripsi* 4 (1986):224.

[25] Alice Munro, "Meneseteung," *New Yorker* (11 January 1988):28.

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Fall 1987

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Alan F. J. Artibise

Canada as an Urban Nation

After almost four centuries of continuous settlement, Canada still evokes images of an immense, unsettled wilderness. Scrawling on postcards depicting the inevitable Mountie, moose, mountain, or lighthouse, visitors from the United States, Japan, England, and Germany write of the fresh air, the wide open spaces, the clean water, and the magnificent natural scenery.[1] But there is another Canada. Despite its deserved reputation as the second largest country in the world, where wilderness landscapes are commonplace, it is in the country's urban landscapes that one can best search for Canada today.

Canadians are an urban people. More than 75 percent of the country's population lives in cities. That is one of the highest percentages of urbanization in the world.[2] As of 1986, Canada had twenty-eight metropolitan areas with populations of 100,000 or more and, together, these cities accounted for 61 percent of Canada's total population of 25,354,064 (see the table).[3] More than one in four Canadians (30 percent) live in metropolitan areas with populations of over a million, while in contrast, only one in twelve (8 percent) live in similar urban agglomerations in the United States.

Seeing Canada as a large map with enormous provinces and tiny dots of cities does not describe the reality of Canada in the late twentieth century. The colorful and dramatic patterns of lakes and forests, oceans and mountains, prairie and muskeg that show up so well on maps of Canada are less relevant—economically, socially,

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Alan Artibise is Director of the School of Community and Regional Planning at the University of British Columbia.

TABLE. A Comparison of Canada's Major Metropolitan Areas (by size of population in 1986)

	Population	Rank
Toronto, Ontario	3,427,168	1
Montreal, Quebec	2,921,357	2
Vancouver, British Columbia	1,380,729	3
Ottawa-Hull, Ontario-Quebec	819,263	4
Edmonton, Alberta	785,465	5
Calgary, Alberta	671,326	6
Winnipeg, Manitoba	625,304	7
Quebec, Quebec	603,267	8
Hamilton, Ontario	557,029	9
St. Catharines-Niagara, Ontario	343,258	10
London, Ontario	342,302	11
Kitchener, Ontario	311,195	12
Halifax, Nova Scotia	295,990	13
Victoria, British Columbia	255,547	14
Windsor, Ontario	253,988	15
Oshawa, Ontario	203,543	16
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan	200,665	17
Regina, Saskatchewan	186,521	18
St. John's, Newfoundland	161,901	19
Chicoutimi-Jonquiere, Quebec	158,468	20
Sudbury, Ontario	148,877	21
Sherbrooke, Quebec	129,960	22
Trois-Rivieres, Quebec	128,888	23
Kingston, Ontario	122,350	24
Thunder Bay, Ontario	122,217	25
St. John, New Brunswick	121,265	26
Sydney, Nova Scotia	119,470	27
Moncton, New Brunswick	102,084	28
TOTAL	15,499,397	

Source: Statistics Canada, *Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations*, in *Population* series (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1987).

politically, and culturally—than are the numerous variations within the few miles separating city and country, or even the few blocks separating one city neighborhood from another. An accurate map of virtually all the variables describing Canada would show several dozen islands of intense activity and variation separated by thousands of miles of low-density, homogeneous areas.[4]

Canada became an urban nation fairly early in its history as its inhabitants flocked to cities, but for centuries "their institutions, their habits of mind and especially, perhaps, their mythology, have lagged behind."[5] In the last three decades, however, Canadians have begun to celebrate their cities. They enthusiastically accept the urban life-style, which is beginning to affect all parts of the country. This dramatic shift in the Canadian mentality comes in large measure—as does so much in the Canadian character—from the discovery of our cities by foreigners. Whether hosting international expositions (such as Expo '67 in Montreal or Expo '86 in Vancouver), international summits (the Group of Seven met in Toronto in 1988), exporting products and talent to world capitals (a Toronto architect, for example, is designing the Bastille Opera in Paris, the centerpiece of the bicentennial of the French Revolution), or attracting visitors and immigrants from all lands, Canadian cities can claim to be among the world's best examples of city building.

Virtually all the fundamental issues of Canadian life are evident in the urban areas. Problems of growth and decline, of power allocation, of conflict between ethnic groups or classes are all found in the cities. Indeed, these issues are often more visible and more clearly understood in the context of an urban area. Canada's three largest cities thrust more diverse cultural groups into daily contact than does all the rest of the country. While Toronto and Montreal and Vancouver are not all there is to Canada, they do represent something significant about the country. Reflecting on these cities, then, is an important approach to understanding Canada.

By examining the economic development, the population, the cityscape, and the cultural life of these cities, one can discover what values many Canadians share. In fact, given the widespread influence of these metropolitan centers, these values undoubtedly represent the mainstream of Canadian society. At the same time, these cities provide ample evidence that the Canadian personality is open to change. Like successful cities elsewhere, Canadian cities are always changing from one kind of settlement to another. They do not merely struggle against the odds to go on doing the same thing but constantly reinvent themselves.[6] Nevertheless, they share certain values that have a long and enduring tradition, and these values explain to no small degree the nature of the country itself.

TORONTO: THE LIVABLE CITY

Toronto's 3.4 million residents claim that their community is the most livable metropolis in the country.[7] It is "the city . . . where the streets are paved with gold and the driveways are jammed with Jaguars."[8] While many Canadians would disagree—Toronto has always been the focus of much resentment and jealousy on the part of Canadians in other regions and other cities (Canadians love to hate Toronto)—Torontonians can marshal a good deal of objective evidence to support their claim. American and European commentators have praised Canada's major metropolis. One of the earliest views was that of poet Rupert Brooke, who wrote:

> It is not squalid like Birmingham, or cramped like Canton, or scattered like Edmonton, or sham like Berlin, or hellish like New York, or tiresome like Nice. It is all right. . . . no Canadian city can ever be anything better or different. If they are good they become Toronto.[9]

More recently, *Harper's* noted that Toronto is "a city that works . . . a model of the alternative future," a comment repeated thirteen years later by *Time* magazine.[10] Even Parisians appreciate Toronto. *Le Nouvel Observateur* said that "Toronto remains a North American miracle, a city . . . without the decay, social squalor and unrest that characterizes so many U.S. cities, or Paris for that matter."[11]

While Toronto has been a livable city, it was, until recently, also characterized as dull. It was "Toronto the Good"[12] or "Hogtown." This early reputation was best stated by Ernest Hemingway in the 1920s when he exclaimed, "Christ I hate to leave Paris for Toronto the City of Churches."[13] In subsequent years—particularly in the postwar era—Toronto has lost its dullness while retaining its cleanliness, safety, order, and civilized stability. The changes have been profound, but the old traditions have survived.

To comprehend this transformation, it is essential to understand Toronto's origins and development before the 1950s. The city was founded as the British army garrison town of York on the shores of Lake Ontario in 1793. By 1812, this frontier village still had only 700 residents, but its roads, governing role, and harbor gave it an initial advantage in the Lake Ontario area that it has never lost. By 1834, the fast growing town of 9,000 had been incorporated as the City of Toronto with an elected government led by Mayor William Lyon Mackenzie. This prominent reform journalist and politician tried to seize the city by force in the Upper Canadian Rebellion of 1837, but his attempt collapsed more in confusion than bloodshed, strengthening Toronto's conservative tendencies.[14]

By the 1830s, Toronto had emerged as the foremost urban center of Upper Canada (the area that joined the Confederation in 1867 as the province of Ontario). The city's economic influence extended to the whole province by means of the large railway network centered in Toronto that was constructed during the 1850s. From the 1850s through the 1880s, Toronto consolidated its position as the center for regional trade, transportation, and finance. From then through the 1920s, Toronto became a major manufacturing center as well as the financial and head-office city for that region of the country. But since the 1920s—and especially since the 1950s—Toronto has emerged as Canada's preeminent business metropolis. While a ravaged Europe recovered from a disastrous war, Toronto boomed.[15]

The indicators of this boom are impressive, not only in Canadian terms but also by international standards. Since 1945, Toronto's economy has become less diversified but has had far more winners than losers. Its port and commercial facilities and its role as a railway center, augmented with air and automotive transport, remain important. Its industry, however, has lost ground to foreign competition and Canadian decentralization. The key growth areas have been business and services relating to property and money—financial and legal services, insurance, real estate, engineering, architecture, accounting, advertising. These brought in 68 percent more workers in the 1970s alone.

Toronto has gained much of its economic power at the expense of Montreal. Many banks, including the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and the Toronto Dominion Bank, have their head offices in Toronto, while principal insurance and investment companies have also chosen to locate their headquarters there. Measured simply by assets of corporations that moved to this city between 1971 and 1981, Toronto's gain was $31.4 billion, whereas Montreal lost $20.5 billion. By 1983, of 278 Canadian-owned industrials in the *Financial Post* "500," 197 were operating out of Toronto. The city's financial sector grew in other ways too. In 1982, 44 out of 57 foreign banks that were allowed to set up branches in Canada chose Toronto. Among cities controlling revenue flows in Canada, Toronto far outranked other Canadian cities with a figure of $92.6 billion; Montreal's flow was only $44.5 billion. Toronto's stock exchange (the seventh largest in the world and the largest in Canada) handled 75 percent of the total value of all equities traded in Canada in 1986. Montreal's exchange (Canada's second largest) accounted for merely 19 percent. By the time the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund met in Toronto in 1982, the mayor could claim that the city was a "major business centre of the world."[16]

Behind this postwar boom are several factors that tell as much about the nature of Toronto (and Canada) as its growth in financial and corporate power does. The growth took place without the social dislocations and political scandals that usually go hand in hand with booms. The reasons lie in large measure in Toronto's tradition of civic democracy. Rejecting obvious partisan politics, Toronto has, with few exceptions, elected respectable and circumspect politicians who have governed competently. It has sought innovation and charisma when called for. It was the first city to form one of Canada's metropolitan governments. In 1953, thirteen municipalities organized themselves in Toronto as the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto. Under the leadership of a dynamic chairman—Frederick Gardiner—and in an orderly, financially sound way, the new government provided the complex infrastructure the growing metropolis required. Parochial concerns were overcome, and by the 1960s, American experts were flocking to Toronto to take lessons in urban government and planning. During the 1970s, a new breed of civic reformers came forward to save Toronto's quality of life from uncontrolled development. With the flowering of residents' associations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Toronto was able to shift its mainstream consensus from the narrow goal of protecting social homogeneity and property values to the wider objective of protecting the environment and accepting mixed populations.[17]

Toronto's booming economy does, however, have a dark side. While "the city is heaven to those who can afford it, it is hell to those who cannot. Toronto is Canada's capital for homeless people." The number of undernourished, inappropriately clothed, and mentally disturbed persons on its streets is growing.[18] Equally significant to some is the fact that Toronto's growth has increasingly linked the city—and through it Canada itself—to the American orbit. Though Toronto has reached the status of Holy See in Canadian corporate finance, it has done so at considerable cost to Canadian independence. Toronto is a key locale for American branch plants, and the southerly flow of dividends from American-owned companies is massive.

People in the city and across the country have resisted "the American connection." Toronto City Hall broadened the city's contacts with other nations by establishing an international office in 1987. It is intended to provide program support and resources to strengthen the city's international profile. It is giving priority to improving business relationships with other countries, including China.

The growing attention of Toronto's officials to international issues stems as well from the city's dramatically changed population makeup. Until the 1950s, Toronto was essentially an English city. "Our British origins may have made us dull," Mayor Arthur Eggelton noted, "but they gave us a tradition of civility."[19] And the tradition proved surprisingly enduring. When English Torontonians discovered in the 1940s that the city's ethnic mix was changing, they also noted—with some comfort—that the immigrants coming in were adopting British behavior while maintaining their own cultures. The term *new Canadians* disappeared and the celebration of "multiculturalism" gained prominence. The face of Toronto has changed so much since 1960 that many call it the new Toronto. White Anglo-Saxon Protestants may still control banks and major businesses, but for the first time since the city was founded, they no longer constitute a majority of the population. Other ethnic groups became significant in all aspects of Toronto's life. By 1981, Italians constituted 10 percent of the total population; Jews, 3.7 percent; Chinese, 3 percent; Portuguese, 3 percent; Polish and Ukrainians, 3.3 percent. East Indians and Pakistanis (2.3 percent) are scattered throughout the Toronto region.[20] Many other ethnic groups congregated in well-defined neighborhoods, where they continued to speak their languages and maintain their cultures. By the mid-1980s, Toronto's sizable numbers of Korean, Arab, Latin American, Filipino, Maltese, and Vietnamese immigrants, of Japanese-Canadians, of Canadian native peoples, and of groups from many other countries clearly established the city as one of the most racially and culturally varied in the world. A result of this change is the mélange of languages to be heard on the street, on radio and television, and in movie theatres. There are numerous ethnic presses and elaborate ethnic community events.[21]

Probably no other North American city has undergone so much change in only thirty years. What is even more remarkable about this transformation is that it has taken place with no major violence or disorder. There have, to be sure, been ethnic struggles, but Toronto has managed to maintain general social tolerance among its people. It has become a symbol of Canada's acceptance of multiculturalism as a national policy. The city is conservative in its values, for it has been preoccupied with public stability and community, revealed in its willingness to check the unfettered exercise of individual and private property rights.

Toronto's experience with multiculturalism, however, is not a simple triumph. As one especially astute observer has noted,

> Toronto in the 1980s cannot be said to be free of the lurking fear that some of the things we appreciate as multicultural may really be the immigrant's cross of exploitation and prejudice; the test will come when the newest immigrants, often from non-European backgrounds, make their choices first in housing and finally in ethnic persistence.[22]

The preoccupation with stability and community is also the key to understanding Toronto's success in developing its cityscape. Planning as a central concept in urban life appeared in the 1940s—in Toronto with a specific plan in 1943. Since then, the city has developed several five- and ten-year plans to cover housing, the preservation of neighborhoods and historic sites, and the creation of new business districts. The city also has a reputation for being flexible enough to abandon plans that run into trouble. A scheme in 1969, for instance, which envisioned Toronto's downtown as a place of commerce whose workers would live in the suburbs, was overturned in 1976 in favor of a proposal to create what Mayor David Crombie called a twenty-four-hour city, a place with a downtown area in which people both live and work.[23]

This transformation is instructive, for in many ways it was a turning point in Toronto's development. The process began with a surge of spectacular high-rise building: Viljo Revell designed a city hall complex (1958–1965); Mïes van der Rohe, the fifty-four storey Toronto-Dominion Centre (1963–1969); and I. M. Pei, the fifty-seven storey Commerce Court (1972). Then came Edward Durell Stone to design First Canadian Place (1973–1983), which at seventy-four storeys is the tallest building in the British Commonwealth.[24] After the high rises came the reaction to what John Sewell and the Reform Caucus considered the Manhattanization of the city. In 1973, Mayor David Crombie and his council put a moratorium on buildings more than 45 feet high.[25] The province of Ontario overruled the council, but few permits were issued for skyscrapers. The result is that Toronto today has a midcity showcase of architectural masterpieces—surrounded by small-scale, livable neighborhoods.[26]

To make Toronto livable, the council adopted a blueprint that encouraged the restoration of older neighborhoods while promoting the construction of new downtown housing developments. In one instance, the moratorium on high rises saved the downtown neighborhood of modest houses in Cabbagetown. It was settled and built by nineteenth-century Irish immigrants who planted cabbages in their front gardens. The brick houses are small and sturdy, with stained glass over the doors and flowers in the yards. For most of its long life, Cabbagetown was the home of the respectable working class, but by the 1960s it was turning into a slum. Its renaissance began with the moratorium on high buildings, but it received little else in the way of official inspiration. Its attractions were inherent. The solid houses were cheap at a time when new, not particularly well-built ones were getting alarmingly expensive, and the location was ideal, close to the jobs and excitement of downtown. The location is still ideal, but the houses are no longer inexpensive.

In another instance, the city was planner, organizer, and client. In the 1970s it constructed 3,500 units to create the St. Lawrence neighborhood. They replace old sheds, warehouses, and vacant lots along old streets in an area twenty blocks long and three to four blocks wide. At one end stands the old market, built around the original town hall of the city of Toronto and full of fresh vegetables, fish and butcher stalls, and shoppers. Though the number of units built was small in relation to the city's need for housing, the St. Lawrence neighborhood is a remarkable accomplishment in the context of the difficulties of building and integrating publicly supported housing. By creating interesting housing, the city provided an environment in which a new neighborhood could take pride.[27]

Toronto's success as "a people's city" is not due only to urban reformers, professionals, and city planners. Toronto is livable because it is a city of ethnic communities:

> One of the greatest contributors of ethnicity in Toronto is in maintaining the human scale of the landscape. The reformers and middle classes who have returned to colonize the inner city, who live next to neighbors who paint their houses pastel while they sandblast theirs to natural colour, would do well to remember that it is their [ethnic] neighbors who saved the city from miles of barren concrete.[28]

Several other downtown developments remarkable for their innovative design have been completed, started, or planned.[29] The result—making Toronto more European and less American—is a thriving downtown where people of all classes and ethnic groups live, work, and enjoy life. The city has at least eighty theatres, where companies stage Broadway hits as well as experimental productions. The recently completed Roy Thompson Hall, devoted to the performing arts, complements the Edwardian panache of the Royal Alexandra Theatre across the street, and the city is on the verge of building a grand opera house.[30] Indeed, Toronto is the main cultural focus in English Canada. It is the home of a major "multiversity"—the University of Toronto (established in 1827)—as well as York University (1959) and Ryerson Polytechnical Institute (1948). The city is also home to the Ontario Art Gallery and the Ontario College of Art, the Royal Ontario Museum and the Ontario Science Centre, the Toronto Symphony and the National Ballet of Canada. Other nationally eminent artistic, musical, and library institutions are found in the city together with top Canadian centers of medical and scientific research and a metropolitan zoo. Toronto is the center for Anglo-Canadian literature and the national base for periodicals, magazines, and publishing houses. It has had a succession of noted authors, from Goldwin Smith to E. J. Pratt, Morley Callahan, Marshall McLuhan, Margaret Atwood, and Robertson Davies. In art, Toronto has been the base for Paul Kane, the Group of Seven, and numerous contemporary painters such as Harold Town as well as celebrated musicians such as Glenn Gould.[31]

In more popular culture, Toronto is also well served. The city's top-circulation *Toronto Star* and the tabloid *Sun* have large readership, while the *Globe and Mail,* distributed daily across Canada, correctly claims it is "Canada's National Newspaper." Popular concerts attract large crowds, notably at Ontario Place, a lakeside recreational area, and at the Canadian National Exhibition, Canada's largest annual exposition, first held in 1846. In professional sports, Toronto is home to the Toronto Maple Leafs (hockey), the Toronto Argonauts (football), and the Toronto Blue Jays (baseball). In television, the city is served by Canadian public and private stations—including several that offer ethnic programming—as well as transborder American stations. No Canadian city (and no North American city except New York) can match the range of facilities and depth of offerings found in Toronto.

Toronto has grown so quickly and changed so substantially in recent years that it seems natural to refer to "the new Toronto" as a radical departure from "Toronto the Good." On first impression, this view is accurate. Toronto has changed and readily evokes the ephemeral, the ultra new, the postmodern. But there is another enduring side to Toronto. It is true, of course, that the material progress of Toronto and the culture that has developed around it have perpetuated social inequalities and made local collective democracy all the harder to practice. Yet Toronto and its people still maintain a belief in a strong social contract; the quality of life as an issue has not disappeared. Recently, for example, the massive Harbourfront development on the lake south of downtown was halted as the public demanded—and received—a commitment that sufficient open spaces would be made available. By keeping their wits about them, people in Toronto can maintain their city as a place "that works . . . a model of the alternative future," not only for Canada but for the world.[32]

MONTREAL: THE CITY AT THE CONFLUENCE OF TWO CULTURES

Montreal is not just another big North American city. It is a cosmopolitan metropolis of 3 million people and a historic place that for more than a century was Canada's most populous city.[33] A great port at the confluence of the St. Lawrence and Ottawa rivers, Montreal is far more complex than its size suggests. It is bilingual and the home of Francophone culture in North America. It is the site of the world's fair Expo '67 and of the 1976 Summer Olympics. It is a major industrial center, a commercial and financial metropolis, a railway and maritime bridgehead. If Toronto is a sort of amalgam of New York and Chicago, Montreal can be understood as the best of Boston and New Orleans, a combination of old-world charm and modern technology. It provides Canada's connection with Europe and with *La Francophonie,* the French-speaking nations of the world representing some 100 million people. The only North American United Nations agency outside New York City—the International Civil Aviation Agency—is located in Montreal.

Montreal's history since it was founded in 1642 as the mission colony of Ville-Marie has been fraught with difficulty, but its most serious challenges have occurred in the past two decades. It has often had to redefine its destiny—sometimes painfully.[34] But a new and positive version has always emerged, and the city has bounced back, drawing deep on its diversity.

Until the 1820s, Montreal was a city of the interior, serving Canada's great fur trade but beholden to the larger, more powerful administrative capital and main port of Quebec City to the east. In the ensuing decades, however, a merchant class emerged, engaged in the import and export trade, and it was men in this group, rather than the fur trade magnates, who directed Montreal through more than a century of rapid growth and primary status in Canada. They created the Bank of Montreal in 1817 and the Committee on Trade in 1822. In 1836, they began to invest in railways. Large-scale immigration enabled British residents to become the majority in the city and resulted in conflict between the English and the French. Struggles for political power marked the 1830s and resulted in the rebellion of 1837, but the defeat of the *patriotes* gave victory to the new Anglophone merchant class, and after 1840 the Francophone leaders had no choice but to cooperate with them.[35]

The cooperation was an economic success. During the next century, changes took place in transportation and industry. Expansion of the St. Lawrence River canal system and the deepening of the channel to Quebec City made Montreal a principal seaport. Railway construction made the city the hub of the young country's railway system. Industrialization, begun around the 1840s, eventually turned

Montreal into Canada's major industrial city. Growing rapidly, Montreal soon overflowed its boundaries and between 1883 and 1918 annexed twenty-two suburbs. Industrial growth attracted people from rural areas and French Canadians poured into the city; by 1867, Francophones were again in the majority.[36] The settlement of the Canadian West was also important for Montreal's development. The country's first transcontinental railway, the Canadian Pacific Railway, established its head office in Montreal in the 1880s, and the city shipped much of western Canada's grain through the enlarged port. By 1900, Montreal was indisputably the metropolis of Canada and St. James Street was the country's financial center.

In the next half century, Montreal continued to prosper. The optimism of these years were best demonstrated by Montreal's mayor, Jean Drapeau. Elected as mayor for innumerable terms (1954–1957, 1960–1986), he epitomized the confidence—indeed the arrogance—of Montreal for almost three decades. But his most noteworthy years were the 1960s. "The 1960s belong to our city," Drapeau noted in a speech. "Montreal will become the London, the Paris, the cosmopolis of Canada and all North America." His comments seemed reasonable to Montrealers; in the civic elections of 1962, 1966, and 1970 he averaged 92 percent of the vote.[37]

During Drapeau's tenure Montreal's cityscape was radically transformed, beginning with the downtown. Particularly important was the widening of Dorchester Boulevard (as of January 1988 renamed René Lévesque Boulevard) in 1955 into a major east-west artery as part of the city's urban renewal program. The location of the street, between the two downtown commercial centers of St. Catherine and St. James streets made it the obvious choice for development as a prestigious office district. The first and most striking of the office developments was the cruciform building of Place Ville-Marie, which was begun in 1959 and initiated a shift of commercial offices from the old town to the new downtown. It is fitting that the original name of the settlement was chosen for the complex, for it has become the heart of the city. It was the first major office development to be undertaken in Montreal since the early 1930s and the cause of the development of the most extensive underground pedestrian system of any city in the world. Covering seven acres, the complex includes 2.3 million square feet of office space in a forty-two storey cruciform tower and three other smaller buildings, an underground shopping promenade occupying 160,000 square feet, and underground parking for 1,500 cars.[38]

Between 1962 and 1967, several other large, multifunctional complexes were completed in the central business district, including Place Victoria, Place Bonaventure, and Place du Canada. All contained features pioneered by Place Ville-Marie, most notably underground promenades and pedestrian systems.[39] These areas facilitate movement between buildings and across streets and provide routes that are particularly appreciated during harsh weather. The opening of Montreal's subway in 1966 contributed to the success of the underground network. Since it opened, the subway has made large sections of the city a fluid unit and played a significant part in its redevelopment. The blue-enameled cars move on quiet rubber tires, carrying hundreds of thousands of people in and out of town every day. Each station is designed by a different architect and dominated by original works of art.

All this redevelopment took place largely without official planning direction.[40] But behind it was Mayor Jean Drapeau. He had ideas about what his city needed. *Grands spectacles* were always uppermost in his mind. And he delivered. He began with Expo '67 and closed the decade with a major-league baseball franchise for Montreal—the Expos, the first such team outside the United States. Then came the Summer Olympics in 1976 and the Floralies Internationales in 1980.[41]

Drapeau continued to win elections throughout the 1970s but had few programs to deal with the complex problems that were arising. The year 1970 brought the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) and the October Crisis. The FLQ kidnapped two men, the federal government invoked the War Measures Act, and the streets of Montreal were full of soldiers. A health report in 1970 found that 20 percent of Montrealers lived in poverty, in substandard housing and with an alarmingly high infant mortality rate. Put another way, more than one-half of Quebec's poor lived in Montreal, many in the city's slum-ridden east end.[42] The pace of feverish redevelopment and demolition had destroyed thousands of homes and working-class neighborhoods, including hundreds of handsome three- and four-storey row houses dating from the Victorian era and built of Montreal's characteristic grey limestone. Montreal lost its coveted status as the first city to its archrival Toronto.

The reaction to these developments was slow in coming and ranged from the formation of groups determined to protect the city's architectural heritage to the creation of a small but effective opposition at city hall. The Montreal Citizens Movement (MCM) was not an instant success, but it did develop the experience and leadership to take charge when Drapeau retired in 1986. More important, however, the MCM and other groups began rethinking the city's destiny. For the first time it included belief in the need to cooperate and plan for a better environment. Associations, pressure groups, and even some politicians began to fight for tenants, green spaces, and the city's old buildings and to promote bicycling, public transport, and neighborhood participation in decision making. A new form of literature began to appear—articles, studies, and books that did not simply recount the glories of Montreal's past but set out alternatives for Montreal's future.[43]

Now, in 1988, Montreal has bounced back from a decade of economic doldrums. The city is coming to grips with a more modest destiny as a regional center for Quebec and eastern Canada. Few people in Montreal speak of regaining past glories; the grandiose visions of Jean Drapeau have been drowned in red ink. There is a new Montreal of smaller vision, a more French, more contained city, "ticking along well [with] a tempered optimism."[44] In the aftermath of the business exodus of the 1970s, of the recession, of the separatist pall, of social problems, Montrealers can point to many good omens today. Among them are a better economic performance in Quebec in the mid-1980s than in any other province, an increase in the number of companies, a budget surplus at city hall, a revival of Montreal's stock exchange, construction contracts being let at a rate to match the best Olympic years, and people moving into—rather than out of—the inner city. The city also has several new museums and will soon have a new symphony hall. Tourism is at a ten-year high, providing nearly $1 billion a year since 1985 for municipal coffers. Helping the process is a wide variety of factors, but two elements seem especially important.

The election in November 1986 of a young, new mayor—Jean Doré—was clear evidence that the dedicated new Francophone class that had been filling holes as Anglophones left had formally assumed power.[45] Accepting the vision of Montreal as a regional center that controls its own market—and not as a satellite of either Toronto or

English Canada—Francophones exuded a new confidence. As one astute observer noted, "What makes a city great in part is that it has its own businessmen who believe strongly in the city and who are willing to stay there and fight for it,"[46] and Montreal's emerging Francophone population is ready to do just that.

Coupled with a whole new generation of energetic leaders, Montreal has other assets as well, including a reputation for good living. The city is not only bilingual and bicultural; it is multicultural. By 1981, French Canadians formed 66 percent of the population, the British comprised some 12 percent, while other ethnic groups made up the remaining 22 percent. Half of this latter category consisted of Italian or Jewish groups, while the balance was formed of many different elements.[47] Some—Germans, Poles, Ukrainians, Dutch—had been in Montreal for decades, while others from southern Europe (Greeks and Portuguese), Asia, and the West Indies had arrived more recently. But whenever they arrived, Montreal's cultural communities added immeasurably to an already cosmopolitan city.[48] Ethnic restaurants, art, and theatre are everywhere in evidence and the richness of Montreal's cultural life is matched by no other Canadian city. At the same time, the growing numbers of immigrants have challenged Montrealers to work out ways of integrating newcomers into a formally bicultural society, a challenge in which all Canadians have a stake. Undoubtedly, this adjustment entails problems,[49] but there is also evidence that the city is well on its way to working out a new understanding that could serve as a model for the entire country.

The city has four universities: two Francophone—Université de Montréal (formed in 1876) and the Université du Québec à Montréal (1968)—and two Anglophone—McGill University (1821) and Concordia University (1974, a merger of Sir George Williams University, 1929, and Loyola College, 1899). Their effectiveness in the city is greatly enhanced by the fact that the former "two solitudes" are breaking down. More and more reciprocity in recognizing each other's courses for credit and more and more joint projects exist. If this trend continues, Montreal will have few rivals on the continent as a center for higher education and research. Nothing could be more important for the attraction of sophisticated enterprises, as Boston's experience demonstrates. In other areas, Montreal is the home to the

Quebec National Library, which contains copies of all works published in the province; the Montreal Musée des beaux arts, established over a century ago; the Musée d'art contemporain; and the McCord Museum, which specializes in the ethnology and history of Canada. While it must share some of the attributes of French-Canadian cultural expression with Quebec City, Montreal nonetheless is the main center of expression and diffusion of that culture as well as a unique meeting place between French and English culture.

In professional sports, the Montreal Canadiens have won hockey's coveted Stanley Cup more often than any other team, and the Montreal Expos play in the National Baseball League, using the stadium constructed for the 1976 Olympics. Seven stories high, vibrant in design, and built at a cost of $700 million, Olympic Stadium merits the title of monument more than any other building in Montreal.[50]

Montreal has several newspapers and a full range of radio and television stations. The center for the performing arts is Place des arts (with three concert halls), where the Montreal Symphony Orchestra plays, and there are numerous theatre companies in the city.

Few cities engender fiercer loyalty among residents than does Montreal. This includes not only members of long-established Quebecois families but also WASPs from Ontario and Atlantic Canada, Italians, Greeks, Poles, Germans, Haitians, Arabs, and Jews. Montreal is one of the few Canadian cities where residents accept lower incomes in order to stay rather than move to a higher income position somewhere else. Some would argue about Toronto and Vancouver, but no one would argue about Montreal. Residents from other parts of Canada make a point of visiting Montreal. "More than any other Canadian city," one Montrealer has said, "Montreal represents Canada's ideal of 'the mosaic,' a country where all people can retain their culture, their language, and their religion, while remaining loyal and enthusiastic Canadians."[51]

VANCOUVER: THE SCENIC CITY

Vancouver is known as the most scenic city in Canada. Its 1.4 million residents live on a peninsula in the southwest corner of British Columbia's mainland.[52] The surrounding waterways—the Burrard

Inlet, the Straits of Georgia, and the Fraser River—provide respectively a sheltered deep-sea port, convenient access to the Pacific Ocean, and an easy route to the rich agricultural lands of the Fraser Valley and the interior of the province. The city is built on hills with mountains in its backyard and the ocean in its front yard. It has clean air, pleasant temperatures year-round, flowers and sculptured shrubbery everywhere, and a livable built environment. Vancouver provides Canada's Asian connections and combines the best features of Los Angeles and San Francisco.

For most Canadians, Vancouver is Canada's West Coast metropolis, but until recently, its status as a Canadian metropolis was granted largely on the strength of its location and size; few would have ever compared it to Toronto or Montreal. In 1975, for example, one central Canadian observer called it "tawdry and romantic, bourgeois and raunchy at once. Vancouver is where small ambitions flourish and the large dreams move furtively."[53] Developments since the 1960s—including the revival of Gastown, the rebirth of Chinatown, and the rejuvenation of False Creek and Granville Island—have begun to attract interest from the rest of Canada and abroad. Millions of visitors attended Expo '86. Vancouver is acquiring a reputation for being far more than a scenic city.

Like other major Canadian cities, Vancouver reached a watershed in the 1960s and 1970s, and by the time it celebrated its centennial in 1986, the city could claim to have chosen a destiny that appealed to people everywhere. While it may not yet claim the international status of Toronto and Montreal, Vancouver is becoming an important link to the Pacific area.

For much of its history, Vancouver's residents were lulled into feeling that none of their activities could seriously impair the city's natural beauty or its destiny as the country's western metropolis. The city began when the Canadian Pacific Railway chose the tiny settlement of Granville as its West Coast terminus; in April 1886 the provincial legislature incorporated Vancouver. Growth was at first slow, but by the turn of the century Vancouver had displaced the capital city of Victoria as the leading commercial center on the coast. Montreal and Toronto businesses established Pacific Coast branches in Vancouver; coastal steamship companies, including Canadian Pacific Navigation and Union Steamships, made the city their headquarters; and transoceanic liners docked regularly. The prewar economic boom expanded markets for such British Columbia products as fish, minerals, and lumber.[54]

The worldwide recession of 1913 and the great war of 1914–1918 severely reduced trade and resource development, but by the 1920s growth had resumed, and Vancouver replaced Winnipeg as the leading city in western Canada. Cheap ocean transport through the Panama Canal opened new markets for British Columbia's resources, while the province's campaign for freight-rate reduction enabled Vancouver to become a major grain-exporting port. After World War II, it was clear that Vancouver's economic future would be shaped by its function as Canada's Pacific port and as the financial, industrial, and distribution center for the resource-based economy of British Columbia.

Population growth along the West Coast of the United States and the recent growth in trade with the Pacific Rim countries has furthered the growth of Vancouver as an international port. Trade with the Asia-Pacific region surpassed traffic across the Atlantic in 1982. The trade routes between Canada and Asia are now carrying six times as much cargo as ten years ago. With close to $25 billion in Canadian currency each year in trade, the region has become second only to the United States in significance in Canada's international trade. This expansion has transformed Vancouver into the second busiest port in North America, surpassed only by New York. Vancouver now handles more cargo than Toronto, Halifax, Quebec, and Montreal combined.[55] Since the first load of export lumber left Vancouver for Australia in 1864, the port has become the community's single most important job generator; it is both rich and busy. The Canadian coast guard's Vancouver traffic center monitors between 225,000 and 250,000 vessels a year, from fishing boats and general freighters to the 100,000-ton bulk carriers that load coal at the Roberts Bank Superport, which while located some forty miles to the south of the main harbor comes under the port of Vancouver jurisdiction. The coast guard's count does not include the estimated 250,000 pleasure boats that ply the waters around Vancouver. In 1986 traffic included 240 sailings by elegant cruise ships, a burgeoning trade whose 350,000 passengers generated $150 million in tourist revenue.[56]

An indication of Vancouver's function as the decision-making heart of the provincial economy is the presence of the Vancouver stock exchange. Since its establishment in 1907, it has emerged as the only significant financial center in Canada outside Toronto, Montreal, and Winnipeg. Vancouver is also the head-office center for a wide variety of provincial corporations and the major unions. It is the regional center for national enterprises such as chartered banks. The city also boasts a busy international airport, a modern light-rail transit system, and good ferry service to points on Vancouver Island and in the United States. A sign of Vancouver's growing international importance was the establishment in the mid-1980s of the B.C. International Commercial Arbitration Centre, competing with the world's two dominant arbitration centers in London and Paris.[57]

Vancouver's dependence on the very volatile resource base of British Columbia has given it—until recently—a pronounced probusiness atmosphere. In the "rush for spoils," few in the city worried about the more complex issues surrounding the development of a livable metropolis.[58] The city was in effect created by the Canadian Pacific Railway, and in the early years most citizens agreed that what was good for the CPR was good for Vancouver. During the twentieth century the CPR's influence waned, but at least until the late 1960s, city government and city affairs continued to be strongly affected by business:

> With more than half the city revenues deriving from property tax, and many members of council engaged in real estate activity, the city fathers were particularly concerned about land development. They accepted the business view that the functions of municipal government were to ensure orderly physical growth and provide services to real property: both would enhance land values. This consensus survived early booms and busts, the Great Depression, and the post-war years.[59]

By the late 1960s, however, it was being seriously challenged. Concerns about the direction of the city's development and the quality of life brought in a new phase in Vancouver's history. The city's landscape—for so long taken for granted—has been shaped (or reshaped) in new, imaginative, and sensitive ways. Among the considerable achievements of the reformers and their supporters was the redevelopment of False Creek and later of Granville Island, the rescue and rejuvenation of Chinatown, and the renewal of Gastown. False Creek was, in the 1960s, a decaying industrial area owned by the CPR and leased to industries that would generate traffic for the railway. During that time, the CPR decided to move its freight operations out of the congested downtown, and the future of the False Creek lands, strategically separating the downtown from inner-city residential areas, became a political issue. The old guard at city hall wanted to retain the lands for industrial use; the reformers wanted residential development. The reformers won, and the result was a very successful mixed-use residential and recreational development housing 3,000 people. The new community, replacing grimy work sheds and battered houses, sits on a depolluted creek full of sailboats. Around the basin, new condominiums face the water from the sides of gentle hills.

Once begun, this energy was not easily dissipated and other areas of Vancouver's waterfront also received attention. Granville Island, located in the False Creek basin, is a thirty-eight acre island originally used for heavy industry but now successfully recycled. The decaying warehouse and industrial area was transformed—with federal government assistance—into a multi-use development containing offices, theatres, restaurants, a public market, craft studios, and retail shops. The objective was to provide a contemporary public place and a major recreational resource for both the residents of False Creek and the broader Vancouver community.[60] Other sections of the waterfront also received attention, and by the late 1980s, several sections of it had been redeveloped, including a dramatic convention center, a cruise-ship facility, and a hotel at Pier B. C. in the heart of the downtown.

The redevelopment of Gastown and Chinatown were also part of the new attention given to livability and the city's heritage. Gastown, one of the city's oldest neighborhoods, was originally constructed in the late 1880s, but by the 1930s it had become Vancouver's skid row, with flophouses on every block. In 1969 businessmen began to fix the area up, and by the 1970s the area was booming as a tourist attraction, full of shops, restaurants, and street celebrations.

Even more fundamental to an understanding of the new attitudes prevalent in the city, however, is the rescue of Chinatown. Vancouver has North America's second largest Chinatown. Almost 30 percent of Canada's 300,000 Chinese live in Vancouver, and most of them live in Chinatown. It is a vigorous inner-directed community with two daily Chinese language newspapers. The people live along a few streets in an area perhaps a mile long and a half mile wide. A visitor walking into a crowded restaurant there will find the tables filled with Chinese-Canadian families, complete with infants and grandmothers, and the menu filled with scores of dishes found only rarely in North America. There are no fortune cookies.

In the late 1960s, the city planned to knock down most of the Strathcona section of Chinatown for urban renewal, but the residents resisted and, with government help, organized the Strathcona Rehabilitation Project. In 1970 the city canceled all urban-renewal projects and adopted a $19-million, citywide, federally and provincially supported program called Community Improvement and Development. This program and its national successor, the Neighbourhood Improvement Program, have subsequently overhauled numerous neighborhoods in the city—Kitsilano, Riley Park, Cedar Cottage, Downtown-Eastside, Mount Pleasant, Grandview-Woodland, Kiwassa, and Kensington. Each plan is unique; each includes resident input. Some neighborhoods developed new housing, some preserved existing homes, and all provided parks and open spaces.[61]

These examples indicate that a new spirit is alive in Vancouver as its residents attempt, after years of complacency, to develop a cityscape to match the splendor and livability of the natural environment.[62] Vancouver is becoming multiethnic, and the city's British charter group has been forced to adjust. By 1979, the school board reported that nearly 40 percent of the children in elementary school did not speak English as a first language.[63] Vancouver—like Toronto—was experiencing a major influx of immigrants, most of them from non-European countries. In 1981, 30 percent of its population was born outside Canada (in comparison with 38 percent in Toronto, 16 percent in Montreal, and 3 percent in St. John's). The British were no longer in the majority, with 49 percent in this category in 1981, followed by the Chinese (7 percent), Germans (6 percent), and French, Italian, Ukrainian, Dutch, Scandinavian, and Indo-Pakistani (all at between 2 and 3 percent). Other groups included native peoples, Jews, Portuguese, Greeks, Arabs, and Pacific Islanders.[64]

The influx of so many newcomers in so short a time did cause flare-ups of racial tension.[65] Overall, however, the host community adjusted, accepting the argument that the immigrants helped make Vancouver an international city. Like Toronto, Vancouver became a testing ground for Canada's commitment to multiculturalism, and while few observers would give the city an A+, Vancouver has gone far beyond mere tolerance. The influence of "the new Canadians" is evident in the restaurants, publications, theatre, and public events these people have added to the city's cultural life.

Institutions of higher learning have also stimulated culture and the arts. Vancouver has two major universities, the University of British Columbia (established in 1908) and Simon Fraser University (1965); several community colleges, including the large, multicampus Vancouver Community College (1965); and the B.C. Institute of Technology. The Art, Historical and Scientific Association had established a museum as early as 1894, but it was in the 1950s and 1960s that the city got the funds to build its most important museum facilities—a civic museum, a maritime museum, and a planetarium. As soon as the CPR opened an opera house in 1891, the city became a regular stop for touring concert artists and theatrical companies. Today there is the Vancouver Symphony Orchestra, the Vancouver Opera Association, and the Playhouse Theatre Centre.[66] The city has several daily newspapers, a number of specialized newspapers and journals, and a host of radio and television stations. In addition, it has numerous recording studios and a rapidly growing film industry.

Because of the setting, outdoor recreation is very popular in Vancouver. Ski hills, marinas, swimming areas, and parks (some 140 of them) abound. The largest is the beautiful 1,000-acre Stanley Park in the heart of the heavily populated West End. Amateur teams participate in all sports, while the B.C. Lions football team and the Vancouver Canucks hockey team play in major professional leagues.

This listing, however, cannot capture the essence of Vancouver's cultural and recreational life-style. The fact is that Vancouver is different from the older, more established cities of central Canada and represents the aspirations of Western Canadians. One observer explained this sense by noting Vancouver's "special character, a product of its newness, westernness, and wilderness. A century of physical development has modified rawness and immaturity. Immigration, communication, and the impress of an international port have alleviated the penalties of separation from other great centres. There is a freshness and vigour and a lively concern . . . ."[67]

If Toronto is Canada's most important metropolis and Montreal its most complex, then Vancouver is certainly the city with the brightest future. Nature has been kind to Vancouver and, given its important strategic location on the West Coast, continuing growth and prosperity seem likely. Its growing connections with Pacific Rim countries are encouraging the city's sense of distinctiveness and independence from central Canada. Vancouver's key challenge is to reconcile development of the built environment with maintenance of the natural setting. Recent evidence suggests that the people of Vancouver are willing to fight—and pay—for the city's unique environment. The mindless process of urban renewal has been halted, and the city is learning to marshal its human talents so as to harmonize with the natural environment. This approach augers well for both Vancouver and Canada.

* * *

The state of a nation's cities can indicate to any critical observer a good deal about the values of a country's civilization. In this context, Canada's achievements are considerable. Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver have advanced to a high state, and the citizens of few countries in the world can claim to have developed urban environments that are so orderly and healthy, so vibrant and safe. There are, to be sure, larger, older, more exciting cities in the world, but few other countries have developed such a consistent pattern of successful yet distinct cities, and no other country has made the advantages of urban living available to so many. Surprisingly, Canada has developed as an urban nation without the benefit of a national urban policy, yet something in the Canadian psyche has molded from a cold, northern landscape dozens of modern, efficient, and healthy cities. It is no mean achievement.[68]

ENDNOTES

[1] See "As Others See Us: What Some People Look At When They Look at Canada," *Saturday Night* (December 1987).

[2] According to figures collected by the United Nations, Canada is the sixteenth most urbanized nation in the world. It stands behind countries like Belgium (87 percent), Australia (86 percent), Sweden (82 percent) and Japan (76 percent), but well ahead of France (73 percent), the U.S.S.R. (58 percent), India (20 percent), and China (13 percent). See *Demographic Yearbook, 1981* (New York: United Nations, 1981), 189–206.

[3] Statistics Canada, *Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations,* no. 92–104 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1987).

[4] James and Robert Simmons, *Urban Canada* (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1974), 2–3.

[5] *Report of the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects,* (1957), quoted in Simmons, *Urban Canada,* 1.

[6] "The Anatomy of Cities: Huddling Through," *Economist* (20 December 1986) 73–81.

[7] *Toronto* in this essay refers to the census metropolitan area (CMA) as defined by Statistics Canada rather than the city of Toronto per se (see *Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations*). For further detail see George Nader, *Cities of Canada,* vol. 2 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976), 191.

[8] A. Bruce, "Canada's Major Metropolis Makes City Living A Pleasure," *Globe and Mail,* 11 January 1988.

[9] Rupert Brooke, *Letters from America,* as quoted in James A. Clapp, *The City: A Dictionary of Quotable Thoughts on Cities and Urban Life* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Center for Urban Policy Research, 1987), 37.

[10] This phrase has been used on numerous occasions to describe both Toronto and other Canadian cities. See, for example, *Harper's* 249 (December 1974):14–19, and *Time* (29 June 1987). See also James Lemon, "Toronto Among North American Cities: A Historical Perspective on the Present," *Forging a Consensus: Historical Essays on Toronto,* ed. Victor L. Russell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 323–52.

[11] Quoted in *Financial Post,* 12 October 1987. For a very useful collection of writings on Toronto see William Kilbourn, ed., *The Toronto Book: An Anthology of Writings Past and Present* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976).

[12] This sobriquet was given to Toronto in the nineteenth century because of its alleged piety, reflected in its many churches and its puritanical laws. It was used sarcastically by C. S. Clark in the title of his book *Of Toronto the Good* (1898). This image survives to some extent today. For example, Toronto has resisted the move to Sunday shopping more so than any other major Canadian city, and with a few notable exceptions, remains "closed."

[13] Lemon, "Toronto Among North American Cities," 323.

[14] For an excellent account of Toronto's early history, see J. M. S. Careless, *Toronto to 1918: An Illustrated History* (Toronto: James Lorimer and National Museum of Man, 1984).

[15] Nader, *Cities of Canada,* 190–243; Careless, *Toronto to 1918;* and Gunter Gad and Deryck Holdsworth, "Building for City, Region, Nation," *Forging a Consensus,* ed. Russell, 272–319.

[16] James Lemon, *Toronto since 1918: An Illustrated History* (Toronto: James Lorimer and National Museum of Man, 1985), chap. 5. In terms of high-technology companies, 117 of the top 200 Canadian computer companies have their boardrooms in greater Toronto. See *Globe and Mail,* 23 May 1988.

[17] Lemon, "Toronto Among North American Cities"; and Warren Magnusson, "Toronto," in *City Politics in Canada,* ed. Warren Magnusson and Andrew Sancton (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 94–139.

[18] Bruce, "Canada's Major Metropolis."

[19] Quoted in *Time* (29 June 1987).

[20] The actual numbers are: Italians, 297,549; Jews, 110,093; Chinese, 89,270; Portuguese, 89,264; Polish and Ukranians, 98,191; Indo-Pakistanis, 68,436. See Lawrence S. Bourne et al., "Canada's Ethnic Mosaic: Characteristics and Patterns of Ethnic Origin Groups in Urban Areas," *Major Report 24* (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, 1986).

[21] Lemon, *Toronto,* chap. 5; William Dendy and William Kilbourn, *Toronto Observed: Its Architecture, Patrons and History* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), 262.

[22] Robert Harney, "Toronto's People," *Polyphony: The Bulletin of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario* 6 (1) (Summer 1984):8, 13.

[23] *Time* (29 June 1987).

[24] Dendy and Kilbourn, *Toronto Observed.*

[25] See John Caulfield, *The Tiny Perfect Mayor: David Crombie and Toronto's Reform Aldermen* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1974).

[26] Dendy and Kilbourn, *Toronto Observed,* 285.

[27] Ibid., 299–305.

[28] Harney, "Toronto's People," 9.

[29] These include Harbourfront (Canada's first national urban park), a major development of housing, retail space, and recreation facilities on Toronto's lakeshore; the Canadian National Communications Tower, one of the world's tallest free-standing structures; and, of course, the world famous Eaton Centre.

[30] Dendy and Kilbourn, *Toronto Observed,* 311.

[31] J. M. S. Careless, "Toronto," *The Canadian Encyclopedia,* 1st ed., s.v. "Toronto."

[32] Lemon, "Toronto Among North American Cities."

[33] *Montreal* in this essay refers to the urbanized region of Montreal, which includes some 100 different municipalities. See Paul-André Linteau, "Montreal," *The Canadian Encyclopedia,* 1st ed., s.v. "Montreal."

[34] Peter Blake, "Downtown in 3-D," *Architectural Forum* 125 (2) (September 1966): 31. See also "Huddling Through," *Economist.*

[35] Linteau, "Montreal." For other general accounts of Montreal's development, see J. I. Cooper, *Montreal: A Brief History* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1969); and Nader, *Cities of Canada,* 117–62.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Dane Lanken, "Drapeau's Montreal: Great Moments, Great Monuments . . . and Excesses," *Canadian Geographic* 106 (August-September 1986):10–23. See also Brian McKenna and Susan Purcell, *Drapeau* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1980).

[38] Nader, *Cities of Canada;* and Jean-Claude Marsan, *Montreal In Evolution* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1981), 387–90.

[39] Ibid. See also Leon Whiteson, *Modern Canadian Architecture* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1983), 214–17.

[40] Nader, *Cities of Canada,* 153.

[41] Lanken, "Drapeau's Montreal"; Linteau, "Montreal."

[42] A. Bruce, "Montreal Economy in Blossom Again Despite Lean Years," *Globe and Mail,* 9 January 1988.

[43] Marsan, *Montreal in Evolution;* Benjamin Higgins, *The Rise—and Fall? of Montreal* (Moncton: Canadian Institute for Research on Regional Development, 1986).

[44] Lawrence Martin, "Montreal Adapts to a More Modest Destiny," *Globe and Mail,* 23 February 1985, 8. See also Matthew Horsman, "The Spring Is Back in Montreal's Step," *Financial Post,* 22 June 1987, 6.

[45] Ann Charney, "The Golden Mayor," *Saturday Night* (August 1987). See also Jean-François Leonard and Jacques Léveillée, *Montreal After Drapeau* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1986).

[46] Mario Polèse, Director of the Institut national de la recherche scientifique—Urbanisation in Montreal, quoted in the *Globe and Mail,* 23 February 1985. See also Matthew Fraser, *Quebec Inc.: French Canadian Entrepreneurs and the New Business Elite* (Toronto: Key Porter, 1986).

[47] The actual numbers are: French Canadians, 1,838,312; British, 318,977; Italians (5.6 percent), 156,690; Jews (3.2 percent), 89,537. See Bourne, "Canada's Ethnic Mosaic."

[48] See "A Tribute to Quebec's Cultural Communities," *Forces* 73 (Winter 1986); and the special issue of *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 18 (2) (1986), devoted to "Ethnicity in Quebec."

[49] See, for example, "Montreal Immigrants Claim Discrimination," *Winnipeg Free Press,* 28 December 1987.

[50] Marsan, *Montreal In Evolution,* 392.

[51] Higgins, *Montreal,* 9.

[52] As in the case of Toronto and Montreal, all references to Vancouver are to the Census Metropolitan Area.

[53] Donald Cameron, quoted in *The City,* 48.

[54] For an excellent account of Vancouver's history, see P. E. Roy, *Vancouver: An Illustrated History* (Toronto: James Lorimer and National Museum of Man, 1980); see also Nader, *Cities of Canada,* 378–417; and Walter Hardwick, *Vancouver* (Don Mills: Collier Macmillan, 1974).

[55] R. Matas, "Pacific Trade," *Globe and Mail,* 28 March 1988.

[56] See John Schreiner, "The Port of Vancouver," *Canadian Geographic* 107 (August-September 1987):10–21.

[57] *Vancouver Sun,* 30 March 1988.

[58] Martin Robin, *The Rush for Spoils: The Company Province* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972).

[59] Donald Gutstein, "Vancouver," in *City Politics in Canada,* ed. Warren Magnusson and Andrew Sancton, 189. See also Gutstein, *Vancouver Ltd.* (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1975).

[60] Douglas Wrenn, *Urban Waterfront Development* (Washington: The Urban Land Institute, 1983), 174–85.

[61] *Canada Today* 8 (1) (1981):7. The Neighbourhood Improvement Program was an innovative initiative that did a great deal to improve Canadian cities. For a comprehensive assessment, see Thomas Carter, "The Neighbourhood Improvement Program," in Alan F.J. Artibise and J. David Hulchonski, eds., *Housing Canadians: Essays on the History of Canadian Housing Policy* (forthcoming 1989).

[62] One indicator of the change in attitude is the effort of a group of Vancouver architects, artists and planners to create a new civic institution called Urbanarium, which they hope will be to city life what an aquarium is to the sea. As a prelude, the group held its first exhibit in the fall of 1987.

[63] Roy, *Vancouver,* 138.

[64] The actual numbers are: British, 612,799; Chinese, 83,790; Germans, 73,786. Bourne, "Canada's Ethnic Mosaic."

[65] See, for example, the article on the Sikhs in Vancouver in *Saturday Night* (January 1988). See also Roy, *Vancouver.*

[66] Roy, *Vancouver.*

[67] Ibid., 167. See also Norbert Macdonald, *Distant Neighbors: A Comparative History of Seattle and Vancouver* (Lincoln: Nebraska University Press, 1987), 183–84.

[68] The obvious question at this point is, How does one explain Canada's success with city building? There is no simple answer and, until recently, few writers have even attempted to answer the question. In a North American context, there is, however, one excellent study—Michael A. Goldberg and John Mercer, *The Myth of the North American City: Continentalism Challenged* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986). The authors conclude that Canadian and American cities are very different and ascribe the major differences to "greater tolerance in Canada of racial mixing residentially, and of a greater desire to sustain a rich ethnic life in Canadian cities (even at the risk of weakening a sense of national identity)." As well, they argue, there is in Canada "a value system that is more accepting of interpersonal differences, that contributes to a markedly lower level of personal violence and which prefers city living." All are factors in the greater livability of most Canadian cities compared to their American counterparts. Two other factors also deserve mention. "Individual interests in Canadian cities are more likely to give way to the rule of the state than in the U.S. where freedom for the individual interests" prevail. The second prominent aspect is "the public nature of Canadian cities" that results in both the prominence and creativity of public enterprise as a leading urban institution and employer. The intervention of the state—as employer, as regulator, as investor—has generally been very positive. See, for example, Alan F. J. Artibise and Matthew J. Kiernan, *Canadian Regional Development: The Urban Dimension* (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1988).

Gérard Pelletier

Quebec: Different but in Step with North America

THE SUBJECT OF THIS ARTICLE is not mine. It was suggested to me by the editors of *Dædalus*, who feel that there is still much that is unknown about Quebec. "Those who claim to know Quebec," I was told, "still hold stereotypes that are more fitted to the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s than to contemporary Quebec. With this in mind, we request that you write an essay that will both inform the public and provide food for thought for those who are already interested in your part of the country."

How could one refuse such an invitation? It is certainly true that information on Quebec is not up to date. People's views oscillate between two extremes; they either assimilate us to our English-speaking compatriots and to our American neighbors, or, like de Gaulle, they view us as "the French of Canada." Yet we are neither one nor the other. We are North Americans, but our language and culture are French, a fact that of course sets us apart from our English-speaking environment.

Until about 1960, our North American neighbors generally thought of Quebec as having a backward society. One must admit that they were not completely mistaken. But the notion of backwardness is nevertheless relative. We were not backward compared with Newfoundland or western Canada, even less so compared with Tennessee hillbillies! Still, we did trail far behind Ontario in several areas, despite the fact that, in terms of its natural resources and

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Gérard Pelletier is Chairman of the Board of the Montreal Council of International Relations and of the Canadian Centre for International Studies and Development.

population, Quebec was ranked second among all Canadian provinces.

By way of example, Quebec did not even have a ministry of education in spite of the fact that under the terms of the Canadian Constitution, the field of education is the exclusive responsibility of each province. At the same time, our economy was much less developed than that of Ontario, and the gap between the two was growing from year to year. The average per capita income of French-speaking Quebecers was considerably lower than that of English-speaking residents and also lower than the national average.

Before 1960, our English-speaking compatriots referred to Quebec as "the priest-ridden province." While the same label could also have been applied to other western provinces whose prime ministers were clergymen, there had never been a single priest in the government of Quebec. Nevertheless, the Catholic clergy had a tremendous influence on the society of Quebec, especially since almost all the French-speaking Quebecers were Roman Catholics, 85 percent of them practicing. (Only half the English-speaking Quebec residents, on the other hand, who made up 15 percent of the total population, were Catholics; the other half were Anglicans or Protestants.)

Assisted by lay religious organizations, the Catholic clergy controlled education from elementary school to the university level. The same religious groups of nuns and monks were dominant in the fields of hospital care and youth protection (orphanages, homes for delinquent youth), and in the social services. The groups also had a huge real estate patrimony and controlled a substantial part of the press. The clergy could promote its views in almost all public debates—and could silence all those who did not agree. It was hardly an exaggeration to say that, at that time, the Catholic clergy was omnipresent and omnipotent in Quebec and that no political structure could govern without the support of its bishops and clergymen.

Furthermore, the French-speaking people of Quebec were much inclined to be conservative in social matters. As a minority group in Canada, the French-speaking felt condemned to live dangerously. Victimized by the disdain (if not the outright racism) of a large part of the English-speaking majority, they tended to be introverted and to take no risks. The impression of being under siege made them choose to remain farmers or professionals and prevented them from developing an entrepreneurial spirit. This frame of mind, further complicated by most capital being in the hands of the English-speaking population, minimized the role of the French-speaking Quebecers in their own economy. They found solace in the glorification of their past. The conservative majority resisted change, and governments were able to rely on the certainty of this passivity during the entire first half of the twentieth century.

For a long time, the province was the legendary "quaint old Quebec." It was isolated, cut off from Latin Europe by the British presence, partly isolated from its North American surroundings by its language, its culture, and the agrarian way of life that had slowly evolved between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries.

Is Quebec still isolated? Less and less so, if at all. In the midtwentieth century, the Quebecers have finally realized that they are perfectly capable of living in step with the rest of North America without giving up the originality of their own culture. The history of this Quiet Revolution, as the media termed it, is not devoid of interest. But since I am not writing a historical essay, I shall be content with just a few paragraphs about our past.

Suffice it to say that a politician by the name of Maurice Duplessis, in power in Quebec from 1936 to 1939 and then from 1944 to 1959, was the last representative of traditional conservatism. From 1960 on, under the guidance of another prime minister, Jean Lesage, and his successors, Quebec undertook a process of accelerated development that shook our society and, for better or worse, "modernized" it.

Let us note as well that the first shock that determined all subsequent transformations of the society—the disturbance of the Quebecois society—can be traced to 1939. Over the course of the century that preceded this date, the industrial labor force of Quebec increased by 200,000. Again, between 1939 and 1949, this time in ten years, a further 200,000 workers (a large proportion of whom were women) swelled the ranks of our factories. Setting the stage for the phenomenon I am about to describe, then, was an industrial revolution that sociologists consider one of the fastest and most profound in Western history, an about-face from an agrarian to an urban way of life.

We were not prepared for it.

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A Parisian friend of mine, the late Henri Marrou, a great academic and one of the most prominent historians of his generation, once said to me, “Do you know what you’re missing, you French-speaking Canadians? You are among the few Westerners who have not decapitated a king. You left France more than a century before the Revolution and the death of Louis XVI—and you fell under British authority more than a century after Cromwell’s revolt and the execution of Charles I.”

“You stand in need of an execution,” Henri Marrou insisted humorously. He was joking, but he wanted us to become aware that in our history there had been no violent break with authority—except, obviously, for the brief uprising of our patriots in 1837–1838. But this episode involved a mere 2,000 or 3,000 men and was short-lived. Marrou thus revealed the passiveness of the Old Regime in our collective psyche, an attitude toward authority that forbade certain thoughts and gestures that characterized precisely what we call modernity.

On the same theme, on the threshold of the 1940s, a student by the name of Daniel Johnson, who twenty-five years later became prime minister of Quebec, said, “We Quebecers will never stage a revolution; we are incapable of staying awake for forty-eight hours in a row!” He was also joking, but his humor had a kernel of truth.

The Quebecers did have a revolution, but it was a quiet revolution that contradicted all the predictions that had been made on the subject, especially the forecasts of many of their English-speaking compatriots.

I remember, for example, a learned professor from Alberta who dabbled in prophecy saying in the early sixties: “Our difficulties in Quebec will soon come to an end. Why? Because the Quebecers are in the process of profoundly reforming their educational system and of opening its doors wider than ever. Thus, when their youth is educated, and when it takes a careful look at its North American surroundings, it will understand that it is in its best interest to conform to them, that is, to speak English like everybody else, to forget French culture, and to merge with the great English-speaking whole. And the unity of Canada will finally be possible.”

Did this professor suspect that he was setting himself up for ridicule when he made this prophecy? The educational system was modernized and made more accessible in every way. Enrollment at French-speaking universities in Quebec went from about 20,000 before 1960 to over 130,000 in 1988. Yet the Albertan's prophecy was carried out—in a way that was exactly the opposite of what the prophet had foretold. It was indeed the first generation of young Quebecers emerging from the Quiet Revolution who, in less than ten years, created a nationalist political party that was fiercely French-speaking. They put this party in power and openly preached secession—the sovereignty of an independent Quebec that would be only *associated* with the rest of Canada.

Before this time, a number of excited young people, for the most part teenagers, had sought to remedy the situation through violence. Between 1963 and 1970, they made many terrorist attacks, planting bombs in public places and mailboxes, holding up banks and gun shops, stealing arms and explosives from the military. These activities culminated in the kidnapping of a British diplomat (who was later released) and a minister of the government of Quebec, who was assassinated during his captivity.

While this terrorism was only a marginal phenomenon, in October of 1970 it did create panic among the residents of Montreal. The armed forces intervened and the federal authorities declared a state of emergency. People eventually realized that there were only a few terrorists, with at most a hundred accomplices and a few thousand sympathizers. The bulk of politically active Quebecois youth were neither terrorists nor café strategists nor dreamers. They had understood that in a free country like Canada, the use of the democratic tools at their disposal would take them much further than bombs and kidnappings.

Guided by a few mentors (such as M. René Lévesque, recently deceased), they succeeded in building a political party from scratch, and in 1976 they brought it to power.

The Albertan professor's prophecy of national unity had a beautiful irony on the eve of the 1980 referendum, which democratically consulted the population about its desire to secede. With the million English-speaking and other non-French-speaking residents of Quebec, a solid majority among French speakers would have been needed to support the referendum. But the French-speaking majority itself defeated secession, if only by a small margin.

Throughout the two decades from 1960 to 1980, the culture of Quebec underwent great change. I use the term *culture* in the widest sense, which embraces the arts and sciences as well as attitudes toward religious, economic, and even athletic matters. We find ourselves facing a new Quebec, very different from what it was in the 1950s but also from what the instigators of change foresaw.

Observers who stop at a superficial glance believe, and readily recount, that after a twenty-five-year detour into nationalism, the community of Quebec has ended up where it started—back to square one. Several external signs seem to support this impression. It is obvious, for example, that the nationalist fever has now broken. The Parti québecois, the political expression of nationalism, had more than 300,000 adherents in 1980; it had just over 30,000 in 1987. The generation of Quebecers that is about to enter university this year is *the least nationalist (in the political sense) that we have known since* the last world war. I could keep on listing signs that, if misinterpreted, would give the impression of a return to the 1950s.

The reality, however, is very different.

It is true that public opinion in Quebec has not stopped focusing its attention on the secessionist agenda since the early 1960s—and even more so since 1976, after the victory of the Parti québecois, which preached the political sovereignty of the province. It is also true that the Quebecois youth and the majority of the intelligentsia of that time were virtually obsessed with their destiny for a full fifteen years. Finally, it has been confirmed that the failure of the May 1980 referendum put at least a temporary end to the separatist venture and to the enthusiasm that it sparked in the generation that is now in its forties.

Yet the facts I have just summarized are only the surface of a very complex social reality. Deep down, during this entire period, transformations were occurring that were invisible but much more important and longer lasting than the political changes. I am in a position to know because I was away from the country for a long time (but for a year's difference, my absence coincided with the period in which the Parti québecois was in power), and when I returned, the social changes that had occurred leapt before my eyes.

First, the disaffection with religious practice had spread. Quebec, once overwhelmingly Catholic and practicing (in the way that the Polish still are today), had become secularized. The phenomenon was certainly not unique in the West, but no other people, to my knowledge, has ever undergone such transformation in so short a time. In 1960 more than 80 percent of French-speaking Montreal residents were practicing Catholics. This figure is an estimate, for no serious study has yet given us reliable statistics. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the majority of the French-speaking in Montreal at that time went to church and lent a sympathetic ear to the ecclesiastic authorities. One needed only to observe the crowds that filled the churches on Sundays.

The year 1960 marked the beginning of the disaffection. Under the embers of habit and social constraint, it had been smouldering for a long time. Although it started slowly, it was to become a bonfire.

Having reason to be unsettled, the Church in 1965 launched a study of the issue, under the direction of specialists in religious sociology. The investigation showed that, over five years, the percentage of practicing Catholics in Quebec had fallen below 65 percent. Toward the end of the 1960s, this movement had accelerated to the point where, over ten years, the number of churchgoers had dropped to 25 percent. In some working-class neighborhoods, the number is now less than 15 percent.

To explain this change would take an entire volume. Its causes are widespread and varied; some are common to all communities whose attitude toward religion changed over the course of the twentieth century, and others are peculiar to Quebec. One can say, however, that the abandoning of religious practice was not limited to any particular generation. Today, in most parishes, every age group is represented in proportion to what its size is in the society.

One can also say that it was a question of the divorce of a people from its clergy, the rupture of a union that had lasted since the origin of New France in the early seventeenth century and that had grown stronger after the aborted uprising of 1837–1838 against the British authorities. This rupture was pivotal to the change in the way of life of the French-speaking Quebecois.

The divorce was not limited to religious practice. One of the principal powers of Quebec suddenly left the stage. All-powerful only yesterday, the clergy abandoned in just a few years all the secular functions it had exercised until then and slipped silently into obscurity. Moreover, many of its followers deserted the clergy, so that now a good number of religious orders are on the verge of extinction. Without missing a beat, lay organizations have picked up the slack.

The sudden discarding of all religious faith by most French-speaking Quebecois "baby boomers" might explain the intense partisan faith that carried the Parti québecois to power and kept it there for nine years. This generation had received the traditional education of Catholic Quebec, that is, an education that was centered on religious faith, that attempted to build personality on a religious absolute, and that provided a structure to support and inspire everything else: culture, character, way of life, behavior. When it put religion aside, perhaps the youth of this age group instinctively sought another absolute to replace the religious one. It found that absolute in the quest for sovereignty. I am not positive whether this hypothesis can be verified, but I do find it interesting.

It might explain the dogmatism that all too frequently colored the political actions of these young people. The Péquistes (members of the Parti québecois) were quick to condemn as traitors those who did not share their convictions. The Péquistes treated the federalists (those who favored Canada's remaining a united federation of provinces) in the same way that religious orthodoxy tends to treat heretics—by excluding them from the community, refusing to recognize them as members (in this case, as "true Quebecois"), and ascribing to them degrading motivations for their politics, such as fear, personal interest, and inability to understand the issues at stake.

Actually, the federalists also intended to work toward the advancement of Quebec and of French culture throughout Canada. They differed from the Péquistes only in choice of methods. The Péquistes seemed to believe that outside their own party (their political church), there was no possibility of national or cultural salvation.

In the months before the referendum of 1980, many old friends stopped speaking to each other, families divided into hostile camps, the young clashed with the old, and political passion permeated all levels of society.

This was not the only consequence of the religious commotion of the 1960s. On the one hand, the ensuing years saw a proliferation of sects, a phenomenon that was universal in the West but much more visible in French-speaking Quebec because of its once monolithic

Catholicism. What only yesterday was the exception has now become the rule. In large cities and small villages alike, today we see the improvised temples of sects that are as tiny as they are esoteric.

On the other hand, the Church's retreat into its own domain has sparked a renewal of the Catholic faith, especially among the young. With the help of priests who are mindful of young people's needs, the young are developing a spiritual attitude and creating religious practices that are suitable to their own time. They put into practice the ideas of their forerunners, whose intuitions the clergy rejected earlier. A team spirit, a sense of Christian community, a religion cleansed of all traces of Jansenism—this is what one finds in Quebec parishes that just yesterday were frozen in a tradition that was obsessed with the sense of sin. The young generation is not rushing back to all the churches, but some of it is returning to the Church.

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For the most part, this generation perceives the political faith of its elders as a substitute for a religion that they felt they no longer needed because they had received a strongly secularized education, at home as well as in school. This new generation has not given up nationalism, if by this term one is referring to the right to be different, the attachment to French language and culture, the fierce resolution to be true to oneself, which has characterized the vast majority of French Canadians for 200 years. But this generation has painlessly accepted the results of the 1980 referendum; that is to say, it takes for granted that most Quebecers, even French speakers, did not favor secession. It has therefore decided to focus its energies in different directions.

It would be a mistake to view today's youth as apolitical on the ground that they do not adhere en masse to the secessionist party in the way that their predecessors did. One finds young people in all parties. Their interest in public affairs has not diminished but, rather, has changed in style and objectives. The students that I encounter are much more concerned about the economic and cultural development of Quebec than about the "national question" their elders were so obsessed with. They are not in love with federalism, but they believe their community can develop within the federal framework as long as its members are competent, enterprising, and aggressive.

One sign of the times is that the youngest part of the nationalist-secessionist group has become the moderate wing. At the conclusion of a recent congress of the Quebecois party, usually the most fiercely militant of all our political organizations, a typical Montrealer was reported in *La Presse* to have said that, "The youth have simply shown that they fear a return to radicalism within the party." In March 1988 many of these young leaders left the highest positions of the party to protest the "radical and outmoded" orientation of the older leaders, who have resumed active leadership since the passing away of the party's founder, René Lévesque.

No doubt, moderation has been a characteristic of most young Westerners since the mid-1970s. I have had the opportunity to observe it on campuses in New York as well as Paris, where calm has reigned since 1975. The contrast with the turmoil of 1968 in France and of 1970 in the United States is even more evident in Quebec because of the intense nationalist fervor that stirred our youth until 1980 and that suddenly abated that year with the referendum. Perhaps the fervor in this cycle that has lasted two centuries will resurface again in a few years.

Noticeable as well has been a shift in the professional orientation of Quebecers, young and old alike. Only yesterday, the French-speaking Quebecers showed little interest in economics and played a modest, almost negligible, role in commerce and industry. Their role was even less prominent in the area of science. They have made a sudden turnaround. Of all Canadian provinces, Quebec today has the most students in the economic and the administrative sciences. One should not jump to the conclusion that the young Quebecers have forsaken all interest in such traditional fields as law, medicine, the liberal arts, and the social sciences, fields in which their predecessors excelled. I am merely noting that entrepreneurship has suddenly gained much prestige among the young and that a new equilibrium between the sciences and the arts has come into being. The University of Quebec in Montreal, for example, has more students enrolled in the faculty of administrative sciences than in all the other departments combined. For a French-speaking institution of higher education, this change represents a veritable revolution.

Moreover, the French-speaking Quebecers have already begun to gain the spotlight in the local and the national economy. This shift can be traced to the launching of the cooperative movement at the turn of the century, although only now does this movement appear to be a major force. The cooperative group Desjardins, named after its founder, began by establishing credit unions and moved from there to insurance and real estate. Its assets are currently some $30 billion, and it controls a large share of savings in Quebec.

Another dimension of Francophone prominence is that the Quiet Revolution revealed to Quebecers how important the provincial state governed by French speakers is as a form of economic leverage. Until then, we were paralyzed by the fear of any measures the state might take that even vaguely resembled socialism, and we remained staunch conservatives and enthusiastic free enterprisers at a time when all Canadian ventures of any significance were in the hands of English-speaking Canadians and of Americans. Between 1960 and 1970, however, the government of Quebec created Hydro-Québec, which has now become one of the world's giants of the electric industry, as well as the Caisse de dépôt et placement and several other public institutions for economic advancement. For the first time, these ventures allowed French-speaking Quebecers, who had been ostracized by the large English-speaking private firms, to be trained on the job in top-level administrative positions.

The insurance company Sun Life is just one example out of thousands that were guilty of ostracizing. Established in Montreal, Sun Life attracted tens of thousands of French-speaking clients. But when the company hired French speakers as employees, it hindered their ascension to the intermediate levels of authority in the corporate ladder and never allowed them to reach the top rungs.

The French-speaking community has, in just the past few years, developed an unprecedented number of powerful financiers who control a large part of the industrial sector. The number of national and multinational companies set up by French-speaking Canadians has increased at a record-breaking pace. Some of our capitalists have even taken control of large commercial and real estate empires in the United States.

Fortunately, the business world does not develop at the expense of artistic activity or scientific interest. The media have served as witnesses to the contrary. Radio and television now carry a number of programs entirely devoted to economics, and never before have newsstands carried scientific publications of such fine quality in French. As for art and literature, they are in greater abundance than ever in Quebec.

Yet the themes have changed. During the separatist period, as it is now referred to, the people's obsession with national identity was the focus of almost all poetry; nearly all vocal artists and composers of pop music celebrated independence and sovereignty in their songs. Only novels were untouched by this wave, probably because fiction expounding political theses had long been discredited.

Literary works today have an openness to the world and a sense of humor that the frustrated nationalists of an earlier decade could not tolerate. Now Quebecers travel, are impassioned by international issues, are interested in commercial relations with other countries, and show initiative. The works of our writers, men and women alike, reveal the effects of these changes. Very soon after World War II and long before English-speaking Canadian artists, our painters caught the attention of Paris, New York, and even Tokyo. Quebec has produced artists of international repute, such as Riopelle, Pellan, Lemieux, and Borduas. Our sculpture has represented the avant-garde. Now it is the turn of our writers, dramatists, and filmmakers to win international prizes.

The works attracting attention at this time are not the ones inspired by nationalism. Few works springing from secessionism ever got off the ground, while the same authors enjoyed success beyond our national boundaries with films, plays, and essays that had nothing to do with our national question.

I realize that this evolution is common to several cultures around the world. What is unique about it in Quebec is that it marks the late and rapid modernization of our society. It also represents a lesson in success for our people. Indeed, French Canadians had not experienced much success since 1760. The British journalist (and later minister) Richard Crossman described us as "historic residue" when he reviewed Mason Wade's *The French Canadians* and declared that such a wreck was of no interest to him. He was not alone in his thinking; even the Quebecers had a tendency to underestimate themselves (or to boast, which amounts to the same thing). Perhaps the originality of recent generations lies in a cool awareness of their true worth, which enables them to set realistic goals for themselves as well as to fully attain them.

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If we are left with the impression that a new society has emerged in French-speaking Quebec, one that is very different from our traditional society, it is in large part because of women and the important role they have recently played in all fields of activity. Here again, the acid test of modernity has acted on Quebec as on all contemporary societies, this time with unique force and speed.

Perhaps nowhere else in the Western world had the traditional family resisted for so long the forces that change the way of life. Until the last world war and even later, the Quebecois family remained untouched and the role of women unchanged. Women had always been confined to the home and restricted to domestic responsibilities, except when such catastrophes as the Great Depression forced every able-bodied person, without regard to gender, to seek gainful employment in order to survive. However, even then, young girls did not dream of careers but, rather, wished to return home as soon as they could find husbands.

In the 1930s, a minimal proportion of women had access to college and university education, and the number and types of jobs available to them were very limited. These circumstances were certainly not new; all Western societies passed through this stage. What was different was that the Quebecois society seemed resolved to perpetuate this state of affairs indefinitely.

It is not surprising that with this kind of lag, Quebec was notorious for being slow to change its legislation concerning women. I remember the indignant protests of Thérèse Casgrain, the "Grand Old Woman" of Quebecois feminism. Though independently wealthy, she discovered that the law did not permit her to sell her own property without the written consent of her husband. And this is just one example. I could cite hundreds. In the eyes of the law, women remained minors all their lives.

Yet when Quebec awoke in the early 1960s, it did not stop at making up for its backwardness: it surpassed all Canadian provinces with the liberalism of its laws concerning the status of women. Thus, by 1987, there was not a single place in Canada (and very few in the United States), where women had more freedom of choice, were better protected against sexism, and had more encouragement to occupy positions they deserved. Women still have hard battles to fight to achieve their emancipation, but Quebec has nevertheless moved from last place to first, in less time than the greatest optimists could have predicted.

Women were ready to take advantage of this turnaround. In a few years, they made a place for themselves in every university faculty. Female students began fierce competition with male students and, in return for their work and self-discipline, have received the larger number of top marks. In several faculties, such as medicine and law, they already make up the majority, even though they still hold only 14 percent of the departmental chairs.

Their role and influence in labor unions, like their role in the media, have continued to grow, thanks to the number and importance of the positions they occupy. While women are still rare in the parliaments of Quebec and Ottawa, in political circles they already represent a force that must be taken into account. A comparative study of the positions of responsibility held by women in the countries of North America and Europe would be interesting indeed. I am nearly certain that Quebec would rank among the top few. In Quebec women now make up 42 percent of the labor force, occupy 58 percent of the banking, insurance, and real estate positions, and hold 43 percent of the professional and managerial positions.[1]

I believe that no other factor in the second half of the twentieth century has so deeply transformed society as the advancement of women, especially since it has occurred at the extreme rate we have witnessed in Quebec. It is not only the cultural, economic, and scientific way of life that is changed by the female presence. Slowly and subtly, women are substituting new goals for those that were pursued by male-dominated society. The demeanor and values are no longer the same, and the nature of ambition is evolving. On issues such as war and peace, international security and disarmament, women do not reason the way men used to. In the feminine scale of values, quality of life is more important than wealth, and ecology is neither a caprice nor a luxury but a cause for which women are prepared to sacrifice other advantages.

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The changes I have described have not, by the way, had only positive results. While Quebec society was carrying out a spectacular process of catching up with the more developed societies of North America, the birth rate of the French-speaking Quebecois sank dramatically.

I say "dramatically" because our society had been characterized by a runaway birth rate for three centuries (on average, the French-speaking population of Canada doubled every twenty years with no significant arrival of immigrants). This birth rate was a principal reason for the survival of our people. In the generation of Quebecers that has just gone into retirement, families of eight, ten, or twelve children were the norm. It is generally recognized that without this high birth rate (this "revenge of the cradles" after the conquest of New France by the British army and then after the drying up of French immigration), we would have disappeared as a people long ago. We would have been reduced to a tiny minority among a hundred others in the Canadian mosaic, almost completely integrated into the English-speaking majority, as were the Franco-Americans of Quebecois origin in New England.

In birth rate, we have dropped from first to last place. Because of our population's originally high growth rate, Arnold Toynbee had in his magnum opus predicted an extraordinary future for us. I do not know what he would say today, now that our birth rate is below the minimum necessary to maintain the current population level. The original Quebecers, the descendants of the first colonists who came from France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, are condemned to slow attrition—unless there occurs an unforeseen change such as the baby boom of the 1940s. Demographers, who know that their science cannot predict the future, do not rule out this possibility.

Nevertheless, they do not think it probable. Young people are marrying less and less and having children later and later. Couples get divorced more and more frequently, the number of single-parent families is increasing rapidly, and our governments do not seem in a hurry to establish adequate day-care centers. All these problems developed later in Quebec than in Ontario or in the United States, and with the possible exception of drugs, have quickly spread and at times exceeded the degree of seriousness that they have elsewhere. (If drug abuse remains lower than in the United States, we are nevertheless not exempt from it. But according to the statistics of our police corps, drugs are less and less common in Quebec, and the number of users, especially among the young, is dropping).

We are, then, from this perspective as well, living in an entirely new society, very different from the traditional society of Quebec, which lacked everything *but* children. For some time now, a debate has been brewing on the subject. Some people claim that it is the essential issue, since it concerns the life and death of our community.

What to do? What to expect from our political leaders? A birth-oriented policy? The Quebec government has recently announced, in the budget speech of last spring, an important increase of family allowances from the third child on. But we are not even sure that such a policy will have much result. Some men and women reject this outright and are persuaded that it is not only impossible but also undesirable to incite people to procreate, an issue which, according to them, involves intensely personal goals and decisions. The time is past when people refer to lovemaking as "working for the sake of the country."

Other citizens believe, on the contrary, and no less firmly, that the allocation of funds, coupled with a suitable network of day-care centers and the revaluation of maternity, would have a decisive effect. Yet others refuse to become alarmed. If our birth rate is low, they say, we must learn to live with it and to count on the assimilation of immigrants into French culture in order to maintain, if not increase, the current proportion of the French-speaking population in Canada. Still, in all these groups and behind all of these opinions, one can discern a common anxiety.

We needed to elevate the level of culture. We did it, and we continue to do it. We needed to enter the world of business, which was alien to us. We entered it with resolve, and our efforts were crowned with success. The discrepancy between the relatively low income of the French-speaking majority and that of the English-speaking minority in Quebec has been progressively fading.

But if we were to disappear over the next century, what would be the use of our efforts and of our affirmation of a difference now? All those who are interested in politics, to whatever degree and whatever the party, are concerned about this question. In the next elections, we will no doubt see the emergence of the first political program attempting to answer it.

In the works of our authors, this uneasiness is expressed only indistinctly. The media deal with it more often and with much insistence—the same media that played such a pivotal role in the awakening of Quebec during the 1950s and that continue to influence the society today. I am referring primarily to the press, which, with the exception of a few periodicals whose distribution was so limited that they reached only a small elite, slumbered until the end of the 1950s. After that point the combined effect of unionism on journalists and of the pressure of television on public opinion induced the large dailies to begin following closely, and with a critical eye, the workings of the government as well as those of the clergy and leaders of all kinds.

In Quebec it was public television that first played a major role in that regard. In English-speaking Canada, the audience of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was very quickly divided between large American networks and the rapidly proliferating private Canadian channels, which, because of their small margins of profit (or so they said), showed little interest in public affairs. Radio-Canada remained, in contrast, at the head of French-speaking television for several years. And since, from the start, public radio around the world has been less subject to the slavery of commercials and listener ratings than private radio, Radio-Canada devoted a considerable amount of time to news, the arts, politics, and debates on all topics of public interest. In more than one way, it is the media that have brought Quebec up to date.

In my opinion, Marcel Trudel, an eminent historian of French Canada, best summarizes the situation in his recent book *Mémoires d'un autre siècle:*

> The man of my generation [the author is seventy years old] was born and raised in the extension of the Old Regime. Then, suddenly, without being prepared for it, he passed into a new type of society, through a stage we call the Quiet Revolution, and which dates from 1960. . . . The man of my generation has had to adapt quickly, in the past thirty years, to a series of profound changes: it seems to me that no generation has undergone as many shocks since the generation that settled in the valley of the Saint Laurent River at the beginning of New France. We have experienced two worlds: today's and that of the Old Regime.[2]

He might have added that, to a lesser degree, several generations that were to follow his had to make the same perilous leap, all of those generations whose eyes opened on the world before the end of World War II.

There is no mystery surrounding Quebec. The only enigmatic element of a complex but perfectly logical evolution is the incredible tenacity demonstrated by a tiny group of people in keeping their language and culture alive against all odds.

ENDNOTES

[1] *Statistics Canada,* cat. 71–001, vol. 43, no. 12.

[2] Marcel Trudel, *Mémoires d'un autre siècle* (Montreal, Le Boréal Express Limité: 1987).

Léon Dion

The Mystery of Quebec

THE TITLE FOR THIS ARTICLE was a suggestion from the editor of *Dædalus.* I was happy to accept it because in my view it aptly expresses the social reality of Quebec, past and present, not only for non-Quebecers but for many Quebecers as well. Several months ago I published a book entitled *A la recherche du Québec* ("In Search of Quebec").[1] Three years ago, still more pointedly, Solange Chaput-Rolland, one of the most knowledgeable writers on Quebec and Canada, thanks to the numerous literary and political positions she has held, titled one of her books *Mystère Québec.*[2]

Approaching the question of Quebec from this standpoint obliges us to adopt a mode of analysis that sociologists or political scientists might find unusual. While not exactly psychological in nature, it is based in large part on subjective judgment and thereby runs the risk of producing a biased view. Such a risk seems to me well worth taking, however, precisely because the approach in question affords promising avenues of inquiry in the search for a deep understanding of Quebec. It requires us, indeed, to listen to those privileged creators of the imaginary, our poets, popular singers, and novelists.

In his remarkable work on nationalism in Quebec, Louis Balthazar stresses the importance of the role of poets, popular singers, and novelists during the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s and during the rise to power, and term of office, of the Parti québecois (1976–1981), which advocated independence for Quebec:

Léon Dion is Professor of Political Science at Laval University in Ste.-Foye, Quebec.

> It is thus not by chance that Quebec's artists expressed with renewed fervor and almost without exception their nation's yearning for sovereignty. Through the magic of their words, music, and forms, they sustained, with even more energy than the politicians, the painful emergence of a people's collective identity. They were, without doubt, voicing the deepest wishes of Quebec's population, and thus lent an authenticity to its nationalism which was lacking in its political leaders. The latter are always open to the charge of manipulating the masses and exploiting nationalism for their own personal gain, but the same cannot be said of artists.[3]

The studies, ideas, and events of the past twenty-five years lead me to conclude that the range of emotions and impulses aroused in the population during these years must be recognized as a major—perhaps even *the* major—source of momentum for the political movement that raised Quebec to the level of a fully fledged modern society and in the process brought it to the brink of political independence. The silence of our nation's creative artists since the defeat of the 1980 referendum on sovereignty, and the lassitude and disillusionment that followed, show how closely they identified with the Parti québecois; their hope had always been that this party could give concrete political form to their longing for autonomy and thereby dispel their anxiety about the future of the French language and Quebecois culture, the twin pillars on which Quebec's identity in North America is based.

In my first section, I shall sketch out the elements constituting the identity of Quebec as perceived by our nation's creative artists since 1960. I shall then turn to the Quebecers' diverse representations of themselves in the complex environment surrounding their sociocultural and political territory, and I shall show how swift and far-reaching have been the many changes that have taken place in Quebec's society over the past three decades. Next, I shall consider the diverse consequences resulting from these changes. Finally, I shall speculate on Quebec's most likely future directions. My conclusions will be based on the implications for our creative artists of the tensions they will continue to experience—tensions between a traditional wisdom, on the one hand, which seems in some respects outmoded yet which in the past was the basis for our national identity, and on the other, the changes that have made Quebec a modern society yet may imperil the fundamental characteristics of its century-old identity.

THE IDENTITY OF QUEBEC

My reflections on Quebec lead me to focus on a question that has always haunted Quebecers but that has had added insistence over the past thirty years: What is their identity as a nation or a people? The problem is clearly insoluble, yet it may be for this very reason that Quebecers at various stages of their history have felt compelled to debate the issue among themselves, and at times—as has recently been the case—to give it central importance. Having been variously known as inhabitants of New France, Canadians, French Canadians, and finally, Quebecers, or even French Americans, who are we now? Where are we going? What has made us the way we are? How have we changed? What has our destiny been in the past, and what is it now? What will be the dimensions and the population of our "homeland," and what will become of its will to survive?

Is there any point in trying to answer such questions? I am well aware of the difficulty of answering, but the search for Quebec's national identity is so fascinating, so fundamental, that like many others before me, I find myself unable to resist taking up this challenge.

A nation is not defined by a list of characteristics, no matter how exhaustive; many other nations will have such characteristics as well. It is, rather, the nature of the relationship among all these characteristics, or more exactly, the configuration they form in relation to one another, that gives a nation such as Quebec its identity.

Picture a small population of 5 million people living in a vast area into which the five largest countries of Western Europe could fit without difficulty, 90 percent of whom huddle devotedly together along the chilly banks of "that great marching river," the Saint Lawrence. Merely to describe their surroundings adequately would require more space than is available here since it would mean exploring the ties that link them as well as the 1 million Anglophones and speakers of other languages with whom they share the province of Quebec. In the first place, there are the 20 million Anglophone Canadians with whom Quebecers form a political alliance of variable stability; second, there are the 250 million Americans in the United States, whose political power, high standard of living, and scientific and technological skills are sources of irresistible attraction yet whose hedonistic and materialistic popular culture instinctively repels the Quebecois. At the same time this culture fascinates them to such a degree that sometimes language seems to be the only difference between the two.

As we in Quebec have learned to appreciate "the others," we have also adopted a more tolerant attitude toward the immigrants who have chosen Quebec as their homeland. In the past, most of them came from Europe or from other parts of North America. In the future, however, the number of immigrants from these areas will probably decline. Quebec is now facing a problem that is likely to become acute in years to come. It will have to assimilate a large number of immigrants and refugees from overpopulated and poor countries, some of which have been under the yoke of dictatorship, most of which are not French-speaking—people from Latin America, the West Indies, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. This new threat to the survival of French on American soil will also have to be overcome. Only by redoubling our efforts to improve the socioeconomic status of French in relation to English, by replacing the residual rigidity of our culture with flexibility, and by not setting up artificial barriers will we be able to accomplish this daunting task.

HOW WE SEE OURSELVES

We Quebecers are uncertain of our identity and haunted by the fear of a tragic destiny.

The brutal separation of Quebec from France after the British Conquest in 1760 left a painful scar on our society whose aftereffects we still feel today. In 1791, 1837, 1867, 1960, 1976, and 1980 some thought that the events that marked these years would establish our nation's identity and heal the scar once and for all. Each time someone expressed hope for final deliverance, but after a short-lived period of euphoria, had to concede that this vision had been only a mirage. Hubert Aquin, a revolutionary novelist who eventually committed suicide, skillfully describes this cycle of euphoria followed by bitter disappointment:

> French Canada, that tired and weary culture, has for a long time been going through an interminable winter; whenever the sun breaks through the ceiling of clouds which take the place of the sky, the feeble and dispirited sick man fancies that spring is on the way again. French-Canadian culture, which lies moribund for long periods, frequently revives, only to sink back again into its former moribund state, and its existence is thus a continual alternation between revival and relapse.[4]

This picture of anguish and lassitude, experienced by many who write and speak of a society of which they feel so deeply a part, demands that we focus, however reluctantly, on the event that brutally altered the course of our destiny: the British Conquest. This was the most tangible of France's legacies, for it nearly stripped us of the inheritance we are today trying so hard to recover. The real tragedy, the greatest wound inflicted on us, was that an entire continent slipped out of French hands in the eighteenth century. Ever since, we have been orphans who have only survived by withdrawing into our shell, increasingly concerned about our future as we emerge from it into the outside world. The separation from our mother country was the most traumatic aspect of our infancy as a people.

The British Conquest nevertheless seems to have induced us to put down terrestrial and spiritual roots so deep that paradoxically, it became the best guarantee of our survival. It seems to have instilled in us the pride of a man who is unbowed by his victor and who defies him with his determination to preserve his original identity. This is what makes Quebec unique compared with the rest of Canada: from the outset, the people of Quebec not only rose to defend it but were also willing to identify its fate with theirs, in spite of the yoke of suffering they had to bear. As Gérald Godin writes, "The writer is the unhappy consciousness of the society to which he belongs."[5]

Quebec: The Homeland

Our homeland! For most Quebecers, this is the land of their forefathers, the land of their own flesh and blood; for others, it is only a land of adoption, which they gradually learn to love to the point that they no longer feel any affinity for their home country. It is clearly those of French descent who most strongly feel Quebec to be their homeland, but many Anglophones and speakers of other languages see it in similar terms, especially those whose ancestors have been here several generations, although their feelings are expressed differently and less passionately.

My own feelings are ambivalent. When I think of Quebec, my homeland, my heart beats fast; when I think of Canada, my country, reason takes over. Yet in a sense Canada too is my homeland: my ancestors discovered, explored, and partially occupied it as far as the foothills of the Rockies, but they were somehow robbed of their great inheritance and gradually pushed back to Quebec, which they clung to and which they multiplied in. My emotional ties with Canada are thus weaker than they are with Quebec.

Among the many incarnations of the Quebecer—trapper, explorer, lumberjack, habitant, settler, sharecropper, farmer, bourgeois—it is the habitant, or the one who clings to his land, who until today has stood out. The habitant of former times, whose memory lives on for our poets and singers, had a great dream: to conquer the forest, to build a country, to preserve it and extend it to all points of the compass.

Clinging to the earth was one way of ensuring the survival of Quebec as a nation. Small wonder, then, that it was in novels about the earth that the main themes of the Quebec homeland were laid down for posterity. As Giuseppe Turi writes, "Quebecers feel an almost visceral need to identify with the soil of Quebec."[6]

As a nation, we still owe much to this conception of ourselves as rural and peasantlike. Neither the crisis of the 1930s nor World War II seems to have done much to alter the wisdom of tradition. Until the early 1960s, neither the representatives of the working class nor those of the bourgeoisie were able to formulate a conception of Quebec as an urban, industrial nation. Workers and bourgeoisie alike were inculcated with the same traditional values that had enabled the people to survive through years of tribulation.

Until now, urban and industrial culture has done little to reinvigorate and enrich Quebecers' conception of their homeland. Popular singers such as Georges Dor, Félix Leclerc, Gilles Vigneault, Claude Léveillée, and Jean-Pierre Ferland, poets like Paul Chamberland and Gaston Miron, dramatists and film directors such as Marcel Dubé, Michel Tremblay, Gilles Carle, Denis Héroux, and Denys Arcand, and novelists like Roger Lemelin and Gabrielle Roy—all these creative artists sing, describe, and speak of the city, yet still usually only to reaffirm traditional values inherited from the land. Few of them, moreover, venture inside the city itself in search of a conception of their homeland that would be more in tune with contemporary social structures and ways of thinking.

We need to examine closely how the idea of Quebec as a nation was expressed by different social groups, notably intellectuals and young people, during the Quiet Revolution and the years preceding the 1980 referendum. We also need to get a clear idea of what the mentality of young people is today, so as to identify their systems of cultural reference.

French and the Culture of Quebec in North America

A language is far more than just a combination of words. For those who speak it, it represents both the most public and the most private expression of their personalities. The words a person uses generally relate to that person's self-image, projects, and goals. As for language as a whole, the collective is at least as important as the individual, perhaps more so. If a language is primarily a tool of communication for human beings, it also reveals what is most fundamental to them: their mental structure. Language expresses not only a person's identity but also that of the collectivity to which he or she belongs. In short, a language is inextricably linked with the particularity of a culture.

If Quebec were not French-speaking and did not retain certain elements of French culture (albeit elements that have been adapted with time to conditions in the New World), then the question of Quebec would be no different from that of Ontario or Manitoba. It is in this sense, first of all, that Quebec's problem is above all a linguistic one; but this is also the case in another sense. Like other Western societies, Quebec is currently in the grip of a major cultural crisis. It would be wrong to suggest that our main concern today lies in the economic domain, however important a role it plays in ensuring the well-being of a culture. All great cultures in the past have been built on a solid economic base.

French-speaking Quebecers have to contend not only with a soil that lies frozen and unproductive for long months each year but also with the fact that they account for no more than 2 percent of the population of the North American continent. In addition, Quebec's society has become extremely diversified.

In human, intellectual, and economic terms, people pay a heavy price for expressing themselves in French in North America. One might even ask if, after two centuries of coexistence with the far more powerful and invasive language of English, the French language is still capable of expressing with accuracy and certainty who we are, what we think, what we are doing, and where we are going. Writers here in Quebec are well aware that French is living on borrowed time and that it is gradually degenerating.

How could any well-informed person deny that we live immersed in an English-speaking, North American world that may turn us, partially or completely, into Americans, without our being aware of the change? It was the realization that this threat is hanging over our heads that once prompted Jean Lemoyne, an essayist who reached prominence in the 1950s and the early 1960s, to write: "I must confess that I think we are no longer capable of giving an adequate account of ourselves in French."[7]

For us Quebecers, it is above all the linguistic aspect of French culture that is its most elementary—not to mention its most dramatic—aspect. Since a people's language is by definition the main form of expression of its thought and mentality, those of us who are aware of this primordial function have good reason to wonder whether the French language could become foreign, secondary, or alienating for us. Yet if we do hold onto our language, how accurately does it reflect our continent's social reality, even at the most everyday level? It is as if we lived simultaneously in two worlds out of phase with each other. One is the world of our language, which is turning increasingly in on itself, is often unable to articulate the social realities it must deal with, and requires all possible forms of protection if it is to survive at all. The other is the world of our culture, our institutions, and our social realities, which are generally North American in origin. These two worlds coexist within us and around us. We seek a way of reconciling the French language, which has most deeply shaped our individual and collective development since 1608, with the North American culture, which invades us through the medium of English. Such, then, are the most important issues posed by the problem of the present and future of French in Quebec. All other considerations fade into abstractions that have no bearing on our everyday lives or on the anxieties of our poets, novelists, popular singers, businesspeople, and scientists.

In a recent study of young people's attitudes toward French, the Conseil de la langue française reached an alarming conclusion: "The values of young people show a marked divergence from the cultural and linguistic evolution of Quebec." A large proportion of their culture comes from the United States. Over 25 percent feel that "living through the medium of French is not essential to their personal development . . . . Moreover, they do not feel any sense of linguistic insecurity."[8]

One should not, nevertheless, be unduly pessimistic about the future of French among young people today. Although a certain number feel detached from it, the vast majority still lives exclusively through the medium of French, notwithstanding its fascination with American popular culture. This fascination is not unique to Quebecers; it is universal. Given the instability of the French language in Quebec, however, it is clearly more damaging there than elsewhere. The greatest problem facing French in Quebec is the standard of teaching in its elementary and high schools. Extensive research by the Conseil de la langue française has revealed, thirty years after teachers first set the alarm bells ringing, that the standard of written and spoken French among schoolchildren verges on the catastrophic. Another study shows that the tyranny of American popular culture has reached such a point that not only French but all foreign languages in Canada are "in a state of crisis" and that there is a sort of "martyrdom of modern languages." Moreover, in the United States also, "the standard of English is in a state of collapse" for the same reasons as elsewhere.[9] As might be expected, the linguistic decline accompanies a crisis in culture everywhere.[10]

If we can be selective in the values we adopt and if we can preserve the best of our heritage, then we need have no worry or guilt about appropriating everything our continent has to offer that is culturally and materially enriching to us. Our loyalty to our ancestors, our duty to ourselves, and our responsibility to our young people, however, all demand that we strive to appropriate it through the medium of French, even if this means sacrificing economic and intellectual efficiency. We will facilitate the task if we remain committed to preserving as large and as stimulating a French-speaking environment as possible in Quebec so that our poets, novelists, scientists, popular singers, and businesspeople can feel happy and relaxed working in their native language.

Quebec's Nationalism

Over the past 200 years in most countries, the quest for a collective identity has usually culminated in the affirmation of a nation. Quebec is no exception. The term *nation* itself is all too often confused with the term *nationalism.* It seems to me that the two are by no means synonymous and that where a connection does exist between them, it is not as straightforward as it is often assumed to be.

Those among us who see Quebec merely as "a province like any other" or who feel no special national allegiance would speak differently. The unconditional federalists, as we might call them, like the millions of English speakers in the other provinces, are adamant that their homeland is Canada as a whole. For most of them, however, their image of this homeland is more of an abstraction than something felt and remains nebulous. After waxing lyrical about the splendors of Niagara Falls or the majesty of the Rockies, all they have left to say, like many Anglophones, is: "Canada sure is a huge country!"

Unlike some, I have no wish to insult these people by claiming that they are not "real Quebecers." They have a right to an opinion different from that of the independence movement, or from that of the federal autonomists, who see Quebec as their homeland and the only homeland, even if Canada remains their country. But I will say that the unconditional federalists' image of their country has little substance to it—so little, in fact, that it is difficult to be sure just what it is. It seems like the Anglophones' image of Canada: lackluster, unimaginative, unemotional. In all of Canada, however, Quebec alone is a self-contained community with a distinctive culture of sufficient unity to set it apart as a nation.

The long-standing distinction between patriotism and nationalism undeniably tends to be obscured in everyday speech, in the news media, and even in scholarly works, but the distinction is as valid today as it has ever been. It would be a pity indeed if Quebecers were taken in by the propaganda that condemns their feelings of loyalty toward their homeland.

It is one thing to feel a strong emotional affinity with one's fellow compatriots; it is quite another to use this affinity as a basis for interpreting social reality or for a doctrine that turns hatred of "the other" into a moral imperative. I am well aware that the slide from patriotism to nationalism takes place almost imperceptibly, but there is still a clear qualitative step from the first to the second, which I am wary of and draw back from whenever I feel too close to it.

A nation may be seen as a network of realities and of particular relationships. It is the way these realities and relationships come together as a whole that differentiates one nation from all others. This definition is complicated, however, by the fact that the realities and relationships in question are initially experienced only intuitively or emotionally; in order to conceptualize them, reason needs the assistance of the emotions or, more precisely, of the imagination.

An attentive observer notices that the transition from patriotism to nationalism involves a change of semantic register. Patriotism is expressed primarily by writers (poets, novelists, folksingers); where nationalism is concerned, their place is taken by sociologists, political scientists, philosophers, and lawmakers. In Kantian terms, the transition is from reasoned reason to reasoning reason, that is, from reason reflecting on matter unmediated by it, which is the domain of "unreflective" feeling, or the instincts, to reason reflecting upon itself to formulate concepts and abstract ideas. There is, however, a bridge between these two categories that is easily crossed. Sociologists, political scientists, and others base their "reasoning"—often unwittingly—on the intuitions of poets, just as poets periodically cross the Rubicon themselves, employing "reasoning" reason in their poems, novels, and songs.

Something else to notice is that in its broadest sense, nationalism in Quebec is an almost constant phenomenon in our history. It is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. Periodically, it is said to be in decline, even on the verge of gradually dying out altogether,[11] but this is no more than a historical trick: whenever it has seemed to be on the edge of extinction, an unexpected turn of events has suddenly revived it.

Nationalism in Quebec is not confined to the linguistic or cultural domain but permeates all social interactions. Demography, the class system, and politics all have a bearing on national feeling. Our nationalism, it could be said, is nourished by our society as a whole. This explains how nationalism alone provides a more or less valid basis for the interpretation of our history. Yet nationalist writers are unable—nor do they wish—to construct a coherent explanation of our history, for fear that their interpretation will invalidate their premises. Moreover, while the interpretation of their nationalism is a project of our culture, or more generally of our society, it is often too vague to be converted into a political program in the contemporary sociopolitical context.

How, then, has nationalism lasted so long in our society? The reason is that nationalism in Quebec, in spite of the many constraints on it, and in all of its many guises, has always projected an image of society conducive to the stability and peace of mind that individuals and communities need in order to lead a normal life in all domains.

From the outset, Francophone Quebec has been faced with the insurmountable problem of being outnumbered demographically by the United States, and since around 1850, by English Canada itself. It has also had to contend with the economic imperialism of the rest of Quebec, of Canada, and of the United States. As the sociologists Guy Rocher and Marcel Rioux have amply demonstrated, this imperialism has been a constant source of discontent and even, at times, of feelings of revolt among Quebec's Francophones. Numerous political crises, even recently, have disturbed the calm of public life: the asbestos strike, the Radio-Canada producers' strike, the airline dispute, the trade union strikes in the public and quasi-public sectors in 1972 and 1981–1982, the referendum of 1980, and the constitutional crisis of 1981–1982, to mention only the most recent ones. The comments of André Laurendeau on the Radio-Canada strike are applicable to all such crises in Quebec over the past two centuries. Laurendeau was one of the best minds of his time and cochairman of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. He said:

> We did not suddenly fall back on the old cry of racism . . . . The nationalist cause has nothing to do with either chauvinism or racism; it is an attitude, rather, of wounded pride. This is almost always how nationalism begins: with the man whom circumstance defines as a second-class citizen, like a colonial in subjection to a powerful and inaccessible metropolis, like a black man.[12]

There has been much debate, both at home and abroad, about whether there is a "natural" progression from the idea of nation to that of state. The view that a nation is incomplete without a state was first advanced in Germany by the philosophers Fichte and Hegel. For

Hegel, the state was an absolute, the very embodiment of the finality of history. Yet a state is not indispensable to a nation's development: the grass-roots networks that flourish in any nation worthy of the name are sufficient indication of the day-to-day solidarity of its members. One state may harbor several nations. In Canada, the best of our prime ministers have recognized that peaceful coexistence between "our two founding peoples" was only possible through vague and provisional compromises. But the state of Canada can never be a national state in anything other than name. When the state and its institutions refer to themselves as being national, the term always means something different in Quebec. Terms such as *the national interest* and *national objectives* are a source of constant annoyance to Quebecers. As for *binational state,* this term is hardly used any more; when it is, it too has a meaning that in Canada is different from what it is in Quebec.

The Quiet Revolution appropriated the term *state* for the nation of Quebec. For Jean Lesage and his government, however, the term was largely symbolic—flattering to the nationalist ego, no doubt, but devoid of political substance. Moreover, the supporters of the Quiet Revolution who appropriated the term sought to exploit it—consciously or unconsciously—for their own ends and thereby tarnished its meaning. The independence movement was obliged to waste much of its energy explaining how its notion of state, the particular one it was proposing, would be a state in the fullest sense, in contrast to the one offered by the Liberals, which it saw as little more than a cardboard cutout.

In 1960 the time seemed ripe for Quebec's independence. A growing, well-organized body of people thought it disgraceful that Quebec should not have a state of its own and were actively engaged in promoting such a state through the Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale, the Mouvement souveraineté-association, and the Parti québecois. The independence movement healed its factional differences and braced itself for the difficult struggle for political power.

The thoughtful comments of Hubert Aquin on this subject are worth quoting here. Although he was forgotten all too soon after his tragic death, his ruthless examination of both himself and our society make him one of the most incisive commentators on the period:

> While I would concede that resentment of English Canadians in all its forms has proved both important and influential in historical terms, I would equally argue that it has been of no importance whatsoever in political terms. To put it another way, although our minority separatism arose in opposition to the English Canadians, when the issue became that of how independence could be achieved, our fight was always against the French Canadians. . . . If the age-old crises of nationalism which have shaken our minority have ended in defeat, it is undeniably because our nationalists were calling for an improvement in our position of dependence rather than the abolition of this dependence. . . . True nationalists seek separation and independence, not a perpetuation of our provincial or minority status.[13]

Another noteworthy aspect of the independence movement in the 1960s was the the moral support given it by the federalists, who thought that it gave useful momentum to the emerging political consciousness of Quebecers. One thinks here of Jean Lesage, Eric Kierans, and above all René Lévesque, whose increasingly acerbic statements on federalism from 1963 on earned him a reputation as a crypto-separatist in some quarters. André Laurendeau also returned to the theme on a number of occasions. The following passage is typical of his statements:

> For several years now, separatism has acted as a stimulating force . . . . Those who espouse it play a waiting game. They may strive hard for the formal granting of independence. The main obstacles are those within us: our laziness and apathy, the mediocrity of our aspirations, our inconsistency. Yesterday's stimulating force is tomorrow's escapism.[14]

As things turned out, in 1967 René Lévesque was given the opportunity to unite most of the splinter groups and those working for them in the independence movement, as well as most of the nationalist groups; within a few years, he had become the leader of a strong party, which succeeded in gaining power in 1976. The road to power and the assumption of governmental responsibilities, however, led to what Laurendeau had predicted in 1961: along the way, the independence movement was forced to adopt countless positions that had "nothing to do with independence." When the great day of the referendum dawned in May 1980, the choice was not about independence at all but merely about the granting of a right to negotiate a "new deal," which looked more like a blueprint for "associate states," or for a confederation of states, than for an independent state with full rights of sovereignty. Yet even this apparent plea for a negotiation of joint sovereignty was rejected by a majority of Quebecers, who preferred to put their trust instead in Prime Minister Trudeau's promise, couched in the vaguest terms imaginable, of "renewed federalism."

THE EXTENT OF CHANGE

Modern Quebec dates from at least as long ago as 1920. It was not until the 1950s and especially the 1960s that this crucial change began to be fully recognized. Jean Lesage's Liberal government took on the task of rectifying the stultifying contradiction between social evolutions at that time. Quebec had been moving steadily into line with neighboring societies and the political regime under the iron rule of Maurice Duplessis, whose policy was stubbornly to preserve the foundations of a tradition based on ruralism, agriculture, and messianic Catholicism. The general interest in politics in the years known as the Quiet Revolution allowed the Quebec government to take giant strides toward modernization, and the Quebecers to refine their sense of identity.

The most important factor in consolidating this sense of identity was not, in my view, the havoc wrought by the terrorist movement, the FLQ (Front de libération du Québec), which in October 1970 held the English diplomat James Cross hostage for two months and assassinated the Quebec minister Pierre Laporte. Nor was it the proclamation in July 1967 by the French president, General de Gaulle, of the independence movement's slogan, "Long live Free Quebec!" from the balcony of Montreal's hôtel de ville before a crowd of 50,000 people. What really consolidated Quebecers' identity was the Second World War. It profoundly changed the structures people worked within and the way they lived. Its long-term repercussions did not fully emerge until many years later. The crisis of identity it precipitated with the introduction of conscription in 1942 left a lasting mark on people at the time.

A more immediate and keenly felt source of encouragement for Quebecers was that landmark in technology, the hydroelectric development of the Manicouagan in 1964, where the various projects of Hydro-Québec were carried out exclusively in French. At music festivals held on Mont Royal and elsewhere in the early 1970s, our best popular singers warmed the hearts of hundreds of thousands of people, awakened a new enthusiasm, and renewed hope that political revival was in the air.

These feelings might have faded overnight had there not been something more. The most gratifying event, in my view, was the World's Fair in Montreal in 1967—Expo '67—aptly entitled "Man and His World." Stéphane Venne's words in the song of the moment, "One day, one day, when you come, we shall hold back time itself for you," highlighted the global nature of Quebec's hospitality, which was already legendary but often dismissed as ethnocentric. During the months of Expo '67, Quebecers showed themselves to be open both to each other and to the world, troubled neither by superiority nor inferiority.

The Olympics of 1978, albeit with less impact, gave further confirmation of Quebec's new openness to the world. From this period up to the present day, the Ministry of International Relations and the Ministry of International Commerce have played an important role, notably through Quebec's twenty-two foreign delegations (seven in the United States, eight in Europe, four in Latin America, and three in Asia), in presenting Quebecers to the world not as a nation of malcontents forever complaining of their misfortunes—as they too often used to see themselves—but as world citizens for whom nothing human is foreign.

There is insufficient space here to do justice to the changes in Quebec over the past three decades. They have affected all areas of society—cultural, social, economic, and political. What has made these changes, largely qualitative rather than quantitative, so difficult for Quebecers to assimilate is that they have for the most part stemmed from ideologies other than their own. Whether the terrorist movement, trade union militancy, the orientation of the many social and community movements, or the rationalization of the welfare state (whose influence extends beyond the public sector into the larger quasi-public sector embracing hospitals, Social Security, and education), Quebec drew, unfortunately often indiscriminately, on models and ideas from abroad that had enabled other countries to modernize.

Culture

In essence, the change that most radically altered the face of Quebec was cultural, the bias toward modernizing—or civilizing, as René Lévesque was fond of calling it. More often than not, change involved scrapping traditional values with little thought for what values might replace them or whether such values were even available, at home or abroad.[15]

Thus the Catholic church, without so much as a murmur except in the field of education, was stripped of the power—which was almost political—that it had enjoyed since 1840. That Catholicism had virtually built the society of Quebec and was at the heart of its culture was ignored. Few people, at least until recently, have stopped to wonder what has become of the sense of the sacred in Quebec. It has, unfortunately, all but disappeared: young people, in particular, search in vain for values to shape their personal development and end up looking elsewhere, chiefly to the United States. They have neither guidance nor criteria on which to base their list of priorities, their life-styles, or their models.

Economics

As far as the main indicators of modernity—industrialization and urbanization—are concerned, Quebec was the first of Canada's provinces to develop in both areas, from the end of the nineteenth century on, and especially in the aftermath of the First World War. Quebec's Francophones played little active part in these developments and for a long time remained ignorant of or took no interest in the world of business. The assumption was that the language of business in North America was English alone. How could they possibly have thought that a great culture could ever take root among a people whom André Laurendeau once described as a nation of beggars? How could it survive on such impoverished soil? With a few notable exceptions—Aurèle Bouchette, Olivar Asselin, and Edouard Montpetit, for example, who stressed the necessity for French Canadians to take over the economy—most of those responsible for shaping public opinion assumed that entering the business world entailed anglicization, and rightly so, if by this they meant compulsory assimilation into the Canadian and American economic system, which operates exclusively through the medium of English. In this connection, the Canadian economist Albert Breton writes pertinently of how:

> the mere fact of being born into a country whose language [i.e., English] serves as a lingua franca confers a kind of nobility on its speakers, like the fact of living in a country whose currency is an international unit of exchange. . . . In Canada, this means that Francophones almost invariably come off the worst in exchanges involving French and English speakers.[16]

Nationalism itself has had to undergo major transformation—from traditional nationalism into neonationalism during the 1950s and 1960s—to come to terms with the radical changes that have taken place in, for example, the field of science since the 1920s and 1930s. These changes resulted largely from the efforts of Adrien Pouliot, the irrepressible head of the science faculty at Laval University. Change in the fields of economics and the social sciences came from the impetus of Esdras Minville and Father Georges-Henri Lévesque in the 1930s and 1940s. In politics, too, change has occurred since the early days of the Quiet Revolution in 1960.

For several years now, the French-speaking have had a negative view of the scientific and economic world, but slowly this attitude has been evaporating. The goal is not to convert North America to speaking French, since this continent is and will remain the preserve of English. The goal is, rather, to create an environment in Quebec in which French is the dominant mode of communication in the business world, even if this means dealing with Anglophone colleagues from outside in their own language. The idea, in short, is to set up a Francophone economic "unit" in Quebec. This is similar to what was done in the land forces with the creation of the twenty-second regiment and the Régiment de la Chaudière. These gave high-caliber officers a better chance of showing off their talents than in an Anglophone regiment. They could obtain promotions, and some could reach the rank of brigadier-general or even general, as was the case with General Allard, the Canadian army's chief of staff in the 1960s.

Hopes for the future of the French in the business world are pinned on the "upwardly mobile professionals" of whom Jacques Parizeau, former minister of the Parti québecois and now its president, has so often spoken. They are establishing themselves in Montreal, in the region of La Beauce, in Drummondville, and elsewhere in Quebec. Not only are they proving capable of holding their own in the business world, but they use French in both internal and external affairs, because they believe that they can succeed while using this language.

Also promising is that more and more Francophone students are showing an interest in going into the private sector after graduating, some in setting up their own businesses. Economics is becoming less and less of a taboo subject and is fast being turned to our advantage. If French holds firm among this first generation of businesspeople, then Quebecers will gain a richer and fuller conception of their homeland, which until now has been deprived of one of its main sources of growth: access to the economy. The Fédération des francophones hors du Québec, in a report from its economic committee, expressed just such an intention. For Francophones who live outside Quebec, however, the opportunities for effective action are far fewer than those for French speakers within Quebec.[17]

Politics

A major shift from religious fervor to political hyperactivity marked the 1960s in Quebec. The rise of the state between 1960 and 1982 amounted to a displacement of power from the religious to the political sphere. So comprehensive was the politicization in this period that it touched the poetic and imaginary works of Quebec's creative artists; it changed people's life-styles and their urban environments; it reordered people's priorities, the emphasis going to education, public health, the economic status of Francophones, and promotion of the French language. Three important language laws passed in just eight years, including the famous Bill 101 of the Parti québecois government in 1977, which made French the official and the primary language of Quebec.

After 1981, however, as a result of its political setbacks, an economic recession that hurt Quebec more than other provinces, and the drift toward neoliberalism arriving from the United States, the Parti québecois government fell rapidly into disfavor. The almost limitless confidence in the virtues of the welfare state, which had become oppressive and bureaucratic in seeking to cater to all its citizens' needs, gave way to realignments and popular movements. A drift toward a new cult of the individual followed, its assumption being that only by their own efforts, rather than with the aid of the Church, the state, or social movements, could Quebecers realize their full potential and achieve a state of well-being.

No Quebecer approaching the political dimension of his society can avoid confronting the issue of Quebec's status as a province and its position within the Canadian federal system.

My own generation has more or less abandoned the term *homeland (la patrie)* and has embroiled itself instead in interminable debate about the merit and demerit of terms such as *nation, people, society,* and *state.* The related notions of "two peoples," "two societies," "two nations," so popular in the 1960s, have had to be dispensed with, since our Anglophone colleagues are unable to conceive of themselves as a distinct nation, society, or people. For this reason, we are now being invited to accord ourselves the title of being "a distinct society." A society distinct from whom and from what, and in what sense? How, in any case, could "the others" understand this notion, so alien to their perception of Canada?

The central issue of this apparently semantic debate is thus political. From the early 1960s on, indeed, the need for reform of the Canadian Constitution became increasingly urgent, the British North America Act of 1867 having long since become a museum piece. The push for constitutional reform culminated in the 1982 Constitution, which did not abolish the one from 1867 but, rather, added to it the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, important linguistic measures, and an amending formula.

Far from being pacifying, however, the reform—in Quebec, at least—only stirred people up. Until now, the province has been unable to endorse it, on the ground that it restricts linguistic rights and that the amending formula places Quebec at the mercy of the other provinces and the federal government. The debate has thus continued with a vengeance. It is not the terms themselves that are the problem but the definition of constitutional objectives that the terms are believed to articulate.

The question ultimately boils down to this: Do the people of Quebec need a state to themselves over which they have the maximum control possible before their claim to being a distinct society can become an indisputable fact?

My own view is that the political and constitutional status of Quebec is but a means to an end, albeit an indispensable means, if it is to realize the one goal from which it must never be diverted: to preserve and promote the French language as well as all other elements of our culture. This must take precedence over the preservation of English and Anglophone institutions.

The agreement reached at Meech Lake at the end of April 1987 relating to five demands of Premier Bourassa's Liberal government in Quebec rekindled the constitutional debate over Quebec. Some claimed that the terms of the accord seemed obscure and inadequate. The dramatic eleventh-hour entry into the debate by ex–Prime Minister Trudeau, with a lengthy article and several television interviews, provoked a sharp reaction in some Anglophone provinces, notably Ontario and Manitoba. Premier Bourassa nevertheless judged the final terms of the deal that the premiers of the ten provinces reached with the federal prime minister after the constitutional conference of June 2–3, 1987, to be sufficiently watertight for him to be able to endorse the 1982 Constitution. The new Article Two, according to Bourassa, incorporates a special dispensation stating that "the effect of the present article is not to impinge on the powers, rights or privileges of either the Parliament or the Government of Canada, or of the legislatures or governments of the provinces, including their powers, rights and privileges with respect to language." This represents, in Bourassa's terms, a "bottom line," which guarantees preservation of the status quo. On this basis, it is hoped it will be possible gradually to consolidate the position of the French language and the culture of Quebec.

Providing that the deal is ultimately endorsed by all legislative and governmental bodies, I am prepared to see it as a step in the right direction, evidence of a new political and constitutional orientation in Canada and of a move away from the centralization envisaged by ex–Prime Minister Trudeau toward the conception in force under Prime Minister Lester Pearson and Jean Lesage, the premier of Quebec. Admittedly, the Meech Lake Accord still falls well short of our ultimate goal, but as in the past, we must try to strike a balance between an ideal goal and the harsh realities of constitutional politics. At the same time we must do all we can to encourage the present government to move in the direction of autonomy.

As we search for an acceptable political status for Quebec, we must be especially careful not to go down blind alleys. Those who still celebrate the epic time of the patriots of 1837–1838 with such emotion would do well to remember that their rebellion ended in a crushing defeat from which it has taken us more than a century to recover. Those who are preoccupied with the reversals suffered by the Parti québecois since 1980 would do better to speculate on the reasons behind the defeat of the referendum and the setbacks that followed it than to tear each other and what is left of their party to pieces.

Nationalism in Quebec is not dead. It is in transition—partly because Quebec has now opened its doors to the world at large and partly because Quebec's foundations are diversifying to such a degree that in years to come, the new upwardly mobile class of the business community may well prove to be the harbingers of a new conception of our society, and consequently of patriotism in Quebec as well.

At the end of the long line of constitutional, political, economic, and cultural setbacks that have fallen on our shoulders, we find ourselves once more wandering in the maze of our own uncertainty.

Tradition and Change

The aphorism that a people, like a tree, is nourished through its roots seems scarcely applicable to Quebec today. It is no exaggeration to say that Quebecers, in their fascination with modernity, have made change into an end in itself. The result has been a crisis in the passing on of values. The problem is not that Quebecers no longer hold the heritage of their ancestors in the same veneration as in the past; it is that the generation which today controls all aspects of public life has lost its sense of heritage altogether.

Can the simple, time-honored identification with the land and the natural world survive in the face of the growing complexity of our postindustrial society, which we so complacently call advanced? Can we change our ways of thinking as easily as we have changed our social structures? Can we broaden our conception of homeland so that our increasingly diverse population will still feel welcome there and so that we will allow for our necessary interdependence with all the world's peoples? Will we at least make the effort, as I sincerely hope we will, to preserve traditional values—notably our sense of persistence and our will to survive in freedom? Or will we simply treat our ancestors' loves and fears as no more than a folk tradition—sung of as a rich tradition but no longer relevant?

Is a new conception of our homeland attuned to the modern world about to burst into life? Or could it be, on the contrary, that the very idea of homeland is quietly extinguishing itself, that our own generation is no more than its dying embers, and that future generations will be unable to rekindle it and need not even bother trying to do so?

Our concern once more must be to define our physical and mental environment as we want it today, so that we at least have the same freedom to defend and cultivate it, and take the same pride in doing so, as our forefathers did with theirs, given the resources that were at their disposal.

What exactly *is* our heritage, and how wrong were we to eradicate it from our memory? Was it really so enriching, so indispensable, after all? Would all its accumulated wealth really make it any easier for us to cope with today's challenges?

It was Lord John George Durham who, as inquirer from the British government, in his famous 1839 report on conditions in Lower Canada after the riots of 1837 and 1838, first stigmatized the Canadians as a people "without a history." My own thoughts on Quebec have led me to the conclusion that deep down, many of its people think the same way, although not all would admit to it. Hubert Aquin, for his part, openly confessed to it without any pretense of shame:

> All of a sudden, I dream that my unreal epic is part of the national calendar of a people without a history. The humiliation, the pity of it! For it is true that we have no history; and that we shall never have one until the uncertain moment when the war of revolution begins. Our history will begin in the blood of a revolution which I cannot bear and which I have scarcely understood.[18]

Others—the independence movement, socialists, secularists, feminists—take the view, in common with Marx, that our history up to this point has been no more than prehistory and that history proper will begin on the first glorious evening after the triumph of their particular causes.

With the exception of scholarly works and the writings of a few journalists, it must be conceded that many Quebecers show scant respect for their past, which explains the shallowness of their analysis of our current situation. Aspects of social reality that have been staring them in the face since at least 1920 pass unnoticed; in their eyes, urbanization, immigration, industrialization, and the rest began only yesterday.

Marc-Adélard Tremblay has given a fine account of how by perpetuating a tradition to which they accorded the value of an absolute, the elites—those responsible for defining the sociopolitical situation—for a long time successfully concealed the true nature and significance of our society's evolution both from themselves and, in the process, from the people as well. This ideological ruse has produced an ever-widening division between contemporary social reality and Quebec's understanding of that reality.[19]

Almost all intellectuals of my generation—notably the nationalists but perhaps even more so the antinationalists—did not take the trouble to examine our past for themselves and thus took this interpretation of our history for granted. Hence our caricature of Quebec as a unified and monolithic society. In reality, what we were condemning was not history but the distorted ideological representations of history that we had indiscriminately accepted before. If my generation, impatient as it was for change, saw tradition as a long winter, they did so in large degree because of their ignorance of our past.

Studying social change ultimately leads to the following question: How is it possible to go on drawing strength from one's roots while at the same time making the most of available and enriching change? Sociologist Colette Moreux has shown how in Douceville, a middle-sized city in central Quebec, people do not recognize change as a continuous process but see it only as fits and starts; hence the frequent and unexpected "jolting" that affects everybody, including the elites.

During a process of change over which no one has complete control, it is always difficult to decide what must be preserved and what, on the contrary, must give way to the new. The process almost invariably includes a certain number of undesirable consequences.

What Colette Moreux writes about Douceville, Quebec experienced as a whole between 1960 and 1966:

> With evolution happily taking its course, in a disarmingly unobtrusive manner, once Douceville had recovered from its amazement, like the sorcerer's apprentice, at how "things were starting to move," it wanted to take a break, to start over and do things more slowly and better; Douceville decided it wanted to be modern when it was already too late; it will indeed become modern, even if the outcome is different from what it intended.[20]

Those who find a period of rapid, intense change disturbing would do well to remember that the only way they can avoid misinterpreting their time and themselves is by rediscovering what French philosopher Paul Ricœur so aptly calls "that lost memory." As French novelist Saint-Exupéry also advises, they must strive to "rediscover Man. He alone is the essence of culture."

Possibly the most serious consequence of the Quebecers' lack of respect for the tradition of Quebec is highlighted by Marc-Adélard Tremblay, who stresses that we have put nothing in the place of what we have abolished:

> While doing away with customs dating back more than a century, Quebec's Francophones have so far been unable to come up with either new models of existence or value-systems with which to replace them. They have relinquished, piece by piece, the fundamental characteristics of their cultural particularity, before having had time to assimilate new elements which could be of equal benefit to their national values.[21]

If we are to understand recent change as well as what is happening now, we must take all aspects of our pluralistic society into account. We must heed the words and actions of all groups—not only those of politicians and intellectuals but also those of young people and women, of the deprived and businesspeople. They, it is said, may well be the architects of a totally new goal for our society.

At any given moment, our collective identity is a combination of both the fragments of tradition and the changes we are experiencing. The dividing line between tradition and change, however, is not clearly defined. As French anthropologist Georges Balandier writes, "It is easier to identify the levels of social reality which are in a state of transition than to pinpoint the exact moment at which a new society emerges."[22] From this perspective, it could be said that although we all still feel the effects of the Quiet Revolution constantly and intensely, it has already passed into the realm of tradition.

During periods of rapid social evolution, furthermore, change appears to displace tradition, pushing it to the back of our memory. As Balandier also writes, however:

> Modernity entails a scrambling of time-sequences; it multiplies them, fragments them, contracts them, setting them, so to speak, in a state of "crasis" in which they overlap and conflict with one another.[23]

A common error is to assume that the new is always by definition superior to the old. In some areas—technology, for example—it is perhaps correct to say that since Galileo and Newton, at least, every innovation has been another step of progress at the strictly technological level. (Even so, many recent technological advances—in genetic engineering, for instance—pose serious moral challenges and entail an upheaval in our knowledge of the consequences, the implications of which remain unknown.) In other areas, it is far less obvious whether change is synonymous with progress. For example, has philosophy progressed since Plato? Are the political regimes of our age superior to those Aristotle wrote of? Has the disappearance of the sacred from today's feasts made them any more joyous and moving than the religious feasts of the past?

One last error that must be avoided is to assume that any particular form of social evolution is irreversible, as some in Quebec in the 1970s (especially between 1976 and 1980) thought the move toward political independence was. Hubert Aquin rightly pointed out that:

> the future history of a human group is not a matter of fate, it is unpredictable: "A man defines himself by his profile," wrote Jean-Paul Sartre. "So does a people."[24]

THE ROAD AHEAD

Our nation's creative artists seem to have fallen silent. Do they refuse to speak because they feel politics has betrayed them? Or are we unable to hear them because the discord of politics obscures what they say? Fernand Dumont, a French-Canadian sociologist, writes in this connection:

> Nationalism in the 1960s sought to reconcile poetics and nationalism. Never before in our history had we pushed these two forms of self-expression so far. But as each developed further, was there not a danger that they would diverge from one another?[25]

This is the crux of the problem our creative artists pose for us all. Their view of our vast social landscape is, so to speak, distracted from its object or obscured by a sense of political alienation or impotence. One need not note the strong (if not entirely unanimous) aspiration in their works for political independence to conclude that the major obstacle to their creativity is their conviction that politics has become powerless either to protect or to promote the French language and the culture of Quebec.

Jacques Brault, a Quebec poet, aptly expresses this sense of alienation:

> We are a people who seem to have lost our bearings, as well as those of our history. The disproportion and lack of correspondence between the general state of affairs and our awareness of it is amazing. Our people seem almost to have forgotten that we are a people at all. Our position is a political one, but our awareness of this fact to some extent has little more immediacy for us than an abstraction.[26]

The sense of alienation is not merely political: in spite of their common concern for the French language, many creative artists feel out of touch with the general public. Those who see themselves as the poetic voice of the people are suddenly realizing that the people are not behind them, cannot understand them, cannot even hear them. Hence the artists' often paralyzing conclusion that they are simply voices crying in a cultural wilderness and that the paucity of means that society puts at their disposal hampers their ability to speak.

I firmly believe that this silence among our nation's creative artists is no more than a passing phase, since we now need them more than ever to awaken us from our state of collective torpor, as Georges Dor, Felix Leclerc, Gilles Vigneault, Gaston Miron, Fernand Ouellette, and others did from the 1960s until the day after the referendum of May 20, 1980. The time will come, perhaps sooner than we expect, when a new event from some unexpected quarter will either revive our hope or goad us into breathing new life into the Quebec issue. This reawakening of our creativity, whatever form it takes, is vital to us. Without it, we may never realize what we are capable of achieving.

Ever since I first involved myself in the future of Quebec, it has always been its defeats that have brought me closest to it: the failure, in 1970, of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to come up with political and constitutional recommendations in the welter of its famous blue pages, a failure I felt all the more keenly for having been a principal adviser of the commission; the repulsion at the FLQ's acts of terrorism as well as the humiliation at the measures our governments took to stamp them out, also in 1970; the defeat of the 1980 referendum, and particularly the setbacks of the years that followed, during which I came to see that Quebec was becoming the dupe of the two opposing governments.

In trying to discern the logic of my progression in understanding Quebec, I am led to this conclusion: if Quebec, in its present circumstances, cannot rely at all times on its intellectual, moral, and physical resources, then it will be weak; it will be so weak that, in some way or other, all its aspirations will be diverted from their goal and all its essential characteristics suppressed.

The problem that the new, rising generation and its elders face today is that everything they challenge or could challenge—religion, an increasingly invasive political system, trade-union militancy, the nation in the traditional sense of the term—has already been repudiated in previous decades. Does this mean that we are doomed to social chaos? Quite the contrary; it seems to me that there is a new world on the horizon. It will call for a far-reaching renewal of values—our own and those of our society as a whole.

The challenges facing Quebec between now and the year 2000 will be legion; they will be different from previous ones and more difficult. They will affect all sectors of the population, especially young people. This new generation does not show the same desire to stand up for the French language as its elders did, partly because it feels protected by Bill 101 (*la charte de la langue française,* or French language charter) and partly because Canada's Anglophones and speakers of other languages are becoming more tolerant of French. The young are also becoming increasingly individualistic because of intense competition on the job market, something they have in common with most industrialized countries. The challenges will affect women, who are insistently demanding, and increasingly getting, equality with men. The challenges will require difficult modifications in the status of certain social groups, notably bureaucrats and intellectuals. The first will suffer from the decline in prestige and power of public authorities. The second will be toppled from their traditional position as scholars, which previously ensured them prestige and influence, if not wealth. Henceforth they will be judged on the quality of their performance alone.

Last, the challenges will affect the economic sector, positively in this case. For the first time in their history, Francophones are realizing the value of the business world, and the upwardly mobile class is growing increasingly confident of success, which it works untiringly to achieve. This social group is also gaining increasing recognition and admiration among the population as a whole.

If our creative artists, and indeed all members of our society, are to adjust to these changes and find new grounds for a resurgence of nationalism, and if they are to give new momentum to the independence movement under the new president of the Parti québecois, the prestigious but equivocal Jacques Parizeau, then they will have to find a way of reconciling themselves with the collective needs and aspirations of our century as it draws to its close. What does seem clear is that the most important changes under way take two forms: the first stems from changes in Quebec's sociopolitical framework; the second, from an international climate in a state of turmoil. In this second area, the margin of error is so great that it is only possible to outline certain general tendencies.

Change in Quebec

I mentioned earlier the Meech Lake constitutional accord, whose terms, if they are ratified by Parliament and the government of Canada and by the legislatures and governments of the nine other provinces as well, and if they fulfill the hopes of Premier Robert Bourassa, notably in their recognition of Quebec's cultural distinctiveness, could attenuate the dissatisfaction with Canadian federalism and reduce the likelihood of resurgence in the independence movement. On a less positive note, Francophones account for only 24 percent of Canada's population (two decades ago the figure was 30 percent). The percentage is likely to continue falling gradually over the coming decades and to have a major bearing on the power relationship between the two main linguistic groups.

A second development, whose exact nature and scope also remain unknown, concerns the free-trade agreements with the United States. These will have unforeseen consequences for research institutes and the mobility of their researchers, for all activities in the economic sector, for the Canadian state, for the status of French in North America, and possibly for the stability of the Canadian state. In this area, the extensive education reforms of the 1960s seem to me to have been farsighted and essentially beneficial, for they make education open to everyone at all levels. I am well aware of the size of the failure rate in schools at all levels in Quebec, as I am in many other areas, just as I am aware of the disparity between the training many young people receive and the realities of the job market. Nevertheless, the overall progress which has been made in less than a generation in the cultural—and I would also say linguistic—standard of the majority of Quebecers seems to me to be an encouraging sign. Businesspeople, scientists, artists, and other professionals will be able to use Quebec's solid cultural base as a springboard in their quest for international recognition.

Another development concerns the size and ethnic composition of Quebec's population. If French is to survive here, transmitting the language from one generation of Francophones to the next will not be enough. The number of French speakers in Quebec in proportion to the rest of its population will decrease, at first imperceptibly and then sharply. Demographers warn that if current trends continue at their present rates, around a century from now the people of French origin will be no more than 12 to 15 percent of Quebec's population. Today they are almost 80 percent of its population.

We may have no more than ten years left to decide whether to let things simply run their course or turn the trend around by taking steps to improve the birth rate (for one thing, by changing young people's aversion to having large numbers of children). These are of course not demographic forecasts but merely projections based on trends; in the next few decades, they may be altered by any number of unforeseen factors. We shall not only have to accustom our ears to accents and expressions very different from those of our children but also to understand that increasing diversity can only enrich our linguistic and cultural heritage. Like Canada as a whole, Quebec is, and must remain, a land that welcomes all people.

Change in the World

The issues preoccupying young people today, as well as a growing number of Quebecers, are not the great themes of nationalism and independence of the past two decades. Now the issues are of international rather than local significance: new technology in most areas, the working conditions of tomorrow, the nature of moral values, the many forms of pollution, the danger of war that threatens to destroy the planet, terrorism, uncertainty about medium-term and short-term economic cycles, racial integration, entering the twenty-first century, the growing size of the aged population in Western society.

As I have said, it is international events that have played the most important role in shaping our life-styles and ways of thinking over the past two decades: the Second World War, Expo '67, and the importance the Quebec government has placed on international relations. It was not by chance that Quebec was one of the first French-speaking nations to propose the setting up of an international association of Francophones.

It seems to me that the Francophone world is under siege, with Quebec as the first line of defense, and because Quebec knows this, it, more than any other country, is concerned about the heavy losses that the growing domination of the North American cultural and economic systems inflicts on all the Francophone nations. Were Quebec to succumb to the avalanche of blows falling on it, our Francophone brothers-in-arms should realize that they themselves would be next in line.

One need hardly mention another international phenomenon that has had an important effect on Quebec: the thousands of young people of all nationalities who each year cross the oceans and frontiers to be with one another and who candidly share their cultural differences as well as the human condition. For these people, youth alone is the best means of communication!

As someone who has a particular fondness for roses, I delight in watching the new cultural varieties springing up in Montreal, in Chicoutimi, in Quebec, in Rimouski, in fact everywhere in the province: sidewalk cafés, colorful summer festivals thronging with men and women of all nationalities, summer theaters, arts and crafts exhibitions and workshops.

Our literature, our cinema, our theater, our popular songs, and our scientific achievements are all being exported now. The fact that they are translated into English, and then into ten or fifteen other languages, is proof of the excellence we have achieved in many fields.

This cultural splendor fills me with a pleasure I could never have dared hope for; I can at last experience in Quebec the same *joie de vivre* as in the rest of the world's most beautiful cities—Paris, New York, Kyoto. UNESCO accorded Quebec City the well-deserved distinction of being "the jewel of the world's cultural heritage." For at least twenty years the city had been a monument to a unique cultural heritage, the bequest of ten generations of people who lived in poverty yet who left a rich cultural treasure to their descendants.

AT THE HEART OF OUR EXISTENCE

At the end of *Mystère Québec,* Solange Chaput-Rolland writes:

> Here I am, then; I have searched within my innermost self, I have reached the furthest limit of my reflections, I am at the end of my explanations. I have nothing more to add to the welter of words, talk, speeches, interviews, and television programs to try in all honesty to penetrate the mystery of Quebec: it remains total.[27]

I will hazard a tentative definition of the mystery surrounding Quebec. The particularity of the people of Quebec resides not so much in non-French themes as in the fact that the French language, in the circumstances in which it finds itself on American soil, lies at the heart of our existence as an original society. Whatever subjects they deal with—and there are many—our creative artists almost invariably return to the same question: Is the French language still of relevance in North America, and if so, under what conditions?

I must express here a strong conviction of mine, which I believe is not generally shared in this society, which places such emphasis on uniformity (partly in reaction against the supposed elitism of the past, partly in response to a general tendency in Western civilization). I am in favor of the active promotion of excellence in all fields: business, politics, art, literature, science, philosophy, and the rest. Although I am not that old, I nevertheless belong to the generation of pioneers, of the first craftsmen who single-handedly founded and opened the way to a society that would be more cultured and more in harmony with its environment. These people possessed two qualities: unshakable belief in themselves and willingness to work themselves to the bone. In view of the circumstances in which we find ourselves, their work has produced fertile soil on which the society of Quebec can grow.

Growth is now well under way, and we must expand our goals. Let us allow ourselves to dream a little. We have dynamic, top-ranking people in all walks of life who are prepared to take risks. In each of our universities, for example, I am happy to say that we have several young professors who have been educated at the world's finest universities. Let us imagine that among the 150,000 students now attending our universities, 1,000 among them want and are able to get the most out of the resources our society puts at their disposal to develop their exceptional intellectual and personal qualities. We will have failed miserably in our task if by the turn of the century Quebec is unable to boast of at least 100 eminent, world-respected individuals, who, each in his or her own domain, can project the culture and the society of Quebec into the world at large. What a dazzling realization it would be of the dreams of Crémazie and Rivarol and of so many of our creative artists after them to achieve world fame as the French-speaking people of Quebec. Our scientists, our artists, our businesspeople, and our professionals would integrate into a society enriched in all respects. They would naturally recognize themselves in it. From such a perspective, we would scarcely be able to grasp the sweeping changes that had taken place in Quebec in less than the two decades leading to the year 2000.

Yet would all these famous people live, speaking French, in Quebec? That would depend to some extent on the individuals but above all on how far our society encouraged them to do so. My guess is that they would stay in Quebec. The fierce loyalty of Quebecers toward that jewel in the crown of their heritage, the French language, even when they have had little reason to be proud of it, seems to me the best guarantee not only that their mother tongue will survive but that it will gain renewed vigor. Through the efforts of those opening the way for it in many areas, it will go out into the world, and the world will take notice of Quebecers' words and actions because it has everything to gain by doing so.

The time will come when Canada's Anglophones will be proud to welcome Quebec into their political fold, to the extent that they will repeatedly ask of it "What political status can we offer you that you will find most fulfilling? For we now see that it is you who are showing the best way forward for our country as a whole." Then, and only then, will we stand tall and, instead of having to crawl to our partner to beg for the crumbs of random concessions, hammer out the constitutional terms ensuring that two different societies, two distinct peoples, may live as equals, and be happy, proud, and prosperous together.

ENDNOTES

[1] Léon Dion, *A la recherche du Québec,* vol. 1 of *Québec 1945–2000* (Ste.-Foy: Presses universitaires de l'Université Laval, 1987). With the permission of the editor of this publisher, several passages from this book are reproduced in this article.

[2] Solange Chaput-Rolland, *Mystère Québec* (Montreal: Pierre Tisseyre, 1984).

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[13] Aquin, *Blocs erratiques,* 53–57.

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[15] Researchers in Quebec are becoming increasingly aware of this problem. Among the published works on how Quebec has entered modernity, the following are in my opinion of particular interest: Edmond Orban et al., *La Modernisation*

politique du Québec (Montreal: Boréal Express, 1976); Yvan Lamonde and Esther Trepanier, *L'avènement de la modernité culturelle au Québec* (Quebec: Institut québecois de recherche sur la culture, 1986); and Marcel Fournier, *L'entrée du Québec dans la modernité* (Montreal: Editions Saint-Martin, 1986).

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[17] Fédération des francophones hors du Québec, *Un Espace economique à inventer* (Ottawa: Fédération des francophones hors du Québec, 1981).

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[22] Georges Balandier, ed., *Sociologie des mutations* (Paris: Anthropos, 1970), 26.

[23] Georges Balandier, *Le Détour, pouvoir et modernité* (Paris: Frayard, 1985), 265.

[24] Aquin, *Blocs erratiques,* 80.

[25] Fernand Dumont, *Le Sort de la culture* (Montreal: Hexagone, 1987), 301.

[26] Jacques Brault, "Discours de réception du prix David, 1987," *Possibles* 11 (3) (1987):172–73.

[27] Chaput-Rolland, 185–86.

Translated by Martin Roberts.

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Margaret Catley-Carlson

Aid: A Canadian Vocation

IN TODAY'S WORLD, only 1 person in every 200 is a Canadian. History and happenstance have endowed this shrinking fraction of humanity with an extraordinary amount of the world's resources: 10 million square kilometers, or almost 7 percent of the planet's land; forests nearly half that area; one-tenth of the world's river flow; extravagant amounts of mineral and ocean resources. We do not worry about where our natural resources for tomorrow will come from or about finding new places for Canadians to live in.

Canadians have benefited from an immense geopolitical blessing. Not only do we have ten to twenty times a fair per capita share of all these riches, but we enjoy a bracing climate and a prime location. Already isolated by distance from wars and possible enemies, we have been further sheltered by peaceable relationships, first with imperial Britain and more recently with the superpower next door to our south. We don't have the hordes on our doorstep, and we don't have to pacify the neighbors with foreign aid to keep our relations civil.

By any standards, we are not through building the country yet. Nearly 90 percent of it has no permanent population. Only 7 percent of the land is fit for farming. And 4 out of 5 Canadians live in large centers within 300 kilometers of the U.S. border, with 15 million of our 25 million people clustered in southern Ontario and Quebec. It takes a lot of money to keep us joined by roads, satellites, pipelines, school systems, and portable pension plans. Our national debates are

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Margaret Catley-Carlson is President of the Canadian International Development Agency.

still about investment inflows, not outgoes. We have quite an alarming government deficit, more than enough foreign debt, and no shortage of places at home to put our money into.

We didn't have a colonial period, of either the imperial or the neocolonial type, and we don't suffer guilt on behalf of those who did. I don't believe anyone has ever suggested using Canadian aid as a counteroffer in order to move to a more restrictive refugee or immigration policy. Since most countries that have done so have had immigration policies designed to maintain the purity of languages or races as the basis for nationhood, this suggestion wouldn't be very relevant here anyway. For many years we have taken both immigrants and refugees from parts of the world suffering economic or political stress, and most of us would probably find the notion of foreign aid as a substitute for immigration inflows puzzling.

Why on earth—in these circumstances, with no military aspirations in the developing parts of the world and with lamentably limited markets for our products out there so far—does Canada help the distant Third World? Why do we see our foreign aid effort as something that defines us? In a 1985 joint report the Senate and House of Commons noted that because our trade with the developing world is just a small part of our total trade, aid becomes the major element in our north-south policy. "More than that," they added, "it is a Canadian vocation." When asked by college students in Chicago what he saw as the difference between Canadians and Americans, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney said that one of the first things that came to mind was Canada's strong commitment to assist foreign development. Why are Canadians so willing to help?

To begin at the very beginning, a sense of mission is probably as much a part of Canada's history as the lust for furs and land—from the priests who accompanied the first explorers to the apostles of British imperial values. We were very much colonized by the collar and the word, every bit as much as by the rule of civil power.

And we continued this sense of mission. To foster education and health care, Canadian missionaries and volunteers first went to places we now call developing countries more than a hundred years ago, and for a century of Sundays generations of Canadian children put pennies in the box or on the plate to keep them there.

Other factors doubtless shored up this missionary zeal (which was of course not restricted to Canada or Canadians)—for instance, the demands of our climate and terrain. "Mon pays, ce n'est pas un pays, c'est l'hiver" ("My country is not a country, it's winter") sings Gilles Vigneault in his anthem to Quebec. Survival is most often cited as the key theme in Canadian literature. At 30 below, there are no self-made men (or women, much less children). A rugged individualist won't last till spring if things go wrong. But if people have the ability to cooperate, they can survive. Nature gives an annual, compulsory seminar in dependence and responsibility.

From the physical to the psychological: according to Louis Hartz's fragment theory, the United States was founded by classical laissez-faire liberals, while their defeated adversaries—the United Empire Loyalists who became the core of British Canada—were Burkean conservatives. Coalescing with Quebec's seigneurial society, the losers of revolution joining the losers of war, these conservatives might well shape a nation with caring, if sometimes paternalistic, attitudes.

In contrast to the United States, created according to its own myth by rugged individualists seeking their rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, Canada was born by edict and built by institutions: Church and Crown, Hudson's Bay Company, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Our founding constitutional documents speak of peace, order, and good government. And the country has been held together by government-financed links of security, transportation, education, and communications, by a safety net of social welfare including health care, by the idea of regional equalization (through transfer payments to ensure standards of social services in the poor parts of the country)—in short, by an instinct for cooperation.

That these concepts ought to extend to the international arena as part of the rationale for development assistance does not seem strange to the Canadian mind. Government-centered development may be finding less favor in the 1980s, but Canadians remain comfortable with the notion of a mixed economy and are perhaps more attuned to such efforts in the Third World.

Canadians also recognize that, in the long run, international development will benefit us all. As one of the most export-dependent of the major industrial nations, and as the only one without sure access to a large-scale consumer market such as the European Community or the United States, Canada has a very strong interest in promoting global economic growth. Nearly thirty cents out of each dollar in Canadian pockets comes from exports. Canadian trade is now skewed heavily to the United States, which took three-quarters of our exports in 1986. But as the world changes, old patterns fade and new competitors crowd into tight markets. We are realizing uneasily that we must explore new markets, especially the rapidly growing markets of the developing world.

Some of our earliest trade ties were with today's "less-developed countries"—in the Caribbean, for instance. But Canada's level of trade with the Third World in the 1980s is strikingly low: less than 10 percent of Canadian exports go to developing countries, while the United States, Japan, and members of the European Community (EC) sell 30 to 40 percent of their exports on Third World markets. We need to change this pattern. One way to strengthen our links with the economies of the Third World is through our development program.

Whatever our motivation—religious, humanitarian, ethical, idealistic—it is powerful. It is the bedrock of public support for an official aid program. Lester Pearson spoke of "aid weariness" almost twenty years ago in his book *Partners in Development,* but the level of public support has stayed high in Canada, in the 70 to 85 percent range—falling a bit in times of economic trouble at home, rising again during crisis overseas. In an opinion survey at the end of 1987, half of those questioned saw poverty and hunger as the most serious world issue; four out of five supported Canada's aid effort (thought it received the right amount of funding or should be increased); and nine out of ten wanted Canada to be among the more generous donors or a world leader in development assistance.[1]

Recent surveys show that while Canadians still strongly endorse the concept of aid as morally right, most are fairly skeptical about whether development and aid actually work. At the same time, Canadians are forming a more sophisticated understanding of the long-term nature of the challenge.[2]

THE CANADIAN AID PROGRAM

Just what kind of aid do we consent to give so consistently? Canada's official development assistance program is only middling in size, but broad in scope and varied in approach. Its budget this year is about U.S. $2.3 billion—one-half of 1 percent of Canada's GNP, or about two cents out of each dollar the federal government spends. This amount means that among industrial-country donors, Canada—with an aid-to-GNP ratio more than one-third higher than the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average—is twice as giving as the United States, but only half as generous as the Scandinavians and the Dutch.

Canada's aid effort originated after World War II, through United Nations agencies and the Colombo Plan, launched in 1950 to help the newly independent ex-colonies of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. Today Canada's development program resembles those of several other donors. The tombstone data look roughly as follows:

- Bilateral aid, the biggest chunk, represents about 40 percent of the aid budget or almost one-half if food aid is included. It is negotiated between governments to reflect developing countries' priorities in projects to meet the needs of their own people.
- Multilateral aid represents one-third of this budget and supports the work of international organizations such as UNICEF, regional development banks, and the Commonwealth and La Francophonie.
- Special programs encourage the involvement of private-sector partners, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), social and educational institutions, and Canadian business and industry.
- Various arrangements for providing $1 million worth of food aid per day and for sending humanitarian relief to refugees and disaster victims.

Through these channels, Canadian taxpayers' dollars flow out into tens of thousands of development initiatives and efforts all over the world, including:

About 1,000 Canadian-sponsored bilateral projects.

About 4,000 projects sponsored by churches, other NGOs, co-ops, unions, and universities.

About 400 food aid projects.

About 100 disaster relief projects.

Several hundred initiatives to develop links between Canadian and Third World businesses.

Thousands of projects financed by development banks.

Thousands of programs assisted through multilateral organizations.

What have been the distinguishing marks of Canadian aid over the past four decades? I can think of five: a rather special institution, an unusually high commitment to multilateralism, a thriving partnership with the nongovernmental community, the global scope of our assistance, and the way Canadian society is reflected in our official development assistance program.

The IDRC

In the early 1970s Parliament created the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). The scope of its work is imaginative, and its board is international. Since it reports directly to Parliament, the IDRC is very independent. It was founded on the novel idea of funding the research of developing countries on their own problems, thus helping to redress the global imbalance in science and technology.

The IDRC has made a unique contribution to international development and has earned a worldwide reputation for excellence. It was one of the first organizations to recognize the importance of investing in agricultural research in Africa, particularly in the semiarid tropics. It has sponsored valuable work on development issues ranging from agriculture and human resources to health care and information sciences. And it has had an important multiplier effect by contributing to the spread of development research expertise throughout the Third World. Developing countries, as well as nongovernmental organizations and institutions, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and other aid agencies have reaped valuable benefits from IDRC research.

Dr. Tom Malone, a former foreign secretary of the National Academy of Sciences in the United States, has called the IDRC "the premier organization in the world tackling one of the most critical problems of our time." The governments of the United States, Sweden, West Germany, Holland, and Australia have incorporated the IDRC model into their aid mechanisms. The governments of Japan, Norway, and Italy are now studying it.

Multilateral Forever

Canadians are firmly committed to the concept of the multilateral international development system but are quite skeptical about the value of particular parts of it. We are stronger financial supporters of the system than most, with a running average of about 38 percent of our aid being disbursed through multilateral organizations. Our share of the burden is high in comparison with the the share of the rest of the Summit Seven. Japan gives close to Canada's percentage level, but the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, and the United States make less than one-quarter of their aid available through the globally managed multilateral system, with the last three offering less than 20 percent—EC figures not included. Perhaps we believe, along with others, that a healthy multilateral system benefits everyone, but especially medium and small-size global players.

Although Canadians are very discouraged about the current state of large parts of the multilateral system, the prevailing view is that most of these organizations would have to be reinvented if they didn't exist now. This has made us less prone to walk out of them, as the United States and the United Kingdom have done with the International Labor Organization (ILO) and with UNESCO. We tend to stay and fight within for reform. We led a highly publicized, if unsuccessful, campaign to change the leadership of the Rome-based Food and Agriculture Organization. We lost, but decided to stay and keep on pressing for the reforms that we felt justified the campaign in the first place.

Nongovernmental Partnerships

Another Canadian specialty was pioneered twenty years ago, when the Canadian International Development Agency was created and was so successful that other donors have copied our model. This is the channeling of official development assistance through NGOs—that is, entrusting private groups with taxpayers' dollars. Canadians are enthusiastic about the results, and Canada provides more of its aid in this way than any other big donor. Almost 12 percent of Canadian aid last year was disbursed through nongovernmental channels. Using this route means we avoid the complexities of our own government apparatus. More important, the partner on the other end is also often nongovernmental.

The effectiveness of this approach was recently demonstrated in Canada's response to political change in the Philippines. When Corazon Aquino came to power, Canadians wanted to move quickly to assist. A coalition of Canadian and Philippine nongovernment groups put together the initial program. Canadian NGOs have also coordinated and managed a large part of Canada's sizable program in support of the international campaign to immunize the world's children against the six main childhood diseases by 1990.

Our Global Aid Policy

It is a source of enormous frustration to many Canadian parliamentarians, development academics, and others who care about such issues as aid that Canadian aid is so spread out among the countries of the developing world. If all our aid were to be divided among the people of the Third World, each individual would receive 65 Canadian cents. In reality, things aren't quite that diffuse, but we are indeed active in a great number of countries—more than eighty.

About 40 percent of Canada's bilateral aid went to Asia last year, a bit over 20 percent apiece to Francophone and Anglophone Africa, and about 15 percent to the Caribbean and to Central and South America. The top dozen recipients were Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Tanzania, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Senegal, Jamaica, Niger, China, Mali, and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference.

Certainly, the aid decisions of most industrialized countries reflect a more directed approach to selecting partners. The top ten bilateral aid recipients for France, for instance, are current or former French colonies; eighteen of the top twenty for the United Kingdom are former British colonies or protectorates. Fully 45 percent of U.S. bilateral aid goes to two countries of high foreign-policy priority—Egypt and Israel. Nine out of the ten top Japanese and Australian aid partners are Asian. In contrast, Canada's top ten span three continents and are a blend of Commonwealth members, Francophone nations, and countries in neither category.

This is of more than academic interest. Canada's very diffuse pattern of bilateral aid distribution, combined with the high proportion of aid we make available multilaterally and through NGOs means that in almost no developing country are we a major donor. Let's look at some examples. Our largest single bilateral program is in India, but we are not one of the top five donors to India. If you add bilateral and food aid, the largest Canadian program is in Bangladesh—but we are only the sixth largest donor in their eyes. And so it goes around the world. Although Canada is now putting a far bigger share of its aid money annually into Africa than is the United States, in the 1985–1986 OECD statistics we don't even rank in the list of the top ten donors to sub-Saharan Africa.

We can draw some interesting conclusions from these figures. First, any extraordinary influence or special ability that Canada has in the development field is not due to how large our aid looms in any given country. Except for our presence in the eastern Caribbean, we're pretty far down the list everywhere. Second, our modest weight spells doom for the views of the few determined Canadians who believe our provision of aid gives us the right to influence a wide variety of policies and practices in the countries we assist. It's not well known that developing countries as a group have depended on foreign aid for less than 20 percent of their investments. For example, India funds 92 to 94 percent of its own investment from domestic resources. Of the remainder, aid accounts for about 4 percent. At the 1987 consortium meeting in Paris, Canada's pledge represented little more than 1 percent of all the pledges made. Clearly, we cannot use this amount of investment to influence everything from human rights to United Nations votes and from attitudes toward family planning to willingness to manage properly.

Aid as our Mirror Image

Although we try to focus on the poorest countries and people, our aid allocations also have some relation to Canada's population mixture. They are its blurred reflection. Our people come from everywhere—we are a rather lumpy stew, with basic ingredients still mostly recognizable. About 2 percent of us are native peoples—Indians of ten major language groups living in various states of tradition, transition, or disarray, plus one-quarter of the world's Inuit population. A very small amount of Canadian aid is directed to indigenous peoples around the world. New France, an offshoot of Louis XIV's society untouched by the Revolution, evolved in its own way, and 27 percent of today's Canadians are of French origin. The aid we give to Africa goes half to Anglophone, half to Francophone countries.

Our largest ethnic group, at 40 percent, is British (reflecting George III's colonial disaster, plus migrant Scots and Irish). The Commonwealth association is of real importance for Canadians, and the commercial potential of countries like India, Kenya, and Zimbabwe does nothing to diminish this relevance. Add our assistance to Commonwealth and Francophone groups, and you'll see about 65 percent of our government-to-government flows.

Other substantial groups include Germans, Italians, and Ukrainians. Waves of immigration recently have brought in people fleeing strife, oppression, or hardship in Eastern Europe, the Caribbean, Lebanon, and Vietnam. These arrivals have enriched the mix and are starting to influence the shape and focus of aid allocations. The Tamil and Haitian communities, for example, have strong views on how events in their countries of origin should be reflected in aid decisions.

The regions of Canada also have a wide variety of linkages. Quebec has cultural affinities with Francophone Africa and Haiti, areas of long-term interest to French-speaking Canadian business. The Atlantic Provinces have a long history of trade (fish for rum and sugar) with the Caribbean. Halifax is closer to Kingston than to Vancouver, and the Bank of Nova Scotia opened a branch in Jamaica's capital before it had one in Toronto. The Commonwealth Caribbean is special for Canadians—it may be the only place on earth where Americans are asked what province they come from.

And while we are a Western Hemisphere country, a member of the Inter-American Development Bank, and the donor of a slightly larger percentage of aid to the hemisphere than the overall OECD average, we are also a Pacific Rim country. British Columbia makes us so. Many of its citizens are of Asian origin, and much tourism, trade, and investment come from there. With China, Indonesia, Thailand, and other countries belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, our linkages may have originated with aid, but now they stem from family and commerce.

And Africa—there is an almost inexplicable strength of feeling between Canadians and Africans. Where does it come from? From missionaries and Commonwealth-Francophonie and common hatred for apartheid, from personal ties and the easy friendships that come from not having too intimately shared parts of our histories. Or, paradoxically from common experience: when famine struck Ethiopia four years ago, drawing a strong public response across Canada, the most spontaneous generosity of all came from Inuit settlements in the Arctic, where elders remembered from first-hand experience what famine feels like.

What it boils down to is that we are a summit country but a middle-size power, and we pursue a global foreign policy and therefore a global aid policy. We were involved in the Colombo Plan from the beginning—in efforts at peacekeeping and/or development in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, and we are now becoming more involved in Central America, southern Africa, and China. But what kind of role, qualitatively, have we been playing?

In the first place, Canadian aid has been responsive to needs that the developing countries have identified themselves. While our bilateral aid has been tied to the purchase of Canadian goods and services, we have allowed the priorities of each country to dictate the sectors and types of activity we contribute to. This responsiveness has been the subject of a long-running debate in Canada. Critics argue that tying aid to purchases from Canada cuts its real value. But Canada, unlike other donors, lacks the colonial ties, the Crown agents, and the sheer economic power to ensure that our aid reflects Canadian capabilities. Nevertheless, we have loosened some tying requirements to add greater flexibility to the program. In 1988, as part of a new strategy for Canada's development cooperation, they have been reduced for bilateral aid, especially for assistance to least-developed and sub-Saharan countries.

Second, having a small population scattered over a huge area has induced Canada to build up a large stock of infrastructure and expertise, beyond our current needs. In many of the sectors basic to national development, such as railways, air transport, forestry, agricultural research, and geophysical mapping, we have spare capacity, and it has seemed eminently sensible to make these specialized resources available as part of Canada's aid program.

Third, Canadians are quite united in the view that there is no single way to do anything. Perhaps the struggle to survive—despite climate, domination, and competition—has fostered the attitudes, skills, and habits of consensus building, compromise, and negotiation. There is no "Canadian way." So we listen. Around the world, governments have made a point of praising not only Canada's involvement in projects but its spirit of balance, flexibility, and willingness to incorporate others' values.

This spirit is reflected in our acceptance of political diversity and change within developing countries. Once an aid relationship with a country is begun, we tend to stay with it in spite of ideological gyrations. When the Cuban revolution resulted in that country's near isolation in the hemisphere, Canada not only maintained diplomatic recognition but kept foreign assistance flowing right up to the time that Cuba began to send troops to southern Africa. Our program of assistance to Nicaragua, centered on dairy development, energy, and support for some very active nongovernmental groups, is substantial.

Overall, the Canadian aid program has been conducted well and much appreciated in the developing countries. The high commissioner for Barbados, Peter Morgan, put it this way in a letter to the editor in the Ottawa *Citizen:*

> There are a few things Canadians should know:
>
> > Canada gives aid to developing countries without being patronizing.
> > Canada gives aid without offending the dignity of the recipient countries however undeveloped and poor they may be.
> > Canada gives aid without demanding prior assurances of a quid pro quo in the form of support of its points of view at the United Nations or other international forums.
> > Canada does not threaten to withdraw or deny aid to countries which might choose to purchase unrelated capital goods from a third country, rather than from Canada, for reasons of merit or price.
> > Canada's primary concern in its foreign aid program is quite clearly humanitarian—"human imperatives" is Ambassador Lewis' more elegant term. That is plain for all to see.
>
> In short, Canada treats other less economically, militarily and politically powerful countries with respect. That is why Canada is so highly respected in return.[3]

These are welcome—and reassuring—words. Over the past two decades, Canadian development assistance has gained a higher reputation overseas than at home. Domestic criticism has focused on certain projects gone awry but has included concern about overcentralization, lack of control in the field, human rights abuses by Third

World governments, the environmental impact of projects, and doubts about whether Canadian aid actually reaches those it is intended for.

DOES IT WORK?

The process may be complex, and the means yet imperfect, but the vision is simple. Development works. We need only look at the facts: declining rates of infant mortality, rising rates of literacy, lengthening life spans. The Third World is not doomed and is not stagnating in hopeless apathy. Over the second half of the twentieth century, it has moved ahead faster than we ever did at comparable stages in our own development. Sri Lanka, for instance, in an eight-year period after World War II, racked up the same increase in life expectancy that had earlier taken Sweden a century to achieve.

While there is ample evidence that development has scored many successes, it is indeed difficult to measure and prove the impact of aid, much less of one donor. Too many variables enter the picture. Drought can devastate agriculture; a drop in demand and price for a Third World commodity—say, copper, sisal, or coffee—can more than wipe out the benefits of even a massive irrigation scheme and leave a country unable to buy essential fertilizer; a country can end up worse off than before. But there is good reason to believe that Canada's aid projects have helped bring progress about—from ships like the *Federal Palm* and the *Federal Maple*, which linked the Caribbean states, to schools for the children of those islands, from the Panaftel network for strengthening communication in Africa to drylands agriculture in India.

Canadians are confident that they can continue to make a valuable contribution to international development. We've learned much from the past thirty—now almost forty—years of development cooperation. For example, we know now that development will not last long if aid programs do not reflect environmental concerns. We have accordingly made the environment a consideration in all of our projects. We've also learned that the concerns and needs of women need to be considered if projects are to succeed. This too is reflected in our development policy.

To keep our aid programs relevant, we need to find answers to a whole host of new questions. We must come up with appropriate responses to Third World debt as well as to the food production and environmental problems in sub-Saharan Africa. At the policy level, we need to find the proper place for human rights issues in our development program. Public pressure to do so has mounted as awareness of international standards of human rights has grown. The trick is to make a concern for human rights compatible with a program aimed at poverty alleviation. Many of the poorest countries in the world are also the worst human rights violators. Making human rights a criterion of aid giving may come squarely up against a desire to focus assistance on the poorest countries and peoples.

DEVELOPMENT MEANS SURVIVAL

For a long time, people said that Canada was a country searching for an identity. In recent years, people have, mercifully, almost stopped using this cliché. I think our elusive identity is gradually taking shape; Canada is materializing out of the northern mists, and it's not quite what anyone expected. Much of our story is unique, and the result is complex: to focus on one aspect of our development, some stereotype of Canada, is to miss the whole point. Our people, sinking roots into this geography, have produced a country that is mono-, bi-, and multicultural, all at the same time. Our pessimists decry us as a nation too weak to fully assimilate its elements; our optimists see us as so calm, tolerant, and confident that diversity is welcome and conformity not needed.

Canada is a major modern industrial nation and, at the same time, a middle power with some developing-country characteristics. It's a very human society, highly urban and service oriented, in which a commitment to equal rights for women has taken firm root and pollution of the environment is considered an important issue (by 98 percent, according to a recent survey[4]).

In "the global village" (a Canadian image from sociologist Marshall McLuhan), the 1 lonely Canadian finds that a relationship with those 199 neighbors who aren't Canadian is a vital interest, a question of survival. Perhaps Canada's commitment to world development is the broadest expression yet of our instinct for survival. In it may lie the opportunity to help build prosperous societies overseas that will generate the trade and thus the jobs we will need to ensure our own future. In world development we see a chance, too, to help our planet and our species survive the stress of desertification, population growth, deforestation, and food shortage. If we won't commit ourselves to dealing with these threats, blessed as we are, who will?

ENDNOTES

[1] *Report to CIDA: Public Attitudes Toward International Development Assistance* (Hull: Canadian International Development Agency, 1988).

[2] A number of surveys carried out in the 1980s by such firms as Decima, Goldfarb, Longwoods, and Adcom reflect these attitudes. See especially the most recent of these, the report cited in note 1 above. Asked where most of Canada's aid should go, 75 percent of respondents chose long-term progress over emergency assistance (question 7, p. 26) despite widespread doubt about the effectiveness of aid (questions 16, 17, 21, and 23, p. 28).

[3] Ottawa *Citizen,* 16 January 1988.

[4] *Review '87/Outlook '88* (Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1987).

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Monique Bégin

Debates and Silences— Reflections of a Politician

A POLITICIAN, in fact any public figure, learns by intuition and by observation what can and should be discussed as well as what cannot and should not be spoken. The issues that require silent accommodation, however, are often less clear than the fact of their existence. To understand Canada's silences and debates, one must study the social fabric of the country and the type of democracy it has developed. Like the United States, Canada is heterogeneous, another potential melting pot. Unlike its neighbor to the south, however, Canada has days when it seems to be doing everything it can to accentuate the differences among its various groups. What, then, does their national identity consist of? And how can they maintain a stable democracy?

Instead of being like the United States with its disparate collection of individuals differentiated by ethnic, linguistic, socioeconomic, religious, or other factors and united by having the same constitutional rights and the same dreams and opportunities, Canada has many groups. Each one has a unity based on a strongly defined identity and belongs to a collection of ten powerful provinces and two territories under one of the most decentralized federal governments in the world. These groups divide into two distinct societies through which individuals organize and define themselves. Literature has provided the expression "the two solitudes" to describe this best-known fragmentation of Canada—its French-English duality.

Monique Bégin holds the Joint Chair in Women's Studies at the University of Ottawa and Carleton University.

Actually, Canada is made up of three broad demographic groups: the French, the English, and the other, the "ethnic," Canadians. And if one counts the native people as its first component, the country has four groups.

Each of these groups, in turn, subdivides into two, three, or more categories. The French, for instance, now consist of the old stock of Francophone "Québecois pure laine" as well as recent Haitian immigrants, Asian Francophones, and Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Francophones from North Africa and the Middle East. These people live mainly in the province of Quebec, which is officially French-speaking. With them also lives an important group of Anglophones who are either newly arrived citizens or descendants of early settlers. Outside Quebec are the Acadians and the other Francophone minorities. Thus it is for each group. Even the nine Anglophone provinces and the two territories show distinctive regional characteristics in their social makeup, not in just their physical environment.

During past elections and political crises in Canada, nothing was more difficult to explain to newcomers than the fact that Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau was not over and above René Lévesque, the premier of Quebec Province, and that Jean Drapeau, the famous mayor of Montreal, was not under the other two. I would not even undertake to explain that the federal government is so decentralized that it is left with approximately one-third of all the spending power from tax revenues in Canada. The provinces control the other two-thirds. So often the structure of a country is envisioned as a pyramid, a unified, authoritarian setting; the Canadian reality of competing yet cooperating political forces, equal among themselves and sharing in the government of the people, is not always easy to grasp. One visible example is the conferences of first ministers and their growing importance. The centrifugal dynamics of such segmentation of this small population dispersed over such a vast land should lead to catastrophe, but the people continue to live with a fair amount of harmony under quite a unified political structure, despite their lack of strong national identity.

According to political scientists interested in fragmented but stable democracies such as the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland, Canada is a good example of the "multiple balance of power." To borrow a concept put forward by the Dutch analyst Arend

Lijphart, Canada is a "consociational democracy" (or a "semi-consociational" one), a cooperative society. With his fourfold typology of democratic regimes, Lijphart distinguishes between the behavior of elites (it is either coalescent or adversarial) and between the types of social structure (they are either homogeneous or pluralistic):

> Coalescent behavior [of elites] is indispensable in order to manage the severe cleavages of a plural society. . . . In a consociational democracy, the centrifugal tendencies inherent in a plural society are counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behavior of the leaders of the different segments of the population. Elite cooperation is the primary distinguishing feature of a consociational democracy.[1]

Canada exemplifies the basic ideas of Lijphart's theory. The country has a "grand coalition" in its various mechanisms for consultation between the two orders of government and between the French and the English populations. It makes use of the mutual informal veto. In its cultural plurality and single-member constituency system lies Lijphart's concept of proportionality. Each province has a certain autonomy.

Robert Presthus, another political analyst of pluralist societies, has documented this theory of "elite accommodation" in Canada's politics. Its elites have little ideology but look for pragmatic solutions to national problems, he says, and operate in a closed, deferential style. To avoid the strain of conflicting demands, he suggests that elite groups find they must narrow the range of access to and participation in the so-called direct democracy and choose to remain somewhat removed from the rest of society. Through the leaders of interest groups, business and its associated elites develop considerable technical information, while the political elites take up the charge of accommodating the claims of the divergent subcultures. Their incentives "include the efforts of elites of the two major subcultures to avoid the disintegration of the national political system, which is threatened by French-Canadian nationalism within as well as American economic and cultural imperialism."[2] Of course this accommodation process takes place behind the scenes and does not reach the public discourse.

Through the ongoing debates and silences of the Canada of, say, the last twenty years, we can sort out and identify the lines of force—

the main themes—from the more superficial, short-lived issues that characterize the nation. For example, is the great debate of Trudeau's "Just Society" concerning the place of the native people in our society, concerning their rights and their land claims, a debate full of passion that dominated till the end of the 1960s? Was it just a casual exercise in rhetoric, or does it come from deep down in the country's soul? Somehow the native presence haunts us with a powerful malaise, in itself a signal to decode, for which I do not have the key. This theme comes and goes, in modern Canada at least, leaving us with a feeling of collective guilt rather than with some sense of accomplishment. We all know the names that revive this intense uneasiness: the National Indian Brotherhood, the Nishgas of B.C., the James Bay Crees, the Dene nation, Mr. Justice Thomas Berger, the Alberta Lubicons—all names that remind us of an old injustice we wish could be erased. Today, when noting the increasing native presence in our western cities, we do not know how to react. The nervousness is so high over the obvious difference in status and opportunities that we are not sure which public policy is appropriate in the circumstances. Too often, we simply keep silent.

Alongside these worries is the more recent debate about the protection of our fragile but overwhelming environment. Does this issue touch a deep chord in all Canadians, or is it just a passing fad for us, a politicians' convenient smoke screen to divert attention from other difficult issues? It's hard to tell. Yet, if a long-exposure photograph of the national scene were taken today, the traveler would see us animatedly discussing the death penalty, abortion, and other issues that are not really unique to us—issues dictated by the development of new sensibilities all over the world. The traveler would observe that religion is not discussed, while the status of women makes for very serious debate involving both citizens and politicians. How can this be so? And why would the country never refer to economic initiatives and trends in financial concentration of power, as if *expansionism* were a dirty word? And is that apparently deep feeling for peace, development, and assistance real and something the majority shares?

I believe that four themes—two silences and two debates—describe Canadians as much as discussions on bilingualism and federal-provincial relations do.

In Canadian politics, one great silence is religion. No politician in contemporary Canada would ever speak insistently about religion. But why? Canada is not the only modern pluralistic society. The United States is also a community of many faiths. Institutional religions have grown vigorously and continue to prosper in both nations, yet only in the United States do religious issues and symbols seem to be used constantly for patriotic goals. Americans easily identify themselves with particular religious denominations, and "the country's leadership is convinced that democracy rests upon a religious foundation and must fall unless the beliefs, attitudes and virtues that religion inculcates are generally accepted."[3] This statement, written thirty years ago for a symposium of the Committee on International Relations, might have appeared yesterday. Public affairs programs and newspaper coverage of the primaries for the 1988 presidential election also suggest how prominent religious issues are in the United States.

In Canada, however, the potential divisiveness and the extraordinary emotional power of religion are recognized as if by instinct. All public figures consent to a wise silence. Of course this is not to negate that we hear a voice here and there expressing the moral values of the New Right, as Bill Van der Zalm, the premier of British Columbia, tried to do. Neither does this statement identify the kind of silence we have here. It is not always serene, but rather, a voluntarily imposed silence. Not a tormented one either, but a silence that at times feels like talking. Yet, a silence.

The only reference made to religion during my eight years in the federal cabinet as minister of national health and welfare occurred in our weekly meeting of ministers—not a very public club! It took place just before a cabinet meeting, shortly after the first results of the 1981 population census had been released by Statistics Canada. The minister responsible for the agency was telling Prime Minister Trudeau that for the first time citizens who identified themselves as Catholic formed the majority of Canadians. No comment was made, but the face of Allan MacEachen—then deputy prime minister and a staunch Catholic from Nova Scotia, more precisely from Cape Breton Island—showed what could only be interpreted as pleasure at a long overdue revenge against history.

Only once in recent Quebec history has a religious reference been made by a politician, and he was almost assassinated by cartoonists for having done so. In 1978, shortly after his election as leader of the provincial Liberal party, it was reported that Claude Ryan, now minister of education in the Bourassa government, when asked about his priorities and political choices, described his life as having been "guided by the hand of God." Overnight, "la main de Dieu"[4] became the laughingstock of the province, and Ryan was reminded that anyone could claim such a privilege. More interesting was a statement he made the following week in an attempt to explain himself:

> If a public figure refuses to be a witness of his faith, it seems to me that he contributes to privatizing (to reducing to the private life) religious values to the point that, one day, they will become meaningless.[5]

It was well known that Ryan had for seventeen years been the secretary general of l'Action catholique in Quebec, a lay organization of the Church, and despite Ryan's reputation as a tough intellectual editorial writer, the mere reference to religion was no longer acceptable to his fellow citizens. Such references, it seems, belong to the past.

Some may argue that the recent full public funding of the Catholic school boards in Ontario after acrimonious debate disproves the thesis that religion is a silence in Canada. It is not clear in this issue if the discussions show this to be a case of open religious bigotry or a hidden example of active resistance to the Francophones' rights. Perhaps both attitudes are so mean and so intolerant, and their potential for divisiveness so high, that many citizens make sure the debate remains outside the religious as well as the ethnic realm. When David Peterson, the premier of Ontario, signed Bill 30 in 1986 to give full funding to Catholic high schools instead of allocating an additional extra budget to cover the initiative, he was simply redistributing the money earmarked for education, with a loss to the already funded public boards. Understandably, many parents became angry at the thought of lowering the quality of education their children would get. The public school system feels it has now been given a lower priority. Since separate school boards (Catholic) are growing quite rapidly, the budgetary imbalance is perceived as undoing the public system's past achievement of providing equal opportunity for every group. But again, part of this quietly raging debate may also be the expression of a wise silence.

The last census statistics (from 1981) reveal that Catholics represent 47.4 percent of the Canadian population, Protestants 41.1

percent, Jews 1.2 percent, people of other faiths 2.9 percent, and those professing no religion 7.4 percent.[6] Given the Catholic majority, it is surprising that a public Catholic political discourse has not emerged in either Quebec or the rest of Canada. Indeed, the Canadian Catholic bishops have made only a few ad hoc attempts to express a political philosophy during the last decade. They have spoken against poverty and unemployment both at home and abroad, and have called for a more "just society," echoing the slogan of Trudeau's 1968 leadership campaign and election platform. They have discussed immigration and aid to the Third World. They have also taken a public stand against abortion, notably in the person of Emmett Cardinal Carter, the archbishop of Toronto, who in 1988 demanded a complete ban on this medical procedure. Yet their statements had little public impact, as recent polls have confirmed.[7]

Trudeau, who shaped Canadian destiny and public philosophy for some seventeen years, felt very strongly that religion and politics, church and state, ought to be, and be seen as, completely separate. His position, paralleling his strong opposition to the concept of a nation-state, which he found absurd and dangerous, can be traced in his writings to his fellow Quebecois in the 1960s, when he warned them of the "treason of the clerics," by which he meant both the clergy and the intellectuals.[8] According to Trudeau, political structures should be based on reason and not on emotional factors such as religion or national identity. Regarding "political pluralism as the only sane way to run a society," Trudeau said that "the sense of exclusivity that tended to be associated with religions in past times has now disappeared,"[9] at least in its political and social manifestations. He considered the Canadian people relatively free of bias and bigotry, and thought that part of his public function was to nurture tolerance and moderation.

Nevertheless, some English-Canadian journalists have linked Trudeau's attitudes and principles to the fact that he and a few other key male political actors of the so-called French Power in Ottawa were educated by the Jesuits. This mental shortcut should be interpreted more as a reference to an elitist education than to a religious one. It could also refer to the intellectual and calculating behavior associated with a Jesuit training. With such a label, many Anglophones attempted to explain this complex prime minister; unfortunately, they also suggested by innuendo that his religion was the source of his strong and original political opinions. Although Trudeau is a practicing Catholic influenced in his formative years by Christian existentialism, especially by Nicholas Berdyaev,[10] I do not recall any occasion when Trudeau in his role as a public figure referred to his faith.

The following anecdote is revealing of the separation the former prime minister made between public life and private belief. Analysts of the political scene, even Trudeau's political colleagues, would have been surprised to hear a long conversation that took place between Father Louis-Marie Régis, a Dominican theologian of great reputation and a personal friend of the prime minister's, and me. In early September 1978 we accompanied Trudeau, at his invitation, to the ceremonies of the enthronement of Pope John Paul I. To my great surprise, Father Régis defended the view, which he told me he had tried without success to impress upon Trudeau, that the government ought to vote *in favor* of the death penalty and *in favor* of abortion.[11]

The development of his ideas was most convincing. In his mind, justice, one of the four cardinal virtues, supersedes other moral considerations and must be respected if the criterion of the good government of mankind is to be met. (The wooden panels of the cabinet room, newly renovated in the early eighties, are framed by a sculpted motto, which had been either suggested or approved by Trudeau: "Love justice, you who are the rulers of the earth" (The Wisdom of Solomon, 1:1). On the question of abortion, Father Régis developed the argument of *ut in pluribus,* the rule of the majority. Like Trudeau, he strongly believed in the rights of individuals and in the supremacy of the freedom of conscience. Since abortion was being legislated in the civil society, not the religious one, and since the majority of women wanted to exercise their freedom of choice, democracy demanded a legislative framework respecting the individual woman's choice. Father Régis also reflected that, at the theological level, the issue of abortion is not so clear when one thinks of the multiple possibilities of life and of the ongoing missed opportunities, so to speak.

The point of this anecdote is that Prime Minister Trudeau and Father Régis, great dialecticians and close friends, illustrious in their own fields, had discussed these moral issues at length with reference to their faith, and yet they had kept their discussions private, faithful to their belief in the separation of church and state.

Hubert Guindon, a Concordia University professor of sociology and a fine observer of the Canadian scene, thinks that it is because the American Constitution provides for a clear separation between church and state that in the United States, religions (each one being an individual's choice and hence equally valid) are not perceived as threatening and can serve political objectives. Canada never established, at the constitutional level, the place and status of the various religions practiced in the country. Although in England the Crown and the Church are united under the same person, Queen Elizabeth II, in Canada the sovereign, represented by the governor general, is not the head of the Anglican church. Neither technically nor emotionally, however, does this fact simplify the resolution of the issue for Canadians. In 1981, a sudden public opinion movement whose exact strength and origin is hard to assess, made the cabinet and the Parliament add at the last minute a reference to God to the preamble of the new Constitution. This addition was made, but it did not commit anyone to much. However, bringing religions into the public arena is dangerous and potentially explosive should it result in the favoring of one church as an institution over another.

The ongoing Canadian silence on religious matters is countered by a now twenty-year-old active public debate on another sociocultural dimension of Canadian life: the status of women. Canada shares with the Scandinavian nations the remarkable distinction of being among the few Western nations that are officially discussing feminist issues at all levels of government. *Discussing* in this case means that, having accepted the premise that something is wrong and must be corrected, politicians know that to be elected and to remain in office, they must be well versed in the various aspects of the dossiers associated with the status of women, familiar with the appropriate terminology and concepts, and, ideally, aware of the personalities and regroupings in the feminist constituency. They must also demonstrate that they have taken action. Those who can refer to the women's movement, and not simply to the conventional women's associations, score most highly.

How could this change come about in Canada at a time when Prime Minister Jacques Chirac of France was able to announce (in the spring of 1986) his first cabinet without appointing even one woman and when the American women's movement continues to find itself in confrontation with the U.S. administration?

Modern feminism as a social movement in Canada (the second wave of feminism after the suffragettes) had its first expression in the Quebec of the mid-1960s when, using both the Quiet Revolution and the 1966 centennial of the Civil Code in Lower Canada, Francophone women decided to unite all women's associations of the province to fight the traditional, conservative society. The kickoff was in April 1965 at the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the provincial women's vote, when women gathered around their heroine, Thérèse Casgrain, and vowed to coordinate their actions. The Quebec civil code rested on the Napoleonic French civil code of 1804, although at the time of drafting the work, the three Quebec commissioners also used as models the Louisiana code and the code of the Canton of Vaud in Switzerland—all based on the patriarchal family, in which the wife is basically incapacitated as *une incapable.*

In the late 1950s, because of the language barrier, the only feminist theoretician known to Quebec women was Simone de Beauvoir, whose major book *Le Deuxième Sexe* had created great excitement. Meanwhile, English-Canadian women were also reading de Beauvoir (a translation had appeared in 1952) as well as Betty Friedan's *Feminine Mystique,* adding outside voices and arguments to their own strategies and aspirations. (Kate Millet and Germaine Greer were to come almost a decade later.[12]) Despite de Beauvoir's intellectual influence, at a practical level Quebec women were left to rely on themselves to develop their goals and methods and to invent their own philosophy of action. As early as its official founding in April 1966, the Fédération des femmes du Québec (FFQ) decided to identify and work closely with the male decision makers who were capable of understanding the issues and of cooperating to bring about social change in their respective spheres of influence. This approach would have important consequences for years to come.

Similarly, Ontario women leaders, informed about the new American women's movement and Betty Friedan's creation of the National Organization of Women (NOW), also began to apply political pressure to obtain more "simple justice" for women through a loose coalition of groups. Their primary objective was to have the federal government make a national inquiry into women's concerns. They were joined by the Quebec FFQ, threatened to bring 2 million women marching on Ottawa, and won. On February 16, 1967, Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson created the Royal Commission on the Status of Women (RCSW). This inquiry tabled its report and recommendations in the federal Parliament three and a half years later.

In Canada, it is often said that a royal commission of inquiry is the best way to kill an issue because it may create a fake debate and its reports and recommendations are usually shelved. But this approach can also be an interesting technique for developing public policy since it necessarily calls for briefs from all concerned individuals and groups. Traditionally, Canadian royal commissions have held public hearings across the country. In this case, not only was the timing perfect, but also, instead of creating a distinct new national feminist association such as the American NOW, each association had an opportunity to be heard. The associations took the same approach as the Quebec women: every existing women's association in the country became to some extent feminist, building aspirations and recommendations on existing traditions, expertise, and membership.

After the royal commission had presented its report, English-Canadian women formed a national feminist grouping of associations, the National Action Committee (NAC), and invited Quebec women to join. At the same time, small local networks developed from coast to coast to form what is now called the women's movement. Founded in 1972, encompassing more than 450 groups across the country, NAC has been a remarkably powerful tool of social change. Together with the FFQ, it has forced governments to make equality a reality and to confront the facts of life for Canadian women. A coalition of widely based women's issues and interests that receives important funding from the government, it remains in control of its own agenda, pushing women's issues to the top of Canada's political agenda in a quiet, articulate, pragmatic, and astute way.[13]

These organizations—the Canadian FFQ, RCSW, and NAC along with the American NOW—would be categorized as liberal feminism. The word *liberal* is pejorative in the minds of some who see such an approach as only looking after the interests of middle- and upper-middle-class women. But one can also see these organizations as defending the common good of a wide majority of women, necessarily middle-class, while constantly bringing up front the case of lone mothers, of poor women, of older pensioners, of immigrants, of women who are disabled, and of those in situations of weakness. These organizations have worked for reforms of attitudes, cultural values, and institutions, reforms leading to equality and better opportunities. In contrast, the smaller networks of the women's movement would be categorized as radical feminism because of their claim that the oppression of women is a fundamental part of capitalism and patriarchy. Of course the reality is far more complex, and several "radical" concepts have permeated the political agenda of women's associations. Feminism in Canada belongs to many women.

Here lies the difference between Canadian and American feminism. Because of the royal commission, hundreds of women's associations from Victoria to St. John's and from Yellowknife to Windsor had carefully prepared hundreds of briefs by the end of the 1960s. To achieve consensus regarding the problems analyzed and the recommendations submitted, discussions, committees, and executive meetings as well as grass-roots approval and support were necessary. In the process, women's associations revived with a new women-oriented mission that added to, or replaced, their traditional altruistic service roles.

After the tabling of the report of the royal commission on December 7, 1970, the women commissioners and women working in the public sector, in the media, and in various associations decided not to let the recommendations die on the shelf. They worked through the interdepartmental committee that the federal government had established in order to decide what to do with the report. Although at the time only one woman was sitting in the House of Commons, New Democratic party Opposition member Grace MacInnis, the strategy of working with reform-minded male decision makers succeeded, and in late 1973, the federal government created the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women (CACSW), which was to report to Parliament. It followed the establishment by the Quebec provincial government of the very first such council earlier in the same year. The political impetus was now irreversible, and provincial governments competed in turn to emulate Ottawa. So too did the political parties.

Politicians supported the movement and the reforms—not necessarily on principle but often because such support makes for excellent politics. (In all fairness I must say that some did and still do share the objectives of the movement.) And it became excellent politics thanks to the wide base of support in the female population. When the Women's Institutes, the AFEAS, the Zonta Club, the National Council of Women, the Jewish Council of Women, the Jaycettes, the Business and Professional Women's Clubs, the Catholic Women's League, the Homemakers Association, the Dames Hélène-de-Champlain, the Home Economics Association, and Les Cercles de fermières all actively support feminist demands at the riding level, politicians must listen. As a result, changes have been brought about largely without confrontation.

A note of humor and history: until recently Canada has always had a male minister responsible for the status of women, a duty rotated among ministers since 1971. It made life miserable for the poor man appointed, particularly at international meetings. Inside Canada, nobody ever paid the slightest attention to this fact, with the exception of the male cabinet members who dreaded the prime minister's call. This approach was no accident; it had been very deliberately chosen by the network of women who were determined not to see the royal commission report end up on a shelf. Since there was no woman on the government side of the House of Commons, these women wanted, on a rotation basis, a "full" minister to add the responsibility of the status of women to his regular portfolio so that both he and his bureaucracy would have to study the dossiers and develop a new sensitivity to women's issues.

In recent years the pattern has changed. In September 1981 (after a crisis confrontation regarding the Constitution between the then minister, Lloyd Axworthy, and the president of the CACSW, Doris Anderson), Judith Erola, who was minister of state (mines) became the first female minister responsible for the status of women. In 1986, Barbara MacDougall, minister of state (privatization and regulatory affairs), became the second one when she replaced Walter MacLean.[14]

Because women's issues are debated publicly in Canada, numerous legal and administrative reforms have been made in the last twenty years. It is not a coincidence that the first major test of the new Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Supreme Court of Canada was the January 28, 1988 judgment that threw out the restrictive federal abortion legislation on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. In support of the majority decision, Madam Justice Bertha

Wilson, one of two women justices, concluded that Section 251 of the Canadian Criminal Code infringes on the security of the person because "it asserts that the woman's capacity to reproduce is to be subject not to her own control, but that of the state." And Chief Justice Brian Dickson wrote in very clear language that "forcing a woman by threat of criminal sanction to carry a fetus to term unless she meets certain criteria unrelated to her own priorities and aspirations is a profound interference with a woman's body."[15] The following week, the first father to receive regular maternity benefits—a form of paid leave from employment—was announced as an ordinary piece of news.

All this does not mean that Canada is the ideal feminist environment, yet the public discourse in Canada does include women and women's issues. A major victory in the women's movement in Canada occurred under the leadership of Judith Erola, the minister responsible for the status of women. In November 1981, the intense lobbying of women brought them guarantees of equality now enshrined in Section 28 of the new Constitution and Charter of Rights. This section is the equivalent of the American Equal Rights Amendment had it become the twenty-seventh American constitutional amendment. And, generally speaking, social programs relevant to women (old-age pensions in particular) as well as the rate of women's participation in public offices (elected and appointed) show quite an advance when compared with the American scene. The deeper reality is that questions regarding the organization of the family, that is, the domestic, or private, sphere, remain private and do not score very high in the value system of what are "important matters" in cabinet meetings. Nothing illustrates this situation better than the debate over the need for a national day-care policy.

Not surprisingly, the Fraser Institute of Vancouver, the epitome of conservatism in big business, started its recent brief on day-care policy by questioning whether the government has a legitimate role in child care. It has asserted that, in the absence of government interference, "households know their own wants and take actions which will bring the greatest satisfaction of those wants."[16] This statement, "reasonable" in the eyes of many, underlines the limits of the nation's feminism. Our society fails to recognize that real choice does not exist for women without pay equity and equality in the workplace and that the way domestic labor is organized, so that it remains unpaid and devalorized, must be challenged. As Virginia Woolf wrote in her outrageous *Three Guineas* (1938):

> The world as it is at present is divided into two services: one the public and the other the private. In one world, the sons . . . ; in the other world, the daughters . . . work as wives, mothers, daughters—but are not paid for that work.

Reforms, yes. Radical changes, no. This marks the difference between Canada and the Scandinavian countries. The issue is debated. Attitudes and institutions have changed. But in Canada the debate must remain sensible, for only then do all the people feel comfortable and reassured that social change will not take place at their own expense.

Religion and women's issues may be a silence and a debate in today's sociocultural reality, but they are not the only ones. Much could be said about the population's growing concern about the environment. The United Nations Bruntland report means a lot to many ordinary Canadians interested in their natural surroundings. A whole network of citizens' action groups is forming. Grass-roots debate; public nervous silence. Nervous at the thought of irritating business and nervous at the idea of confronting the American administration. Much more could also be said about the perennial Canadian issue of bilingualism, a succession of debates and silences for twenty-five years. Right now, we find ourselves in a period of relative silence, a strange silence, except for the members of Parliament who oppose government amendments to the Official Languages Act. It is to Prime Minister Mulroney's credit that he tries to keep the lid on the so-called dinosaurs of his party. Many Canadians have concluded that since Bourassa's reelection as Quebec's premier in December 1985, when the Parti québecois was reduced to a small Opposition in the National Assembly, the situation was "back to normal" and "the problem" was over, an attitude that will only lead to more misunderstanding. In Quebec too, there is silence, also a strange silence. While the Anglophone Alliance in Quebec flexes its muscles and tests the new provincial government to see if things *are* back to normal, the Francophones quietly put pronatalist policies on the public agenda in an effort to counteract the low birthrate, which is below the population replacement level—a trend seen as a serious threat in the balance of forces on the national scene.

If one were to follow the many social conversations going on at a given time with a view to finding a main theme, I would identify the air-controllers' crisis of the summer of 1976 as the most critical situation of all in recent times.* The ensuing silence after the official settlement of the strike had for French Canadians the bitterness of injury, the incompleteness of a scar that has not healed. Unpleasant memories of crises like this may well be why so many Canadians are reluctant to oppose or question the Meech Lake constitutional accord negotiated with the provinces by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Many citizens are fully aware that it is not technically a good arrangement for the country, but they prefer to emphasize its symbolic value as a unique opportunity to welcome Quebec back into the constitutional family.

I stated earlier that discussing, for example, day-care needs does not excite the cabinet, because the problem is a "private sphere" issue not related to matters of real importance to the men of our governments. Of course this statement should be qualified and there is room for nuance. What is valued is war and peace, matters of the economy and of finance (especially macroeconomics), matters of technology and mass production, what makes up "the public sphere"—"the real world." Not all that should be debated is dealt with openly and frankly. The world of big business is yet another area of silence in the Canadian public agenda, while some aspects of foreign affairs are the topics of tenacious, almost obstinate, public discussion.

Canadians like to think of themselves as a nation of small entrepreneurs and family businesses. The almost palpable and overbearing feeling of wealth that the traveler has when walking along New York's Park Avenue or Paris's "beaux quartiers" is thus very alienating for Canadians. They like to believe that they are a

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*In what appeared at first to be an ordinary labor-relations conflict, a national strike of air controllers degenerated into one of the ugliest anti-French language demonstrations ever to develop in Canada. The Anglophone union opposed its own Francophone membership, rejecting the use of French in Quebec airports on grounds of "security," causing public panic. The then minister of transport, Otto Lang, settled the strike in favor of the Anglophone union membership. Jean Marchand, senior minister and a personal friend of Trudeau, resigned over that compromise. For further discussion, see Sanford Borins, *The Language of the Skies* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983).

hardworking people who may at times be daring in business ventures but who have nothing in common with the violence of big money displayed on "Dallas," "Dynasty," or "Falcon Crest." Of course Canadians are very proud of the new tall glass and steel buildings à la Philip Johnson of Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, and Calgary. But the Canadian perception of what goes on inside these buildings is another story. The identity of those who work there is a mystery to most Canadians. It is telling that the first Canadian television series about the contemporary world of big business first appeared early in 1988. Despite the familiarity of both the locale and the actors of "Mount Royal,"[17] the audience still views the action as fundamentally exotic, somehow non-Canadian.

Peter C. Newman's *The Canadian Establishment* seems more appropriate as an art book with its display of pictures of the rich and famous and their residences and gardens than as a paperback analyzing the Canadian reality. That such life-styles are also socioeconomic indicators of the world of financial power is a connection the reader doesn't make. The names of a few prominent players are well known—Canadians are quite familiar with Paul Desmarais, Robert Campeau, Conrad Black, the Bronfman family, and the Reichman brothers. New names now circulate, and new elites emerge—Frank Stronach, president of Magna International Inc., for instance. Except for the Bronfmans and the Reichmans, the others represent for the public highly successful individuals, who seem to have come from nowhere and achieved eminence in the world of business in the same way that the world's athletes succeeded at the Winter Olympics in Calgary this year. In other words, these are strong individuals with drive who have made it in a tough world.

Despite his prominence, Conrad Black's holding company, Argus, remains outside the concerns of Canadians' daily life. For the majority of Canadians, it is of almost no consequence that Black is building a newspaper and a publishing empire through Hollinger, Inc. and that his business takeovers are the cause of arguments in London and New York. Of course Torontonians became nervous when his acquisitions included the purchase of *Saturday Night* magazine, but the rest of Canada concluded that such a reaction was typical of the Toronto's well-known economic nationalists. While the Power Corporation of Paul Desmarais is a common household word, its nature and magnitude are not known. People remember only that the two Sudbury brothers modestly started with a local bus company—Voyageur—and that the giant Montreal-based holding company is the proof that hard work is always rewarded. When Robert Campeau bid for and won the control of major corporations in the United States, Canadians saw it more as a clever move of the little Franco-Ontarian, an isolated incident, than as an illustration of Canada "becoming," as American journalist Andrew H. Malcolm put it, "a voracious tiger, . . . marching south with energetic business imagination."[18]

Most Canadians and their elected representatives do not realize that through five conglomerates thirty-two families now control one-third of the country's nonfinancial assets, almost double the amount they controlled four years earlier. According to one observer, the Canadian economy shows:

> that in 1983 just 500 firms, representing about an eighth of one percent of all firms (397,965), accounted for more than half of total sales, more than two-thirds of assets and of profits, and almost three-quarters of equity. The top 100 firms alone accounted for more than one-third of sales and more than half of all assets, equity and profits. . . . This reveals the existence of shared monopolies in the major productive sectors of the economy and in 70 key manufacturing industries.[19]

This recent concentration of economic power in a few hands is no more known to Canadians than is their economic history. The increased mobility of private capital and rapidly growing investment abroad have not raised the question of whose interests such big money serves. A vague pride in having big-league players obscures the dim realities of the new internationalization of capital, be it American or Canadian. There is no connection between these financial conglomerates and the consumers, and absolutely no accountability when it comes to the creation of wealth for the country's citizens.

The only major economic issue that has off and on gained public attention and mobilized some segments of the population is the debate about foreign ownership. The Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA), created in 1974, was replaced in June 1985 by Investment Canada, a government agency that has yet to reject a request for foreign investment in Canada. Whatever the assessment history will make of FIRA, it is important to consider how and why it appeared on the public agenda when broader, more fundamental issues remain "uninteresting." The nationalistic theme of the dangers of foreign ownership—an integral part of the Liberal party's program for twenty-five years and clearly a New Democratic party issue—usually gets promotion from people in Toronto and southern Ontario and therefore nurtures the alienation of the rest of the country from central Canada. Each time the issue of foreign ownership comes up, the dynamics of rejection are put into motion against Ontario—the big, rich, industrialized province—by Atlantic Canada, Quebec, and the West, who angrily dismiss any new regulatory schemes that might deprive them of the investments they need for new jobs and opportunities.

To assess the economic trend properly, one should simultaneously focus on the two phenomena—foreign ownership (mainly by U.S. capital) and Canadian concentration of economic power. Direct foreign investment in Canada increased from $37.4 billion in 1975 to some $84 billion in 1985, while the share of American investment decreased in the same period from 79 percent of total foreign investment to 75 percent. More significantly, the flux of new annual American investment in Canada also decreased, from 77 percent of all new annual investment in 1975 to 53 percent in 1983 and 65 percent in 1984. In a parallel way, Canadian investment abroad went from $10.5 billion in 1975 to $50.4 billion in 1985, and the proportion of this that was invested in the United States went from 52.3 percent in 1975 to 70.4 percent in 1985. In other words, Canada is losing capital investments on all accounts—its own and American capital, both moving rapidly to wherever the situation is most profitable.[20]

Unfortunately, the last decade's economic debates have either been spurts of economic nationalism or sterile discussions of the neoconservative economic philosophy, all conducted in the bad, inward-looking atmosphere of the recession. The new internationalization of capital, the Canadian concentration of economic power in the hands of too few, and the weak competition laws of the country have remained outside any serious public attention, despite several attempts to bring the issue into the limelight through specific case studies.

One such area of corporate concentration is the field of mass media communications on which the Davey (1970) and the Kent (1981) commissions of inquiry reported. Some action was taken following the Davey report, and a "newspapers bill," in itself not a very good way of dealing with the problem, was introduced during Trudeau's last years and later withdrawn from the order paper. Allegations, now substantiated, that the oil and petroleum industry was dangerously concentrated and had conspired to fix prices were probed in several massive volumes by the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission between 1981 and 1985. Although its report revealed that for fifteen years the industry had defrauded Canadians of some $12 billion for home heating oil and gasoline, no action has been taken.[21] The numerous versions of the Combines Investigation Act in the last decade that were tabled and then withdrawn or else died upon the order paper again suggests that the issues have not been adequately addressed. In fact, modern Canada has never had a national debate on the concentration of economic power and its consequences for the Canadian economy and for Canadians.

While a competition bill was finally passed by the Conservative government in June 1986, in practice, competition cannot increase when the case has not been made before the public. Over the last thirty years, a few isolated voices of academics, journalists, and elected representatives have attempted, with little success, to expose this situation. At a Toronto fund-raising dinner of the Liberal party, for example, Opposition leader John Turner repeated the points he had also made in the House of Commons:

> Looking at recent takeovers, and I have analyzed most of them, we ask the obvious questions. Have new jobs been created? Not too often. Have efficiency and productivity improved? Not too often. Has competition really increased? No. Do we have better Canadian technology? No. Larger and larger concentration in fewer hands means less and less opportunity for change and innovation, less responsiveness to new markets, less competition in price and quality—and all of that is bad for the consumer.[22]

Wallace Clement, a perceptive political economist of Carleton University who has been an inspiration for students and colleagues but remained unknown outside academic circles, has published some excellent analyses of the Canadian and other North American corporate elites.[23] In her recent analysis *Controlling Interest: Who owns Canada?* (1986), Diane Francis offers this hypothesis:

> But the virtues of competition must be understood by lawmakers, judges, and the public before any meaningful changes will restore competition in many Canadian sectors. Competition and the related issue of concentration . . . are little understood in a country where one out of every three workers is employed by a non-profit, government or monopoly enterprise.[24]

On her own initiative, Francis decided to popularize the topic in order to counteract the surprising findings of yet another inquiry into concentration of economic power—the Bryce Royal Commission into Corporate Concentration (1975–1978), chaired by the legendary former deputy minister of finance, Robert Bryce. The commission concluded that concentration exists and is inevitable in a country as small in population as Canada.

Canadians do not realize that although the Americans are perceived to be the quintessence of the capitalist system with a strict minimum of government interference in the economy, they have extremely tough laws enforcing maximum competition among companies. Canadians remain completely unaware of the critical economic concentration at home and of its role in a world oligopoly. If confronted with these facts, they would probably be as surprised as they would be to hear that the relative poverty rate in Canada has not markedly changed since the Second World War, a fact that conflicts with Canadians' assumption that they have created a very egalitarian society.

In the "real world" of international affairs, Canadian domestic issues receive more media coverage proportionately than in other countries. Yet foreign affairs and international relations are quietly becoming part of the domestic public debate in opposition to the silences on economic issues. In the same way that Canadians think of themselves as egalitarian at home, they feel comfortable with a foreign policy based on equal partnership among all nations. Three topics particularly interest them: Latin America; famine, poverty, and the refugee question; and peace and security, including denuclearization of the world. Officials may at times give the impression that Canadians are rather naive about these issues. Although probably less sophisticated than the discussions of the Europeans, on matters of East-West relations, for example, the views and the reasoning of Canadians are clear and not easy to turn around. They know what they want, and their politicians do not always read them properly or follow them fast enough. Canadians have been very proud of Lester B. Pearson, their Nobel Prize prime minister with impeccable United Nations credentials. They have also drawn great personal and collective satisfaction from Pierre Trudeau's international know-how and worldview.

When discussing foreign affairs, Canadians are realistic. They are familiar with their role in the world as "honest brokers" and they have no expansionist desires. Being the northern neighbor of the wealthiest superpower of all, they are also very much aware of the interdependence of nations. They are nobody's fools. They used to be strong supporters of American foreign policy: in 1980, when Trudeau was still prime minister, 63 percent of Canadians "highly trusted" it. This percentage dropped regularly, and in 1988, only 34 percent of Canadians say they feel confident in American foreign policy, and, conversely, 57 percent state that they have very little confidence in it. They remain loyal partners, however, while their officials try to impress Canadian viewpoints and nuances on their Washington counterparts, not always with success.[25]

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) interested in the Third World have flourished in Canada for many years because of its deep humanitarian concern. No less deep is a general sense of obligation of the fortunate for the disadvantaged. Canada's annual expenditures for official development assistance totaled $2.1 billion in 1984–1985. Politicians find it very difficult to increase this government budget of aid to the Third World; they are nervous at the thought that the public might not support such a move. It is surprising that Canada has not yet reached the United Nations' aid contribution target for each member country of 1 percent of its GNP. I believe Canadians are ready to contribute not a mere 0.45 percent of the GNP but as much as such countries as Norway (1.6 percent), the Netherlands (0.91 percent), Sweden (0.85 percent), and Denmark (0.73 percent) even if Canada would have to double its $2 billion annual contribution to do so.

In its 1987 special report on official development assistance, *For Whose Benefit?* the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs makes it very clear that the public gives strong but critical support to aid and to development policies and programs. *Effectiveness* is the key word. Nevertheless, the committee members have written that "while some Canadians might prefer that we put our aid money only on sure bets in development, most support a strong commitment to the poorest countries and people in the world."[26] Public opinion polls confirm that Canadians are acutely aware of world hunger and poverty, but, although generous, they are uncertain about the outcome of many projects.

Canadians learn young to talk of development of the Third World. Teachers discuss it in schools, and children prepare assignments on the issue. University students organize debates and panels on it. Women's groups devise projects with women of poorer countries. Churches, NGOs of all origins, unions, professional associations, and citizens' committees talk of it and promote it, showing impatience at the government's cautious moves.

The national conversation progresses along an informal network covering the country, but it is not a national debate, politicians being collectively withdrawn from the issue out of fear of appearing weak and sentimental. It is as if elected representatives were ashamed of showing concerns from the heart and wanted to play hardball on the international scene. Nothing expresses this attitude better than the issue of connecting aid to the purchase of goods and services from Canada, where politicians want to reaffirm (or increase) the 80 percent tying rule and the public wants it to disappear or be at least cut by half. "In regard to the quality of aid programs, our pervasive tying of aid-financed purchases . . . is probably the most embarrassing, and puzzling, blot on the Canadian record."[27] Statements such as this from the former head of the McGill University Department of Economics, Irving Brecher, are regularly heard in Canadian life. Most Canadians would rather link aid to the respect for human rights, a problem that deeply bothers them.[28]

Of all the places in the world for which a strong feeling has developed, Latin America holds a special place in the hearts of Canadians. The reasons are not obvious, yet from Mexico to Chile, events are followed and discussed, again by citizens, not on the political level, as if the public, unsure of itself faced with official theories, were being polite but was unconvinced of the proposed course of action unfolding. According to Canadians, Latin American and Caribbean countries should be able to settle their own affairs without outside interference, whatever the source and rationale for such interference. This approach, by no means new, has been Canadian policy for thirty years despite changes in government and governing party. In its support of the Contadora peace process and its opposition to the sale of arms to the Contras, the Mulroney government has acted in continuity with its predecessors of thirty years ago, when Diefenbaker refused to sever commercial links with the new Cuban regime led by Castro. It has now been documented that Washington repeatedly pressed both the Tory minority government of Diefenbaker and the Liberal administration of Pearson not to trade with Cuba.[29] Although Trudeau's disapproval of the American invasion of Grenada is not surprising, Mulroney's similar stand on Central America is both surprising and revealing given his close relationship with and affinity to the Reagan administration.

International peace and security concern everyone in the world today. They are matters of tremendous importance to Canada because it is situated right between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. A new territorial conscience has developed around the Canadian Arctic in relation to strategic developments, as is documented in another courageous special report of the Senate and the House of Commons: *Independence and Internationalism*.[30] There are no two ways about it: Canadians dislike nuclear developments, whatever use is made of them. Public opinion repeatedly says so to the government. The latest evidence came through an Environics poll on Ottawa's plan to equip the navy with a fleet of ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines at a cost of some $8 billion. A full 59 percent of the poll's respondents disapproved or strongly disapproved of the proposal, whereas only 32 percent approved of it. This opposition cuts across all demographic, geographic, and partisan lines.[31] Once again, it is a case where the public speaks its mind, the same way it voices its disapproval of any display of readiness to use military power around the world, as is at times the attitude in Washington. The prudent silences of Canadian authorities may well articulate the limits of the possible.

More and more, Canadians talk of foreign affairs issues, consistently and with candor and fervor. But it is often as if the political body, hoping to look good in the eyes of the world's important capital cities, wanted to dissociate itself from these "soft" issues so close to the population.

Religion and concentration of economic power are two unexpected companions inhabiting the silences of contemporary Canada.

The changing status of women and the drawing up of a foreign policy on Canada's own terms have been strangely related ongoing debates for twenty years. In the same way, bilingualism, multiculturalism, and the future of Quebec within or without Canada have exacerbated Canada's search for its soul. Recently the themes have been Meech Lake—the new constitutional accord with Quebec—and free trade—with the United States—yet the truth is that neither issue has been honestly examined. Both have been victims of political rhetoric and polarization before discussion could take place.

These silences and debates do not all fall within the same categories. Some have their roots in social psychology, like the silences about divisive issues and the debates that enhance shared experience. Others are historical in nature, like the absence of discussion of economic concentration, multinationals, lack of competition, and the new internationalization of capital. Economic policies have traditionally resulted from foreign decisions and outside interests—"made in France," "made in England," and "made in the United States" are familiar to us. New economic elites, autonomous in their decisions and power, have evolved from the same secretive financial culture and have not seen any advantage to opening up the rules of the game. It is this impenetrable arbitration of financial circles that Francophone or Western alienation denounces and tries to bypass or join.

If these hypotheses are correct, and I believe they are, it could be advanced that while Catholicism used to be closely allied with the French language (as English was with the Protestant churches), religion is now becoming a personal choice and being distributed over a broad spectrum of groups in the country's population. Speaking of religion could then be even more divisive without the familiar interpretive context and at the high cost of new, unknown risks.

On the contrary, the modern debate about the changing status of women has become an element of unity with general participation and poses no threat to the country as a whole, although it has been seen as a threat to cultural groups such as the native people. Women's associations, when defining their strategies of action, have followed the usual pattern of developing links of privilege with the political elites.

The economy of the country is, however, a different matter. If provincial interests were convergent and regional development similar throughout Canada, the major problems of the country's economy might have become a source of public debate despite the economic elites' reluctance to engage in discussion. Even foreign ownership, which has been so extensive in Canada, has not found the common denominator needed for public opinion to be engaged in a sustained debate. It is not surprising that the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few Canadians—elites in their own right—who have probably benefited from the assistance or the silence of political elites, has been viewed as a necessity in an unfriendly world and has never been seriously challenged. Discussing foreign policy when one is a medium-sized power that has often played the honest broker can be a very gratifying public debate in the process of forging one's difficult identity.

Still forging an identity of its own, different from that of its overwhelming neighbor to the south, and trying to integrate both what was "an uneasy union of British and French settlers" [32] and the recent massive immigration from the wider world, Canada is coming of age. As distinguished reporter Bruce Hutchison sees it, this country has quietly replaced the colony and in its typically Canadian introverted way, is stubbornly pursuing happiness. Canadians are a quiet people who deeply dislike confrontation, especially conflict associated with class differences. They have managed to accommodate themselves to a bilingual country and a multicultural society, but how will they meet the challenges of the next century?

It may be true that Canadians do not have much of a sense of celebration, as theologian Harvey Cox has defined it. It is significant that the country's finest hour was twenty years ago. Its only memory of a collective celebration that is still vivid in Canadians' minds is Montreal's Expo '67, the world exhibition with the theme "Man and His World"—"Terre des hommes."

ENDNOTES

[1] Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), 108, 1.

[2] Robert Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1973), 63.

[3] Aaron I. Abell, "The Religious Aspect," *What America Stands For*, ed. Stephen D. Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimons (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), 183.

[4] *Le Devoir*, 16 September 1978.

[5] "Si un homme public refuse de témoigner sa foi, il me semble qu'il continue à privatiser les valeurs religieuses au point qu'un jour elles ne signifieront plus rien" (*Le Devoir*, 23 September 1978).

[6] 1981 Census of Canada, Cat. 92–912.

[7] Polls conducted in early 1988 by Angus Reid Association on behalf of Southam News.

[8] Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *The Future of Canadian Federalism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965).

[9] Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *Conversation with Canadians* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 8–9.

[10] Ibid.

[11] The final vote in third reading on the death penalty in the House of Commons took place on July 14, 1976, with 130 MPs against capital punishment and 124 in favor. When Prime Minister Brian Mulroney put the question to a free vote on June 29, 1987, the results gave a clearer majority, with 148 against capital punishment and 127 in favor. Abortion was discussed again further after the tabling of the Badgley Report (1976).

[12] Simone de Beauvoir's *Le Deuxième Sexe* was published in 1949 and became available in Quebec around 1959. Betty Friedan's *Feminine Mystique* became available there in 1963. Both Germaine Greer's *Female Eunuch* and Kate Millett's *Sexual Politics* were published in 1970.

[13] For an excellent analysis of NAC since its inception, see Christine Appelle, *The New Parliament of Women, A Study of NAC*, master's thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1987.

[14] The following are the ministers who have taken on the status of women as one of their responsibilities:
1971– : Robert K. Andras, minister of consumer and corporate affairs
1971–1972: Bryce Mackasey, minister of manpower and immigration
1972–1974: John Munro, minister of national health and welfare
1974–1979: Marc Lalonde, minister of national health and welfare
1979–1980: David MacDonald, minister of social development
1980–1981: Lloyd Axworthy, minister of manpower and immigration
1981–1984: Judith Erola, minister of state (mines) and minister of consumer and corporate affairs
1984–1986: Walter McLean, secretary of state
1986– : Barbara McDougall, minister of state (privatization and regulatory affairs)

[15] In the case of *Dr. Henry Morgentaler, Dr. Leslie Frank Smoling, and Dr. Robert Scott v. Her Majesty the Queen, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Supreme Court of Canada, January 28, 1988,* the seven judges rendered their verdict in four separate written decisions. Chief Justice Brian Dickson and four judges upheld Dr. Morgentaler's acquittal, and two objected to it.

[16] Jack L. Carr, *The Day Care Dilemma: A Critical Analysis of the Options* (Vancouver: The Frazer Institute, 1987), 5.

[17] "Mount Royal" is a coproduction of Canada and France that was aired on the CTV network in January 1988. It is a seventeen-hour series with a $17 million budget, created by executive producer Robert Lantos of the Toronto-based Alliance Entertainment Corporation.

[18] Andrew H. Malcolm, *The Canadians* (Toronto and New York: Paperbacks Ltd., 1985), 235–36.

[19] Henry Veltmeyer, *Canadian Corporate Power* (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1987), 23, 25.

[20] For a recent discussion of the Canadian economy, see François Houle, "L'Etat canadien et le capitalisme mondial: Stratégies d'insertion," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 20 (3) (1987):467–500.

[21] Robert J. Bertrand, *The State of Competition in the Canadian Petroleum Industry* (Ottawa: Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation Act, 1981).

[22] John N. Turner, speech at the Confederation dinner in Toronto, 17 September 1986. See also his speech in the House of Commons, *Hansard*, 9 April 1986.

[23] Wallace Clement, *The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), and *Continental Corporate Power: Economic Elite Linkages Between Canada and the United States* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977).

[24] Diane Francis, *Controlling Interest: Who Owns Canada?* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1986), 286.

[25] A Gallup poll published in the Canadian print media in mid-April. See *La Presse,* 11 April 1988.

[26] House of Commons, *For Whose Benefit?* report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, William C. Winegard, chairman (Ottawa, 1987), 109.

[27] Irving Brecher, "Rethinking Foreign Aid," *Policy Options* 8 (3) (April 1987):24.

[28] Ibid. 130–32.

[29] Paul Martin, *A Very Public Life* (Toronto: Deneau, 1985), 393.

[30] Senate and House of Commons, *Independence and Internationalism,* report of the Special Committee on Canada's International Relations, J. M. Simard and Tom Hockin, joint chairmen (Ottawa, 1986), 9–11, 47–65.

[31] Poll conducted by Environics on behalf of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament and published in the *Globe and Mail,* 26 May 1988.

[32] Bruce Hutchison, "Our Lost Innocence," *MacLean's* (11 July 1988): 16–17.

Donald S. Macdonald

Three Perspectives on Canada's Future

PREDICTING THE FUTURE has always been a risky enterprise. No matter how secure a trend may be, no matter how apparently immutable a set of facts, the unexpected must be expected and will turn the inevitable into past speculation. And yet we cannot avoid engaging in some degree of prediction; to manage the present, we have to make some assumptions about the future.

Three themes have been fundamental to the Canadian political economy and will probably continue to be so over the next several decades.

The first is Canada in the global community. What events outside Canada are most likely to affect its welfare? How will Canada react to the shifts in power that may take place in the world at large?

The second theme is the perennial problem of federal-provincial relations. The strength of Canada as a national state is often said to derive from the flexibility of the federal system. But how does a federal system adjust itself to dealing with changing forces from outside the country?

The third theme is one of the most fundamental questions of Canadian political experience: What should be the place of the French-speaking community in the larger Canadian community? After two decades of political turbulence in Quebec, the French-speaking population there seems more calm and self-assured than ever before. How will its relationship to the rest of the Canadian population evolve in the decades to come?

Donald Macdonald is the High Commissioner for Canada to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

One international direction of events Canadians will have to come to terms with is the rise of the Asian-Pacific states to economic power. It will bring not only great economic challenge to Canada but also important military and political realignment. As Paul Kennedy has expressed in his book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:*

> It is reasonable to expect, for example, that one of the better-known "global trends" of today, the rise of the Pacific region, is likely to continue, simply because that development is so broad-based. It includes not only the economic powerhouse of Japan, but also that swiftly changing giant the People's Republic of China; not only the prosperous and established industrial states of Australia and New Zealand, but also the immensely successful Asian newly industrializing countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore—as well as the larger Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) lands of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines; by extension, it also includes the Pacific states of the United States and provinces of Canada.... Each success has beneficially interacted with the others, to produce a rate of economic expansion which has far eclipsed that of the traditional western powers—as well as that of Comecon—in recent years.[1]

During the past two decades, the countries of east Asia, particularly Japan, have emerged as important economic competitors in world markets. From its position as a major exporter of manufactured products, Japan has evolved into the principal creditor nation in a dramatic reversal of fortunes with the United States. The major Japanese banks have now supplanted the major American banks as leaders in the world's financial community. The policies of Japan's central bank are almost as important to the stability of the U.S. dollar as the policies of the Federal Reserve Board. The investment or noninvestment by the Japanese in U.S. securities can make an important difference both to the securities markets of the United States and to the external value of its dollar.

As Kennedy has noted, it is not only Japan but also China that is becoming a major economic force. The past ten years have seen an impressive change in the political and economic organization of that country. It has transformed itself into a competitive economy and has adopted a historic openness to the outside world rivaling that of Japan after the Meiji restoration. If China has shown signs of strain because of these changes, it has also shown considerable capacity to bear the pressure. In particular, decentralization of economic decision making has not appeared to diminish strong political direction from the center. Above all, it has the kind of cultural strength that has made overseas Chinese communities such as Hong Kong and Singapore significant players on the world's economic scene.

To Kennedy's enumeration, I would add one more economic power—India. The preoccupation of some Western observers with differences among India's sects and ethnic groups and the overwhelming problem of population control have obscured the success of India as a political entity and its emergence as an economic power. While China and Taiwan have achieved economic advance with governments of an authoritarian nature, over the past forty years India has made itself into a major industrial nation while maintaining a democratic form of government and respect for its traditional values. Problems of internal management and governance remain to be solved, but India has the management and manpower potential to extend its economic power throughout the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.

This shift in economic power is going to bring along with it a shift in political and military power.[2] Japan will be faced with the necessity of advancing its political position, not only in its own region but elsewhere in the world. A consequence of that will be the need to rethink its defense policy and consider departing from its current policy of maintaining only minimal military forces. A relatively weaker United States may decide to withdraw important elements of the security umbrella that Japan has enjoyed for the last forty years, and it will then have to decide what forces to deploy to replace the Americans—to ensure access to the Strait of Malacca, for example—and what changes in foreign policy to make to guide its greater military power.

China is already of superpower status with its numbers and nuclear capability. The strengthening of its economy will enhance the ability of China not only to defend its own landmass but to become the dominant power in the region and a peer of the Soviet Union and the United States in the world. Growing affluence in other states in the region will enable them to assert their political and military presence as well.

This growth in power on the far side of the Pacific will have important implications for the United States and its role as the dominant power in the region since World War II. The strength of local powers in relation to each other and the decline of the U.S. capability to finance its role as guarantor of stability in the Pacific will mean the end of the Pax Americana, which notwithstanding Vietnam, has been the regional history since 1945. The United States will increasingly have to come to terms with decisions made in the region rather than impose its own.

For Canada, too, the changed circumstances will have important consequences—economic, military, and political. In the first century following Confederation, Canadians principally directed their attention to other countries in the Atlantic basin. The Canadian population was made up largely of people of European origin. The colonial period had oriented Canadian thinking on political questions to European developments. When Canada first engaged in military involvement abroad early in this century, it followed the lead of Great Britain. While the decision of the United States to play a global role in security matters from the 1940s onward ended the era of British leadership, in helping to found the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Canada was placing its military initiatives within an Atlantic institution. Canada's attitudes toward political questions abroad have been strongly influenced by her Atlantic allies.

On economic matters, too, events in Europe and North America have dominated Canadian thinking. The sources of capital and technology for Canadian economic development have been Europe and the United States. The exports on which Canada's prosperity has grown were directed initially to European markets but, after the turn of the century, also to those of the United States. The emergence of the Asian power center, however, will compel Canadians to broaden their focus from those traditional directions and to build political relations of a new kind with the nations of the East.

Canada has already felt the growing economic power of the Pacific Rim. Since the 1960s, China has become a major market for Canadian grains, and Japan for metallurgical coal, sulphur, forest products, and metals. As the east Asian economies grow, customers in the Pacific will become even more important to producers. But Canadians aspire to being more than a traditional resource supplier. They want to share in all the benefits of a high-technology world as the producers of knowledge-intensive merchandise and as the vendors of advanced services. In manufactured goods and in services, Canada has felt competitive pressure from the new Asian powers.

The past two decades have seen the Canadian electronics industry overwhelmed by those of Japan and the newly industrializing countries. In other products—automobiles, textiles, clothing, shoes—Asian producers have taken a significant market share away from Canadian industries. Only the imposition of trade barriers—the "voluntary" restraint arrangements, supertariffs, and quantitative restrictions—have prevented complete dominance of the Canadian market in certain products by Asian suppliers.

As Asian-Pacific countries assume leadership in the world economy, they will be less willing to submit to discriminatory trade barriers in North America, just as the United States has reacted strongly in our time against barriers to its exports of goods and services. The Asian countries will cease being price takers and become price makers, and countries like Canada will be compelled to accept this change if they want to share in the world's economic expansion.

A link may be made here to the current Canadian debate about removing the remaining trade barriers between Canada and the United States through a free-trade area agreement. If Canadians are not prepared and are unwilling to meet the competition of the American market, how can they expect to deal with the pressure of the rapidly growing Asian area, which is itself challenging American predominance? The nostalgia for a simpler era in which Canada was a major exporter of resources but could continue to maintain a highly protected market at home is just as unrealistic in the prospect of the Asian challenge as it is in face of the American.

This new economic reality has an important cultural and demographic element. For all the years of Canada's existence as an independent country, the majority of Canadians have had the advantage of speaking the same language as the dominant world powers, initially the United Kingdom and then the United States. The past dominance of the United States has meant that the Asian-Pacific countries have had to deal with the United States, and therefore with the world, in the English language and on American terms. The loss of that dominance means that the new economic powers will be able to impose their own terms and their own languages. Much of the Canadian business community is singularly ill prepared to deal with that new environment, especially as traders. It will be necessary for Canadian businesses and for the Canadian educational system to accommodate to such changes in the business climate. They will no longer be in the position of dealing from among the chosen. They are going to have to work to gain business opportunities as others have had to.

One group of Canadians, however, can expect to play a leading role in building relationships and attaining economic success in the Pacific, and that is Canadians of Asian origin. In the last two decades there has been substantial immigration to Canada from overseas Chinese communities and from India, Korea, and the Philippines. While at first these immigrant communities had to be content with taking lower-paid jobs within our society, they have come to play important roles in the business and financial communities today. Canadians of Asian origin who have maintained their language skills and connection with their ancestral cultures are going to be at a distinct advantage in dealing with the new economic powers on the world scene.

Economic change in Asia will also require a new orientation of Canadian foreign and military policies. With the exception of its limited participation in the Pacific in World War II and in the Korean encounter, Canada has focused its defense policy on the Atlantic and on northwestern Europe. No institution comparable to NATO for attaining cohesion in policy exists in the Pacific region.

Even without taking into account the long-term increase in significance of the Pacific powers, the case has already been made that Canadian defense priorities have understated the need for Canada to place increased military resources on her west coast.[3] That concern has been expressed in the context of the greatly expanded capability of the Soviet Pacific fleet:

> In the context of conflict scenarios below the nuclear threshold, it is clear that without early efforts to expand west coast defence capabilities, Ottawa's only option in the event of war in the Pacific would be a resort to the American security crutch—a state of affairs that suggests some rather pointed questions about Canada's functional sovereignty in the area. It is in Canada's direct national interest to be able to undertake effective surveillance and control of its territorial waters, especially the approaches to major ports and harbours, as well as its extended economic zone. In wartime or, if we are spared such trials,

> during future East-West crises that take the blocs to the brink of war, the Canadian forces should possess the ability to deny those waters to any enemy vessel including Soviet SSNS—or at the very least to deter uninhibited access to them by being able to threaten an unacceptably high probability of detection and destruction.[4]

Assuming that Canada will increase its economic involvement in the Asian-Pacific market, one can expect its concern about territorial defense to grow as well as its role in maintaining the stability of the region, just as Canada has helped ensure European security over the past four decades. That concern will involve Canadians and their government in all of those difficult questions of how, and to what extent, and with what means Canada should carry out its role. Resolving those questions will not be easy, because they will not arise within the purview of a cohesive alliance such as NATO. Instead, they will have to be thought through individually and in the light of shifting alliances among the countries in the region.

As it enlarges its participation in the Pacific, Canada will have to answer awkward questions about its defense priorities. Assuming that its defense resources will be limited and that its concern about defending the Arctic will grow, it may have to choose between continuing its commitment of significant forces to the Atlantic area and Europe and responding to defense needs on the other two oceans.

Conflict may arise not only among the powers of the Pacific region but also between the United States and Pacific countries with whom Canada develops important economic ties. There have been awkward moments in Canadian-American relations in the past, for example when Canada chose to go ahead of the United States in the diplomatic recognition of China. Such tension could build again. In foreign policy, therefore, Canada must become adept at dealing with divergent interests in the Pacific region and be prepared to play its own hand rather than rely on the action of its traditional allies.

What I have said assumes the diminution of Canada's interest and involvement in Europe and a very limited interest in other major sectors of the world, particularly Central and South America and Africa. Latin America and Africa may rise to importance over the next several decades, but that they will do so is not certain at this point. Both regions are struggling to come to terms with internal political and economic difficulties, and the outcome of that struggle is far from clear. In giving priority to the Asian-Pacific region, I am therefore falling back to the assumption that since the Asian states are on the international economic scene as economic powers now, the political and economic consequences of their significance are going to follow much more quickly than changes in the other two regions.

But what about Europe? Canadian economic involvement with Europe has been on the decline, notwithstanding the conscious effort of Canada's government to develop a closer European relationship. With the idea of developing a "third option," my colleagues and I in the Trudeau government attempted to expand our contacts with the newly united Europe on the assumption that Canada and the European Economic Community had complementarities that would work to the advantage of both.

The trade statistics for Canada and Europe indicate the failure of that policy. In 1954, before the formation of the European Economic Community, Canada took 12.6 percent of its imports from the United Kingdom and other EEC countries. In 1984, or thirty years later, the relative share of Canadian imports from Europe had dropped to 8.9 percent.[5] In the case of Canadian exports, the decline of European trade is even more dramatic. In 1954, the United Kingdom and other EEC countries took 33.1 percent of Canadian exports, but by 1984, the European share had dropped to 6.2 percent. In exports, the shares of both Japan and the United States increased over the same period.[6]

In retrospect, it is not difficult to see why this situation should develop. In the first place, the Canadian and European economies have been competitive rather than complementary. While in the past, Canada was a major supplier of grains and dairy products to European countries, with the introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), Canada has not only lost its market position in Europe but has had to face European competition in these products around the world. Canada and Europe both aspire to be exporters of goods and services, and the Europeans have shown no disposition to favor Canada as a supplier. What is more, the economic union has increased trade within Europe. Relations between Europe and its neighbors in Scandinavia affect such Canadian exports as forest products. The process that has cut away at Canada's economic relationship with Europe does not seem likely to reverse.

With the emergence of *perestroika,* the new trend in Soviet policy, will trade between Europe and the transformed Soviet economy not show new growth? Could such an economic boom not work to the benefit of Canada as well? There are three responses to this question.

First, one cannot know to what extent Mr. Gorbachev will succeed in redirecting the political system and the deeply entrenched institutions of the Soviet Union toward a more competitive economy, although a confident Soviet community based on economic success is very much to be wished for.

Second, if there is to be a dramatic increase in economic activity in the Soviet Union, much of it will initially be based on the Soviets' substantial natural resources. Such an endowment of minerals, forest products, and energy has also been Canada's economic strength. If a new Soviet economy based on natural resources emerges, it will be competitive with, not advantageous to, Canadian opportunities.

Third, why should one assume that Europe rather than the Asian-Pacific area will be the beneficiary of economic and political change in the Soviet Union? If it is a goal of Soviet policy to move to more advanced technology and to achieve a better supply of consumer products for its citizens, would the Soviet Union not turn to Asian-Pacific suppliers that have already been highly competitive with those of Europe and North America? It would be in the Soviet interest to convert the current status of confrontation with some of its Asian neighbors to one of economic cooperation. It is by no means clear that the countries of the West will enjoy any special advantage in a new Soviet economic initiative.

In conclusion, the Asian-Pacific countries have already shown themselves to be the rising powers in the world's economy. Neither Canadian business strategy nor public policy has adjusted adequately to that fact. An important future task for Canadians in the private and public sectors will therefore be to come to terms with the Asian-Pacific economic reality. This adjustment is going to require far greater effort than has been devoted to the problem up till now.

The second of my subjects is the question of federalism. Since Canada is a federal state, the relations between the national and the provincial governments have remained one of the major political questions before Canadians in every generation. Working out federal-provincial and interregional accommodation has absorbed a great deal of the time and talent of the Canadian political system. On the other hand, the Confederation has overcome some tensions and challenges that other, more confident countries have dealt with very badly. It took the Americans four years of civil war and 100,000 lives to determine whether or not a group of constituent states should be entitled to withdraw from the Union. The number of lives lost in the tension between Quebec and the rest of Canada over the past two decades can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The British, with all their vaunted political and constitutional skills, are now into the tenth century of strife in dealing with the Irish question. The framers of the Canadian Constitution, and those in succeeding generations who have had the responsibility of carrying out its directions, could justifiably claim that although federal-provincial relations have used up a great deal of time in Canadian public life, it has been time well spent.

The perennial tension between the national and the provincial governments in Canada has become so much a part of Canadian public life that it has even spawned its own genre of humor. Professor A. E. Safarian of the University of Toronto has made the following contribution to the collection, and incidentally to this writer as former chairman of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada:

> A scientific discovery of a revolutionary nature is made at Cambridge University in England on a Monday afternoon. By Tuesday, an American has found a way to put the discovery to practical application. On Wednesday, Izvestia claims that the discovery was made by Russian scientists—thirty years before. On Thursday, the Japanese ship the first product based on the discovery to the United States. On Friday, the Koreans ship to Japan their first product based on the discovery. And two weeks from the following Monday, the government of Canada appoints a royal commission—to determine if the discovery is a federal or a provincial responsibility!

The international context also relates to emergent problems in Canadian federalism. The British scholar Dr. Brian Hocking has observed that:

> As policy areas falling under regional jurisdiction have acquired international significance, so regional governments have found themselves (not always willingly) involved in international affairs. . . . Vile noted some years ago that "state politics" have become involved in national politics because "foreign affairs" are not autonomous—they

> are always "about something". As the list of issues that they are "about" has expanded into such areas as environmental control, wildlife protection and labour relations, where jurisdiction is shared between central and regional governments, the concept of foreign policy as the preserve of the center has weakened.[7]

This trend toward internationalization of issues coincides with a trend toward decentralization in Canadian government. In an agreement struck between the Mulroney government and the ten provincial premiers, the eleven governments agreed to accord to the Canadian provinces even greater influence and decision-making power than they have had before. Canada has been described as one of the most decentralized of the federations. It will become even more so. Just when there is greater need for concerted action by governments of federal states on the international scene, Canada is moving into a situation where such concentration of action will become even more difficult. Jock Finlayson, director of policy analysis and research for the Business Council on National Issues in Ottawa, has noted that:

> As a small, open economy heavily dependent on foreign commerce and capital, Canada has a strong interest in the existence and promotion of open global markets and effectively functioning international institutions and rules. Thus, in addition to such objectives as a more competitive economy and improved access to foreign markets for Canadian exports, another aim of Canadian international economic policy will be to continue to support and strengthen such multilateral institutions and arrangements as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.[8]

Cooperating with our trading partners and strengthening international institutions, however, would put constraints on the ability of local governments to act. Recent experience on trade questions provides some illustration of this conflict.

As Finlayson has said, "Services now account for the bulk of gross national product (GNP) in almost all advanced industrial economies, and they are becoming a more significant component of world trade as well."[9] In Canada much of the jurisdictional responsibility for the service area—the professions, commercial activity, tourism, and public services—lies with the provincial governments. As Canada's trading partners move toward defining a code of international conduct governing trade regulations in the service sector, governments in Canada will increasingly face the need to coordinate national obligations with local responsibilities.

A recent incident indicates just how difficult coordination may be. For the past sixty years or so, the provincial governments in Canada have assumed responsibility for the sale of wines and spirits. Each province has established its autonomous Crown corporation, such as the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, which maintains the retail outlets for the sale of alcohol within the province. The initial motivation for this organization was a response to many of the same sentiments that produced Prohibition in the United States. But succeeding generations have seen the sale of liquor as an important revenue source for all provincial governments, and in the case of some provinces, such as Ontario, which are producers of wines and spirits, control of the retail system has been used to discriminate against competing products from the United States and other parts of the world.

The discriminatory practices of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario have resulted in adverse comment from Canada's trading partners and have been the subject of nonbinding arrangements under the Tokyo Round of negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Following on Ontario's noncompliance with the "statement of intentions" with respect to provincial marketing practices, which was used as part of the Tokyo Round negotiations, the EEC sought a GATT panel to pronounce judgment on discriminatory practices of the Canadian liquor boards. A 1988 decision found Canada, and by inference, Ontario, in default of our GATT obligations. The initial response of the government of Ontario, which otherwise describes itself as being in favor of freer trade and the multilateral negotiation of trade reductions within GATT, was to oppose the GATT ruling.

The identical question has emerged with the negotiation of the Canadian-U.S. free-trade agreement. California wine makers and Tennessee whiskey distillers have been among the major victims of Ontario's discrimination in alcohol marketing practices. It was natural, therefore, for the U.S. negotiators to seek commitments from Canada to bring such discrimination to an end. It was scarcely a position that the Canadian negotiators, with their wide range of other Canadian objectives in mind, could resist. But the premier of Ontario has said that he would refuse to carry out such undertakings toward the United States and might seek to block the trade agreement through constitutional litigation.

It may well be that Canada's willingness to make adjustments, which has made Canadian federalism operate as well as it has, will once again rescue the participants from this kind of impasse. The incident illustrates that in a world in which matters within the jurisdiction of the constituent parts of the Canadian federation increasingly become the subject of international negotiation, it is going to be very difficult for Canada to formulate its goals and achieve them in the trade-off of negotiations.

There are costs imposed on Canada by this jurisdictional ambivalence:

1. Canadian negotiators may find it more difficult to obtain meaningful foreign concessions because of their inability to give assurances that Canadian concessions will be carried out by the provincial governments. Foreign negotiators may exact penalties from Canada that have stiffer terms or that guarantee greater access in exchange for Canada's continuing to enjoy the luxury of an equivocal system of government responsibilities.

2. If province differs with province, or region with region, a foreign negotiating party may exploit the differences among Canadians so as to weaken Canada's negotiating position. In such cases, federalism may well be the best means of organizing the governance of Canada, but it may cause Canada to lose some of its international effectiveness.

This problem engaged the careful attention of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (otherwise known as the Macdonald Commission). The commission recommended that a number of federal-provincial institutions be created to coordinate the actions of both levels of government—a first ministers' conference, a council of ministers of finance, a council of ministers responsible for economic development (who may not be the same persons in some governments as the ministers of finance), and a council of ministers on social policy. The commission had focused on the question of interprovincial barriers to trade and expressed its concern about subdividing a Canadian market that is already small by international standards. The proposed institutions would give a better focus on national policy to both levels of government. As the commission concluded:

> The federal government in the conduct of its responsibilities must possess the capacity to represent and accommodate the interests of all regions: intergovernmental relations are not a substitute for full regional representation at the centre. Similarly, enhanced regional representation in national institutions is not a substitute for intergovernmental relations. The existence of a formal division of powers and of two strong orders of government means that coordination is essential, no matter how regional representation in national institutions is achieved. Thus we see reform of the centre and reform of the institutions of the federation not as alternatives, but as complementary: Canada needs not merely one or the other, but both, for different purposes.[10]

The subject of better national coordination of economic policy, and the creation of institutions to bring it about, remain on the agenda of federal-provincial discussions awaiting attention.

The final word on this question comes from Alan Cairns, the political scientist who was one of the research directors of the royal commission. "Federalism," he said, "is not a subject for tidy minds."

The third of my concerns in this article is the role of the French-speaking community within Canada, one of the fundamental issues of Canadian politics. After close to thirty years of political turmoil in the evolution of the Quebec community, it has now attained a state of relative calm. This collection of essays includes works by a number of Quebecois reflecting their perspectives on the evolution of the Francophone community in Quebec. My perspective is that of an Anglophone from Ontario. Through the tumultuous years of the 1960s and 1970s, I supported accommodation of the French fact in Canada in official institutions and policies and, more fundamentally, by my fellow Anglophones in Canada.

Many observers have noted that the frenetic political interest and activity that characterized Quebec from 1960 on subsided after the decision taken in the May 1980 referendum. During the earlier years, if one spoke at a Quebec university, one would be bombarded by questions on politics, but now the questions are about business. The Quebec community has had a burst of confidence, much of it based on the success of Quebec's businesses, not only in attaining control of the instruments of economic decision making within the province but in competing elsewhere in Canada, and indeed throughout the world.[11]

In the English-speaking community of this postreferendum period, I can identify at least four distinctive viewpoints toward Quebec.

The first is the opinion of Anglophone Quebecers, who are the survivors of a larger Anglophone community, a great number of whose members emigrated to Ontario and other parts of Canada during the political upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s. Many other English-speaking Canadians appear to be complacent about the state of events in Quebec, but not many Anglophone Quebecers. While they are no longer exposed to the same degree of legal, political, and societal pressure they experienced during the Parti québecois government, they continue to feel, despite public protestations to the contrary, that they are not a totally welcome minority within the Quebec community. They observe the fact that Quebec must be the only community within the Western world where it is a matter of criminal penalty to post a public sign in other than the majority language. They can remember what it was like to be a despised minority in a community in which many of them were born and brought up. The Quebec license plate bears the expression "Je me souviens" ("I remember") and they *do* remember what it was like to be under the Parti québecois government. They see in the Meech Lake Accord powers that might make it possible for another Parti québecois government to discriminate against them even more assiduously.

A second group of Anglophone Canadians lives both inside and outside Quebec. They strongly support the concept of official bilingualism and have a positive attitude toward the French fact in Canada. These are the Anglophones who have taken steps to acquire competence in the French language or who have attempted to ensure the bilingual competence of their children through schooling. They are calm because they feel relieved about the reduction of political tension in Quebec, and they are optimistic that over time, as the Canadian community becomes more accustomed to the use of two official languages, the Canadian community will accept bilingualism as one of its foundations.

The third group in the community is at the very opposite pole. Its members are those whom I would characterize as the anti-French ultras. They have never reconciled themselves to the concept of bilingualism. To them it is an affront that the public services of Canada should be offered in both French and English, not only in Quebec but also in communities remote from Quebec. When a provincial government such as Saskatchewan's wrestles with the best administrative means of providing French language services to the Francophone minority in that province and brings forward policy proposals which to the Francophones of Saskatchewan seem too limited, the ultras leap in on the other side of the controversy and oppose any accommodation to the Francophone minority at all.

The fourth opinion group, I believe, makes up the majority of Anglophone Canadians. Their lives are totally unaffected by the French fact in Canada, for in their communities and in their careers, the French presence is not evident at all. They are unconcerned about the language question in Canada, not because they are hostile to the Francophone community but simply because French has no impact on them. If asked, this group would probably be ready to say that "the problem of Quebec" has now been resolved. This well-meaning complacency on their part may not be justified.

What will be the future orientation of public policy with respect to language in Quebec? Two scenarios, one pessimistic and one optimistic, are possible.

The concern that the very success of Quebec's businesses in dealing with the world, particularly with Quebec's neighbors in the United States, and the openness of the Quebec community to imported popular culture, again from the United States, may in time produce a new crisis of confidence within the province about the survival of the French language and culture. Whereas the task of the Quebecois in the 1960s and 1970s was to take possession of the major institutions of Quebec society, their challenge for the next two decades will be to ensure the continued survival of the French language and culture against the very openness of the community to the world. If the Francophone community feels threatened by assimilation, the political response may again be to close the province to outside influence, through political separation. Hence the challenge of separatism will not have been met for all time but may merely have been postponed to a future time when concerns about *la survivance* will be revived.

I believe that a more optimistic scenario will prevail. If smaller language and cultural communities in Europe such as Sweden and the

Netherlands have been able to persist while accommodating themselves to wider political ties, why couldn't Quebec do the same within North America? Those communities too have had to face the challenge of popular culture, particularly the impact of the ubiquitous American culture, and yet have not had to fear for the survival of their unique characteristics. Just as the Swedes and the Dutch have had to learn other languages to go abroad and do business, so will Quebecers have to learn English and other languages to be effective in international economic competition. With the reinforcement of the role of the French language within Quebec over the past two decades, will not Quebecers be capable of using their own language at home but dealing in other languages abroad without any risk to their community identity?

Incidentally, a community that has accustomed itself to learning a second language for the purpose of carrying on business abroad, as Quebec has, will probably be in a better position to adapt to the new Pacific economic reality, inclusive of new languages, than the unilingual Anglo-Canadians.

From all three of the perspectives that I have described, it is apparent that Canadians will be presented with the challenge of having to adjust to new circumstances with new policies and new institutions. The Canadian community has enjoyed good fortune since the end of World War II, good fortune that in part it made for itself and that in part just happened. A certain mood of complacency will have to be shaken off as Canada is faced with new realities.

ENDNOTES

[1] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), 441.

[2] Ibid., chap. 8.

[3] Frank Langdon and Douglas Ross, "Towards a Canadian Maritime Strategy in the North Pacific Region," *International Journal* 42 (4) (1987):848.

[4] Ibid., 876.

[5] *Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada*, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985), 237.

[6] Ibid., 238.

[7] Brian Hocking, "Regional Governments and International Affairs: Foreign Policy Problem or Deviant Behaviour?" *International Journal* 41 (3) (1986):477–79.

[8] Jock A. Finlayson, *Canadian International Economic Policy: Context, Issues and a Review of Some Recent Literature,* vol. 28, Collected Research Studies of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 9.

[9] Ibid., 16.

[10] *Report of the Royal Commission* 3:271. The analysis leading up that conclusion may be found in chap. 22, p. 99.

[11] Matthew Fraser, *Quebec Inc.* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1987), 1.

John Conway

An "Adapted Organic Tradition"

NOTHING IMPEDES THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING of Canadian and American political scientists more than the different meanings of the words *liberal* and *conservative*, and of *liberalism* and *conservatism* in the two societies. For the Canadians, President Reagan, William Buckley, and their followers are not conservatives but nineteenth-century Manchester laissez-faire liberals.

British conservatism and its expression in Canada in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is based upon an organic rather than an individualistic concept of society. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's recent statement that there is no such thing as society, there are only individuals, may be taken as an aberrancy or as an unplanned and unintended assertion of what has long been apparent—that she is a nineteenth-century British liberal rather than a Tory-Conservative.

In Canada traditional conservatism is best represented by the social and welfare legislation introduced by successive Conservative administrations in the province of Ontario between 1943 and 1986.[1] These legislative programs express in practice a set of political values derived from the political philosophy of modern British conservatism, ideals expressed most memorably by Edmund Burke and put into practice by, among others, Disraeli. For Burke, and hence for his pragmatic Canadian heirs, men are, as they were for Aristotle, social beings, not individual accumulators. In his great statement of the conservative creed, Burke stressed that the goals of society could not be achieved in one generation. Change, to be fruitful, must be

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John Conway is Retired Professor of Canadian Studies at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

brought about slowly, so that the desires of one generation will not obliterate its obligations to secure the good for its successors.

In Canada the "partnership between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born,"[2] has been expressed in many current political issues. None is more symbolic than the battle to control acid rain, which pits Canada's leaders of all parties against Washington's laissez-faire liberals, who call themselves conservatives but have no desire to conserve. This is the most profound difference between Canadian and American political values and political philosophies. Americans cherish individualism and individuality above community. Canadians have exactly the reverse set of political priorities.

To understand this fundamental and vital difference between the two countries, so alike in so many ways, it is necessary to look at their markedly different histories. Cardinal Manning said that in the end all problems are theological, and it is true that at the root of American political and social values there is the distinctive Puritanism of the early New England settlers. These men and women believed in and expressed what Burke described as "the dissidence of dissent and the protestantism of the Protestant religion."[3] Based as it was on the concept of the individual alone with God, unaided by a priestly or an episcopal intermediary, New England Puritanism fostered an intense individualism, which lost none of its force as Puritanism became secularized during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thoreau, in Concord in the 1840s confronting slavery and the Mexican War, declared that "the only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right."[4] This statement of fundamental belief was to reverberate through American history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was expressed in the westward movement, in the inability to compromise that led to the Civil War, in the belief that the North American continent existed for Americans to appropriate. Moreover, it was expressed in the rugged individualism in American political and business life forged by the meeting of New England Puritanism with social Darwinism.

There is no counterpart to Thoreau in Canadian history, because no settlers, French or British, brought the dissidence of dissent and the protestantism of the Protestant religion to Canada's shores. Canadians cherish community, and however pragmatically, will fight vigorously to ensure that its basis is not undermined. They do so because geography gave Canadians a grimmer view of nature than Thoreau could understand, viewing the world as he did from the Edenic innocence of his tranquil Concord. Thoreau's musings on man and his place in society were written in the full flood of enthusiasm for the westward movement, before industrialism, the anarchic violence of the West, and the hazards of modern warfare could pose serious questions about unchallenged individualism. The Canadian frontier experience, when it came, was less hopeful, the extension of the frontier more difficult, less economically rewarding, than the American. Thus, Thoreau's assertion of total freedom is simply incomprehensible to the average Canadian, whether his forebears be French, British, or of the newly arrived ethnic communities of this diverse country.

Moreover, the spiritual and intellectual climate of Canada was radically different from the American. The doctrine of imperfection, of Original Sin, taught and believed by Anglican, Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, and Methodist alike, was inhospitable to the American liberal belief in unending progress. In the approach to government they developed, therefore, Canadians saw law not as an impediment to liberty, as did Thoreau, but as a necessary means of securing human rights. They understood, with Burke, that "the restraints on men's liberties are to be counted among their rights."[5] In a characteristic expression of these attitudes, the Canadian Parliament recently adopted legislation banning all forms of tobacco advertising in Canada and requiring that every cigarette pack contain a more explicit statement than in the United States of the health hazards attributable to smoking.

The Canadian historian William L. Morton has argued persuasively that the Canadian ideological inheritance derives from Bossuet, Burke, and Bentham, from Counter-Reformation Catholicism, eighteenth-century English Tory-Conservatism, and nineteenth-century English utilitarianism. He could have added Scots egalitarianism and pragmatism, both influential in shaping Canadian social attitudes and in building Canadian political, educational, and financial institutions.[6]

American independence and the emergence of the American nation occurred in the eighteenth century and bear the hallmarks of that era. Canadian semi-independence and emergence as the Dominion of Canada occurred in the middle of the nineteenth century and bear the hallmarks of that age. Thus, there is no statutory separation of church and state in Canada. The reason for this situation is twofold. In the British North America Act of 1867 sovereignty was vested in the Crown, in the person of the monarch, Queen Victoria. The monarch was also head of the Church of England. Statutory separation of church and state was therefore legally impossible. It was also, in the Canadian setting, considered undesirable and unnecessary, since Canada at the time of Confederation was almost wholly a professing Christian country. Furthermore, the anticlericalism and deism characteristic of eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought had waned by 1867 and had, in any event, never found more than the weakest expression in the Canadian provinces.

For financial, economic, and military reasons, it seemed by the 1850s that the British North American provinces should become united. These provinces were Canada West (Ontario), Canada East (Quebec), and the Maritime Provinces (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island). Delegates from these provinces met at Quebec City in 1865 to discuss proposals for union. After lengthy discussion, the assembled delegates drew up the Quebec Resolutions and adjourned to their respective capitals to debate the acceptability of these proposals. The result of these deliberations was the adoption at Westminster on July 1, 1867 of the British North America Act, which established in the united provinces a parliamentary, constitutional monarchy.

This statute adopted for Canada the British Constitution as it then existed, and added only modifications that made it suitable to the economic and environmental circumstances of the Canadian provinces. Similar and subsidiary legislatures were established in each province, where, in contrast to the United States, residual powers were reserved for the central government. The problems and dangers of "states' rights" were much at the forefront in the Confederation debates. Despite the arguments of some commentators (notably the late Louis Hartz in his *Founding of New Societies,* published in 1964), there can be no questioning of the fact that the union established by the British North America Act embodied the ideals of a Tory-Conservative government, and of Tory leaders such as Peel and Disraeli, and was explicitly understood to do so. This was not surprising. Toryism was one of the accepted norms in British political thought and action as the British Empire rose to its zenith. Patriotism, directed in the United States to the new republic and its accumulating achievements, was, in the British world, directed to the Empire. Toryism seemed as right to the founding fathers of the Canadian federation as it had seemed wrong to the founding fathers of the American union. The Crown, for Canadian colonials, was the guardian of freedom rather than its usurper.

To the men who discussed union at Quebec in 1865, the philosophy of the Declaration of Independence made no sense. Canadian pragmatism and empiricism, the reluctance to discuss political philosophy and its relationship to Canadian political institutions, amounting at times to a genuine fear of abstraction, may have begun as a recoil from what abstract political philosophy had seemed to do to the American republic. When the Canadian political leaders met at Quebec in 1865, the ashes of the American Civil War still smouldered, the hatreds and passions that had precipitated that war had intensified rather than eased, and the great republic was still deeply divided. It required no anti-Americanism in these Canadians for them to see the American experiment not as an example to be followed but as an example to be shunned. The tone and flavor of the discussions at Quebec and the subsequent provincial debates were influenced by one other important factor. Canada had been invaded by American troops in the War of 1812. While the invasion had been repulsed, and in reality represented no major effort to capture Canada, the fact that it had occurred was a memory present in the minds of Canadians. The sorry state of the American union and the collective memory that Americans wanted to overrun Canada were solidly fixed in the Canadian consciousness. The instrument of government, devised to bring about the Canadian union (and, it was hoped, to foster prosperity) took account of these realities and articulated a completely different set of political values from those the American founding fathers had enunciated.

Liberalism, when it came to Canada, was not the liberalism of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment but that of William Ewart Gladstone, whose passion for liberty was equaled only by his passion for the teachings of the Church of England, as by law established. In 1865, the goal of the man who was to become the first prime minister of the Dominion of Canada was "a great British monarchy, in connection with the British Empire, and under the British Queen."[7]

The Tory creed of mid-nineteenth-century England, however, enunciated by the Canadian fathers of Confederation and made the philosophical foundation of their new political structure, was not only, or even mainly, a bulwark against what they conceived to be the excesses of American democracy and American populism. Canada's founding fathers believed with their British contemporaries that liberty and equality were incompatible. In their view, the foundation of a sound and just polity was the right relationship between freedom and authority. Some American political scientists and commentators have seemed to believe that American liberalism is the "one far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves."[8] For Canadians, it is not. It is one of a series of economic and sociopolitical credos, each of which is suitable for its own set of historical and geographic circumstances. Mid-Victorian Toryism was the credo that suited Canada in the nineteenth century and that, with the operation of natural forces of change, seems to suit the country now.

It is worth pausing here to examine and reflect on some of the sentiments and convictions of the men who took on the task of building a new political structure in a hardy North American climate, a structure deliberately designed to be very different from the one the thirteen colonies had created almost a century earlier. John A. Macdonald, later the first prime minister of the Dominion, used words that were close to a direct quotation from Burke's famous letter to the electors of Bristol, to define the relationship of the member of Parliament to his constituents:

> We in this House are representatives of the people and are not mere delegates . . . . if we do represent them we have a right to see for them, to think for them, to act for them.[9]

Comparing the Canadian national character with the American, John Rose, a member of the legislature of the Province of Canada, said, "The genius and instincts of our people are monarchical and conservative, theirs leveling and democratic."[10] D'Arcy McGee, also a member of the Province of Canada legislature, visualized the fathers of Confederation approaching Queen Victoria and addressing her in the florid oratory of the day: "We come to Your Majesty, who have given us liberty, to give us unity, that we may preserve and perpetuate our freedom."[11]

To an American, the notion that monarchy could be viewed as the guarantor of liberty and freedom is preposterous, but to a Canadian who has for many years had the advantage of living under both systems of government, this Canadian point of view is clear and persuasive. In the United States, popular sovereignty assumes many of the characteristics of Rousseau's general will. The sovereign people are always right. This means that Americans should, and generally do, conform to "the American way of life."

By contrast, the Canadian nation, formed as it was by formal acts of allegiance on the part of a number of provinces accepting the sovereignty of the British monarch, has allowed for more genuine diversity, for greater freedom for the individual to be himself and for the group to express its own cranky values. As W. L. Morton wrote:

> The society of allegiance admits of a diversity the society of compact does not, and one of the blessings of Canadian life is that there is no Canadian way of life, much less two, but a unity under the Crown, admitting of a thousand diversities.[12]

This tolerance for diversity, probably the most important difference between Canada and the United States, must be understood because of its many ramifications in Canadian culture and political behavior. J. M. S. Careless, a professor of history at the University of Toronto, writing in terms that deserve repeating, summarized this difference:

> Neither French nor English Canada knew eighteenth-century rationalist democracy, as did the United States with its generalized precepts on the equality, rights and powers of men as men. In the Canadian scheme of values there was no all-embracing sovereign people but rather, particular societies of people under a sovereign Crown. They were exclusive rather than inclusive in viewpoint. Their guide was adapted organic tradition more than the innovative power of the popular will. And they stressed the nearer corporate loyalties of religious and ethnic distinctions—Scots, English and Irish as well as French—instead of a broad adherence to a democratic state.[13]

The liberty not to conform is a freedom not easy to achieve under a doctrine of mass sovereignty. It is a freedom that has many dimensions for Canadians. For them, excellence is to be found in diversity rather than uniformity, and this value has been, until recently, so self-evident that legal guarantees for minority rights are much less apparent in Canadian law than in the United States. Many aspects of Canadian society combine to produce this respect for—indeed, positive disposition toward—diversity. In political life, the absence of centralized power requires the representation of every region, not just the dominant voting blocs, in cabinets, national commissions, symbolic gatherings, and lists of honors. Geographic regionalism is reinforced by the necessary regional organization of the media, both print and electronic.

Moreover, the enduring sense that the nation is made up of two founding national groups and several reluctant regions means that the society must operate in a nonmajoritarian way. During the Boer War, for instance, one could be equally conscious of being Canadian by supporting the British cause, as did most Anglo-Canadians, or by opposing it, as did many French Canadians. There could never be a national investigation into un-Canadian activities in Canada, because the very existence of the national state rests upon the agreement that there shall be many different versions of what it is to be Canadian and that no one version must ever be advocated to the exclusion of others.

Because Canada is a society of allegiance, and not of ideology, what it is to be Canadian is always in the process of being defined and discovered. The country has never had a definitive ideological statement to settle the matter once and for all. Moreover, in every Canadian consciousness, there is an awareness that pushing definitions too far will fragment the allegiances that all wish to preserve. This reality undergirds all political life, and its cultural consequences reinforce diversity. A loosely affiliated regional society cannot foster cultural uniformity. Toronto's more than 40 independent theater companies and the province of Quebec's more than 200 groups that employ professional actors are indications of the extent to which cultural diversity flourishes.[14] Since there is no star system, there is nothing negative about playing to a local audience.

Canada has also lacked the sense of mission, of divinely inspired singularity, which has been part of the American consciousness since the time of John Winthrop. This sense of mission has come close to making America, in the eyes of Americans, something akin to a religion as well as a nation. Emerson, in many ways the prophetic voice of nineteenth-century American nationalism, spoke the truth when he said that to become an American was a religious act as well as a political decision. So it certainly seems to observers across the border in Canada today. The name *America* is itself a metaphysical concept as well as a geographic expression, and by naming their part of the American experience in religious terms, "a city set upon a hill" for John Winthrop and "God's crucible" for Israel Zangwill, generations of Americans have recognized this fact.

Canadians are nonetheless astonished when metaphysics begin to color practical American politics, or when patriotism verges on worship, as in the rites attending the rededication of the Statue of Liberty in 1986. This is not to say that Canadians are generally anti-American. They are not. John A. Macdonald said of the American Constitution that it was "one of the most perfect organizations that ever governed a free people."[15] Most educated Canadians, would, I think, agree. Their attitude toward the United States is governed less by dislike than by dubiety, particularly when American ideological passion seems to overtake common sense. Americans take on faith the soundness of the ideological assumptions expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.

Canadians are believers also, but their faith is in pragmatism itself. Thus, the full spectrum of modern political ideologies is represented in Canadian politics. The New Democratic party (Canada's socialist party) has held power provincially in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, and there now seems little doubt that it will in due course become the government in power in Ottawa. The prospect, and the reality, of a socialist party holding power has not unduly alarmed Canadians of other party allegiances, for however strongly they oppose socialist policies, they know that eventually there will be a change of government, an orderly change, according to the Constitution.

This acceptance of socialist reality springs from the general Canadian tolerance for diversity and from Canada's unique history. Large numbers of British immigrants, usually Labour supporters at home, have carried their values to British North America and have retained their allegiance to Labour rather than convert to a uniform Canadian economic ideology. Moreover, the Canadian frontier experience was one in which state investment was required to permit the exploitation of new land by settlers on the prairies and in the Pacific Northwest. As a result, the Canadian and American attitudes toward the state as an economic agent are wholly different. When these different attitudes undergird discussions about continental matters, both sets of unexamined and unarticulated values can circumscribe the possibility of political discussion.

We may see these differences clearly expressed in the actual outcomes of political discussions about the relationship between state and religion on different sides of the border. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states clearly that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion." In the setting of the times, this provision was totally comprehensible. To the liberal mind in the late eighteenth century, religious establishments were anathema. In time, the interpretation of the First Amendment came to require the maintenance of an unbreachable wall between church and state. The First Amendment itself was maintained as an article of faith rather than as a practical provision for preventing the establishment in the thirteen colonies of those corrupt and tyrannical institutions that were the scandal of the Enlightenment. The dogma of the unbreachable wall has required that, despite the excellent outcomes of church-sponsored educational institutions within inner cities, no state subsidies may assist in what is surely an educational mission of great importance.

In Canada, the question of state aid to religious education has been settled with admirable pragmatism and tolerance for different points of view. Under the British North America Act, education is an area reserved for the provinces, and legislation governing state aid to religious education has varied from province to province. Some provincial governments support complete parochial school systems. Some support none. Some, such as Newfoundland, support several school systems. The province of Quebec supports a Protestant as well as a Catholic school system. Ontario has two systems, a secular and a Catholic one, and Ontarians may check off on their tax returns whether they want their taxes to support Catholic schools or not. The Canadian system of local choice and diversity has worked well with a minimum of dissension.

To the American questioner concerned about whether such public support for religious education has undermined allegiance to the state, the answer must be that there is not the slightest evidence that this is the case in Canada. Canadians would argue that this tolerance for diversity gives a necessary freedom to Canadian citizens, the freedom to have their children educated according to the religious beliefs of the family without having to pay a heavy financial penalty.

Canadian pragmatism and common sense seem to have made it possible for citizens to agree that religious training is not limited to one or two hours a week and that the communication of values goes on throughout the school day. Canadian common sense and pragmatism have here provided for diversity and several practical solutions to a knotty problem of the modern state rather than the imposition of ideological conformity.

We know that not all American parents wish their children to be educated in totally secularized classrooms. As a consequence of these sentiments, a system of church-related private preparatory schools, usually boarding schools, grew up in the eastern seabord states and was gradually extended across the country. Since the fees for these schools are high, they are attended primarily by the children of upper-income families. This development undermines the democratizing aspirations of the nineteenth-century public school system and fails to meet the educational aspirations of those seeking religious training who are not affluent.

How, then, should we compare and contrast the political and social systems of Canada and the United States? We gain more insight into the differences if we examine not only the differing sets of constitutional arrangements but also the beliefs and values that shape how they operate. Perhaps the most instructive instances of the differences between the two societies may be found in the attitudes that govern discussion of war and peace. The state of nature for Americans is John Locke's state of nature. It is believed to be a state of nature where "peace, good will, mutual assistance, and preservation" prevail. The Declaration of Independence reinforces Locke's description of the natural order of things. Every American is guaranteed the right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." For Americans, war shatters this vision and seems to replace it with the state of nature as seen by Thomas Hobbes:

> Where exist no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.[16]

For Americans, war is not in the natural order of things, as it is for Canadians, and indeed for many other peoples of the globe. Peacemaking for Americans thus becomes a one-time, permanent solution to problems of world order rather than an art, as it is for Canadian diplomats, and by extension for Canadian electors. The military profession does not rank high in the American social scale. Few boys from the private preparatory schools of the East Coast have gone to West Point. We can recognize Hobbes's state of nature in the language of a General Spaatz talking of bombing the Vietnamese "back to the Stone Age."

These contrasting views of war and peace have little to do with either soldierly courage or military skills. They have to do, however, with the frame of mind in which wars are fought. The film *Platoon* and the tactics of Lieutenant William Calley take place in a Hobbesian state of nature. The Canadian attitude toward and handling of the fact of war is different from the American. The continuing ties with Great Britain and the Crown, the absence of a formal break with Europe, explain in part why this is so. A sense of the permanent imperfection of man, of Original Sin, has overshadowed the imagination of both the British and the French Canadians. They are prepared psychologically for the breakdown of social order experienced in warfare and do not describe the experience of warfare as the ultimate horror we find in American literature and films dealing with twentieth-century warfare. The Canadians have never inhabited Thoreau's Concord and would not read his response to the Mexican war in the way a citizen of the United States would.

It is characteristic of Canada that the organization of the Canadian army in the First and Second World Wars drew upon voluntary military service and emphasized the country's ethnic and cultural diversity, in contrast to the homogenized conscription forces of the United States. Any parade of the Canadian armed forces during 1939–1945 demonstrated that although we speak, mistakenly, about English Canada and French Canada, the most important founding group in the country after the French is not the English but the Scots. They came to Canada first as the agents of the Hudson's Bay Company, chartered in 1670. Over the next two centuries they spread across the continent with the trading posts of this company. They were the suppliers of Wolfe's army in the conquest of New France in 1759. Subsequent generations emigrated in increasing numbers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Since Canada's political culture did not impose "Canadianization," the Scots, like later immigrant groups, cherished their culture, and in some cases, retained their language. The Cape Breton Highlanders of Nova Scotia kept their Gaelic tongue as well as their annual Highland Games.

The Scots early established their militia clan regiments, regiments called up immediately in wartime. Across Canada the Cape Breton Highlanders, the Black Watch of Montreal, the Toronto Scottish and Forty-eighth Highlanders, the Calgary Highlanders, the Seaforth Highlanders of Vancouver drew on local loyalties and nourished a proud military tradition. Beside them were Irish and French Canadian regiments, notably the Royal Twenty-second Regiment, known as "the Van Doos," with a distinguished World War I record. Each regiment had its distinctive uniform, the Highland regiments wearing their clans' tartan kilt or trews and marching to their pipe bands. The Canadian foot soldier was recruited, not into the anonymity of a number and a general-issue uniform, but into a singularity of which he was proud and with whose history he identified.

These traditions meant that the Canadian armed services were voluntary in World War I until 1917, and in World War II until 1944. In that war, a nation of 12 million had 1 million men and women in active military service, most of them volunteers.[17] When Britain declared war on Germany in 1939, Canada's militia units were immediately called up, including the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, for which I was a volunteer. My experience of joining the Seaforths was, I believe, typical for Canadians of my generation. Psychologically, volunteering was a dimension of freedom, an honorable form of service, whereas the conscript serves, at least initially, as a passive object in the hands of a remote authority. Nothing could have been less remote than the authority I knew when I entered the familiar Seaforth Armory in Vancouver. In the law firm I had joined after being called to the bar, one of the juniors had attended Canada's Royal Military College (a popular alternative to university for the sons of English Canadians) and had served for several years in the Seaforth Highlanders. His father had been killed as a serving officer in the Seaforths in the 1914–1918 war. By November 1939, Cecil had already been called up and had left with the regiment for England, where he was later to be awarded the Victoria Cross for his leadership in the Dieppe raid. The senior partner in the firm with whom I worked most closely had served in the regiment in the 1914–1918 war and had been seriously wounded. The commanding officer of the regiment lived around the corner from my family's house, and

I had studied law with his son, who had attended the Royal Military College, and was already a Seaforth officer. I took it for granted that I would serve with the Seaforths. I was commissioned in June 1940, and I left for England in September. The group of officers I was joining were friends who had known one another in peacetime and had chosen the regiment as volunteers. New officers were quickly absorbed into this tightly knit community, and replacements were often drawn from our own ranks, ranks which included most of Canada's ethnic groups. In the Seaforths, for instance, there were some West Coast Indians, themselves bearers of a warrior tradition. Thus, no matter how distant from home our military service might carry us, we remained members of our community, our service an extension of civic duty rather than a shocking departure from civilized life.

The political and social systems of Canada and the United States are both expressions of a European intellectual heritage, a heritage in both cases received from France and Great Britain. The France of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, of Voltaire and the *philosophes,* inspired much of the thought expressed in the creation of the American republic. The basic religious-political theory, however, was brought from seventeenth-century England by the New England Puritans. Though the Puritan revolt foundered in old England, it was victorious in New England, and its strong and ineradicable imprint is found today in almost all walks of American life.

The Canadian inheritance is also drawn from France and England but in both cases from a period of triumphant European imperialism. New France was born, not in the decline of the great French empire, but at its heroic apogee. And its imprint is just as ineradicable on all aspects of Canadian life. British Canada was born at the height of the British Empire in 1867, and the forms of its political and cultural life express the values and embody the institutions of that era. Neither founding people saw fit to break the ties of its European inheritance by an act of revolution, and much in Canadian culture reveals the significance of that unbroken tradition.

If the inheritance of Puritan and Enlightenment ideas and values have made the United States philosophically a liberal society, Counter-Reformation Catholicism and British imperialism have given Canada's varied regions the values and beliefs that have enabled them to create a nonmajoritarian modern society embodying the values of true European conservatism. These are values that ensure respect for diversity within a society of allegiance, values that sustain community despite the forces of modern society and the experience of migration that work against rootedness and the sense of place. As every historian of Europe knows, the sense of collective values undergirding conservative beliefs ensures that such societies are more open to socialist criticism than are societies of liberal orthodoxy. So it is with Canada and its flourishing socialist tradition. Only when the differences between these societies that occupy the major part of the North American continent are understood can the many problems we share be creatively addressed and resolved.

ENDNOTES

[1] Notably a comprehensive scheme of health insurance passed in conjunction with the Liberal party administration (Ottawa, 1963).

[2] Ross J. Hoffman and Paul Levack, eds., *Burke's Politics: Selected Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke on Reform, Revolution, and War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), 318.

[3] Ibid., 71.

[4] *The Variorum Civil Disobedience, by Henry David Thoreau,* annotated with an introduction by Walter Harding (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1967), 33.

[5] Hoffman and Levack, 304.

[6] William L. Morton, *The Canadian Identity* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), 86.

[7] Donald Creighton, *John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician* (Agincourt: Canadian Publishing Corp., Macmillan of Canada, 1952), 369.

[8] From Alfred Lord Tennyson's poem "In Memoriam."

[9] Province of Canada, *Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of Confederation of the British North American Provinces* (Quebec: The Queen's Printer, 1865), 1004–7.

[10] *Parliamentary Debates,* 396.

[11] *Parliamentary Debates,* 146. Readers interested in pursuing this subject will find it treated in detail in William J. Fleury, "Conservatism and the Quebec Resolutions: A Study of the Principles Behind Confederation," master's thesis, University of Toronto, 1981.

[12] Morton, 111.

[13] J. M. S. Careless, "Limited Identities in Canada," *Canadian Historical Review* 50 (1969):254.

[14] Andrew H. Malcolm, *The Canadians* (New York: Times Books, 1985), 143.

[15] *Parliamentary Debates,* 32.

[16] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London: J. M. Dent, 1950), 103.

[17] Morton, 77.

DÆDALUS

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

Volume 117 of the *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 1988

Contents

Index of Authors

Contents

Artificial Intelligence

Number 1, Winter 1988

v Preface

Seymour Papert
1 One AI or Many?

Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus
15 Making a Mind Versus Modeling the Brain: Artificial Intelligence Back at a Branchpoint

Robert Sokolowski
45 Natural and Artificial Intelligence

Pamela McCorduck
65 Artificial Intelligence: An Aperçu

Jack D. Cowan and David H. Sharp
85 Neural Nets and Artificial Intelligence

Jacob T. Schwartz
123 The New Connectionism: Developing Relationships Between Neuroscience and Artificial Intelligence

George N. Reeke, Jr., and Gerald M. Edelman
143 Real Brains and Artificial Intelligence

W. Daniel Hillis
175 Intelligence as an Emergent Behavior; or, The Songs of Eden

David L. Waltz
191 The Prospects for Building Truly Intelligent Machines

Anya Hurlbert and Tomaso Poggio
213 Making Machines (and Artificial Intelligence) See

Sherry Turkle
241 Artificial Intelligence and Psychoanalysis: A New Alliance

Hilary Putnam
269 Much Ado About Not Very Much

Daniel C. Dennett
283 When Philosophers Encounter Artificial Intelligence

John McCarthy
297 Mathematical Logic in Artificial Intelligence

Contents

Religion and Education

Number 2, Spring 1988

v Preface

1 Conference on Religion and Education

John B. Cobb, Jr.
147 Education and Religious Pluralism

Daniel Callahan
151 Tension Between Religion and Philosophy

George Lindbeck
153 The Search for Habitable Texts

Robert Kiely
157 Religion in (and out of) the University Curriculum

Timothy S. Healy, S.J.
161 The Contrary Model

Steven M. Tipton
163 The Church as a School for Virtue

Isadore Twersky
177 Random Thoughts

Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty
181 The Case for the History of Religions

187 Notes on Contributors

Contents

Three Decades of *Dædalus*

Number 3, Summer 1988

v Preface

Erik H. Erikson
1 Youth: Fidelity and Diversity

Alice S. Rossi
25 Equality between the Sexes: An Immodest Proposal

John Maynard Smith
73 Eugenics and Utopia

Czeslaw Milosz
93 Letter from "The Novel in Poland"

Robert N. Bellah
97 Civil Religion in America

John T. Noonan, Jr.
119 Intellectual and Demographic History

Roger W. Shattuck
143 Thoughts on the Humanities

Gerald Holton
151 The Roots of Complementarity

Frank E. Manuel
199 The Use and Abuse of Psychology in History

Octavio Paz
227 Eroticism and Gastrosophy

Northrop Frye
251 The Search for Acceptable Words

Vernon E. Jordan, Jr.
273 Blacks and Higher Education—Some Reflections

Kenneth S. Lynn
283 Adulthood in American Literature

Lewis Thomas, M.D.
299 On the Science and Technology of Medicine

Elizabeth Hardwick
317 Domestic Manners

David Baltimore
333 Limiting Science: A Biologist's Perspective

Jean Starobinski
345 The Accuser and the Accused

Stanley Hoffmann
371 Fragments Floating in the Here and Now

Judith N. Shklar
409 Learning without Knowing

John Hope Franklin
439 The Land of Room Enough

Mary Douglas
457 The Effects of Modernization on Religious Change

Per Olov Enquist
485 On the Art of Flying Backward with Dignity

Contents

In Search of Canada

Number 4, Fall 1988

ix Preface

William Kilbourn
1 The Peaceable Kingdom Still

F. Kenneth Hare
31 Canada: The Land

Robert F. Harney
51 "So Great a Heritage as Ours"
Immigration and the Survival of the Canadian Polity

David H. Flaherty
99 Who Rules Canada?

Lloyd Axworthy
129 The Federal System—An Uncertain Path

Robert G. Evans
155 "We'll Take Care of It for You"
Health Care in the Canadian Community

Geraldine A. Kenney-Wallace and J. Fraser Mustard
191 From Paradox to Paradigm:
The Evolution of Science and Technology in Canada

Eleanor Cook
215 "A Seeing and Unseeing in the Eye"
Canadian Literature and the Sense of Place

Alan F. J. Artibise
237 Canada as an Urban Nation

Gérard Pelletier
265 Quebec: Different but in Step with North America

Léon Dion
283 The Mystery of Quebec

Margaret Catley-Carlson
319 Aid: A Canadian Vocation

Monique Bégin
335 Debates and Silences—Reflections of a Politician

Donald S. Macdonald
363 Three Perspectives on Canada's Future

John Conway
381 An "Adapted Organic Tradition"

Index of Authors

Alan F. J. Artibise, 237 *(Fall)*
Lloyd Axworthy, 129 *(Fall)*

David Baltimore, 333 *(Summer)*
Monique Bégin, 335 *(Fall)*
Robert N. Bellah, 97 *(Summer)*

Daniel Callahan, 1, 151 *(Spring)*
Denise L. Carmody, 1 *(Spring)*
Margaret Catley-Carlson, 319 *(Fall)*
Stanley Cavell, 1 *(Spring)*
John B. Cobb, Jr., 1, 147 *(Spring)*
John Conway, 381 *(Fall)*
Eleanor Cook, 215 *(Fall)*
Jack D. Cowan, 85 *(Winter)*

Daniel C. Dennett, 283 *(Winter)*
Léon Dion, 283 *(Fall)*
Mary Douglas, 457 *(Summer)*
Hubert L. Dreyfus, 15 *(Winter)*
Stuart E. Dreyfus, 15 *(Winter)*

Gerald M. Edelman, 143 *(Winter)*
Per Olov Enquist, 485 *(Summer)*
Erik H. Erikson, 1 *(Summer)*
Robert G. Evans, 155 *(Fall)*

Michael Fishbane, 1 *(Spring)*
David H. Flaherty, 99 *(Fall)*
John Hope Franklin, 439 *(Summer)*
Northrop Frye, 251 *(Summer)*

James M. Gustafson, 1 *(Spring)*

Elizabeth Hardwick, 317 *(Summer)*
F. Kenneth Hare, 31 *(Fall)*
Robert F. Harney, 51 *(Fall)*
Timothy S. Healy, S.J., 1, 161 *(Spring)*
W. Daniel Hillis, 175 *(Winter)*
Stanley Hoffmann, 371 *(Summer)*
Gerald Holton, 151 *(Summer)*
Anya Hurlbert, 213 *(Winter)*

Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., 273 *(Summer)*

Geraldine A. Kenney-Wallace, 191 *(Fall)*
Robert Kiely, 1, 157 *(Spring)*
William Kilbourn, 1 *(Fall)*

George Lindbeck, 1, 153 *(Spring)*
Kenneth S. Lynn, 283 *(Summer)*
Robert W. Lynn, 1 *(Spring)*

Donald S. Macdonald, 363 *(Fall)*
Frank E. Manuel, 1 *(Spring)*, 199 *(Summer)*
John Maynard Smith, 73 *(Summer)*
John McCarthy, 297 *(Winter)*
Pamela McCorduck, 65 *(Winter)*
Czeslaw Milosz, 93 *(Summer)*
J. Fraser Mustard, 191 *(Fall)*

John T. Noonan, Jr., 119 *(Summer)*

Wendy D. O'Flaherty, 1, 181 *(Spring)*

John W. Padberg, S.J., 1 *(Spring)*
Seymour Papert, 1 *(Winter)*
Octavio Paz, 227 *(Summer)*
Gérard Pelletier, 265 *(Fall)*
Tomaso Poggio, 213 *(Winter)*
Hilary Putnam, 269 *(Winter)*

George N. Reeke, Jr., 143 *(Winter)*
Alice S. Rossi, 25 *(Summer)*

Jacob T. Schwartz, 123 *(Winter)*
David H. Sharp, 85 *(Winter)*
Judith N. Shklar, 409 *(Summer)*
Roger W. Shattuck, 143 *(Summer)*
Theodore R. Sizer, 1 *(Spring)*
Robert Sokolowski, 45 *(Winter)*
Jean Starobinski, 345 *(Summer)*

Lewis Thomas, M.D., 299 *(Summer)*
Steven M. Tipton, 1, 163 *(Spring)*
Sherry Turkle, 241 *(Winter)*
Isadore Twersky, 177 *(Spring)*

David L. Waltz, 191 *(Winter)*

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
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